40 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
40 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: "intro"
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page_title: "Vault vs. HSMs"
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sidebar_current: "vs-other-hsm"
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description: |-
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Comparison between Vault and HSM systems.
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---
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# Vault vs. HSMs
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A [hardware security module (HSM)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module)
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is a hardware device that is meant to secure various secrets. They generally
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have very strong security models and adhere to many compliance regulations.
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The primary issue with HSMs is that they are expensive and not very
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cloud friendly. Amazon provides CloudHSM, but the minimum price point to
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even begin using CloudHSM is in the thousands of US dollars.
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Once an HSM is up and running, configuring it is generally very tedious,
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and the "API" to request secrets is also difficult to use. Example: CloudHSM
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requires SSH and setting up various keypairs manually. It is difficult to
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automate.
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Vault **doesn't replace an HSM**. There are many benefits to an HSM if
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you can afford it. Instead, an HSM is a fantastic potential secret backend
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for Vault. This would allow Vault to access the HSM data via the Vault API,
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making it significantly easier to use an HSM, while also retaining all the
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audit logs. In fact, you'd have multiple audit logs: requests to Vault
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as well as to the HSM.
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Vault can also do many things that HSMs cannot currently do, such
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as generating _dynamic secrets_. Instead of storing AWS access keys directly
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within Vault, Vault can generate access keys according to a specific
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policy on the fly. Vault has the potential of doing this for any
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system through its mountable secret backend system.
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For most companies, an HSM is overkill, and Vault is enough. For companies
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that can afford an HSM, it can be used with Vault to get the best of both
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worlds.
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