website: address minor doc typos
This commit is contained in:
parent
2409fe0836
commit
3d5f3d1d70
|
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Name: `syslog`
|
|||
|
||||
The "syslog" audit backend writes audit logs to syslog.
|
||||
|
||||
It currently does not support a configurable syslog desination, and
|
||||
It currently does not support a configurable syslog destination, and
|
||||
always sends to the local agent. This backend is only supported on Unix systems,
|
||||
and should not be enabled if any standby Vault instances do not support it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ of the cookie should be "token" and the value should be the token.
|
|||
<dd>
|
||||
Revokes a token but not its child tokens. When the token is revoked,
|
||||
all secrets generated with it are also revoked. All child tokens
|
||||
are orpahaned, but can be revoked sub-sequently using `/auth/token/revoke/`.
|
||||
are orphaned, but can be revoked sub-sequently using `/auth/token/revoke/`.
|
||||
</dd>
|
||||
|
||||
<dt>Method</dt>
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The endpoint for the login is `/login/USERNAME`.
|
|||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
To use the "userpass" auth backend, an operator must configure it with
|
||||
userse that are allowed to authenticate. An example is shown below.
|
||||
users that are allowed to authenticate. An example is shown below.
|
||||
Use `vault help` for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ The properties of the dev server:
|
|||
via the API, you'll need to authenticate using the token printed out.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Single unseal key** - The server is initialized with a single unseal
|
||||
key. The Vault is already unsealed, but if you want to experiement with
|
||||
key. The Vault is already unsealed, but if you want to experiment with
|
||||
seal/unseal, then only the single outputted key is required.
|
||||
|
||||
## Use Case
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: "docs"
|
||||
page_title: "High Availibility"
|
||||
page_title: "High Availability"
|
||||
sidebar_current: "docs-concepts-ha"
|
||||
description: |-
|
||||
Vault can be highly available, allowing you to run multiple Vaults to protect against outages.
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -70,6 +70,6 @@ where the secret was requested from. This lets you revoke trees of
|
|||
secrets. For example, to revoke all AWS access keys, you can do
|
||||
`vault revoke -prefix aws/`.
|
||||
|
||||
This is very useful if there is an intrustion within a specific system:
|
||||
This is very useful if there is an intrusion within a specific system:
|
||||
all secrets of a specific backend or a certain configured backend can
|
||||
be revoked quickly and easily.
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Only root or "sudo" privilege users are allowed to do this.
|
|||
|
||||
## Root Policy
|
||||
|
||||
The "root" policy is special policy that can'be modified or removed.
|
||||
The "root" policy is a special policy that can be modified or removed.
|
||||
Any user associated with the "root" policy becomes a root user. A root
|
||||
user can do _anything_ within Vault.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ with these commands for more information. They are very easy to use.
|
|||
To associate a policy with a user, you must consult the documentation for
|
||||
the authentication backend you're using.
|
||||
|
||||
For tokens, they are assocated at creation time with `vault token-create`
|
||||
For tokens, they are associated at creation time with `vault token-create`
|
||||
and the `-policy` flags. Child tokens can be associated with a subset of
|
||||
a parent's policies. Root users can assign any policies.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -67,6 +67,6 @@ There is also an API to seal the Vault. This will throw away the encryption
|
|||
key and require another unseal process to restore it. Sealing only requires
|
||||
a single operator with root privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
This way, if there is a detected intrustion, the Vault data can be locked
|
||||
This way, if there is a detected intrusion, the Vault data can be locked
|
||||
quickly to try to minimize damages. It can't be accessed again without
|
||||
access to the master key shards.
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ description: |-
|
|||
<dt>Description</dt>
|
||||
<dd>
|
||||
Reads the value of the key at the given path. This is the raw path in the
|
||||
storage packend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
storage backend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
</dd>
|
||||
|
||||
<dt>Method</dt>
|
||||
|
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ description: |-
|
|||
<dt>Description</dt>
|
||||
<dd>
|
||||
Update the value of the key at the given path. This is the raw path in the
|
||||
storage packend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
storage backend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
</dd>
|
||||
|
||||
<dt>Method</dt>
|
||||
|
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ description: |-
|
|||
<dt>Description</dt>
|
||||
<dd>
|
||||
Delete the key with given path. This is the raw path in the
|
||||
storage packend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
storage backend and not the logical path that is exposed via the mount system.
|
||||
</dd>
|
||||
|
||||
<dt>Method</dt>
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ description: |-
|
|||
Installing Vault is simple. There are two approaches to installing Vault:
|
||||
downloading a precompiled binary for your system, or installing from source.
|
||||
|
||||
Downloading a precombiled binary is easiest, and we provide downloads over
|
||||
Downloading a precompiled binary is easiest, and we provide downloads over
|
||||
TLS along with SHA256 sums to verify the binary is what we say it is.
|
||||
However, we use a 3rd party storage host, and some people feel that
|
||||
due to the importance of security with Vault, they'd rather compile it
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ clarify what is being discussed:
|
|||
|
||||
* **Credential Backend** - A credential backend is used to authenticate users or applications which
|
||||
are connecting to Vault. Once authenticated, the backend returns the list of applicable policies
|
||||
which shoud be applied. Vault takes an authenticated user and returns a client token that can
|
||||
which should be applied. Vault takes an authenticated user and returns a client token that can
|
||||
be used for future requests. As an example, the `user-password` backend uses a username and password
|
||||
to authenticate the user. Alternatively, the `github` backend allows users to authenticate
|
||||
via GitHub.
|
||||
|
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ A very high level overview of Vault looks like this:
|
|||
|
||||
![Architecture Overview](/assets/images/layers.png)
|
||||
|
||||
Lets begin to break down this picture. There is a clear seperation of components
|
||||
Lets begin to break down this picture. There is a clear separation of components
|
||||
that are inside or outside of the security barrier. Only the storage backend and
|
||||
the HTTP API are outside, all other components are inside the barrier.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ and enters the _unsealed_ state. Once unsealed, Vault loads all of the configure
|
|||
audit, credential and secret backends.
|
||||
|
||||
The configuration of those backends must be stored in Vault since they are security
|
||||
sensitive. Only users with the correct permisisons should be able to modify them,
|
||||
sensitive. Only users with the correct permissions should be able to modify them,
|
||||
meaning they cannot be specified outside of the barrier. By storing them in Vault,
|
||||
any changes to them are protected by the ACL system and tracked by audit logs.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ lease to expire, the expiration manager automatically revokes the secret.
|
|||
The core handles logging of requests and responses to the audit broker, which fans the
|
||||
request out to all the configured audit backends. Outside of the request flow, the core
|
||||
performs certain background activity. Lease management is critical, as it allows
|
||||
expired client tokens or secrets to be revoked automatically. Addiitonally, Vault handles
|
||||
expired client tokens or secrets to be revoked automatically. Additionally, Vault handles
|
||||
certain partial failure cases by using write ahead logging with a rollback manager.
|
||||
This is managed transparently within the core and is not user visible.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The following are not parts of the Vault threat model:
|
|||
reads would allow an attacker to snapshot in a well-known state and rollback state
|
||||
changes if that would be beneficial to them.
|
||||
|
||||
* Protecting against the leakage of the existance of secret material. An attacker
|
||||
* Protecting against the leakage of the existence of secret material. An attacker
|
||||
that can read from the storage backend may observe that secret material exists
|
||||
and is stored, even if it is kept confidential.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ policies are associated with a client), the highest access level permitted is us
|
|||
For example, if the "engineering" policy permits read/write access to the "eng/" path,
|
||||
and the "ops" policy permits read access to the "ops/" path, then the user gets the
|
||||
union of those. Policy is matched using a longest-prefix match, which is the most
|
||||
specific definied policy.
|
||||
specific defined policy.
|
||||
|
||||
Certain operations are only permitted by "root" users, which is a distinguished
|
||||
policy built into Vault. This is similar to the concept of a root user on a Unix system
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ privileges. When a token is revoked, the entire sub-tree of tokens is revoked
|
|||
with it. This allows clients to safely generate child tokens and then revoke
|
||||
them all along with the root.
|
||||
|
||||
Child tokens are very useful, espcially when combined with limited use tokens.
|
||||
Child tokens are very useful, especially when combined with limited use tokens.
|
||||
When a token is created their use count can be optionally specified. Providing
|
||||
a use count of one makes a _one time token_. This means the token can be used
|
||||
for a single request before being automatically revoked. This can be generalized
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Success! Data written to: consul/roles/readonly
|
|||
|
||||
The backend expects the policy to be base64 encoded, so we need to encode
|
||||
it properly before writing. The policy language is
|
||||
[documented by Consul](https://consul.io/docs/internals/acl.html), but we've definited a read-only policy.
|
||||
[documented by Consul](https://consul.io/docs/internals/acl.html), but we've defined a read-only policy.
|
||||
|
||||
To generate a new set Consul ACL token, we simply read from that role:
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ to the configured physical backend for Vault. A "read" turns into a
|
|||
"read" of the physical backend at the same path, a "write" turns into
|
||||
a write, etc. This is a lot like a normal filesystem.
|
||||
|
||||
The "aws" backend, on the otherhand, behaves differently. When you
|
||||
The "aws" backend, on the other hand, behaves differently. When you
|
||||
write to `aws/config/root`, it expects a certain format and stores that
|
||||
information as configuration. You can't read from this path. When you
|
||||
read from `aws/<name>`, it looks up an IAM policy named `<name>` and
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ $ vault write postgresql/config/connection \
|
|||
```
|
||||
|
||||
In this case, we've configured Vault with the user "root" and password "vaulttest",
|
||||
connecting to a PostgreSQL instance in AWS RDS. The "postgres" databse name is being used.
|
||||
connecting to a PostgreSQL instance in AWS RDS. The "postgres" database name is being used.
|
||||
It is important that the Vault user have the `GRANT OPTION` privilege to manage users.
|
||||
|
||||
Optionally, we can configure the lease settings for credentials generated
|
||||
|
@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ subpath for interactive help output.
|
|||
<span class="param">sql</span>
|
||||
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
|
||||
The SQL statements executed to create and configure the role.
|
||||
Must be semi-colon seperated. The '{{name}}', '{{password}}' and
|
||||
Must be semi-colon separated. The '{{name}}', '{{password}}' and
|
||||
'{{expiration}}' values will be substituted.
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
layout: "docs"
|
||||
page_title: "Secret Backend: Trasit"
|
||||
page_title: "Secret Backend: Transit"
|
||||
sidebar_current: "docs-secrets-transit"
|
||||
description: |-
|
||||
The transit secret backend for Vault encrypts/decrypts data in-transit. It doesn't store any secrets.
|
||||
|
@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ only encrypt or decrypt using the named keys they need access to.
|
|||
<dl class="api">
|
||||
<dt>Description</dt>
|
||||
<dd>
|
||||
Dencrypts the provided ciphertext using the named key.
|
||||
Decrypts the provided ciphertext using the named key.
|
||||
</dd>
|
||||
|
||||
<dt>Method</dt>
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ Vault initialized with 5 keys and a key threshold of 3!
|
|||
|
||||
Please securely distribute the above keys. Whenever a Vault server
|
||||
is started, it must be unsealed with 3 (the threshold)
|
||||
of thekeys above (any of the keys, as long as the total number equals
|
||||
of the keys above (any of the keys, as long as the total number equals
|
||||
the threshold).
|
||||
|
||||
Vault does not store the original master key. If you lose the keys
|
||||
|
@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ Unseal Progress: 1
|
|||
|
||||
After pasting in a valid key and confirming, you'll see that the Vault
|
||||
is still sealed, but progress is made. Vault knows it has 1 key out of 3.
|
||||
Due to the nature of the algorith, Vault doesn't know if it has the
|
||||
Due to the nature of the algorithm, Vault doesn't know if it has the
|
||||
_correct_ key until the threshold is reached.
|
||||
|
||||
Also notice that the unseal process is stateful. You can go to another
|
||||
|
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ that other computer can continue the unseal process.. This is incredibly
|
|||
important to the design of the unseal process: multiple people with multiple
|
||||
keys are required to unseal the Vault. The Vault can be unsealed from
|
||||
multiple computers and the keys should never be together. A single malicious
|
||||
operator does not have enough keys to be mailicious.
|
||||
operator does not have enough keys to be malicious.
|
||||
|
||||
Continue with `vault unseal` to complete unsealing the Vault. Note that
|
||||
all 3 keys must be different, but they can be any other keys. As long as
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ help for an individual path. For this, just use `vault help` with a path
|
|||
that would match the regular expression for that path. Note that the path
|
||||
doesn't need to actually _work_. For example, we'll get the help below
|
||||
for accessing `aws/creds/operator`, even though we never created the `operator`
|
||||
rolek:
|
||||
role:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ vault help aws/creds/operator
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ storage backend (after encrypting data first).
|
|||
|
||||
However, the "aws" backend (which you'll see soon), will read/write IAM
|
||||
policies and access tokens. So, while you might do a `vault read aws/deploy`,
|
||||
this isn't readnig from any _physical_ path "aws/deploy". Instead, the AWS
|
||||
this isn't reading from any _physical_ path "aws/deploy". Instead, the AWS
|
||||
backend is dynamically generating an access key based on the "deploy" policy.
|
||||
|
||||
This abstraction is incredibly powerful. It lets Vault interface directly
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ supports an ACL system to restrict access to keys and service information.
|
|||
While Consul can be used to store secret information and gate access using
|
||||
ACLs, it is not designed for that purpose. As such, data is not encrypted
|
||||
in transit nor at rest, it does not have pluggable authentication mechanisms,
|
||||
there is no per-request auditing mechansim.
|
||||
there is no per-request auditing mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
Vault is designed ground up a secret management solution. As such, it
|
||||
protects secrets in transit and at rest. It provides multiple authentication
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ cloud friendly. Amazon provides CloudHSM, but the minimum price point to
|
|||
even begin using CloudHSM is in the thousands of US dollars.
|
||||
|
||||
Once an HSM is up and running, configuring it is generally very tedious,
|
||||
and the "API" to request secrets is also difficult ot use. Example: CloudHSM
|
||||
and the "API" to request secrets is also difficult to use. Example: CloudHSM
|
||||
requires SSH and setting up various keypairs manually. It is difficult to
|
||||
automate.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ audit logs. In fact, you'd have multiple audit logs: requests to Vault
|
|||
as well as to the HSM.
|
||||
|
||||
Vault can also do many things that HSMs cannot currently do, such
|
||||
as generating _dynamic secrets_. Insetad of storing AWS access keys directly
|
||||
as generating _dynamic secrets_. Instead of storing AWS access keys directly
|
||||
within Vault, Vault can generate access keys according to a specific
|
||||
policy on the fly. Vault has the potential of doing this for any
|
||||
system through its mountable secret backend system.
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue