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---
layout: "docs"
page_title: "Auth Backend: AWS-EC2"
sidebar_current: "docs-auth-aws-ec2"
description: |-
The aws-ec2 backend allows automated authentication of AWS EC2 instances.
---
# Auth Backend: aws-ec2
The aws-ec2 auth backend provides a secure introduction mechanism for AWS EC2
instances, allowing automated retrieval of a Vault token. Unlike most Vault
authentication backends, this backend does not require first-deploying, or
provisioning security-sensitive credentials (tokens, username/password, client
certificates, etc). Instead, it treats AWS as a Trusted Third Party and uses
the cryptographically signed dynamic metadata information that uniquely
represents each EC2 instance.
## Authentication Workflow
EC2 instances have access to metadata describing the instance. (For those not
familiar with instance metadata, details can be found
[here](http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html).)
One piece of "dynamic metadata" available to the EC2 instance, is the instance
identity document, a JSON representation of a collection of instance metadata.
AWS also provides PKCS#7 signature of the instance metadata document, and
publishes the public keys (grouped by region) which can be used to verify the
signature. Details on the instance identity document and the signature can be
found
[here](http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html).
During login, the backend verifies the signature on the PKCS#7 document,
ensuring that the information contained within, is certified accurate by AWS.
Before succeeding the login attempt and returning a Vault token, the backend
verifies the current running status of the instance via the EC2 API.
There are various modifications to this workflow that provide more or less
security, as detailed later in this documentation.
## Authorization Workflow
The basic mechanism of operation is per-role. Roles are registered in the
backend and associated with various optional restrictions, such as the set
of allowed policies and max TTLs on the generated tokens. Each role can
be specified with the constraints that are to be met during the login. For
example, one such constraint that is supported is to bind against AMI ID. A
role which is bound to a specific AMI, can only be used for login by those
instances that are deployed on the same AMI.
In many cases, an organization will use a "seed AMI" that is specialized after
bootup by configuration management or similar processes. For this reason, a
role entry in the backend can also be associated with a "role tag". These tags
are generated by the backend and are placed as the value of a tag with the
given key on the EC2 instance. The role tag can be used to further restrict the
parameters set on the role, but cannot be used to grant additional privileges.
If a role with an AMI bind constraint has "role tag" enabled on the role, and
the EC2 instance performing login does not have an expected tag on it, or if the
tag on the instance is deleted for some reason, authentication fails.
The role tags can be generated at will by an operator with appropriate API
access. They are HMAC-signed by a per-role key stored within the backend, allowing
the backend to verify the authenticity of a found role tag and ensure that it has
not been tampered with. There is also a mechanism to blacklist role tags if one
has been found to be distributed outside of its intended set of machines.
## Client Nonce
If an unintended party gains access to the PKCS#7 signature of the identity
document (which by default is available to every process and user that gains
access to an EC2 instance), it can impersonate that instance and fetch a Vault
token. The backend addresses this problem by using a Trust On First Use (TOFU)
mechanism that allows the first client to present the PKCS#7 signature of the
document to be authenticated and denying the rest. An important property of
this design is detection of unauthorized access: if an unintended party authenticates,
the intended client will be unable to authenticate and can raise an alert for
investigation.
During the first login, the backend stores the instance ID that authenticated
in a `whitelist`. One method of operation of the backend is to disallow any
authentication attempt for an instance ID contained in the whitelist, using the
'disallow_reauthentication' option on the role, meaning that an instance is
allowed to login only once. However, this has consequences for token rotation,
as it means that once a token has expired, subsequent authentication attempts
would fail. By default, reauthentication is enabled in this backend, and can be
turned off using 'disallow_reauthentication' parameter on the registered role.
In the default method of operation, the backend will return a unique nonce
during the first authentication attempt, as part of auth `metadata`. Clients
should present this `nonce` for subsequent login attempts and it should match
the `nonce` cached at the identity-whitelist entry at the backend. Since only
the original client knows the `nonce`, only the original client is allowed to
reauthenticate. (This is the reason that this is a whitelist rather than a
blacklist; by default, it's keeping track of clients allowed to reauthenticate,
rather than those that are not.). Clients can choose to provide a `nonce` even
for the first login attempt, in which case the provided `nonce` will be tied to
the cached identity-whitelist entry. It is recommended to use a strong `nonce`
value in this case.
It is up to the client to behave correctly with respect to the nonce; if the
client stores the nonce on disk it can survive reboots, but could also give
access to other users or applications on the instance. It is also up to the
operator to ensure that client nonces are in fact unique; sharing nonces allows
a compromise of the nonce value to enable an attacker that gains access to any
EC2 instance to imitate the legitimate client on that instance. This is why
nonces can be disabled on the backend side in favor of only a single
authentication per instance; in some cases, such as when using ASGs, instances
are immutable and single-boot anyways, and in conjunction with a high max TTL,
reauthentication may not be needed (and if it is, the instance can simply be
shut down and allow ASG to start a new one).
In both cases, entries can be removed from the whitelist by instance ID,
allowing reauthentication by a client if the nonce is lost (or not used) and an
operator approves the process.
One other point: if available by the OS/distribution being used with the EC2
instance, it is not a bad idea to firewall access to the signed PKCS#7 metadata
to ensure that it is accessible only to the matching user(s) that require
access.
## Advanced Options and Caveats
### Dynamic Management of Policies Via Role Tags
If the instance is required to have customized set of policies based on the
role it plays, the `role_tag` option can be used to provide a tag to set on
instances, for a given role. When this option is set, during login, along with
verification of PKCS#7 signature and instance health, the backend will query
for the value of a specific tag with the configured key that is attached to the
instance. The tag holds information that represents a *subset* of privileges that
are set on the role and are used to further restrict the set of the role's
privileges for that particular instance.
A `role_tag` can be created using `auth/aws-ec2/role/<role>/tag` endpoint
and is immutable. The information present in the tag is SHA256 hashed and HMAC
protected. The per-role key to HMAC is only maintained in the backend. This prevents
an adversarial operator from modifying the tag when setting it on the EC2 instance
in order to escalate privileges.
When 'role_tag' option is enabled on a role, the instances are required to have a
role tag. If the tag is not found on the EC2 instance, authentication will fail.
This is to ensure that privileges of an instance are never escalated for not
having the tag on it or for getting the tag removed. If the role tag creation does
not specify the policy component, the client will inherit the allowed policies set
on the role. If the role tag creation specifies the policy component but it contains
no policies, the token will contain only the `default` policy; by default, this policy
allows only manipulation (revocation, renewal, lookup) of the existing token, plus
access to its [cubbyhole](/docs/secrets/cubbyhole/index.html).
This can be useful to allow instances access to a secure "scratch space" for
storing data (via the token's cubbyhole) but without granting any access to
other resources provided by or resident in Vault.
### Handling Lost Client Nonces
If an EC2 instance loses its client nonce (due to a reboot, a stop/start of the
client, etc.), subsequent login attempts will not succeed. If the client nonce
is lost, normally the only option is to delete the entry corresponding to the
instance ID from the identity `whitelist` in the backend. This can be done via
the `auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist/<instance_id>` endpoint. This allows a new
client nonce to be accepted by the backend during the next login request.
Under certain circumstances there is another useful setting. When the instance
is placed onto a host upon creation, it is given a `pendingTime` value in the
instance identity document (documentation from AWS does not cover this option,
unfortunately). If an instance is stopped and started, the `pendingTime` value
is updated (this does not apply to reboots, however).
The backend can take advantage of this via the `allow_instance_migration`
option, which is set per-role. When this option is enabled, if the client nonce
does not match the saved nonce, the `pendingTime` value in the instance
identity document will be checked; if it is newer than the stored `pendingTime`
value, the backend assumes that the client was stopped/started and allows the
client to log in successfully, storing the new nonce as the valid nonce for
that client. This essentially re-starts the TOFU mechanism any time the
instance is stopped and started, so should be used with caution. Just like with
initial authentication, the legitimate client should have a way to alert (or an
alert should trigger based on its logs) if it is denied authentication.
Unfortunately, the `allow_instance_migration` only helps during stop/start
actions; the current metadata does not provide for a way to allow this
automatic behavior during reboots. The backend will be updated if this needed
metadata becomes available.
The `allow_instance_migration` option is set per-role, and can also be
specified in a role tag. Since role tags can only restrict behavior, if the
option is set to `false` on the role, a value of `true` in the role tag takes
effect; however, if the option is set to `true` on the role, a value set in the
role tag has no effect.
### Disabling Reauthentication
If in a given organization's architecture, a client fetches a long-lived Vault
token and has no need to rotate the token, all future logins for that instance
ID can be disabled. If the option `disallow_reauthentication` is set, only one
login will be allowed per instance. If the intended client successfully
retrieves a token during login, it can be sure that its token will not be
hijacked by another entity.
When `disallow_reauthentication` option is enabled, the client can choose not
to supply a nonce during login, although it is not an error to do so (the nonce
is simply ignored). Note that reauthentication is enabled by default. If only
a single login is desired, `disallow_reauthentication` should be set explicitly
on the role or on the role tag.
The `disallow_reauthentication` option is set per-role, and can also be
specified in a role tag. Since role tags can only restrict behavior, if the
option is set to `false` on the role, a value of `true` in the role tag takes
effect; however, if the option is set to `true` on the role, a value set in the
role tag has no effect.
### Blacklisting Role Tags
Role tags are tied to a specific role, but the backend has no control over, which
instances using that role, should have any particular role tag; that is purely up
to the operator. Although role tags are only restrictive (a tag cannot escalate
privileges above what is set on its role), if a role tag is found to have been
used incorrectly, and the administrator wants to ensure that the role tag has no
further effect, the role tag can be placed on a `blacklist` via the endpoint
`auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist/<role_tag>`. Note that this will not invalidate the
tokens that were already issued; this only blocks any further login requests from
those instances that have the blacklisted tag attached to them.
### Expiration Times and Tidying of `blacklist` and `whitelist` Entries
The expired entries in both identity `whitelist` and role tag `blacklist` are
deleted automatically. The entries in both of these lists contain an expiration
time which is dynamically determined by three factors: `max_ttl` set on the role,
`max_ttl` set on the role tag, and `max_ttl` value of the backend mount. The
least of these three dictates the maximum TTL of the issued token, and
correspondingly will be set as the expiration times of these entries.
The endpoints `aws/auth/tidy/identity-whitelist` and `aws/auth/tidy/roletag-blacklist` are
provided to clean up the entries present in these lists. These endpoints allow
defining a safety buffer, such that an entry must not only be expired, but be
past expiration by the amount of time dictated by the safety buffer in order
to actually remove the entry.
Automatic deletion of expired entries is performed by the periodic function
of the backend. This function does the tidying of both blacklist role tags
and whitelist identities. Periodic tidying is activated by default and will
have a safety buffer of 72 hours, meaning only those entries are deleted which
were expired before 72 hours from when the tidy operation is being performed.
This can be configured via `config/tidy/roletag-blacklist` and `config/tidy/identity-whitelist`
endpoints.
### Varying Public Certificates
The AWS public certificate, which contains the public key used to verify the
PKCS#7 signature, varies for different AWS regions. The primary AWS public
certificate, which covers most AWS regions, is already included in Vault and
does not need to be added. Instances whose PKCS#7 signatures cannot be
verified by the default public certificate included in Vault can register a
different public certificate which can be found [here]
(http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/instance-identity-documents.html),
via the `auth/aws-ec2/config/certificate/<cert_name>` endpoint.
### Dangling Tokens
An EC2 instance, after authenticating itself with the backend gets a Vault token.
After that, if the instance terminates or goes down for any reason, the backend
will not be aware of such events. The token issued will still be valid, until
it expires. The token will likely be expired sooner than its lifetime when the
instance fails to renew the token on time.
### Cross Account Access
To allow Vault to authenticate EC2 instances running in other accounts, AWS STS
(Security Token Service) can be used to retrieve temporary credentials by
assuming an IAM Role in those accounts. All these accounts should be configured
at the backend using the `auth/aws-ec2/config/sts/<account_id>` endpoint.
The account in which Vault is running (i.e. the master account) must be listed as
a trusted entity in the IAM Role being assumed on the remote account. The Role itself
must allow the `ec2:DescribeInstances` action, and `iam:GetInstanceProfile` if IAM Role
binding is used (see below).
Furthermore, in the master account, Vault must be granted the action `sts:AssumeRole`
for the IAM Role to be assumed.
## Authentication
### Via the CLI
#### Enable AWS EC2 authentication in Vault.
```
$ vault auth-enable aws-ec2
```
#### Configure the credentials required to make AWS API calls
If not specified, Vault will attempt to use standard environment variables
(`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` and `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`) or IAM EC2 instance role
credentials if available.
The IAM account or role to which the credentials map must allow the
`ec2:DescribeInstances` action. In addition, if IAM Role binding is used (see
`bound_iam_role_arn` below), `iam:GetInstanceProfile` must also be allowed.
```
$ vault write auth/aws-ec2/config/client secret_key=vCtSM8ZUEQ3mOFVlYPBQkf2sO6F/W7a5TVzrl3Oj access_key=VKIAJBRHKH6EVTTNXDHA
```
#### Configure the policies on the role.
```
$ vault write auth/aws-ec2/role/dev-role bound_ami_id=ami-fce3c696 policies=prod,dev max_ttl=500h
```
#### Perform the login operation
```
$ vault write auth/aws-ec2/login role=dev-role \
pkcs7=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 nonce=5defbf9e-a8f9-3063-bdfc-54b7a42a1f95
```
### Via the API
#### Enable AWS EC2 authentication in Vault.
```
curl -X POST -H "x-vault-token:123" "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/auth/aws-ec2" -d '{"type":"aws-ec2"}'
```
#### Configure the credentials required to make AWS API calls.
```
curl -X POST -H "x-vault-token:123" "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/auth/aws-ec2/config/client" -d '{"access_key":"VKIAJBRHKH6EVTTNXDHA", "secret_key":"vCtSM8ZUEQ3mOFVlYPBQkf2sO6F/W7a5TVzrl3Oj"}'
```
#### Configure the policies on the role.
```
curl -X POST -H "x-vault-token:123" "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/auth/aws-ec2/role/dev-role -d '{"bound_ami_id":"ami-fce3c696","policies":"prod,dev","max_ttl":"500h"}'
```
#### Perform the login operation
```
curl -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/auth/aws-ec2/login" -d
'{"role":"dev-role","pkcs7":"'$(curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/pkcs7 | tr -d '\n')'","nonce":"5defbf9e-a8f9-3063-bdfc-54b7a42a1f95"}'
```
The response will be in JSON. For example:
```javascript
{
"auth": {
"renewable": true,
"lease_duration": 72000,
"metadata": {
"role_tag_max_ttl": "0s",
"role": "ami-f083709d",
"region": "us-east-1",
"nonce": "5defbf9e-a8f9-3063-bdfc-54b7a42a1f95",
"instance_id": "i-a832f734",
"ami_id": "ami-f083709d"
},
"policies": [
"default",
"dev",
"prod"
],
"accessor": "5cd96cd1-58b7-2904-5519-75ddf957ec06",
"client_token": "150fc858-2402-49c9-56a5-f4b57f2c8ff1"
},
"warnings": null,
"wrap_info": null,
"data": null,
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": "",
"request_id": "d7d50c06-56b8-37f4-606c-ccdc87a1ee4c"
}
```
## API
### /auth/aws-ec2/config/client
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Configures the credentials required to perform API calls to AWS. The
instance identity document fetched from the PKCS#7 signature will provide
the EC2 instance ID. The credentials configured using this endpoint will be
used to query the status of the instances via DescribeInstances API. If
static credentials are not provided using this endpoint, then the
credentials will be retrieved from the environment variables
`AWS_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_SECRET_KEY` and `AWS_REGION` respectively. If the
credentials are still not found and if the backend is configured on an EC2
instance with metadata querying capabilities, the credentials are fetched
automatically.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/client`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">access_key</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
AWS Access key with permissions to query EC2 DescribeInstances API.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">secret_key</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
AWS Secret key with permissions to query EC2 DescribeInstances API.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">endpoint</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
URL to override the default generated endpoint for making AWS EC2 API calls.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
Returns the previously configured AWS access credentials.
<dd>
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/client`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"secret_key": "vCtSM8ZUEQ3mOFVlYPBQkf2sO6F/W7a5TVzrl3Oj",
"access_key": "VKIAJBRHKH6EVTTNXDHA"
"endpoint" "",
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes the previously configured AWS access credentials.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/client`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/config/certificate/<cert_name>
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Registers an AWS public key to be used to verify the instance identity
documents. While the PKCS#7 signature of the identity documents have DSA
digest, the identity signature will have RSA digest, and hence the public
keys for each type varies respectively. Indicate the type of the public key
using the "type" parameter.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/certificate/<cert_name>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">cert_name</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Name of the certificate.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">aws_public_cert</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
AWS Public key required to verify PKCS7 signature of the EC2 instance metadata.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">type</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
Takes the value of either "pkcs7" or "identity", indicating the type of
document which can be verified using the given certificate. The PKCS#7
document will have a DSA digest and the identity signature will have an
RSA signature, and accordingly the public certificates to verify those
also vary. Defaults to "pkcs7".
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the previously configured AWS public key.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/certificate/<cert_name>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"aws_public_cert": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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\n7HX32MxXYruse9ACFBNGmdX2ZBrVNGrN9N2f6ROk0k9K\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### LIST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Lists all the AWS public certificates that are registered with the backend.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>LIST/GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/certificates` (LIST) or `/auth/aws-ec2/config/certificates?list=true` (GET)</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"keys": [
"cert1"
]
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/config/sts/<account_id>
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Allows the explicit association of STS roles to satellite AWS accounts
(i.e. those which are not the account in which the Vault server is
running.) Login attempts from EC2 instances running in these accounts will
be verified using credentials obtained by assumption of these STS roles.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/sts/<account_id>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">account_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
AWS account ID to be associated with STS role. If set, Vault will use
assumed credentials to verify any login attempts from EC2 instances in
this account.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">sts_role</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
AWS ARN for STS role to be assumed when interacting with the account
specified. The Vault server must have permissions to assume this role.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the previously configured STS role.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/sts/<account_id>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"sts_role ": "arn:aws:iam:<account_id>:role/myRole"
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### LIST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Lists all the AWS Account IDs for which an STS role is registered
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>LIST/GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/sts` (LIST) or `/auth/aws-ec2/config/sts?list=true` (GET)</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"keys": [
"<account_id_1>",
"<account_id_2>"
]
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes a previously configured AWS account/STS role association
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/sts/<account_id>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/identity-whitelist
##### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Configures the periodic tidying operation of the whitelisted identity entries.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/identity-whitelist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">safety_buffer</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The amount of extra time that must have passed beyond the `roletag`
expiration, before it is removed from the backend storage. Defaults to
72h.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">disable_periodic_tidy</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set to 'true', disables the periodic tidying of the
'identity-whitelist/<instance_id>' entries.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the previously configured periodic whitelist tidying settings.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/identity-whitelist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"safety_buffer": 60,
"disable_periodic_tidy": false
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes the previously configured periodic whitelist tidying settings.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/identity-whitelist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/roletag-blacklist
##### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Configures the periodic tidying operation of the blacklisted role tag entries.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/roletag-blacklist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">safety_buffer</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The amount of extra time that must have passed beyond the `roletag`
expiration, before it is removed from the backend storage. Defaults to
72h.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">disable_periodic_tidy</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set to 'true', disables the periodic tidying of the
'roletag-blacklist/<role_tag>' entries.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the previously configured periodic blacklist tidying settings.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/roletag-blacklist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"safety_buffer": 60,
"disable_periodic_tidy": false
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes the previously configured periodic blacklist tidying settings.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/config/tidy/roletag-blacklist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/role/[role]
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Registers a role in the backend. Only those instances which are using the
role registered using this endpoint, will be able to perform the login
operation. Contraints can be specified on the role, that are applied on the
instances attempting to login. At least one constraint should be specified
on the role.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/role/<role>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">role</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Name of the role.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_ami_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instances that they should be
using the AMI ID specified by this parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_account_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instances that the account ID
in its identity document to match the one specified by this parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_region</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instances that the region in
its identity document to match the one specified by this parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_vpc_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instance to be associated with
the VPC ID that matches the value specified by this parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_subnet_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instance to be associated with
the subnet ID that matches the value specified by this parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_iam_role_arn</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the authenticating EC2 instance that it
must match the IAM role ARN specified by this parameter. The value is
prefix-matched (as though it were a glob ending in `*`). The
configured IAM user or EC2 instance role must be allowed to execute the
`iam:GetInstanceProfile` action if this is specified.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">bound_iam_instance_profile_arn</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, defines a constraint on the EC2 instances to be associated with
an IAM instance profile ARN which has a prefix that matches the value
specified by this parameter. The value is prefix-matched (as though it
were a glob ending in `*`).
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">role_tag</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, enables the role tags for this role. The value set for this
field should be the 'key' of the tag on the EC2 instance. The 'value'
of the tag should be generated using 'role/<role>/tag' endpoint.
Defaults to an empty string, meaning that role tags are disabled.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">ttl</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The TTL period of tokens issued using this role, provided as "1h",
where hour is the largest suffix.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">max_ttl</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The maximum allowed lifetime of tokens issued using this role.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">period</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, indicates that the token generated using this role should never
expire. The token should be renewed within the duration specified by
this value. At each renewal, the token's TTL will be set to the value
of this parameter. The maximum allowed lifetime of tokens issued using
this role.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">policies</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
Policies to be set on tokens issued using this role.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">allow_instance_migration</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, allows migration of the underlying instance where the client
resides. This keys off of pendingTime in the metadata document, so
essentially, this disables the client nonce check whenever the instance
is migrated to a new host and pendingTime is newer than the
previously-remembered time. Use with caution.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">disallow_reauthentication</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, only allows a single token to be granted per instance ID. In
order to perform a fresh login, the entry in whitelist for the instance
ID needs to be cleared using
'auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist/<instance_id>' endpoint. Defaults to
'false'.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the previously registered role configuration.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/role/<role>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"bound_ami_id": "ami-fce36987",
"role_tag": "",
"policies": [
"default",
"dev",
"prod"
],
"max_ttl": 1800000,
"disallow_reauthentication": false,
"allow_instance_migration": false
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### LIST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Lists all the roles that are registered with the backend.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>LIST/GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/roles` (LIST) or `/auth/aws-ec2/roles?list=true` (GET)</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"keys": [
"dev-role",
"prod-role"
]
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes the previously registered role.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/role/<role>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/role/[role]/tag
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Creates a role tag on the role, which help in restricting the capabilities
that are set on the role. Role tags are not tied to any specific ec2
instance unless specified explicitly using the `instance_id` parameter. By
default, role tags are designed to be used across all instances that
satisfies the constraints on the role. Regardless of which instances have
role tags on them, capabilities defined in a role tag must be a strict
subset of the given role's capabilities. Note that, since adding and
removing a tag is often a widely distributed privilege, care needs to be
taken to ensure that the instances are attached with correct tags to not
let them gain more privileges than what were intended. If a role tag is
changed, the capabilities inherited by the instance will be those defined
on the new role tag. Since those must be a subset of the role
capabilities, the role should never provide more capabilities than any
given instance can be allowed to gain in a worst-case scenario.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/role/<role>/tag`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">role</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Name of the role.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">policies</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
Policies to be associated with the tag. If set, must be a subset of the
role's policies. If set, but set to an empty value, only the 'default'
policy will be given to issued tokens.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">max_ttl</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, specifies the maximum allowed token lifetime.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">instance_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
Instance ID for which this tag is intended for. If set, the created tag
can only be used by the instance with the given ID.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">disallow_reauthentication</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, only allows a single token to be granted per instance ID. This
can be cleared with the auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist endpoint.
Defaults to 'false'.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">allow_instance_migration</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
If set, allows migration of the underlying instance where the client
resides. This keys off of pendingTime in the metadata document, so
essentially, this disables the client nonce check whenever the instance
is migrated to a new host and pendingTime is newer than the
previously-remembered time. Use with caution. Defaults to 'false'.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"tag_value": "v1:09Vp0qGuyB8=:r=dev-role:p=default,prod:d=false:t=300h0m0s:uPLKCQxqsefRhrp1qmVa1wsQVUXXJG8UZP/pJIdVyOI=",
"tag_key": "VaultRole"
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/login
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Fetch a token. This endpoint verifies the pkcs7 signature of the instance
identity document. Verifies that the instance is actually in a running
state. Cross checks the constraints defined on the role with which the
login is being performed. As an alternative to pkcs7 signature, the
identity document along with its RSA digest can be supplied to this
endpoint.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/login`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">role</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
Name of the role against which the login is being attempted. If `role`
is not specified, then the login endpoint looks for a role bearing the
name of the AMI ID of the EC2 instance that is trying to login. If a
matching role is not found, login fails.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">identity</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Base64 encoded EC2 instance identity document. This needs to be
supplied along with the `signature` parameter. If using `curl` for
fetching the identity document, consider using the option `-w 0` while
piping the output to `base64` binary.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">signature</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Base64 encoded SHA256 RSA signature of the instance identity document.
This needs to be supplied along with `identity` parameter.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">pkcs7</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
PKCS7 signature of the identity document with all `\n` characters
removed. Either this needs to be set *OR* both `identity` and
`signature` need to be set.
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">nonce</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The nonce to be used for subsequent login requests. If this parameter
is not specified at all and if reauthentication is allowed, then the
backend will generate a random nonce, attaches it to the instance's
identity-whitelist entry and returns the nonce back as part of auth
metadata. This value should be used with further login requests, to
establish client authenticity. Clients can choose to set a custom nonce
if preferred, in which case, it is recommended that clients provide a
strong nonce. If a nonce is provided but with an empty value, it
indicates intent to disable reauthentication. Note that, when
`disallow_reauthentication` option is enabled on either the role or the
role tag, the `nonce` holds no significance.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": {
"renewable": true,
"lease_duration": 1800000,
"metadata": {
"role_tag_max_ttl": "0",
"instance_id": "i-de0f1344"
"ami_id": "ami-fce36983"
"role": "dev-role"
},
"policies": [
"default",
"dev",
],
"accessor": "20b89871-e6f2-1160-fb29-31c2f6d4645e",
"client_token": "c9368254-3f21-aded-8a6f-7c818e81b17a"
},
"warnings": null,
"data": null,
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist/<role_tag>
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Places a valid role tag in a blacklist. This ensures that the role tag
cannot be used by any instance to perform a login operation again. Note
that if the role tag was previously used to perform a successful login,
placing the tag in the blacklist does not invalidate the already issued
token.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist/<role_tag>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">role_tag</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
Role tag to be blacklisted. The tag can be supplied as-is. In order to
avoid any encoding problems, it can be base64 encoded.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns the blacklist entry of a previously blacklisted role tag.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/broletag-blacklist/<role_tag>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"expiration_time": "2016-04-25T10:35:20.127058773-04:00",
"creation_time": "2016-04-12T22:35:01.178348124-04:00"
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### LIST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Lists all the role tags that are blacklisted.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>LIST/GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist` (LIST) or `/auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist?list=true` (GET)</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"keys": [
"v1:09Vp0qGuyB8=:a=ami-fce3c696:p=default,prod:d=false:t=300h0m0s:uPLKCQxqsefRhrp1qmVa1wsQVUXXJG8UZP/"
]
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes a blacklisted role tag.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/roletag-blacklist/<role_tag>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/tidy/roletag-blacklist
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Cleans up the entries in the blacklist based on expiration time on the
entry and `safety_buffer`.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/tidy/roletag-blacklist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">safety_buffer</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The amount of extra time that must have passed beyond the `roletag`
expiration, before it is removed from the backend storage. Defaults to
72h.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist/<instance_id>
#### GET
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Returns an entry in the whitelist. An entry will be created/updated by
every successful login.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist/<instance_id>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">instance_id</span>
<span class="param-flags">required</span>
EC2 instance ID. A successful login operation from an EC2 instance gets
cached in this whitelist, keyed off of instance ID.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"pending_time": "2016-04-14T01:01:41Z",
"expiration_time": "2016-05-05 10:09:16.67077232 +0000 UTC",
"creation_time": "2016-04-14 14:09:16.67077232 +0000 UTC",
"client_nonce": "5defbf9e-a8f9-3063-bdfc-54b7a42a1f95",
"role": "dev-role"
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### LIST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Lists all the instance IDs that are in the whitelist of successful logins.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>LIST/GET</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist` (LIST) or `/auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist?list=true` (GET)</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
```javascript
{
"auth": null,
"warnings": null,
"data": {
"keys": [
"i-aab47d37"
]
},
"lease_duration": 0,
"renewable": false,
"lease_id": ""
}
```
</dd>
</dl>
#### DELETE
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Deletes a cache of the successful login from an instance.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>DELETE</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/identity-whitelist/<instance_id>`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
None.
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
### /auth/aws-ec2/tidy/identity-whitelist
#### POST
<dl class="api">
<dt>Description</dt>
<dd>
Cleans up the entries in the whitelist based on expiration time and `safety_buffer`.
</dd>
<dt>Method</dt>
<dd>POST</dd>
<dt>URL</dt>
<dd>`/auth/aws-ec2/tidy/identity-whitelist`</dd>
<dt>Parameters</dt>
<dd>
<ul>
<li>
<span class="param">safety_buffer</span>
<span class="param-flags">optional</span>
The amount of extra time that must have passed beyond the identity
expiration, before it is removed from the backend storage. Defaults to
72h.
</li>
</ul>
</dd>
<dt>Returns</dt>
<dd>`204` response code.
</dd>
</dl>
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