43 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
43 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: "docs"
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page_title: "Security Details - HSM Integration - Vault Enterprise"
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sidebar_current: "docs-vault-enterprise-hsm-security"
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description: |-
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Recommendations to ensure the security of a Vault Enterprise HSM deployment.
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---
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# Vault Enterprise HSM Security Details
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This page provides information to help ensure that a Vault HSM deployment is
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performed as securely as possible.
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## PKCS#11 Authentication
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PKCS#11 authentication occurs via a slot number and PIN. In practice, because
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the PIN is not required to be numeric (and some HSMs require more complex
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PINs), this behaves like a username and password.
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Like a username and password, these values should be protected. If they are
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stored in Vault's configuration file, read access to the file should be tightly
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controlled to appropriate users. (Vault's configuration file should always have
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tight write controls.) Rather than storing these values into Vault's
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configuration file, they can also be supplied via the environment; see the
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[Configuration](/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11.html) page for more details.
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The attack surface of stolen PKCS#11 credentials depends highly on the
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individual HSM, but generally speaking, it should be assumed that if an
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attacker can see these credentials and has access to a machine on which Vault
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is running, the attacker will be able to access the HSM key protecting Vault's
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master key. Therefore, it is extremely important that access to the machine on
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which Vault is running is also tightly controlled.
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## Recovery Key Shares Protection
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Recovery key shares should be protected in the same way as your organization
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would protect key shares for the cryptographic barrier. As a quorum of recovery
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key shares can be used with the `generate-root` feature to generate a new root
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token, and root tokens can do anything within Vault, PGP encryption should
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always be used to protect the returned recovery key shares and the recovery
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share holders should be highly trusted individuals.
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