a3dfde5cec
* conversion stage 1 * correct image paths * add sidebar title to frontmatter * docs/concepts and docs/internals * configuration docs and multi-level nav corrections * commands docs, index file corrections, small item nav correction * secrets converted * auth * add enterprise and agent docs * add extra dividers * secret section, wip * correct sidebar nav title in front matter for apu section, start working on api items * auth and backend, a couple directory structure fixes * remove old docs * intro side nav converted * reset sidebar styles, add hashi-global-styles * basic styling for nav sidebar * folder collapse functionality * patch up border length on last list item * wip restructure for content component * taking middleman hacking to the extreme, but its working * small css fix * add new mega nav * fix a small mistake from the rebase * fix a content resolution issue with middleman * title a couple missing docs pages * update deps, remove temporary markup * community page * footer to layout, community page css adjustments * wip downloads page * deps updated, downloads page ready * fix community page * homepage progress * add components, adjust spacing * docs and api landing pages * a bunch of fixes, add docs and api landing pages * update deps, add deploy scripts * add readme note * update deploy command * overview page, index title * Update doc fields Note this still requires the link fields to be populated -- this is solely related to copy on the description fields * Update api_basic_categories.yml Updated API category descriptions. Like the document descriptions you'll still need to update the link headers to the proper target pages. * Add bottom hero, adjust CSS, responsive friendly * Add mega nav title * homepage adjustments, asset boosts * small fixes * docs page styling fixes * meganav title * some category link corrections * Update API categories page updated to reflect the second level headings for api categories * Update docs_detailed_categories.yml Updated to represent the existing docs structure * Update docs_detailed_categories.yml * docs page data fix, extra operator page remove * api data fix * fix makefile * update deps, add product subnav to docs and api landing pages * Rearrange non-hands-on guides to _docs_ Since there is no place for these on learn.hashicorp, we'll put them under _docs_. * WIP Redirects for guides to docs * content and component updates * font weight hotfix, redirects * fix guides and intro sidenavs * fix some redirects * small style tweaks * Redirects to learn and internally to docs * Remove redirect to `/vault` * Remove `.html` from destination on redirects * fix incorrect index redirect * final touchups * address feedback from michell for makefile and product downloads
44 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
44 lines
2 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
layout: "docs"
|
|
page_title: "Security Details - HSM Integration - Vault Enterprise"
|
|
sidebar_title: "Security"
|
|
sidebar_current: "docs-vault-enterprise-hsm-security"
|
|
description: |-
|
|
Recommendations to ensure the security of a Vault Enterprise HSM deployment.
|
|
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Vault Enterprise HSM Security Details
|
|
|
|
This page provides information to help ensure that a Vault HSM deployment is
|
|
performed as securely as possible.
|
|
|
|
## PKCS#11 Authentication
|
|
|
|
PKCS#11 authentication occurs via a slot number and PIN. In practice, because
|
|
the PIN is not required to be numeric (and some HSMs require more complex
|
|
PINs), this behaves like a username and password.
|
|
|
|
Like a username and password, these values should be protected. If they are
|
|
stored in Vault's configuration file, read access to the file should be tightly
|
|
controlled to appropriate users. (Vault's configuration file should always have
|
|
tight write controls.) Rather than storing these values into Vault's
|
|
configuration file, they can also be supplied via the environment; see the
|
|
[Configuration](/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11.html) page for more details.
|
|
|
|
The attack surface of stolen PKCS#11 credentials depends highly on the
|
|
individual HSM, but generally speaking, it should be assumed that if an
|
|
attacker can see these credentials and has access to a machine on which Vault
|
|
is running, the attacker will be able to access the HSM key protecting Vault's
|
|
master key. Therefore, it is extremely important that access to the machine on
|
|
which Vault is running is also tightly controlled.
|
|
|
|
## Recovery Key Shares Protection
|
|
|
|
Recovery key shares should be protected in the same way as your organization
|
|
would protect key shares for the cryptographic barrier. As a quorum of recovery
|
|
key shares can be used with the `generate-root` feature to generate a new root
|
|
token, and root tokens can do anything within Vault, PGP encryption should
|
|
always be used to protect the returned recovery key shares and the recovery
|
|
share holders should be highly trusted individuals.
|