This PR adds the common OSS changes for adding support for Consul Namespaces,
which is going to be a Nomad Enterprise feature. There is no new functionality
provided by this changeset and hopefully no new bugs.
* Throw away result of multierror.Append
When given a *multierror.Error, it is mutated, therefore the return
value is not needed.
* Simplify MergeMultierrorWarnings, use StringBuilder
* Hash.Write() never returns an error
* Remove error that was always nil
* Remove error from Resources.Add signature
When this was originally written it could return an error, but that was
refactored away, and callers of it as of today never handle the error.
* Throw away results of io.Copy during Bridge
* Handle errors when computing node class in test
When a task is restored after a client restart, the template runner will
create a new lease for any dynamic secret (ex. Consul or PKI secrets
engines). But because this lease is being created in the prestart hook, we
don't trigger the `change_mode`.
This changeset uses the the existence of the task handle to detect a
previously running task that's been restored, so that we can trigger the
template `change_mode` if the template is changed, as it will be only with
dynamic secrets.
While Nomad v0.12.8 fixed `NOMAD_{ALLOC,TASK,SECRETS}_DIR` use in
`template.destination`, interpolating these variables in
`template.source` caused a path escape error.
**Why not apply the destination fix to source?**
The destination fix forces destination to always be relative to the task
directory. This makes sense for the destination as a destination outside
the task directory would be unreachable by the task. There's no reason
to ever render a template outside the task directory. (Using `..` does
allow destinations to escape the task directory if
`template.disable_file_sandbox = true`. That's just awkward and unsafe
enough I hope no one uses it.)
There is a reason to source a template outside a task
directory. At least if there weren't then I can't think of why we
implemented `template.disable_file_sandbox`. So v0.12.8 left the
behavior of `template.source` the more straightforward "Interpolate and
validate."
However, since outside of `raw_exec` every other driver uses absolute
paths for `NOMAD_*_DIR` interpolation, this means those variables are
unusable unless `disable_file_sandbox` is set.
**The Fix**
The variables are now interpolated as relative paths *only for the
purpose of rendering templates.* This is an unfortunate special case,
but reflects the fact that the templates view of the filesystem is
completely different (unconstrainted) vs the task's view (chrooted).
Arguably the values of these variables *should be context-specific.*
I think it's more reasonable to think of the "hack" as templating
running uncontainerized than that giving templates different paths is a
hack.
**TODO**
- [ ] E2E tests
- [ ] Job validation may still be broken and prevent my fix from
working?
**raw_exec**
`raw_exec` is actually broken _a different way_ as exercised by tests in
this commit. I think we should probably remove these tests and fix that
in a followup PR/release, but I wanted to leave them in for the initial
review and discussion. Since non-containerized source paths are broken
anyway, perhaps there's another solution to this entire problem I'm
overlooking?
Prior to Nomad 0.12.5, you could use `${NOMAD_SECRETS_DIR}/mysecret.txt` as
the `artifact.destination` and `template.destination` because we would always
append the destination to the task working directory. In the recent security
patch we treated the `destination` absolute path as valid if it didn't escape
the working directory, but this breaks backwards compatibility and
interpolation of `destination` fields.
This changeset partially reverts the behavior so that we always append the
destination, but we also perform the escape check on that new destination
after interpolation so the security hole is closed.
Also, ConsulTemplate test should exercise interpolation
Ensure that the client honors the client configuration for the
`template.disable_file_sandbox` field when validating the jobspec's
`template.source` parameter, and not just with consul-template's own `file`
function.
Prevent interpolated `template.source`, `template.destination`, and
`artifact.destination` fields from escaping file sandbox.
adds in oss components to support enterprise multi-vault namespace feature
upgrade specific doc on vault multi-namespaces
vault docs
update test to reflect new error
When rendering a task template, the `plugin` function is no longer
permitted by default and will raise an error. An operator can opt-in
to permitting this function with the new `template.function_blacklist`
field in the client configuration.
When rendering a task template, path parameters for the `file`
function will be treated as relative to the task directory by
default. Relative paths or symlinks that point outside the task
directory will raise an error. An operator can opt-out of this
protection with the new `template.disable_file_sandbox` field in the
client configuration.
When rendering a task consul template, ensure that only task environment
variables are used.
Currently, `consul-template` always falls back to host process
environment variables when key isn't a task env var[1]. Thus, we add
an empty entry for each host process env-var not found in task env-vars.
[1] bfa5d0e133/template/funcs.go (L61-L75)
As part of deprecating legacy drivers, we're moving the env package to a
new drivers/shared tree, as it is used by the modern docker and rkt
driver packages, and is useful for 3rd party plugins.
