The e2e test code is absolutely hideous and leaks processes and files
on disk. NomadAgent seems useful, but the clientstate e2e tests are very
messy and slow. The last test "Corrupt" is probably the most useful as
it explicitly corrupts the state file whereas the other tests attempt to
reproduce steps thought to cause corruption in earlier releases of
Nomad.
Point users to security doc instead. Right now it takes a lot of
explaining to describe to users exactly how to validate the binary and
what the output of the tools used means.
For example, this is the output when validating according to the
instructions in this guide and the linked doc:
```
vagrant@linux:/tmp$ gpg --verify nomad_0.8.7_SHA256SUMS.sig
nomad_0.8.7_SHA256SUMS
gpg: Signature made Fri 11 Jan 2019 09:47:56 PM UTC using RSA key ID
348FFC4C
gpg: Good signature from "HashiCorp Security <security@hashicorp.com>"
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the
owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 91A6 E7F8 5D05 C656 30BE F189 5185 2D87 348F
FC4C
vagrant@linux:/tmp$ shasum -a 256 -c nomad_0.8.7_SHA256SUMS
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_darwin_amd64.zip:
./nomad_0.8.7_darwin_amd64.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_linux_386.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_386.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_linux_amd64-lxc.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_amd64-lxc.zip: FAILED open or read
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_amd64.zip: OK
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_linux_arm64.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_arm64.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_linux_arm.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_arm.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_windows_386.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_windows_386.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: ./nomad_0.8.7_windows_amd64.zip: No such file or directory
./nomad_0.8.7_windows_amd64.zip: FAILED open or read
shasum: WARNING: 7 listed files could not be read
```
There are only two lines that matter in all of that output:
```
...
gpg: Good signature from "HashiCorp Security <security@hashicorp.com>"
...
./nomad_0.8.7_linux_amd64.zip: OK
...
```
I feel like trying to teach users how to use and interpret these tools
in our deployment guide may be as likely to reduce confidence as
increase it.
Reverts hashicorp/nomad#5433
Apparently, channel communications can constitute Happens-Before even for proximate variables, so this syncing isn't necessary.
> _The closing of a channel happens before a receive that returns a zero value because the channel is closed._
https://golang.org/ref/mem#tmp_7
The systemd configs spread across our repo were fairly out of sync. This
should get them on our best practices.
The deployment guide also had some strange things like running Nomad as
a non-root user. It would be fine for servers but completely breaks
clients. For simplicity I simply removed the non-root user references.
* update versions of all products and add consul-template
* update client and server user_data scripts
* modify README.md and terraform.tfvars
* fix typo in consul-template system unit file
* update AMI id
* skeleton
* configure portworx
* destroy and redeploy mysql with data intact
* rename all directories and references from persistent storage to stateful workloads
* add considerations and remove references to StorageOS
* update wording and headings
* create portworx volume externally and modify jobfile to reflect that
* fix typo
* Update website/source/guides/stateful-workloads/portworx.html.md
Co-Authored-By: Omar-Khawaja <Omar-Khawaja@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update website/source/guides/stateful-workloads/portworx.html.md
Co-Authored-By: Omar-Khawaja <Omar-Khawaja@users.noreply.github.com>
