open-nomad/nomad/variables_endpoint.go

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package nomad
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
memdb "github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state/paginator"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs"
)
// Variables encapsulates the variables RPC endpoint which is
// callable via the Variables RPCs and externally via the "/v1/var{s}"
// HTTP API.
type Variables struct {
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
encrypter *Encrypter
}
// Apply is used to apply a SV update request to the data store.
func (sv *Variables) Apply(args *structs.VariablesApplyRequest, reply *structs.VariablesApplyResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.VariablesApplyRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{
"nomad", "variables", "apply", string(args.Op)}, time.Now())
// Check if the Namespace is explicitly set on the variable. If
// not, use the RequestNamespace
if args.Var == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("variable must not be nil")
}
targetNS := args.Var.Namespace
if targetNS == "" {
targetNS = args.RequestNamespace()
args.Var.Namespace = targetNS
}
canRead, err := svePreApply(sv, args, args.Var)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var ev *structs.VariableEncrypted
switch args.Op {
case structs.VarOpSet, structs.VarOpCAS:
ev, err = sv.encrypt(args.Var)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("variable error: encrypt: %w", err)
}
now := time.Now().UnixNano()
ev.CreateTime = now // existing will override if it exists
ev.ModifyTime = now
case structs.VarOpDelete, structs.VarOpDeleteCAS:
ev = &structs.VariableEncrypted{
VariableMetadata: structs.VariableMetadata{
Namespace: args.Var.Namespace,
Path: args.Var.Path,
ModifyIndex: args.Var.ModifyIndex,
},
}
}
// Make a SVEArgs
sveArgs := structs.VarApplyStateRequest{
Op: args.Op,
Var: ev,
WriteRequest: args.WriteRequest,
}
// Apply the update.
out, index, err := sv.srv.raftApply(structs.VarApplyStateRequestType, sveArgs)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("raft apply failed: %w", err)
}
r, err := sv.makeVariablesApplyResponse(args, out.(*structs.VarApplyStateResponse), canRead)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *r
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
func svePreApply(sv *Variables, args *structs.VariablesApplyRequest, vd *structs.VariableDecrypted) (canRead bool, err error) {
canRead = false
var aclObj *acl.ACL
// Perform the ACL token resolution.
if aclObj, err = sv.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return
} else if aclObj != nil {
hasPerm := func(perm string) bool {
return aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(args.Var.Namespace,
args.Var.Path, perm)
}
canRead = hasPerm(acl.VariablesCapabilityRead)
switch args.Op {
case structs.VarOpSet, structs.VarOpCAS:
if !hasPerm(acl.VariablesCapabilityWrite) {
err = structs.ErrPermissionDenied
return
}
case structs.VarOpDelete, structs.VarOpDeleteCAS:
if !hasPerm(acl.VariablesCapabilityDestroy) {
err = structs.ErrPermissionDenied
return
}
default:
err = fmt.Errorf("svPreApply: unexpected VarOp received: %q", args.Op)
return
}
} else {
// ACLs are not enabled.
canRead = true
}
switch args.Op {
case structs.VarOpSet, structs.VarOpCAS:
args.Var.Canonicalize()
if err = args.Var.Validate(); err != nil {
return
}
case structs.VarOpDelete, structs.VarOpDeleteCAS:
if args.Var == nil || args.Var.Path == "" {
err = fmt.Errorf("delete requires a Path")
return
}
}
return
}
// MakeVariablesApplyResponse merges the output of this VarApplyStateResponse with the
// VariableDataItems
func (sv *Variables) makeVariablesApplyResponse(
req *structs.VariablesApplyRequest, eResp *structs.VarApplyStateResponse,
canRead bool) (*structs.VariablesApplyResponse, error) {
out := structs.VariablesApplyResponse{
Op: eResp.Op,
Input: req.Var,
Result: eResp.Result,
Error: eResp.Error,
WriteMeta: eResp.WriteMeta,
}
if eResp.IsOk() {
if eResp.WrittenSVMeta != nil {
// The writer is allowed to read their own write
out.Output = &structs.VariableDecrypted{
VariableMetadata: *eResp.WrittenSVMeta,
Items: req.Var.Items.Copy(),
}
}
return &out, nil
}
if eResp.IsError() {
return &out, eResp.Error
}
// At this point, the response is necessarily a conflict.
// Prime output from the encrypted responses metadata
out.Conflict = &structs.VariableDecrypted{
VariableMetadata: eResp.Conflict.VariableMetadata,
Items: nil,
}
// If the caller can't read the conflicting value, return the
// metadata, but no items and flag it as redacted
if !canRead {
out.Result = structs.VarOpResultRedacted
return &out, nil
}
if eResp.Conflict == nil || eResp.Conflict.KeyID == "" {
// zero-value conflicts can be returned for delete-if-set
dv := &structs.VariableDecrypted{}
dv.Namespace = eResp.Conflict.Namespace
dv.Path = eResp.Conflict.Path
out.Conflict = dv
} else {
// At this point, the caller has read access to the conflicting
// value so we can return it in the output; decrypt it.
dv, err := sv.decrypt(eResp.Conflict)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out.Conflict = dv
}
return &out, nil
}
// Read is used to get a specific variable
func (sv *Variables) Read(args *structs.VariablesReadRequest, reply *structs.VariablesReadResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.VariablesReadRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "variables", "read"}, time.Now())
_, err := sv.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args.QueryOptions,
acl.PolicyRead, args.Path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, s *state.StateStore) error {
out, err := s.GetVariable(ws, args.RequestNamespace(), args.Path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the output
reply.Data = nil
if out != nil {
dv, err := sv.decrypt(out)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ov := dv.Copy()
reply.Data = &ov
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
} else {
sv.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(s, state.TableVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
}
return nil
}}
return sv.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// List is used to list variables held within state. It supports single
// and wildcard namespace listings.
func (sv *Variables) List(
args *structs.VariablesListRequest,
reply *structs.VariablesListResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.VariablesListRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "variables", "list"}, time.Now())
// If the caller has requested to list variables across all namespaces, use
// the custom function to perform this.
if args.RequestNamespace() == structs.AllNamespacesSentinel {
return sv.listAllVariables(args, reply)
}
aclObj, err := sv.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args.QueryOptions,
acl.PolicyList, args.Prefix)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return sv.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Perform the state query to get an iterator.
iter, err := stateStore.GetVariablesByNamespaceAndPrefix(ws, args.RequestNamespace(), args.Prefix)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Generate the tokenizer to use for pagination using namespace and
// ID to ensure complete uniqueness.
tokenizer := paginator.NewStructsTokenizer(iter,
paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithNamespace: true,
WithID: true,
},
)
filters := []paginator.Filter{
paginator.GenericFilter{
Allow: func(raw interface{}) (bool, error) {
sv := raw.(*structs.VariableEncrypted)
return strings.HasPrefix(sv.Path, args.Prefix) &&
(aclObj == nil || aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(sv.Namespace, sv.Path, acl.PolicyList)), nil
},
},
}
// Set up our output after we have checked the error.
var svs []*structs.VariableMetadata
// Build the paginator. This includes the function that is
// responsible for appending a variable to the variables
// stubs slice.
paginatorImpl, err := paginator.NewPaginator(iter, tokenizer, filters, args.QueryOptions,
func(raw interface{}) error {
sv := raw.(*structs.VariableEncrypted)
svStub := sv.VariableMetadata
svs = append(svs, &svStub)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to create result paginator: %v", err)
}
// Calling page populates our output variable stub array as well as
// returns the next token.
nextToken, err := paginatorImpl.Page()
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to read result page: %v", err)
}
// Populate the reply.
reply.Data = svs
reply.NextToken = nextToken
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return sv.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
// listAllVariables is used to list variables held within
// state where the caller has used the namespace wildcard identifier.
func (s *Variables) listAllVariables(
args *structs.VariablesListRequest,
reply *structs.VariablesListResponse) error {
// Perform token resolution. The request already goes through forwarding
// and metrics setup before being called.
aclObj, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// allowFunc checks whether the caller has the read-job capability on the
// passed namespace.
allowFunc := func(ns string) bool {
return aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(ns, "", acl.PolicyList)
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return s.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Identify which namespaces the caller has access to. If they do
// not have access to any, send them an empty response. Otherwise,
// handle any error in a traditional manner.
_, err := allowedNSes(aclObj, stateStore, allowFunc)
switch err {
case structs.ErrPermissionDenied:
reply.Data = make([]*structs.VariableMetadata, 0)
return nil
case nil:
// Fallthrough.
default:
return err
}
// Get all the variables stored within state.
iter, err := stateStore.Variables(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var svs []*structs.VariableMetadata
// Generate the tokenizer to use for pagination using namespace and
// ID to ensure complete uniqueness.
tokenizer := paginator.NewStructsTokenizer(iter,
paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithNamespace: true,
WithID: true,
},
)
filters := []paginator.Filter{
paginator.GenericFilter{
Allow: func(raw interface{}) (bool, error) {
sv := raw.(*structs.VariableEncrypted)
return strings.HasPrefix(sv.Path, args.Prefix) &&
(aclObj == nil || aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(sv.Namespace, sv.Path, acl.PolicyList)), nil
},
},
}
// Build the paginator. This includes the function that is
// responsible for appending a variable to the stubs array.
paginatorImpl, err := paginator.NewPaginator(iter, tokenizer, filters, args.QueryOptions,
func(raw interface{}) error {
sv := raw.(*structs.VariableEncrypted)
svStub := sv.VariableMetadata
svs = append(svs, &svStub)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to create result paginator: %v", err)
}
// Calling page populates our output variable stubs array as well as
// returns the next token.
nextToken, err := paginatorImpl.Page()
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to read result page: %v", err)
}
// Populate the reply.
reply.Data = svs
reply.NextToken = nextToken
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return s.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
func (sv *Variables) encrypt(v *structs.VariableDecrypted) (*structs.VariableEncrypted, error) {
b, err := json.Marshal(v.Items)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ev := structs.VariableEncrypted{
VariableMetadata: v.VariableMetadata,
}
ev.Data, ev.KeyID, err = sv.encrypter.Encrypt(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &ev, nil
}
func (sv *Variables) decrypt(v *structs.VariableEncrypted) (*structs.VariableDecrypted, error) {
b, err := sv.encrypter.Decrypt(v.Data, v.KeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
dv := structs.VariableDecrypted{
VariableMetadata: v.VariableMetadata,
}
dv.Items = make(map[string]string)
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &dv.Items)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &dv, nil
}
// handleMixedAuthEndpoint is a helper to handle auth on RPC endpoints that can
// either be called by external clients or by workload identity
func (sv *Variables) handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args structs.QueryOptions, cap, pathOrPrefix string) (*acl.ACL, error) {
// Perform the initial token resolution.
aclObj, err := sv.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err == nil {
// Perform our ACL validation. If the object is nil, this means ACLs
// are not enabled, otherwise trigger the allowed namespace function.
if aclObj != nil {
if !aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix, cap) {
return nil, structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return aclObj, nil
}
if helper.IsUUID(args.AuthToken) {
// early return for ErrNotFound or other errors if it's formed
// like an ACLToken.SecretID
return nil, err
}
// Attempt to verify the token as a JWT with a workload
// identity claim
claims, err := sv.srv.VerifyClaim(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
metrics.IncrCounter([]string{
"nomad", "variables", "invalid_allocation_identity"}, 1)
sv.logger.Trace("allocation identity was not valid", "error", err)
return nil, structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// The workload identity gets access to paths that match its
// identity, without having to go thru the ACL system
err = sv.authValidatePrefix(claims, args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix)
if err == nil {
return aclObj, nil
}
// If the workload identity doesn't match the implicit permissions
// given to paths, check for its attached ACL policies
aclObj, err = sv.srv.ResolveClaims(claims)
if err != nil {
return nil, err // this only returns an error when the state store has gone wrong
}
if aclObj != nil && aclObj.AllowVariableOperation(
args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix, cap) {
return aclObj, nil
}
return nil, structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// authValidatePrefix asserts that the requested path is valid for
// this allocation
func (sv *Variables) authValidatePrefix(claims *structs.IdentityClaims, ns, pathOrPrefix string) error {
store, err := sv.srv.fsm.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
alloc, err := store.AllocByID(nil, claims.AllocationID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if alloc == nil || alloc.Job == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("allocation does not exist")
}
if alloc.Job.Namespace != ns {
return fmt.Errorf("allocation is in another namespace")
}
parts := strings.Split(pathOrPrefix, "/")
expect := []string{"nomad", "jobs", claims.JobID, alloc.TaskGroup, claims.TaskName}
if len(parts) > len(expect) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
for idx, part := range parts {
if part != expect[idx] {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}