open-nomad/nomad/secure_variables_endpoint.go

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package nomad
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
memdb "github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
multierror "github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state/paginator"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs"
)
// SecureVariables encapsulates the secure variables RPC endpoint which is
// callable via the SecureVariables RPCs and externally via the "/v1/var{s}"
// HTTP API.
type SecureVariables struct {
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
encrypter *Encrypter
}
// Upsert creates or updates secure variables held within Nomad.
func (sv *SecureVariables) Upsert(
args *structs.SecureVariablesUpsertRequest,
reply *structs.SecureVariablesUpsertResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.SecureVariablesUpsertRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "secure_variables", "upsert"}, time.Now())
// Perform the ACL token resolution.
if aclObj, err := sv.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if aclObj != nil {
for _, variable := range args.Data {
if !aclObj.AllowSecureVariableOperation(args.RequestNamespace(),
variable.Path, acl.PolicyWrite) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
}
// Use a multierror, so we can capture all validation errors and pass this
// back so they can be addressed by the caller in a single pass.
var mErr multierror.Error
uArgs := structs.SecureVariablesEncryptedUpsertRequest{
Data: make([]*structs.SecureVariableEncrypted, len(args.Data)),
WriteRequest: args.WriteRequest,
}
// Iterate the secure variables and validate them. Any error results in the
// call failing.
for i, v := range args.Data {
v.Canonicalize()
if err := v.Validate(); err != nil {
mErr.Errors = append(mErr.Errors, err)
continue
}
if args.CheckIndex != nil {
var conflict *structs.SecureVariableDecrypted
if err := sv.validateCASUpdate(*args.CheckIndex, v, &conflict); err != nil {
if reply.Conflicts == nil {
reply.Conflicts = make([]*structs.SecureVariableDecrypted, len(args.Data))
}
reply.Conflicts[i] = conflict
continue
}
}
ev, err := sv.encrypt(v)
if err != nil {
mErr.Errors = append(mErr.Errors, err)
continue
}
uArgs.Data[i] = ev
}
if len(reply.Conflicts) != 0 {
// This is a reply with CAS conflicts so it needs to return here
// "successfully". The caller needs to check to see if Conflicts
// is non-Nil.
return nil
}
if err := mErr.ErrorOrNil(); err != nil {
return &mErr
}
if err := sv.enforceQuota(uArgs); err != nil {
return err
}
// Update via Raft.
out, index, err := sv.srv.raftApply(structs.SecureVariableUpsertRequestType, uArgs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index. There is no need to floor this as we are writing to
// state and therefore will get a non-zero index response.
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// Delete removes a single secure variable, as specified by its namespace and
// path from Nomad.
func (sv *SecureVariables) Delete(
args *structs.SecureVariablesDeleteRequest,
reply *structs.SecureVariablesDeleteResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.SecureVariablesDeleteRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "secure_variables", "delete"}, time.Now())
// Perform the ACL token resolution.
if aclObj, err := sv.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if aclObj != nil {
if !aclObj.AllowSecureVariableOperation(args.RequestNamespace(), args.Path, acl.PolicyWrite) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
if args.CheckIndex != nil {
if err := sv.validateCASDelete(*args.CheckIndex, args.Namespace, args.Path, &reply.Conflict); err != nil {
// If the validateCASDelete func sends back the conflict sentinel
// error value then it will have put the conflict into the reply,
// and we need to "succeed".
if err.Error() == "conflict" {
reply.Index = reply.Conflict.ModifyIndex
return nil
}
// There are a few cases where validateCASDelete can error that
// aren't conflicts.
return err
}
}
// Update via Raft.
out, index, err := sv.srv.raftApply(structs.SecureVariableDeleteRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index. There is no need to floor this as we are writing to
// state and therefore will get a non-zero index response.
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// Read is used to get a specific secure variable
func (sv *SecureVariables) Read(args *structs.SecureVariablesReadRequest, reply *structs.SecureVariablesReadResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.SecureVariablesReadRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "secure_variables", "read"}, time.Now())
// FIXME: Temporary ACL Test policy. Update once implementation complete
err := sv.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args.QueryOptions,
acl.PolicyRead, args.Path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, s *state.StateStore) error {
out, err := s.GetSecureVariable(ws, args.RequestNamespace(), args.Path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the output
reply.Data = nil
if out != nil {
dv, err := sv.decrypt(out)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ov := dv.Copy()
reply.Data = &ov
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
} else {
sv.srv.replySetIndex(state.TableSecureVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
}
return nil
}}
return sv.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// List is used to list secure variables held within state. It supports single
// and wildcard namespace listings.
func (sv *SecureVariables) List(
args *structs.SecureVariablesListRequest,
reply *structs.SecureVariablesListResponse) error {
if done, err := sv.srv.forward(structs.SecureVariablesListRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "secure_variables", "list"}, time.Now())
// If the caller has requested to list secure variables across all namespaces, use
// the custom function to perform this.
if args.RequestNamespace() == structs.AllNamespacesSentinel {
return sv.listAllSecureVariables(args, reply)
}
// FIXME: Temporary ACL Test policy. Update once implementation complete
err := sv.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args.QueryOptions,
acl.PolicyList, args.Prefix)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return sv.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Perform the state query to get an iterator.
iter, err := stateStore.GetSecureVariablesByNamespaceAndPrefix(ws, args.RequestNamespace(), args.Prefix)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Generate the tokenizer to use for pagination using namespace and
// ID to ensure complete uniqueness.
tokenizer := paginator.NewStructsTokenizer(iter,
paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithNamespace: true,
WithID: true,
},
)
// Set up our output after we have checked the error.
var svs []*structs.SecureVariableMetadata
// Build the paginator. This includes the function that is
// responsible for appending a variable to the secure variables
// stubs slice.
paginatorImpl, err := paginator.NewPaginator(iter, tokenizer, nil, args.QueryOptions,
func(raw interface{}) error {
sv := raw.(*structs.SecureVariableEncrypted)
svStub := sv.SecureVariableMetadata
svs = append(svs, &svStub)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to create result paginator: %v", err)
}
// Calling page populates our output variable stub array as well as
// returns the next token.
nextToken, err := paginatorImpl.Page()
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to read result page: %v", err)
}
// Populate the reply.
reply.Data = svs
reply.NextToken = nextToken
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return sv.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableSecureVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
// listAllSecureVariables is used to list secure variables held within
// state where the caller has used the namespace wildcard identifier.
func (s *SecureVariables) listAllSecureVariables(
args *structs.SecureVariablesListRequest,
reply *structs.SecureVariablesListResponse) error {
// Perform token resolution. The request already goes through forwarding
// and metrics setup before being called.
aclObj, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// allowFunc checks whether the caller has the read-job capability on the
// passed namespace.
allowFunc := func(ns string) bool {
return aclObj.AllowSecureVariableOperation(ns, "", acl.PolicyList)
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return s.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Identify which namespaces the caller has access to. If they do
// not have access to any, send them an empty response. Otherwise,
// handle any error in a traditional manner.
allowedNSes, err := allowedNSes(aclObj, stateStore, allowFunc)
switch err {
case structs.ErrPermissionDenied:
reply.Data = make([]*structs.SecureVariableMetadata, 0)
return nil
case nil:
// Fallthrough.
default:
return err
}
// Get all the secure variables stored within state.
iter, err := stateStore.SecureVariables(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var svs []*structs.SecureVariableMetadata
// Generate the tokenizer to use for pagination using namespace and
// ID to ensure complete uniqueness.
tokenizer := paginator.NewStructsTokenizer(iter,
paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithNamespace: true,
WithID: true,
},
)
// Build the paginator. This includes the function that is
// responsible for appending a variable to the stubs array.
paginatorImpl, err := paginator.NewPaginator(iter, tokenizer, nil, args.QueryOptions,
func(raw interface{}) error {
sv := raw.(*structs.SecureVariableEncrypted)
if allowedNSes != nil && !allowedNSes[sv.Namespace] {
return nil
}
svStub := sv.SecureVariableMetadata
svs = append(svs, &svStub)
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to create result paginator: %v", err)
}
// Calling page populates our output variable stubs array as well as
// returns the next token.
nextToken, err := paginatorImpl.Page()
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to read result page: %v", err)
}
// Populate the reply.
reply.Data = svs
reply.NextToken = nextToken
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return s.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableSecureVariables, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
func (sv *SecureVariables) encrypt(v *structs.SecureVariableDecrypted) (*structs.SecureVariableEncrypted, error) {
b, err := json.Marshal(v.Items)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ev := structs.SecureVariableEncrypted{
SecureVariableMetadata: v.SecureVariableMetadata,
}
ev.Data, ev.KeyID, err = sv.encrypter.Encrypt(b)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &ev, nil
}
func (sv *SecureVariables) decrypt(v *structs.SecureVariableEncrypted) (*structs.SecureVariableDecrypted, error) {
b, err := sv.encrypter.Decrypt(v.Data, v.KeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
dv := structs.SecureVariableDecrypted{
SecureVariableMetadata: v.SecureVariableMetadata,
}
dv.Items = make(map[string]string)
err = json.Unmarshal(b, &dv.Items)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &dv, nil
}
// handleMixedAuthEndpoint is a helper to handle auth on RPC endpoints that can
// either be called by external clients or by workload identity
func (sv *SecureVariables) handleMixedAuthEndpoint(args structs.QueryOptions, cap, pathOrPrefix string) error {
// Perform the initial token resolution.
aclObj, err := sv.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err == nil {
// Perform our ACL validation. If the object is nil, this means ACLs
// are not enabled, otherwise trigger the allowed namespace function.
if aclObj != nil {
if !aclObj.AllowSecureVariableOperation(args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix, cap) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}
if helper.IsUUID(args.AuthToken) {
// early return for ErrNotFound or other errors if it's formed
// like an ACLToken.SecretID
return err
}
// Attempt to verify the token as a JWT with a workload
// identity claim
claims, err := sv.srv.VerifyClaim(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
metrics.IncrCounter([]string{
"nomad", "secure_variables", "invalid_allocation_identity"}, 1)
sv.logger.Trace("allocation identity was not valid", "error", err)
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// The workload identity gets access to paths that match its
// identity, without having to go thru the ACL system
err = sv.authValidatePrefix(claims, args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
// If the workload identity doesn't match the implicit permissions
// given to paths, check for its attached ACL policies
aclObj, err = sv.srv.ResolveClaims(claims)
if err != nil {
return err // this only returns an error when the state store has gone wrong
}
if aclObj != nil && aclObj.AllowSecureVariableOperation(
args.RequestNamespace(), pathOrPrefix, cap) {
return nil
}
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// authValidatePrefix asserts that the requested path is valid for
// this allocation
func (sv *SecureVariables) authValidatePrefix(claims *structs.IdentityClaims, ns, pathOrPrefix string) error {
store, err := sv.srv.fsm.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
alloc, err := store.AllocByID(nil, claims.AllocationID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if alloc == nil || alloc.Job == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("allocation does not exist")
}
if alloc.Job.Namespace != ns {
return fmt.Errorf("allocation is in another namespace")
}
parts := strings.Split(pathOrPrefix, "/")
expect := []string{"jobs", alloc.Job.ID, alloc.TaskGroup, claims.TaskName}
if len(parts) > len(expect) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
for idx, part := range parts {
if part != expect[idx] {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}
func (s *SecureVariables) validateCASUpdate(cidx uint64, sv *structs.SecureVariableDecrypted, conflict **structs.SecureVariableDecrypted) error {
return s.validateCAS(cidx, sv.Namespace, sv.Path, conflict)
}
func (s *SecureVariables) validateCASDelete(cidx uint64, namespace, path string, conflict **structs.SecureVariableDecrypted) error {
return s.validateCAS(cidx, namespace, path, conflict)
}
func (s *SecureVariables) validateCAS(cidx uint64, namespace, path string, conflictOut **structs.SecureVariableDecrypted) error {
casConflict := errors.New("conflict")
// lookup any existing key and validate the update
snap, err := s.srv.fsm.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
ws := memdb.NewWatchSet()
exist, err := snap.GetSecureVariable(ws, namespace, path)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cas error: %w", err)
}
if exist == nil && cidx != 0 {
// return a zero value with the namespace and path applied
zeroVal := &structs.SecureVariableDecrypted{
SecureVariableMetadata: structs.SecureVariableMetadata{
Namespace: namespace,
Path: path,
CreateIndex: 0,
CreateTime: 0,
ModifyIndex: 0,
ModifyTime: 0,
},
Items: nil,
}
*conflictOut = zeroVal
return casConflict
}
if exist != nil && exist.ModifyIndex != cidx {
dec, err := s.decrypt(exist)
if err != nil {
// we can't return the conflict and we will have to bail out
decErrStr := fmt.Sprintf(". Additional error decrypting conflict: %s", err)
return fmt.Errorf("cas error: requested index %v; found index %v%s", cidx, exist.ModifyIndex, decErrStr)
}
*conflictOut = dec
return casConflict
}
return nil
}