open-nomad/client/client.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package client
import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
"net"
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"net/rpc"
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"os"
"path/filepath"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics"
consulapi "github.com/hashicorp/consul/api"
hclog "github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
multierror "github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocdir"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocrunner"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocrunner/interfaces"
arstate "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocrunner/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocrunner/taskrunner/getter"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocwatcher"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/config"
consulApi "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/consul"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/devicemanager"
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/dynamicplugins"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/fingerprint"
cinterfaces "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/interfaces"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/lib/cgutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/pluginmanager"
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/pluginmanager/csimanager"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/pluginmanager/drivermanager"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/servers"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/serviceregistration"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/serviceregistration/checks/checkstore"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/serviceregistration/nsd"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/serviceregistration/wrapper"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/state"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/stats"
cstructs "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/structs"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/vaultclient"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/command/agent/consul"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/envoy"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/pointer"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/pool"
hstats "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/stats"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/tlsutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/uuid"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs"
nconfig "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs/config"
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/plugins/csi"
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"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/plugins/device"
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vaultapi "github.com/hashicorp/vault/api"
"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/host"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
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)
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const (
// clientRPCCache controls how long we keep an idle connection
// open to a server
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clientRPCCache = 5 * time.Minute
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// clientMaxStreams controls how many idle streams we keep
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// open to a server
clientMaxStreams = 2
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// datacenterQueryLimit searches through up to this many adjacent
// datacenters looking for the Nomad server service.
datacenterQueryLimit = 9
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// registerRetryIntv is minimum interval on which we retry
// registration. We pick a value between this and 2x this.
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registerRetryIntv = 15 * time.Second
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// getAllocRetryIntv is minimum interval on which we retry
// to fetch allocations. We pick a value between this and 2x this.
getAllocRetryIntv = 30 * time.Second
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// devModeRetryIntv is the retry interval used for development
devModeRetryIntv = time.Second
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// noServerRetryIntv is the retry interval used when client has not
// connected to server yet
noServerRetryIntv = time.Second
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// stateSnapshotIntv is how often the client snapshots state
stateSnapshotIntv = 60 * time.Second
// initialHeartbeatStagger is used to stagger the interval between
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// starting and the initial heartbeat. After the initial heartbeat,
// we switch to using the TTL specified by the servers.
initialHeartbeatStagger = 10 * time.Second
// nodeUpdateRetryIntv is how often the client checks for updates to the
// node attributes or meta map.
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nodeUpdateRetryIntv = 5 * time.Second
// allocSyncIntv is the batching period of allocation updates before they
// are synced with the server.
allocSyncIntv = 200 * time.Millisecond
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// allocSyncRetryIntv is the interval on which we retry updating
// the status of the allocation
allocSyncRetryIntv = 5 * time.Second
// defaultConnectLogLevel is the log level set in the node meta by default
// to be used by Consul Connect sidecar tasks.
defaultConnectLogLevel = "info"
// defaultConnectProxyConcurrency is the default number of worker threads the
// connect sidecar should be configured to use.
//
// https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/operations/cli#cmdoption-concurrency
defaultConnectProxyConcurrency = "1"
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)
var (
// grace period to allow for batch fingerprint processing
batchFirstFingerprintsProcessingGrace = batchFirstFingerprintsTimeout + 5*time.Second
)
// ClientStatsReporter exposes all the APIs related to resource usage of a Nomad
// Client
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type ClientStatsReporter interface {
// GetAllocStats returns the AllocStatsReporter for the passed allocation.
// If it does not exist an error is reported.
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GetAllocStats(allocID string) (interfaces.AllocStatsReporter, error)
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// LatestHostStats returns the latest resource usage stats for the host
LatestHostStats() *stats.HostStats
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}
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// Client is used to implement the client interaction with Nomad. Clients
// are expected to register as a schedule-able node to the servers, and to
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// run allocations as determined by the servers.
type Client struct {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
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start time.Time
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// stateDB is used to efficiently store client state.
stateDB state.StateDB
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client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
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// config must only be accessed with lock held. To update the config, use the
// Client.UpdateConfig() helper. If you need more fine grained control use
// the following pattern:
//
// c.configLock.Lock()
// newConfig := c.config.Copy()
// // <mutate newConfig>
// c.config = newConfig
// c.configLock.Unlock()
configLock sync.Mutex
config *config.Config
metaDynamic map[string]*string // dynamic node metadata
// metaStatic are the Node's static metadata set via the agent configuration
// and defaults during client initialization. Since this map is never updated
// at runtime it may be accessed outside of locks.
metaStatic map[string]string
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logger hclog.InterceptLogger
rpcLogger hclog.Logger
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connPool *pool.ConnPool
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// tlsWrap is used to wrap outbound connections using TLS. It should be
// accessed using the lock.
tlsWrap tlsutil.RegionWrapper
tlsWrapLock sync.RWMutex
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// servers is the list of nomad servers
servers *servers.Manager
// heartbeat related times for tracking how often to heartbeat
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heartbeatTTL time.Duration
haveHeartbeated bool
heartbeatLock sync.Mutex
heartbeatStop *heartbeatStop
// triggerDiscoveryCh triggers Consul discovery; see triggerDiscovery
triggerDiscoveryCh chan struct{}
// triggerNodeUpdate triggers the client to mark the Node as changed and
// update it.
triggerNodeUpdate chan struct{}
// triggerEmitNodeEvent sends an event and triggers the client to update the
// server for the node event
triggerEmitNodeEvent chan *structs.NodeEvent
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// rpcRetryCh is closed when there an event such as server discovery or a
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// successful RPC occurring happens such that a retry should happen. Access
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// should only occur via the getter method
rpcRetryCh chan struct{}
rpcRetryLock sync.Mutex
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// allocs maps alloc IDs to their AllocRunner. This map includes all
// AllocRunners - running and GC'd - until the server GCs them.
allocs map[string]interfaces.AllocRunner
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allocLock sync.RWMutex
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// allocrunnerFactory is the function called to create new allocrunners
allocrunnerFactory config.AllocRunnerFactory
// invalidAllocs is a map that tracks allocations that failed because
// the client couldn't initialize alloc or task runners for it. This can
// happen due to driver errors
invalidAllocs map[string]struct{}
invalidAllocsLock sync.Mutex
// pendingUpdates stores allocations that need to be synced to the server.
pendingUpdates *pendingClientUpdates
// consulService is the Consul handler implementation for managing services
// and checks.
consulService serviceregistration.Handler
// nomadService is the Nomad handler implementation for managing service
// registrations.
nomadService serviceregistration.Handler
// checkStore is used to store group and task checks and their current pass/fail
// status.
checkStore checkstore.Shim
// serviceRegWrapper wraps the consulService and nomadService
// implementations so that the alloc and task runner service hooks can call
// this without needing to identify which backend provider should be used.
serviceRegWrapper *wrapper.HandlerWrapper
// consulProxies is Nomad's custom Consul client for looking up supported
// envoy versions
consulProxies consulApi.SupportedProxiesAPI
// consulCatalog is the subset of Consul's Catalog API Nomad uses.
consulCatalog consul.CatalogAPI
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// HostStatsCollector collects host resource usage stats
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hostStatsCollector *stats.HostStatsCollector
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// shutdown is true when the Client has been shutdown. Must hold
// shutdownLock to access.
shutdown bool
// shutdownCh is closed to signal the Client is shutting down.
shutdownCh chan struct{}
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shutdownLock sync.Mutex
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// shutdownGroup are goroutines that exit when shutdownCh is closed.
// Shutdown() blocks on Wait() after closing shutdownCh.
shutdownGroup group
// tokensClient is Nomad Client's custom Consul client for requesting Consul
// Service Identity tokens through Nomad Server.
tokensClient consulApi.ServiceIdentityAPI
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// vaultClient is used to interact with Vault for token and secret renewals
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vaultClient vaultclient.VaultClient
// garbageCollector is used to garbage collect terminal allocations present
// in the node automatically
garbageCollector *AllocGarbageCollector
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// clientACLResolver holds the ACL resolution state
clientACLResolver
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// rpcServer is used to serve RPCs by the local agent.
rpcServer *rpc.Server
endpoints rpcEndpoints
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streamingRpcs *structs.StreamingRpcRegistry
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// fingerprintManager is the FingerprintManager registered by the client
fingerprintManager *FingerprintManager
// pluginManagers is the set of PluginManagers registered by the client
pluginManagers *pluginmanager.PluginGroup
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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// csimanager is responsible for managing csi plugins.
csimanager csimanager.Manager
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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// devicemanger is responsible for managing device plugins.
devicemanager devicemanager.Manager
// drivermanager is responsible for managing driver plugins
drivermanager drivermanager.Manager
// baseLabels are used when emitting tagged metrics. All client metrics will
// have these tags, and optionally more.
baseLabels []metrics.Label
// batchNodeUpdates is used to batch initial updates to the node
batchNodeUpdates *batchNodeUpdates
// fpInitialized chan is closed when the first batch of fingerprints are
// applied to the node
fpInitialized chan struct{}
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
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// registeredCh is closed when Node.Register has successfully run once.
registeredCh chan struct{}
registeredOnce sync.Once
// serversContactedCh is closed when GetClientAllocs and runAllocs have
// successfully run once.
serversContactedCh chan struct{}
serversContactedOnce sync.Once
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
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// dynamicRegistry provides access to plugins that are dynamically registered
// with a nomad client. Currently only used for CSI.
dynamicRegistry dynamicplugins.Registry
// cpusetManager configures cpusets on supported platforms
cpusetManager cgutil.CpusetManager
// EnterpriseClient is used to set and check enterprise features for clients
EnterpriseClient *EnterpriseClient
// getter is an interface for retrieving artifacts.
getter cinterfaces.ArtifactGetter
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}
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var (
// noServersErr is returned by the RPC method when the client has no
// configured servers. This is used to trigger Consul discovery if
// enabled.
noServersErr = errors.New("no servers")
)
// NewClient is used to create a new client from the given configuration.
// `rpcs` is a map of RPC names to RPC structs that, if non-nil, will be
// registered via https://golang.org/pkg/net/rpc/#Server.RegisterName in place
// of the client's normal RPC handlers. This allows server tests to override
// the behavior of the client.
func NewClient(cfg *config.Config, consulCatalog consul.CatalogAPI, consulProxies consulApi.SupportedProxiesAPI, consulService serviceregistration.Handler, rpcs map[string]interface{}) (*Client, error) {
2016-10-25 23:01:53 +00:00
// Create the tls wrapper
2016-11-01 18:55:29 +00:00
var tlsWrap tlsutil.RegionWrapper
2016-10-25 22:57:38 +00:00
if cfg.TLSConfig.EnableRPC {
tw, err := tlsutil.NewTLSConfiguration(cfg.TLSConfig, true, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tlsWrap, err = tw.OutgoingTLSWrapper()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if cfg.StateDBFactory == nil {
cfg.StateDBFactory = state.GetStateDBFactory(cfg.DevMode)
}
2018-09-17 21:22:40 +00:00
// Create the logger
logger := cfg.Logger.ResetNamedIntercept("client")
2018-09-17 21:22:40 +00:00
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
// Create the client
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
c := &Client{
config: cfg,
consulCatalog: consulCatalog,
consulProxies: consulProxies,
consulService: consulService,
start: time.Now(),
2018-09-17 21:22:40 +00:00
connPool: pool.NewPool(logger, clientRPCCache, clientMaxStreams, tlsWrap),
tlsWrap: tlsWrap,
streamingRpcs: structs.NewStreamingRpcRegistry(),
2018-09-17 22:44:37 +00:00
logger: logger,
rpcLogger: logger.Named("rpc"),
allocs: make(map[string]interfaces.AllocRunner),
pendingUpdates: newPendingClientUpdates(),
shutdownCh: make(chan struct{}),
triggerDiscoveryCh: make(chan struct{}),
triggerNodeUpdate: make(chan struct{}, 8),
triggerEmitNodeEvent: make(chan *structs.NodeEvent, 8),
fpInitialized: make(chan struct{}),
invalidAllocs: make(map[string]struct{}),
serversContactedCh: make(chan struct{}),
serversContactedOnce: sync.Once{},
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
registeredCh: make(chan struct{}),
registeredOnce: sync.Once{},
cpusetManager: cgutil.CreateCPUSetManager(cfg.CgroupParent, cfg.ReservableCores, logger),
getter: getter.New(cfg.Artifact, logger),
2020-05-28 19:43:16 +00:00
EnterpriseClient: newEnterpriseClient(logger),
allocrunnerFactory: cfg.AllocRunnerFactory,
}
// we can't have this set in the default Config because of import cycles
if c.allocrunnerFactory == nil {
c.allocrunnerFactory = allocrunner.NewAllocRunner
}
c.batchNodeUpdates = newBatchNodeUpdates(
c.updateNodeFromDriver,
c.updateNodeFromDevices,
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
c.updateNodeFromCSI,
)
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
// Initialize the server manager
c.servers = servers.New(c.logger, c.shutdownCh, c)
// Start server manager rebalancing go routine
go c.servers.Start()
// initialize the client
if err := c.init(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize client: %v", err)
2015-09-12 18:47:44 +00:00
}
// initialize the dynamic registry (needs to happen after init)
c.dynamicRegistry =
dynamicplugins.NewRegistry(c.stateDB, map[string]dynamicplugins.PluginDispenser{
dynamicplugins.PluginTypeCSIController: func(info *dynamicplugins.PluginInfo) (interface{}, error) {
return csi.NewClient(info.ConnectionInfo.SocketPath, logger.Named("csi_client").With("plugin.name", info.Name, "plugin.type", "controller")), nil
},
dynamicplugins.PluginTypeCSINode: func(info *dynamicplugins.PluginInfo) (interface{}, error) {
return csi.NewClient(info.ConnectionInfo.SocketPath, logger.Named("csi_client").With("plugin.name", info.Name, "plugin.type", "client")), nil
},
})
2018-01-11 19:24:57 +00:00
// Setup the clients RPC server
c.setupClientRpc(rpcs)
2018-01-11 19:24:57 +00:00
2017-08-23 20:49:08 +00:00
// Initialize the ACL state
c.clientACLResolver.init()
2017-08-23 20:49:08 +00:00
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
// Setup the node
if err := c.setupNode(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("node setup failed: %v", err)
}
c.fingerprintManager = NewFingerprintManager(
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
cfg.PluginSingletonLoader, c.GetConfig, cfg.Node,
c.shutdownCh, c.updateNodeFromFingerprint, c.logger)
c.pluginManagers = pluginmanager.New(c.logger)
2018-01-24 13:01:37 +00:00
2018-02-05 23:02:52 +00:00
// Fingerprint the node and scan for drivers
if err := c.fingerprintManager.Run(); err != nil {
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
return nil, fmt.Errorf("fingerprinting failed: %v", err)
}
2015-08-20 23:53:43 +00:00
// Build the allow/denylists of drivers.
2020-10-14 22:17:47 +00:00
// COMPAT(1.0) uses inclusive language. white/blacklist are there for backward compatible reasons only.
allowlistDrivers := cfg.ReadStringListToMap("driver.allowlist", "driver.whitelist")
blocklistDrivers := cfg.ReadStringListToMap("driver.denylist", "driver.blacklist")
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
// Setup the csi manager
csiConfig := &csimanager.Config{
Logger: c.logger,
DynamicRegistry: c.dynamicRegistry,
UpdateNodeCSIInfoFunc: c.batchNodeUpdates.updateNodeFromCSI,
TriggerNodeEvent: c.triggerNodeEvent,
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
}
csiManager := csimanager.New(csiConfig)
c.csimanager = csiManager
c.pluginManagers.RegisterAndRun(csiManager.PluginManager())
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
// Setup the driver manager
driverConfig := &drivermanager.Config{
Logger: c.logger,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
Loader: cfg.PluginSingletonLoader,
PluginConfig: cfg.NomadPluginConfig(),
Updater: c.batchNodeUpdates.updateNodeFromDriver,
EventHandlerFactory: c.GetTaskEventHandler,
State: c.stateDB,
AllowedDrivers: allowlistDrivers,
BlockedDrivers: blocklistDrivers,
}
drvManager := drivermanager.New(driverConfig)
c.drivermanager = drvManager
c.pluginManagers.RegisterAndRun(drvManager)
// Setup the device manager
devConfig := &devicemanager.Config{
Logger: c.logger,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
Loader: cfg.PluginSingletonLoader,
PluginConfig: cfg.NomadPluginConfig(),
Updater: c.batchNodeUpdates.updateNodeFromDevices,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
StatsInterval: cfg.StatsCollectionInterval,
State: c.stateDB,
}
devManager := devicemanager.New(devConfig)
c.devicemanager = devManager
c.pluginManagers.RegisterAndRun(devManager)
// Set up the service registration wrapper using the Consul and Nomad
// implementations. The Nomad implementation is only ever used on the
// client, so we do that here rather than within the agent.
c.setupNomadServiceRegistrationHandler()
c.serviceRegWrapper = wrapper.NewHandlerWrapper(c.logger, c.consulService, c.nomadService)
// Batching of initial fingerprints is done to reduce the number of node
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
// updates sent to the server on startup.
go c.batchFirstFingerprints()
// create heartbeatStop. We go after the first attempt to connect to the server, so
// that our grace period for connection goes for the full time
c.heartbeatStop = newHeartbeatStop(c.getAllocRunner, batchFirstFingerprintsTimeout, logger, c.shutdownCh)
// Watch for disconnection, and heartbeatStopAllocs configured to have a maximum
// lifetime when out of touch with the server
go c.heartbeatStop.watch()
// Add the stats collector
statsCollector := stats.NewHostStatsCollector(c.logger, c.GetConfig().AllocDir, c.devicemanager.AllStats)
c.hostStatsCollector = statsCollector
// Add the garbage collector
gcConfig := &GCConfig{
MaxAllocs: cfg.GCMaxAllocs,
DiskUsageThreshold: cfg.GCDiskUsageThreshold,
InodeUsageThreshold: cfg.GCInodeUsageThreshold,
Interval: cfg.GCInterval,
ParallelDestroys: cfg.GCParallelDestroys,
ReservedDiskMB: cfg.Node.Reserved.DiskMB,
}
c.garbageCollector = NewAllocGarbageCollector(c.logger, statsCollector, c, gcConfig)
go c.garbageCollector.Run()
// Set the preconfigured list of static servers
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if len(cfg.Servers) > 0 {
if _, err := c.setServersImpl(cfg.Servers, true); err != nil {
logger.Warn("none of the configured servers are valid", "error", err)
}
}
// Setup Consul discovery if enabled
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if cfg.ConsulConfig.ClientAutoJoin != nil && *cfg.ConsulConfig.ClientAutoJoin {
c.shutdownGroup.Go(c.consulDiscovery)
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
if c.servers.NumServers() == 0 {
// No configured servers; trigger discovery manually
c.triggerDiscoveryCh <- struct{}{}
}
}
if err := c.setupConsulTokenClient(); err != nil {
2022-04-02 00:24:02 +00:00
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to setup consul tokens client: %w", err)
}
2016-08-18 03:28:48 +00:00
// Setup the vault client for token and secret renewals
if err := c.setupVaultClient(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to setup vault client: %v", err)
}
// wait until drivers are healthy before restoring or registering with servers
select {
case <-c.fpInitialized:
case <-time.After(batchFirstFingerprintsProcessingGrace):
2019-04-19 13:31:43 +00:00
logger.Warn("batch fingerprint operation timed out; proceeding to register with fingerprinted plugins so far")
}
// Register and then start heartbeating to the servers.
c.shutdownGroup.Go(c.registerAndHeartbeat)
2016-09-14 20:30:01 +00:00
// Restore the state
if err := c.restoreState(); err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to restore state", "error", err)
logger.Error("Nomad is unable to start due to corrupt state. "+
"The safest way to proceed is to manually stop running task processes "+
"and remove Nomad's state and alloc directories before "+
2017-07-03 19:29:21 +00:00
"restarting. Lost allocations will be rescheduled.",
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
"state_dir", cfg.StateDir, "alloc_dir", cfg.AllocDir)
logger.Error("Corrupt state is often caused by a bug. Please " +
"report as much information as possible to " +
"https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to restore state")
2016-09-14 20:30:01 +00:00
}
// Begin periodic snapshotting of state.
c.shutdownGroup.Go(c.periodicSnapshot)
// Begin syncing allocations to the server
c.shutdownGroup.Go(c.allocSync)
// Start the client! Don't use the shutdownGroup as run handles
// shutdowns manually to prevent updates from being applied during
// shutdown.
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
go c.run()
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
// Start collecting stats
c.shutdownGroup.Go(c.emitStats)
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
c.logger.Info("started client", "node_id", c.NodeID())
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
return c, nil
2015-08-23 23:53:15 +00:00
}
// Ready returns a chan that is closed when the client is fully initialized
func (c *Client) Ready() <-chan struct{} {
return c.serversContactedCh
}
2015-09-12 18:47:44 +00:00
// init is used to initialize the client and perform any setup
// needed before we begin starting its various components.
func (c *Client) init() error {
2015-09-24 21:29:53 +00:00
// Ensure the state dir exists if we have one
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
conf := c.GetConfig()
if conf.StateDir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(conf.StateDir, 0700); err != nil {
2015-09-24 21:29:53 +00:00
return fmt.Errorf("failed creating state dir: %s", err)
}
2015-11-11 00:03:18 +00:00
} else {
2018-03-11 18:34:27 +00:00
// Otherwise make a temp directory to use.
p, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "NomadClient")
2015-11-11 00:03:18 +00:00
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed creating temporary directory for the StateDir: %v", err)
}
p, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(p)
if err != nil {
2016-10-11 23:16:06 +00:00
return fmt.Errorf("failed to find temporary directory for the StateDir: %v", err)
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
conf = c.UpdateConfig(func(c *config.Config) {
c.StateDir = p
})
2015-09-24 21:29:53 +00:00
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.logger.Info("using state directory", "state_dir", conf.StateDir)
2015-09-24 21:29:53 +00:00
// Open the state database
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
db, err := conf.StateDBFactory(c.logger, conf.StateDir)
2017-04-29 22:43:23 +00:00
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to open state database: %v", err)
2017-04-29 22:43:23 +00:00
}
// Upgrade the state database
if err := db.Upgrade(); err != nil {
// Upgrade only returns an error on critical persistence
// failures in which an operator should intervene before the
// node is accessible. Upgrade drops and logs corrupt state it
// encounters, so failing to start the agent should be extremely
// rare.
return fmt.Errorf("failed to upgrade state database: %v", err)
}
2017-04-29 22:43:23 +00:00
c.stateDB = db
// Ensure the alloc dir exists if we have one
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if conf.AllocDir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(conf.AllocDir, 0711); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed creating alloc dir: %s", err)
}
2015-09-26 01:12:11 +00:00
} else {
2018-03-11 18:34:27 +00:00
// Otherwise make a temp directory to use.
p, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "NomadClient")
2015-09-26 01:12:11 +00:00
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed creating temporary directory for the AllocDir: %v", err)
}
p, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(p)
if err != nil {
2016-10-11 23:16:06 +00:00
return fmt.Errorf("failed to find temporary directory for the AllocDir: %v", err)
}
// Change the permissions to have the execute bit
2017-05-25 21:44:13 +00:00
if err := os.Chmod(p, 0711); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to change directory permissions for the AllocDir: %v", err)
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
conf = c.UpdateConfig(func(c *config.Config) {
c.AllocDir = p
})
2015-09-12 18:47:44 +00:00
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.logger.Info("using alloc directory", "alloc_dir", conf.AllocDir)
reserved := "<none>"
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if conf.Node != nil && conf.Node.ReservedResources != nil {
// Node should always be non-nil due to initialization in the
// agent package, but don't risk a panic just for a long line.
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
reserved = conf.Node.ReservedResources.Networks.ReservedHostPorts
}
c.logger.Info("using dynamic ports",
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
"min", conf.MinDynamicPort,
"max", conf.MaxDynamicPort,
"reserved", reserved,
)
// startup the CPUSet manager
c.cpusetManager.Init()
// setup the nsd check store
c.checkStore = checkstore.NewStore(c.logger, c.stateDB)
2015-09-12 18:47:44 +00:00
return nil
}
client: enable support for cgroups v2 This PR introduces support for using Nomad on systems with cgroups v2 [1] enabled as the cgroups controller mounted on /sys/fs/cgroups. Newer Linux distros like Ubuntu 21.10 are shipping with cgroups v2 only, causing problems for Nomad users. Nomad mostly "just works" with cgroups v2 due to the indirection via libcontainer, but not so for managing cpuset cgroups. Before, Nomad has been making use of a feature in v1 where a PID could be a member of more than one cgroup. In v2 this is no longer possible, and so the logic around computing cpuset values must be modified. When Nomad detects v2, it manages cpuset values in-process, rather than making use of cgroup heirarchy inheritence via shared/reserved parents. Nomad will only activate the v2 logic when it detects cgroups2 is mounted at /sys/fs/cgroups. This means on systems running in hybrid mode with cgroups2 mounted at /sys/fs/cgroups/unified (as is typical) Nomad will continue to use the v1 logic, and should operate as before. Systems that do not support cgroups v2 are also not affected. When v2 is activated, Nomad will create a parent called nomad.slice (unless otherwise configured in Client conifg), and create cgroups for tasks using naming convention <allocID>-<task>.scope. These follow the naming convention set by systemd and also used by Docker when cgroups v2 is detected. Client nodes now export a new fingerprint attribute, unique.cgroups.version which will be set to 'v1' or 'v2' to indicate the cgroups regime in use by Nomad. The new cpuset management strategy fixes #11705, where docker tasks that spawned processes on startup would "leak". In cgroups v2, the PIDs are started in the cgroup they will always live in, and thus the cause of the leak is eliminated. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.html Closes #11289 Fixes #11705 #11773 #11933
2022-02-28 22:24:01 +00:00
// reloadTLSConnections allows a client to reload its TLS configuration on the fly
func (c *Client) reloadTLSConnections(newConfig *nconfig.TLSConfig) error {
var tlsWrap tlsutil.RegionWrapper
if newConfig != nil && newConfig.EnableRPC {
tw, err := tlsutil.NewTLSConfiguration(newConfig, true, true)
if err != nil {
return err
}
twWrap, err := tw.OutgoingTLSWrapper()
if err != nil {
return err
}
tlsWrap = twWrap
}
2018-02-15 23:22:57 +00:00
// Store the new tls wrapper.
c.tlsWrapLock.Lock()
c.tlsWrap = tlsWrap
c.tlsWrapLock.Unlock()
// Keep the client configuration up to date as we use configuration values to
// decide on what type of connections to accept
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.UpdateConfig(func(c *config.Config) {
c.TLSConfig = newConfig
})
c.connPool.ReloadTLS(tlsWrap)
return nil
}
// Reload allows a client to reload parts of its configuration on the fly
func (c *Client) Reload(newConfig *config.Config) error {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
existing := c.GetConfig()
shouldReloadTLS, err := tlsutil.ShouldReloadRPCConnections(existing.TLSConfig, newConfig.TLSConfig)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error parsing TLS configuration", "error", err)
return err
}
if shouldReloadTLS {
if err := c.reloadTLSConnections(newConfig.TLSConfig); err != nil {
return err
}
}
c.fingerprintManager.Reload()
return nil
}
2015-08-23 23:53:15 +00:00
// Leave is used to prepare the client to leave the cluster
func (c *Client) Leave() error {
if c.GetConfig().DevMode {
return nil
}
// In normal mode optionally drain the node
return c.DrainSelf()
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
// GetConfig returns the config of the client. Do *not* mutate without first
// calling Copy().
func (c *Client) GetConfig() *config.Config {
2018-02-05 23:02:52 +00:00
c.configLock.Lock()
defer c.configLock.Unlock()
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.config
}
// UpdateConfig allows mutating the configuration. The updated configuration is
// returned.
func (c *Client) UpdateConfig(cb func(*config.Config)) *config.Config {
c.configLock.Lock()
defer c.configLock.Unlock()
// Create a copy of the active config
newConfig := c.config.Copy()
// Pass the copy to the supplied callback for mutation
cb(newConfig)
// Set new config struct
c.config = newConfig
return newConfig
}
// UpdateNode allows mutating just the Node portion of the client
// configuration. The updated Node is returned.
//
// This is similar to UpdateConfig but avoids deep copying the entier Config
// struct when only the Node is updated.
func (c *Client) UpdateNode(cb func(*structs.Node)) *structs.Node {
c.configLock.Lock()
defer c.configLock.Unlock()
// Create a new copy of Node for updating
newNode := c.config.Node.Copy()
// newNode is now a fresh unshared copy, mutate away!
cb(newNode)
// Shallow copy config before mutating Node pointer which might have
// concurrent readers
newConfig := *c.config
newConfig.Node = newNode
c.config = &newConfig
return newNode
}
// Datacenter returns the datacenter for the given client
func (c *Client) Datacenter() string {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.GetConfig().Node.Datacenter
}
// Region returns the region for the given client
func (c *Client) Region() string {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.GetConfig().Region
}
// NodeID returns the node ID for the given client
func (c *Client) NodeID() string {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.GetConfig().Node.ID
}
// secretNodeID returns the secret node ID for the given client
func (c *Client) secretNodeID() string {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.GetConfig().Node.SecretID
}
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
// Shutdown is used to tear down the client
func (c *Client) Shutdown() error {
c.shutdownLock.Lock()
defer c.shutdownLock.Unlock()
if c.shutdown {
c.logger.Info("already shutdown")
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
return nil
}
c.logger.Info("shutting down")
2017-04-29 22:43:23 +00:00
2016-08-18 03:28:48 +00:00
// Stop renewing tokens and secrets
if c.vaultClient != nil {
c.vaultClient.Stop()
}
// Stop Garbage collector
c.garbageCollector.Stop()
arGroup := group{}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if c.GetConfig().DevMode {
// In DevMode destroy all the running allocations.
for _, ar := range c.getAllocRunners() {
ar.Destroy()
arGroup.AddCh(ar.DestroyCh())
2015-10-04 20:36:03 +00:00
}
} else {
// In normal mode call shutdown
for _, ar := range c.getAllocRunners() {
ar.Shutdown()
arGroup.AddCh(ar.ShutdownCh())
}
2015-10-04 20:36:03 +00:00
}
arGroup.Wait()
2015-10-04 20:36:03 +00:00
// Assert the implementation, so we can trigger the shutdown call. This is
// the only place this occurs, so it's OK to store the interface rather
// than the implementation.
if h, ok := c.nomadService.(*nsd.ServiceRegistrationHandler); ok {
h.Shutdown()
}
2018-12-21 19:23:21 +00:00
// Shutdown the plugin managers
c.pluginManagers.Shutdown()
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
c.shutdown = true
close(c.shutdownCh)
// Must close connection pool to unblock alloc watcher
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
c.connPool.Shutdown()
// Wait for goroutines to stop
c.shutdownGroup.Wait()
// One final save state
c.saveState()
return c.stateDB.Close()
2015-08-20 22:25:09 +00:00
}
2015-08-20 23:07:26 +00:00
// Stats is used to return statistics for debugging and insight
// for various sub-systems
func (c *Client) Stats() map[string]map[string]string {
c.heartbeatLock.Lock()
defer c.heartbeatLock.Unlock()
2015-08-20 23:07:26 +00:00
stats := map[string]map[string]string{
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"client": {
"node_id": c.NodeID(),
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
"known_servers": strings.Join(c.GetServers(), ","),
"num_allocations": strconv.Itoa(c.NumAllocs()),
"last_heartbeat": fmt.Sprintf("%v", time.Since(c.lastHeartbeat())),
2015-09-22 22:29:30 +00:00
"heartbeat_ttl": fmt.Sprintf("%v", c.heartbeatTTL),
2015-08-20 23:07:26 +00:00
},
2018-01-12 21:58:44 +00:00
"runtime": hstats.RuntimeStats(),
2015-08-20 23:07:26 +00:00
}
return stats
}
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
// GetAlloc returns an allocation or an error.
func (c *Client) GetAlloc(allocID string) (*structs.Allocation, error) {
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ar.Alloc(), nil
}
// SignalAllocation sends a signal to the tasks within an allocation.
// If the provided task is empty, then every allocation will be signalled.
// If a task is provided, then only an exactly matching task will be signalled.
func (c *Client) SignalAllocation(allocID, task, signal string) error {
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return ar.Signal(task, signal)
}
// CollectAllocation garbage collects a single allocation on a node. Returns
// true if alloc was found and garbage collected; otherwise false.
func (c *Client) CollectAllocation(allocID string) bool {
return c.garbageCollector.Collect(allocID)
}
// CollectAllAllocs garbage collects all allocations on a node in the terminal
// state
func (c *Client) CollectAllAllocs() {
c.garbageCollector.CollectAll()
}
Task lifecycle restart (#14127) * allocrunner: handle lifecycle when all tasks die When all tasks die the Coordinator must transition to its terminal state, coordinatorStatePoststop, to unblock poststop tasks. Since this could happen at any time (for example, a prestart task dies), all states must be able to transition to this terminal state. * allocrunner: implement different alloc restarts Add a new alloc restart mode where all tasks are restarted, even if they have already exited. Also unifies the alloc restart logic to use the implementation that restarts tasks concurrently and ignores ErrTaskNotRunning errors since those are expected when restarting the allocation. * allocrunner: allow tasks to run again Prevent the task runner Run() method from exiting to allow a dead task to run again. When the task runner is signaled to restart, the function will jump back to the MAIN loop and run it again. The task runner determines if a task needs to run again based on two new task events that were added to differentiate between a request to restart a specific task, the tasks that are currently running, or all tasks that have already run. * api/cli: add support for all tasks alloc restart Implement the new -all-tasks alloc restart CLI flag and its API counterpar, AllTasks. The client endpoint calls the appropriate restart method from the allocrunner depending on the restart parameters used. * test: fix tasklifecycle Coordinator test * allocrunner: kill taskrunners if all tasks are dead When all non-poststop tasks are dead we need to kill the taskrunners so we don't leak their goroutines, which are blocked in the alloc restart loop. This also ensures the allocrunner exits on its own. * taskrunner: fix tests that waited on WaitCh Now that "dead" tasks may run again, the taskrunner Run() method will not return when the task finishes running, so tests must wait for the task state to be "dead" instead of using the WaitCh, since it won't be closed until the taskrunner is killed. * tests: add tests for all tasks alloc restart * changelog: add entry for #14127 * taskrunner: fix restore logic. The first implementation of the task runner restore process relied on server data (`tr.Alloc().TerminalStatus()`) which may not be available to the client at the time of restore. It also had the incorrect code path. When restoring a dead task the driver handle always needs to be clear cleanly using `clearDriverHandle` otherwise, after exiting the MAIN loop, the task may be killed by `tr.handleKill`. The fix is to store the state of the Run() loop in the task runner local client state: if the task runner ever exits this loop cleanly (not with a shutdown) it will never be able to run again. So if the Run() loops starts with this local state flag set, it must exit early. This local state flag is also being checked on task restart requests. If the task is "dead" and its Run() loop is not active it will never be able to run again. * address code review requests * apply more code review changes * taskrunner: add different Restart modes Using the task event to differentiate between the allocrunner restart methods proved to be confusing for developers to understand how it all worked. So instead of relying on the event type, this commit separated the logic of restarting an taskRunner into two methods: - `Restart` will retain the current behaviour and only will only restart the task if it's currently running. - `ForceRestart` is the new method where a `dead` task is allowed to restart if its `Run()` method is still active. Callers will need to restart the allocRunner taskCoordinator to make sure it will allow the task to run again. * minor fixes
2022-08-24 21:43:07 +00:00
func (c *Client) RestartAllocation(allocID, taskName string, allTasks bool) error {
if allTasks && taskName != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("task name cannot be set when restarting all tasks")
}
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if taskName != "" {
Task lifecycle restart (#14127) * allocrunner: handle lifecycle when all tasks die When all tasks die the Coordinator must transition to its terminal state, coordinatorStatePoststop, to unblock poststop tasks. Since this could happen at any time (for example, a prestart task dies), all states must be able to transition to this terminal state. * allocrunner: implement different alloc restarts Add a new alloc restart mode where all tasks are restarted, even if they have already exited. Also unifies the alloc restart logic to use the implementation that restarts tasks concurrently and ignores ErrTaskNotRunning errors since those are expected when restarting the allocation. * allocrunner: allow tasks to run again Prevent the task runner Run() method from exiting to allow a dead task to run again. When the task runner is signaled to restart, the function will jump back to the MAIN loop and run it again. The task runner determines if a task needs to run again based on two new task events that were added to differentiate between a request to restart a specific task, the tasks that are currently running, or all tasks that have already run. * api/cli: add support for all tasks alloc restart Implement the new -all-tasks alloc restart CLI flag and its API counterpar, AllTasks. The client endpoint calls the appropriate restart method from the allocrunner depending on the restart parameters used. * test: fix tasklifecycle Coordinator test * allocrunner: kill taskrunners if all tasks are dead When all non-poststop tasks are dead we need to kill the taskrunners so we don't leak their goroutines, which are blocked in the alloc restart loop. This also ensures the allocrunner exits on its own. * taskrunner: fix tests that waited on WaitCh Now that "dead" tasks may run again, the taskrunner Run() method will not return when the task finishes running, so tests must wait for the task state to be "dead" instead of using the WaitCh, since it won't be closed until the taskrunner is killed. * tests: add tests for all tasks alloc restart * changelog: add entry for #14127 * taskrunner: fix restore logic. The first implementation of the task runner restore process relied on server data (`tr.Alloc().TerminalStatus()`) which may not be available to the client at the time of restore. It also had the incorrect code path. When restoring a dead task the driver handle always needs to be clear cleanly using `clearDriverHandle` otherwise, after exiting the MAIN loop, the task may be killed by `tr.handleKill`. The fix is to store the state of the Run() loop in the task runner local client state: if the task runner ever exits this loop cleanly (not with a shutdown) it will never be able to run again. So if the Run() loops starts with this local state flag set, it must exit early. This local state flag is also being checked on task restart requests. If the task is "dead" and its Run() loop is not active it will never be able to run again. * address code review requests * apply more code review changes * taskrunner: add different Restart modes Using the task event to differentiate between the allocrunner restart methods proved to be confusing for developers to understand how it all worked. So instead of relying on the event type, this commit separated the logic of restarting an taskRunner into two methods: - `Restart` will retain the current behaviour and only will only restart the task if it's currently running. - `ForceRestart` is the new method where a `dead` task is allowed to restart if its `Run()` method is still active. Callers will need to restart the allocRunner taskCoordinator to make sure it will allow the task to run again. * minor fixes
2022-08-24 21:43:07 +00:00
event := structs.NewTaskEvent(structs.TaskRestartSignal).
SetRestartReason("User requested task to restart")
return ar.RestartTask(taskName, event)
}
Task lifecycle restart (#14127) * allocrunner: handle lifecycle when all tasks die When all tasks die the Coordinator must transition to its terminal state, coordinatorStatePoststop, to unblock poststop tasks. Since this could happen at any time (for example, a prestart task dies), all states must be able to transition to this terminal state. * allocrunner: implement different alloc restarts Add a new alloc restart mode where all tasks are restarted, even if they have already exited. Also unifies the alloc restart logic to use the implementation that restarts tasks concurrently and ignores ErrTaskNotRunning errors since those are expected when restarting the allocation. * allocrunner: allow tasks to run again Prevent the task runner Run() method from exiting to allow a dead task to run again. When the task runner is signaled to restart, the function will jump back to the MAIN loop and run it again. The task runner determines if a task needs to run again based on two new task events that were added to differentiate between a request to restart a specific task, the tasks that are currently running, or all tasks that have already run. * api/cli: add support for all tasks alloc restart Implement the new -all-tasks alloc restart CLI flag and its API counterpar, AllTasks. The client endpoint calls the appropriate restart method from the allocrunner depending on the restart parameters used. * test: fix tasklifecycle Coordinator test * allocrunner: kill taskrunners if all tasks are dead When all non-poststop tasks are dead we need to kill the taskrunners so we don't leak their goroutines, which are blocked in the alloc restart loop. This also ensures the allocrunner exits on its own. * taskrunner: fix tests that waited on WaitCh Now that "dead" tasks may run again, the taskrunner Run() method will not return when the task finishes running, so tests must wait for the task state to be "dead" instead of using the WaitCh, since it won't be closed until the taskrunner is killed. * tests: add tests for all tasks alloc restart * changelog: add entry for #14127 * taskrunner: fix restore logic. The first implementation of the task runner restore process relied on server data (`tr.Alloc().TerminalStatus()`) which may not be available to the client at the time of restore. It also had the incorrect code path. When restoring a dead task the driver handle always needs to be clear cleanly using `clearDriverHandle` otherwise, after exiting the MAIN loop, the task may be killed by `tr.handleKill`. The fix is to store the state of the Run() loop in the task runner local client state: if the task runner ever exits this loop cleanly (not with a shutdown) it will never be able to run again. So if the Run() loops starts with this local state flag set, it must exit early. This local state flag is also being checked on task restart requests. If the task is "dead" and its Run() loop is not active it will never be able to run again. * address code review requests * apply more code review changes * taskrunner: add different Restart modes Using the task event to differentiate between the allocrunner restart methods proved to be confusing for developers to understand how it all worked. So instead of relying on the event type, this commit separated the logic of restarting an taskRunner into two methods: - `Restart` will retain the current behaviour and only will only restart the task if it's currently running. - `ForceRestart` is the new method where a `dead` task is allowed to restart if its `Run()` method is still active. Callers will need to restart the allocRunner taskCoordinator to make sure it will allow the task to run again. * minor fixes
2022-08-24 21:43:07 +00:00
if allTasks {
event := structs.NewTaskEvent(structs.TaskRestartSignal).
SetRestartReason("User requested all tasks to restart")
return ar.RestartAll(event)
}
event := structs.NewTaskEvent(structs.TaskRestartSignal).
SetRestartReason("User requested running tasks to restart")
return ar.RestartRunning(event)
}
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
// Node returns the locally registered node
func (c *Client) Node() *structs.Node {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return c.GetConfig().Node
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
}
// getAllocRunner returns an AllocRunner or an UnknownAllocation error if the
// client has no runner for the given alloc ID.
func (c *Client) getAllocRunner(allocID string) (interfaces.AllocRunner, error) {
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
c.allocLock.RLock()
defer c.allocLock.RUnlock()
ar, ok := c.allocs[allocID]
if !ok {
return nil, structs.NewErrUnknownAllocation(allocID)
}
return ar, nil
}
// StatsReporter exposes the various APIs related resource usage of a Nomad
// client
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
func (c *Client) StatsReporter() ClientStatsReporter {
return c
}
2018-10-04 22:45:46 +00:00
func (c *Client) GetAllocStats(allocID string) (interfaces.AllocStatsReporter, error) {
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return ar.StatsReporter(), nil
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
}
// LatestHostStats returns all the stats related to a Nomad client.
func (c *Client) LatestHostStats() *stats.HostStats {
2016-12-12 06:58:28 +00:00
return c.hostStatsCollector.Stats()
}
func (c *Client) LatestDeviceResourceStats(devices []*structs.AllocatedDeviceResource) []*device.DeviceGroupStats {
return c.computeAllocatedDeviceGroupStats(devices, c.LatestHostStats().DeviceStats)
}
func (c *Client) computeAllocatedDeviceGroupStats(devices []*structs.AllocatedDeviceResource, hostDeviceGroupStats []*device.DeviceGroupStats) []*device.DeviceGroupStats {
// basic optimization for the usual case
if len(devices) == 0 || len(hostDeviceGroupStats) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Build an index of allocated devices
adIdx := map[structs.DeviceIdTuple][]string{}
total := 0
for _, ds := range devices {
adIdx[*ds.ID()] = ds.DeviceIDs
total += len(ds.DeviceIDs)
}
// Collect allocated device stats from host stats
result := make([]*device.DeviceGroupStats, 0, len(adIdx))
for _, dg := range hostDeviceGroupStats {
k := structs.DeviceIdTuple{
Vendor: dg.Vendor,
Type: dg.Type,
Name: dg.Name,
}
allocatedDeviceIDs, ok := adIdx[k]
if !ok {
continue
}
rdgStats := &device.DeviceGroupStats{
Vendor: dg.Vendor,
Type: dg.Type,
Name: dg.Name,
InstanceStats: map[string]*device.DeviceStats{},
}
for _, adID := range allocatedDeviceIDs {
deviceStats, ok := dg.InstanceStats[adID]
if !ok || deviceStats == nil {
c.logger.Warn("device not found in stats", "device_id", adID, "device_group_id", k)
continue
}
rdgStats.InstanceStats[adID] = deviceStats
}
result = append(result, rdgStats)
}
return result
}
2017-10-07 00:54:09 +00:00
// ValidateMigrateToken verifies that a token is for a specific client and
2017-10-07 01:54:55 +00:00
// allocation, and has been created by a trusted party that has privileged
2017-10-07 00:54:09 +00:00
// knowledge of the client's secret identifier
func (c *Client) ValidateMigrateToken(allocID, migrateToken string) bool {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
conf := c.GetConfig()
if !conf.ACLEnabled {
return true
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return structs.CompareMigrateToken(allocID, conf.Node.SecretID, migrateToken)
}
// GetAllocFS returns the AllocFS interface for the alloc dir of an allocation
2016-01-14 21:35:42 +00:00
func (c *Client) GetAllocFS(allocID string) (allocdir.AllocDirFS, error) {
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
2016-01-12 23:25:51 +00:00
}
return ar.GetAllocDir(), nil
2016-01-13 05:28:07 +00:00
}
client: expose task state to client The interesting decision in this commit was to expose AR's state and not a fully materialized Allocation struct. AR.clientAlloc builds an Alloc that contains the task state, so I considered simply memoizing and exposing that method. However, that would lead to AR having two awkwardly similar methods: - Alloc() - which returns the server-sent alloc - ClientAlloc() - which returns the fully materialized client alloc Since ClientAlloc() could be memoized it would be just as cheap to call as Alloc(), so why not replace Alloc() entirely? Replacing Alloc() entirely would require Update() to immediately materialize the task states on server-sent Allocs as there may have been local task state changes since the server received an Alloc update. This quickly becomes difficult to reason about: should Update hooks use the TaskStates? Are state changes caused by TR Update hooks immediately reflected in the Alloc? Should AR persist its copy of the Alloc? If so, are its TaskStates canonical or the TaskStates on TR? So! Forget that. Let's separate the static Allocation from the dynamic AR & TR state! - AR.Alloc() is for static Allocation access (often for the Job) - AR.AllocState() is for the dynamic AR & TR runtime state (deployment status, task states, etc). If code needs to know the status of a task: AllocState() If code needs to know the names of tasks: Alloc() It should be very easy for a developer to reason about which method they should call and what they can do with the return values.
2018-09-27 00:08:43 +00:00
// GetAllocState returns a copy of an allocation's state on this client. It
// returns either an AllocState or an unknown allocation error.
func (c *Client) GetAllocState(allocID string) (*arstate.State, error) {
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(allocID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
client: expose task state to client The interesting decision in this commit was to expose AR's state and not a fully materialized Allocation struct. AR.clientAlloc builds an Alloc that contains the task state, so I considered simply memoizing and exposing that method. However, that would lead to AR having two awkwardly similar methods: - Alloc() - which returns the server-sent alloc - ClientAlloc() - which returns the fully materialized client alloc Since ClientAlloc() could be memoized it would be just as cheap to call as Alloc(), so why not replace Alloc() entirely? Replacing Alloc() entirely would require Update() to immediately materialize the task states on server-sent Allocs as there may have been local task state changes since the server received an Alloc update. This quickly becomes difficult to reason about: should Update hooks use the TaskStates? Are state changes caused by TR Update hooks immediately reflected in the Alloc? Should AR persist its copy of the Alloc? If so, are its TaskStates canonical or the TaskStates on TR? So! Forget that. Let's separate the static Allocation from the dynamic AR & TR state! - AR.Alloc() is for static Allocation access (often for the Job) - AR.AllocState() is for the dynamic AR & TR runtime state (deployment status, task states, etc). If code needs to know the status of a task: AllocState() If code needs to know the names of tasks: Alloc() It should be very easy for a developer to reason about which method they should call and what they can do with the return values.
2018-09-27 00:08:43 +00:00
return ar.AllocState(), nil
}
// GetServers returns the list of nomad servers this client is aware of.
func (c *Client) GetServers() []string {
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
endpoints := c.servers.GetServers()
res := make([]string, len(endpoints))
for i := range endpoints {
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
res[i] = endpoints[i].String()
}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
sort.Strings(res)
return res
}
// SetServers sets a new list of nomad servers to connect to. As long as one
// server is resolvable no error is returned.
func (c *Client) SetServers(in []string) (int, error) {
return c.setServersImpl(in, false)
}
// setServersImpl sets a new list of nomad servers to connect to. If force is
2018-03-11 18:55:30 +00:00
// set, we add the server to the internal serverlist even if the server could not
// be pinged. An error is returned if no endpoints were valid when non-forcing.
//
// Force should be used when setting the servers from the initial configuration
// since the server may be starting up in parallel and initial pings may fail.
func (c *Client) setServersImpl(in []string, force bool) (int, error) {
var mu sync.Mutex
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var merr multierror.Error
endpoints := make([]*servers.Server, 0, len(in))
wg.Add(len(in))
for _, s := range in {
go func(srv string) {
defer wg.Done()
addr, err := resolveServer(srv)
if err != nil {
2018-09-06 00:34:17 +00:00
mu.Lock()
c.logger.Debug("ignoring server due to resolution error", "error", err, "server", srv)
merr.Errors = append(merr.Errors, err)
2018-09-06 00:34:17 +00:00
mu.Unlock()
return
}
// Try to ping to check if it is a real server
if err := c.Ping(addr); err != nil {
2018-09-06 00:34:17 +00:00
mu.Lock()
merr.Errors = append(merr.Errors, fmt.Errorf("Server at address %s failed ping: %v", addr, err))
2018-09-06 00:34:17 +00:00
mu.Unlock()
// If we are forcing the setting of the servers, inject it to
// the serverlist even if we can't ping immediately.
if !force {
return
}
}
mu.Lock()
endpoints = append(endpoints, &servers.Server{Addr: addr})
mu.Unlock()
}(s)
}
wg.Wait()
// Only return errors if no servers are valid
if len(endpoints) == 0 {
if len(merr.Errors) > 0 {
return 0, merr.ErrorOrNil()
}
return 0, noServersErr
}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
c.servers.SetServers(endpoints)
return len(endpoints), nil
}
2015-08-23 21:12:26 +00:00
// restoreState is used to restore our state from the data dir
// If there are errors restoring a specific allocation it is marked
// as failed whenever possible.
2015-08-23 21:12:26 +00:00
func (c *Client) restoreState() error {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
conf := c.GetConfig()
if conf.DevMode {
2015-08-23 21:12:26 +00:00
return nil
}
//XXX REMOVED! make a note in backward compat / upgrading doc
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
// COMPAT: Remove in 0.7.0
2018-03-11 19:06:05 +00:00
// 0.6.0 transitioned from individual state files to a single bolt-db.
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
// The upgrade path is to:
// Check if old state exists
// If so, restore from that and delete old state
// Restore using state database
// Restore allocations
allocs, allocErrs, err := c.stateDB.GetAllAllocations()
if err != nil {
return err
}
for allocID, err := range allocErrs {
c.logger.Error("error restoring alloc", "error", err, "alloc_id", allocID)
//TODO Cleanup
// Try to clean up alloc dir
// Remove boltdb entries?
// Send to server with clientstatus=failed
}
// Load each alloc back
for _, alloc := range allocs {
// COMPAT(0.12): remove once upgrading from 0.9.5 is no longer supported
// See hasLocalState for details. Skipping suspicious allocs
// now. If allocs should be run, they will be started when the client
// gets allocs from servers.
if !c.hasLocalState(alloc) {
c.logger.Warn("found an alloc without any local state, skipping restore", "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
continue
}
//XXX On Restore we give up on watching previous allocs because
// we need the local AllocRunners initialized first. We could
// add a second loop to initialize just the alloc watcher.
prevAllocWatcher := allocwatcher.NoopPrevAlloc{}
prevAllocMigrator := allocwatcher.NoopPrevAlloc{}
arConf := &config.AllocRunnerConfig{
Alloc: alloc,
Logger: c.logger,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
ClientConfig: conf,
StateDB: c.stateDB,
StateUpdater: c,
DeviceStatsReporter: c,
Consul: c.consulService,
ConsulSI: c.tokensClient,
ConsulProxies: c.consulProxies,
Vault: c.vaultClient,
PrevAllocWatcher: prevAllocWatcher,
PrevAllocMigrator: prevAllocMigrator,
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
DynamicRegistry: c.dynamicRegistry,
CSIManager: c.csimanager,
CpusetManager: c.cpusetManager,
DeviceManager: c.devicemanager,
DriverManager: c.drivermanager,
ServersContactedCh: c.serversContactedCh,
ServiceRegWrapper: c.serviceRegWrapper,
CheckStore: c.checkStore,
RPCClient: c,
Getter: c.getter,
}
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
ar, err := c.allocrunnerFactory(arConf)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error running alloc", "error", err, "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
c.handleInvalidAllocs(alloc, err)
continue
}
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
// Restore state
if err := ar.Restore(); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error restoring alloc", "error", err, "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
// Override the status of the alloc to failed
ar.SetClientStatus(structs.AllocClientStatusFailed)
// Destroy the alloc runner since this is a failed restore
ar.Destroy()
continue
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
}
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
allocState, err := c.stateDB.GetAcknowledgedState(alloc.ID)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error restoring last acknowledged alloc state, will update again",
err, "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
} else {
ar.AcknowledgeState(allocState)
}
// Maybe mark the alloc for halt on missing server heartbeats
if c.heartbeatStop.shouldStop(alloc) {
err = c.heartbeatStop.stopAlloc(alloc.ID)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error stopping alloc", "error", err, "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
}
continue
}
//XXX is this locking necessary?
c.allocLock.Lock()
c.allocs[alloc.ID] = ar
c.allocLock.Unlock()
c.heartbeatStop.allocHook(alloc)
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
}
// All allocs restored successfully, run them!
2018-07-19 00:04:36 +00:00
c.allocLock.Lock()
for _, ar := range c.allocs {
go ar.Run()
}
2018-07-19 00:04:36 +00:00
c.allocLock.Unlock()
return nil
2015-08-23 21:12:26 +00:00
}
// hasLocalState returns true if we have any other associated state
// with alloc beyond the task itself
//
// Useful for detecting if a potentially completed alloc got resurrected
// after AR was destroyed. In such cases, re-running the alloc lead to
// unexpected reruns and may lead to process and task exhaustion on node.
//
// The heuristic used here is an alloc is suspect if we see no other information
// and no other task/status info is found.
//
// Also, an alloc without any client state will not be restored correctly; there will
// be no tasks processes to reattach to, etc. In such cases, client should
// wait until it gets allocs from server to launch them.
//
// See:
// - https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/pull/6207
// - https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues/5984
//
// COMPAT(0.12): remove once upgrading from 0.9.5 is no longer supported
func (c *Client) hasLocalState(alloc *structs.Allocation) bool {
tg := alloc.Job.LookupTaskGroup(alloc.TaskGroup)
if tg == nil {
// corrupt alloc?!
return false
}
for _, task := range tg.Tasks {
ls, tr, _ := c.stateDB.GetTaskRunnerState(alloc.ID, task.Name)
if ls != nil || tr != nil {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (c *Client) handleInvalidAllocs(alloc *structs.Allocation, err error) {
c.invalidAllocsLock.Lock()
c.invalidAllocs[alloc.ID] = struct{}{}
c.invalidAllocsLock.Unlock()
// Mark alloc as failed so server can handle this
failed := makeFailedAlloc(alloc, err)
c.pendingUpdates.add(failed)
}
2017-05-09 17:50:24 +00:00
// saveState is used to snapshot our state into the data dir.
func (c *Client) saveState() error {
2017-05-01 23:16:53 +00:00
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var l sync.Mutex
var mErr multierror.Error
runners := c.getAllocRunners()
wg.Add(len(runners))
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
for id, ar := range runners {
go func(id string, ar interfaces.AllocRunner) {
err := ar.PersistState()
2017-05-01 23:16:53 +00:00
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error saving alloc state", "error", err, "alloc_id", id)
2017-05-01 23:16:53 +00:00
l.Lock()
_ = multierror.Append(&mErr, err)
2017-05-01 23:16:53 +00:00
l.Unlock()
2017-05-01 22:06:18 +00:00
}
2017-05-01 23:16:53 +00:00
wg.Done()
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
}(id, ar)
}
2017-05-01 22:06:18 +00:00
2017-05-09 17:50:24 +00:00
wg.Wait()
return mErr.ErrorOrNil()
2015-08-23 21:12:26 +00:00
}
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
// getAllocRunners returns a snapshot of the current set of alloc runners.
func (c *Client) getAllocRunners() map[string]interfaces.AllocRunner {
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
c.allocLock.RLock()
defer c.allocLock.RUnlock()
runners := make(map[string]interfaces.AllocRunner, len(c.allocs))
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
for id, ar := range c.allocs {
runners[id] = ar
}
return runners
}
// NumAllocs returns the number of un-GC'd allocs this client has. Used to
// fulfill the AllocCounter interface for the GC.
func (c *Client) NumAllocs() int {
n := 0
c.allocLock.RLock()
for _, a := range c.allocs {
if !a.IsDestroyed() {
n++
}
}
2017-05-31 21:05:47 +00:00
c.allocLock.RUnlock()
return n
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
// ensureNodeID restores, or generates if necessary, a unique node ID and
// SecretID. The node ID is, if available, a persistent unique ID. The secret
// ID is a high-entropy random UUID.
func ensureNodeID(conf *config.Config) (id, secret string, err error) {
var hostID string
hostInfo, err := host.Info()
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if !conf.NoHostUUID && err == nil {
if hashed, ok := helper.HashUUID(hostInfo.HostID); ok {
hostID = hashed
}
}
if hostID == "" {
// Generate a random hostID if no constant ID is available on
// this platform.
hostID = uuid.Generate()
}
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
// Do not persist in dev mode
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if conf.DevMode {
return hostID, uuid.Generate(), nil
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
}
// Attempt to read existing ID
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
idPath := filepath.Join(conf.StateDir, "client-id")
idBuf, err := os.ReadFile(idPath)
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return "", "", err
}
// Attempt to read existing secret ID
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
secretPath := filepath.Join(conf.StateDir, "secret-id")
secretBuf, err := os.ReadFile(secretPath)
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return "", "", err
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
}
// Use existing ID if any
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
if len(idBuf) != 0 {
id = strings.ToLower(string(idBuf))
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
} else {
id = hostID
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
// Persist the ID
if err := os.WriteFile(idPath, []byte(id), 0700); err != nil {
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
return "", "", err
}
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
}
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
if len(secretBuf) != 0 {
secret = string(secretBuf)
} else {
// Generate new ID
secret = uuid.Generate()
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
// Persist the ID
if err := os.WriteFile(secretPath, []byte(secret), 0700); err != nil {
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
return "", "", err
}
}
2016-08-19 02:01:24 +00:00
return id, secret, nil
2015-09-22 17:31:47 +00:00
}
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
// setupNode is used to setup the initial node
func (c *Client) setupNode() error {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.configLock.Lock()
defer c.configLock.Unlock()
newConfig := c.config.Copy()
node := newConfig.Node
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
if node == nil {
node = &structs.Node{}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig.Node = node
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
// Generate an ID and secret for the node
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
id, secretID, err := ensureNodeID(newConfig)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("node ID setup failed: %v", err)
}
node.ID = id
node.SecretID = secretID
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
if node.Attributes == nil {
node.Attributes = make(map[string]string)
}
if node.Links == nil {
node.Links = make(map[string]string)
}
if node.Drivers == nil {
node.Drivers = make(map[string]*structs.DriverInfo)
}
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
if node.CSIControllerPlugins == nil {
node.CSIControllerPlugins = make(map[string]*structs.CSIInfo)
}
if node.CSINodePlugins == nil {
node.CSINodePlugins = make(map[string]*structs.CSIInfo)
}
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
if node.Meta == nil {
node.Meta = make(map[string]string)
}
2018-09-30 00:23:41 +00:00
if node.NodeResources == nil {
node.NodeResources = &structs.NodeResources{}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
node.NodeResources.MinDynamicPort = newConfig.MinDynamicPort
node.NodeResources.MaxDynamicPort = newConfig.MaxDynamicPort
2018-09-30 00:23:41 +00:00
}
2018-10-04 21:33:09 +00:00
if node.ReservedResources == nil {
node.ReservedResources = &structs.NodeReservedResources{}
}
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
if node.Resources == nil {
node.Resources = &structs.Resources{}
}
2016-03-14 02:05:41 +00:00
if node.Reserved == nil {
node.Reserved = &structs.Resources{}
}
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
if node.Datacenter == "" {
node.Datacenter = "dc1"
}
if node.Name == "" {
node.Name, _ = os.Hostname()
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
node.CgroupParent = newConfig.CgroupParent
if node.HostVolumes == nil {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if l := len(newConfig.HostVolumes); l != 0 {
node.HostVolumes = make(map[string]*structs.ClientHostVolumeConfig, l)
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
for k, v := range newConfig.HostVolumes {
if _, err := os.Stat(v.Path); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to validate volume %s, err: %v", v.Name, err)
}
node.HostVolumes[k] = v.Copy()
}
}
}
if node.HostNetworks == nil {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if l := len(newConfig.HostNetworks); l != 0 {
node.HostNetworks = make(map[string]*structs.ClientHostNetworkConfig, l)
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
for k, v := range newConfig.HostNetworks {
node.HostNetworks[k] = v.Copy()
}
}
}
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
if node.Name == "" {
node.Name = node.ID
}
node.Status = structs.NodeStatusInit
// Setup default static meta
if _, ok := node.Meta[envoy.SidecarMetaParam]; !ok {
node.Meta[envoy.SidecarMetaParam] = envoy.ImageFormat
}
if _, ok := node.Meta[envoy.GatewayMetaParam]; !ok {
node.Meta[envoy.GatewayMetaParam] = envoy.ImageFormat
}
if _, ok := node.Meta["connect.log_level"]; !ok {
node.Meta["connect.log_level"] = defaultConnectLogLevel
}
if _, ok := node.Meta["connect.proxy_concurrency"]; !ok {
node.Meta["connect.proxy_concurrency"] = defaultConnectProxyConcurrency
}
// Since node.Meta will get dynamic metadata merged in, save static metadata
// here.
c.metaStatic = maps.Clone(node.Meta)
// Merge dynamic node metadata
c.metaDynamic, err = c.stateDB.GetNodeMeta()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error reading dynamic node metadata: %w", err)
}
if c.metaDynamic == nil {
c.metaDynamic = map[string]*string{}
}
for dk, dv := range c.metaDynamic {
if dv == nil {
_, ok := node.Meta[dk]
if ok {
// Unset static node metadata
delete(node.Meta, dk)
} else {
// Forget dynamic node metadata tombstone as there's no
// static value to erase.
delete(c.metaDynamic, dk)
}
continue
}
node.Meta[dk] = *dv
}
// Write back dynamic node metadata as tombstones may have been removed
// above
if err := c.stateDB.PutNodeMeta(c.metaDynamic); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error syncing dynamic node metadata: %w", err)
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.config = newConfig
2015-08-20 23:41:29 +00:00
return nil
}
// updateNodeFromFingerprint updates the node with the result of
// fingerprinting the node from the diff that was created
func (c *Client) updateNodeFromFingerprint(response *fingerprint.FingerprintResponse) *structs.Node {
c.configLock.Lock()
defer c.configLock.Unlock()
nodeHasChanged := false
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig := c.config.Copy()
2018-02-23 20:01:57 +00:00
for name, newVal := range response.Attributes {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
oldVal := newConfig.Node.Attributes[name]
if oldVal == newVal {
continue
}
nodeHasChanged = true
2018-02-23 20:01:57 +00:00
if newVal == "" {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
delete(newConfig.Node.Attributes, name)
2018-01-26 11:51:09 +00:00
} else {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig.Node.Attributes[name] = newVal
2018-01-26 11:51:09 +00:00
}
}
// update node links and resources from the diff created from
// fingerprinting
2018-02-23 20:01:57 +00:00
for name, newVal := range response.Links {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
oldVal := newConfig.Node.Links[name]
if oldVal == newVal {
continue
}
nodeHasChanged = true
2018-02-23 20:01:57 +00:00
if newVal == "" {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
delete(newConfig.Node.Links, name)
2018-01-26 11:51:09 +00:00
} else {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig.Node.Links[name] = newVal
2018-01-26 11:51:09 +00:00
}
}
2018-09-30 00:23:41 +00:00
// COMPAT(0.10): Remove in 0.10
// update the response networks with the config
// if we still have node changes, merge them
if response.Resources != nil {
response.Resources.Networks = updateNetworks(
response.Resources.Networks,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig)
if !newConfig.Node.Resources.Equal(response.Resources) {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig.Node.Resources.Merge(response.Resources)
nodeHasChanged = true
}
}
// update the response networks with the config
// if we still have node changes, merge them
if response.NodeResources != nil {
response.NodeResources.Networks = updateNetworks(
response.NodeResources.Networks,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig)
if !newConfig.Node.NodeResources.Equal(response.NodeResources) {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
newConfig.Node.NodeResources.Merge(response.NodeResources)
nodeHasChanged = true
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
response.NodeResources.MinDynamicPort = newConfig.MinDynamicPort
response.NodeResources.MaxDynamicPort = newConfig.MaxDynamicPort
if newConfig.Node.NodeResources.MinDynamicPort != response.NodeResources.MinDynamicPort ||
newConfig.Node.NodeResources.MaxDynamicPort != response.NodeResources.MaxDynamicPort {
nodeHasChanged = true
}
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}
2018-03-09 17:28:01 +00:00
if nodeHasChanged {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.config = newConfig
c.updateNode()
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}
2018-03-07 18:34:38 +00:00
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
return newConfig.Node
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}
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
// updateNetworks filters and overrides network speed of host networks based
// on configured settings
func updateNetworks(up structs.Networks, c *config.Config) structs.Networks {
if up == nil {
return nil
}
if c.NetworkInterface != "" {
// For host networks, if a network device is configured filter up to contain details for only
// that device
upd := []*structs.NetworkResource{}
for _, n := range up {
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
switch n.Mode {
case "host":
if c.NetworkInterface == n.Device {
upd = append(upd, n)
}
default:
upd = append(upd, n)
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
}
Revert accidental merge of pr #5482 Revert "fingerprint Constraints and Affinities have Equals, as set" This reverts commit 596f16fb5f1a4a6766a57b3311af806d22382609. Revert "client tests assert the independent handling of interface and speed" This reverts commit 7857ac5993a578474d0570819f99b7b6e027de40. Revert "structs missed applying a style change from the review" This reverts commit 658916e3274efa438beadc2535f47109d0c2f0f2. Revert "client, structs comments" This reverts commit be2838d6baa9d382a5013fa80ea016856f28ade2. Revert "client fingerprint updateNetworks preserves the network configuration" This reverts commit fc309cb430e62d8e66267a724f006ae9abe1c63c. Revert "client_test cleanup comments from review" This reverts commit bc0bf4efb9114e699bc662f50c8f12319b6b3445. Revert "client Networks Equals is set equality" This reverts commit f8d432345b54b1953a4a4c719b9269f845e3e573. Revert "struct cleanup indentation in RequestedDevice Equals" This reverts commit f4746411cab328215def6508955b160a53452da3. Revert "struct Equals checks for identity before value checking" This reverts commit 0767a4665ed30ab8d9586a59a74db75d51fd9226. Revert "fix client-test, avoid hardwired platform dependecy on lo0" This reverts commit e89dbb2ab182b6368507dbcd33c3342223eb0ae7. Revert "refactor error in client fingerprint to include the offending data" This reverts commit a7fed726c6e0264d42a58410d840adde780a30f5. Revert "add client updateNodeResources to merge but preserve manual config" This reverts commit 84bd433c7e1d030193e054ec23474380ff3b9032. Revert "refactor struts.RequestedDevice to have its own Equals" This reverts commit 689782524090e51183474516715aa2f34908b8e6. Revert "refactor structs.Resource.Networks to have its own Equals" This reverts commit 49e2e6c77bb3eaa4577772b36c62205061c92fa1. Revert "refactor structs.Resource.Devices to have its own Equals" This reverts commit 4ede9226bb971ae42cc203560ed0029897aec2c9. Revert "add COMPAT(0.10): Remove in 0.10 notes to impl for structs.Resources" This reverts commit 49fbaace5298d5ccf031eb7ebec93906e1d468b5. Revert "add structs.Resources Equals" This reverts commit 8528a2a2a6450e4462a1d02741571b5efcb45f0b. Revert "test that fingerprint resources are updated, net not clobbered" This reverts commit 8ee02ddd23bafc87b9fce52b60c6026335bb722d.
2019-04-11 14:25:19 +00:00
}
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
up = upd
}
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
// if set, apply the config NetworkSpeed to networks in host mode
if c.NetworkSpeed != 0 {
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
for _, n := range up {
if n.Mode == "host" {
n.MBits = c.NetworkSpeed
}
}
}
2020-05-15 15:09:01 +00:00
return up
}
2015-08-24 00:40:14 +00:00
// retryIntv calculates a retry interval value given the base
func (c *Client) retryIntv(base time.Duration) time.Duration {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if c.GetConfig().DevMode {
2015-08-24 00:40:14 +00:00
return devModeRetryIntv
}
return base + helper.RandomStagger(base)
2015-08-24 00:40:14 +00:00
}
// registerAndHeartbeat is a long lived goroutine used to register the client
2018-03-11 18:12:19 +00:00
// and then start heartbeating to the server.
func (c *Client) registerAndHeartbeat() {
// Register the node
c.retryRegisterNode()
// Start watching changes for node changes
go c.watchNodeUpdates()
// Start watching for emitting node events
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
go c.watchNodeEvents()
// Setup the heartbeat timer, for the initial registration
// we want to do this quickly. We want to do it extra quickly
// in development mode.
var heartbeat <-chan time.Time
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if c.GetConfig().DevMode {
heartbeat = time.After(0)
} else {
heartbeat = time.After(helper.RandomStagger(initialHeartbeatStagger))
}
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
for {
select {
2018-04-04 01:05:28 +00:00
case <-c.rpcRetryWatcher():
case <-heartbeat:
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
if err := c.updateNodeStatus(); err != nil {
// The servers have changed such that this node has not been
// registered before
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "node not found") {
// Re-register the node
c.logger.Info("re-registering node")
c.retryRegisterNode()
heartbeat = time.After(helper.RandomStagger(initialHeartbeatStagger))
} else {
intv := c.getHeartbeatRetryIntv(err)
c.logger.Error("error heartbeating. retrying", "error", err, "period", intv)
heartbeat = time.After(intv)
// If heartbeating fails, trigger Consul discovery
c.triggerDiscovery()
}
} else {
c.heartbeatLock.Lock()
heartbeat = time.After(c.heartbeatTTL)
c.heartbeatLock.Unlock()
}
}
}
func (c *Client) lastHeartbeat() time.Time {
return c.heartbeatStop.getLastOk()
}
// getHeartbeatRetryIntv is used to retrieve the time to wait before attempting
// another heartbeat.
func (c *Client) getHeartbeatRetryIntv(err error) time.Duration {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
if c.GetConfig().DevMode {
return devModeRetryIntv
}
// Collect the useful heartbeat info
c.heartbeatLock.Lock()
haveHeartbeated := c.haveHeartbeated
last := c.lastHeartbeat()
ttl := c.heartbeatTTL
c.heartbeatLock.Unlock()
// If we haven't even successfully heartbeated once or there is no leader
// treat it as a registration. In the case that there is a leadership loss,
// we will have our heartbeat timer reset to a much larger threshold, so
// do not put unnecessary pressure on the new leader.
if !haveHeartbeated || err == structs.ErrNoLeader {
return c.retryIntv(registerRetryIntv)
}
// Determine how much time we have left to heartbeat
2020-12-09 19:05:18 +00:00
left := time.Until(last.Add(ttl))
// Logic for retrying is:
// * Do not retry faster than once a second
// * Do not retry less that once every 30 seconds
// * If we have missed the heartbeat by more than 30 seconds, start to use
// the absolute time since we do not want to retry indefinitely
switch {
case left < -30*time.Second:
2018-04-05 20:48:33 +00:00
// Make left the absolute value so we delay and jitter properly.
left *= -1
case left < 0:
return time.Second + helper.RandomStagger(time.Second)
default:
}
stagger := helper.RandomStagger(left)
switch {
case stagger < time.Second:
return time.Second + helper.RandomStagger(time.Second)
case stagger > 30*time.Second:
return 25*time.Second + helper.RandomStagger(5*time.Second)
default:
return stagger
}
}
// periodicSnapshot is a long lived goroutine used to periodically snapshot the
// state of the client
func (c *Client) periodicSnapshot() {
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// Create a snapshot timer
snapshot := time.After(stateSnapshotIntv)
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for {
select {
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case <-snapshot:
snapshot = time.After(stateSnapshotIntv)
2017-05-09 17:50:24 +00:00
if err := c.saveState(); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error saving state", "error", err)
2015-08-31 00:19:20 +00:00
}
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
// run is a long lived goroutine used to run the client. Shutdown() stops it first
func (c *Client) run() {
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
// Watch for changes in allocations
2016-02-19 04:43:48 +00:00
allocUpdates := make(chan *allocUpdates, 8)
go c.watchAllocations(allocUpdates)
for {
select {
case update := <-allocUpdates:
// Don't apply updates while shutting down.
c.shutdownLock.Lock()
if c.shutdown {
c.shutdownLock.Unlock()
return
}
// Apply updates inside lock to prevent a concurrent
// shutdown.
c.runAllocs(update)
c.shutdownLock.Unlock()
2015-08-24 00:40:14 +00:00
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
}
}
// submitNodeEvents is used to submit a client-side node event. Examples of
2018-03-09 17:43:20 +00:00
// these kinds of events include when a driver moves from healthy to unhealthy
// (and vice versa)
2018-03-12 01:00:13 +00:00
func (c *Client) submitNodeEvents(events []*structs.NodeEvent) error {
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nodeID := c.NodeID()
nodeEvents := map[string][]*structs.NodeEvent{
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nodeID: events,
}
2018-03-12 01:00:13 +00:00
req := structs.EmitNodeEventsRequest{
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
NodeEvents: nodeEvents,
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{
Region: c.Region(),
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
}
2018-03-12 01:00:13 +00:00
var resp structs.EmitNodeEventsResponse
if err := c.RPC("Node.EmitEvents", &req, &resp); err != nil {
2018-03-14 01:04:55 +00:00
return fmt.Errorf("Emitting node events failed: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
// watchNodeEvents is a handler which receives node events and on a interval
// and submits them in batch format to the server
func (c *Client) watchNodeEvents() {
// batchEvents stores events that have yet to be published
var batchEvents []*structs.NodeEvent
timer := stoppedTimer()
defer timer.Stop()
for {
select {
case event := <-c.triggerEmitNodeEvent:
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
if l := len(batchEvents); l <= structs.MaxRetainedNodeEvents {
batchEvents = append(batchEvents, event)
} else {
// Drop the oldest event
c.logger.Warn("dropping node event", "node_event", batchEvents[0])
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
batchEvents = append(batchEvents[1:], event)
}
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
timer.Reset(c.retryIntv(nodeUpdateRetryIntv))
case <-timer.C:
if err := c.submitNodeEvents(batchEvents); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error submitting node events", "error", err)
2018-03-13 13:33:53 +00:00
timer.Reset(c.retryIntv(nodeUpdateRetryIntv))
2018-03-14 16:48:59 +00:00
} else {
2018-03-14 20:54:25 +00:00
// Reset the events since we successfully sent them.
2018-03-20 17:25:07 +00:00
batchEvents = []*structs.NodeEvent{}
2018-03-12 01:00:13 +00:00
}
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
2018-03-12 01:00:13 +00:00
// triggerNodeEvent triggers a emit node event
func (c *Client) triggerNodeEvent(nodeEvent *structs.NodeEvent) {
select {
case c.triggerEmitNodeEvent <- nodeEvent:
// emit node event goroutine was released to execute
default:
// emit node event goroutine was already running
}
}
// retryRegisterNode is used to register the node or update the registration and
// retry in case of failure.
func (c *Client) retryRegisterNode() {
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
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authToken := c.getRegistrationToken()
for {
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
err := c.registerNode(authToken)
if err == nil {
// Registered!
return
}
retryIntv := registerRetryIntv
if err == noServersErr || structs.IsErrNoRegionPath(err) {
c.logger.Debug("registration waiting on servers")
c.triggerDiscovery()
retryIntv = noServerRetryIntv
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
} else if structs.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
// any previous cluster state we have here is invalid (ex. client
// has been assigned to a new region), so clear the token and local
// state for next pass.
authToken = ""
c.stateDB.PutNodeRegistration(&cstructs.NodeRegistration{HasRegistered: false})
c.logger.Error("error registering", "error", err)
} else {
c.logger.Error("error registering", "error", err)
}
select {
2018-04-04 01:05:28 +00:00
case <-c.rpcRetryWatcher():
case <-time.After(c.retryIntv(retryIntv)):
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
// getRegistrationToken gets the node secret to use for the Node.Register call.
// Registration is trust-on-first-use so we can't send the auth token with the
// initial request, but we want to add the auth token after that so that we can
// capture metrics.
func (c *Client) getRegistrationToken() string {
select {
case <-c.registeredCh:
return c.secretNodeID()
default:
// If we haven't yet closed the registeredCh we're either starting for
// the 1st time or we've just restarted. Check the local state to see if
// we've written a successful registration previously so that we don't
// block allocrunner operations on disconnected clients.
registration, err := c.stateDB.GetNodeRegistration()
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("could not determine previous node registration", "error", err)
}
if registration != nil && registration.HasRegistered {
c.registeredOnce.Do(func() { close(c.registeredCh) })
return c.secretNodeID()
}
}
return ""
}
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
// registerNode is used to register the node or update the registration
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
func (c *Client) registerNode(authToken string) error {
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
req := structs.NodeRegisterRequest{
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
Node: c.Node(),
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{
Region: c.Region(),
AuthToken: authToken,
},
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
}
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
var resp structs.NodeUpdateResponse
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
if err := c.UnauthenticatedRPC("Node.Register", &req, &resp); err != nil {
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
return err
}
2016-02-19 07:02:28 +00:00
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
// Signal that we've registered once so that RPCs sent from the client can
// send authenticated requests. Persist this information in the state so
// that we don't block restoring running allocs when restarting while
// disconnected
c.registeredOnce.Do(func() {
err := c.stateDB.PutNodeRegistration(&cstructs.NodeRegistration{
HasRegistered: true,
})
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("could not write node registration", "error", err)
}
close(c.registeredCh)
})
err := c.handleNodeUpdateResponse(resp)
if err != nil {
return err
}
2016-02-19 07:02:28 +00:00
// Update the node status to ready after we register.
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.UpdateConfig(func(c *config.Config) {
c.Node.Status = structs.NodeStatusReady
})
2016-02-19 07:02:28 +00:00
c.logger.Info("node registration complete")
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
if len(resp.EvalIDs) != 0 {
c.logger.Debug("evaluations triggered by node registration", "num_evals", len(resp.EvalIDs))
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
}
2016-02-10 06:43:16 +00:00
c.heartbeatLock.Lock()
defer c.heartbeatLock.Unlock()
c.heartbeatStop.setLastOk(time.Now())
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
c.heartbeatTTL = resp.HeartbeatTTL
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
return nil
}
// updateNodeStatus is used to heartbeat and update the status of the node
func (c *Client) updateNodeStatus() error {
2017-12-07 02:02:24 +00:00
start := time.Now()
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
req := structs.NodeUpdateStatusRequest{
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
NodeID: c.NodeID(),
Status: structs.NodeStatusReady,
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{
Region: c.Region(),
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
}
var resp structs.NodeUpdateResponse
2016-08-08 23:57:21 +00:00
if err := c.RPC("Node.UpdateStatus", &req, &resp); err != nil {
c.triggerDiscovery()
2016-08-10 22:17:32 +00:00
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update status: %v", err)
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
}
2017-12-07 02:02:24 +00:00
end := time.Now()
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
if len(resp.EvalIDs) != 0 {
c.logger.Debug("evaluations triggered by node update", "num_evals", len(resp.EvalIDs))
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
}
2016-02-10 06:43:16 +00:00
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
// Update the last heartbeat and the new TTL, capturing the old values
c.heartbeatLock.Lock()
last := c.lastHeartbeat()
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
oldTTL := c.heartbeatTTL
haveHeartbeated := c.haveHeartbeated
c.heartbeatStop.setLastOk(time.Now())
2015-08-23 01:16:05 +00:00
c.heartbeatTTL = resp.HeartbeatTTL
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
c.haveHeartbeated = true
c.heartbeatLock.Unlock()
c.logger.Trace("next heartbeat", "period", resp.HeartbeatTTL)
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
if resp.Index != 0 {
c.logger.Debug("state updated", "node_status", req.Status)
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
// We have potentially missed our TTL log how delayed we were
if haveHeartbeated {
c.logger.Warn("missed heartbeat",
"req_latency", end.Sub(start), "heartbeat_ttl", oldTTL, "since_last_heartbeat", time.Since(last))
2017-12-07 01:57:50 +00:00
}
}
// Check heartbeat response for information about the server-side scheduling
// state of this node. If there are errors on the server side, this will come
// back as an empty string.
c.UpdateConfig(func(c *config.Config) {
if resp.SchedulingEligibility != "" {
c.Node.SchedulingEligibility = resp.SchedulingEligibility
}
})
err := c.handleNodeUpdateResponse(resp)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("heartbeat response returned no valid servers")
}
// If there's no Leader in the response we may be talking to a partitioned
// server. Redo discovery to ensure our server list is up to date.
if resp.LeaderRPCAddr == "" {
c.triggerDiscovery()
}
c.EnterpriseClient.SetFeatures(resp.Features)
return nil
}
func (c *Client) handleNodeUpdateResponse(resp structs.NodeUpdateResponse) error {
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
// Update the number of nodes in the cluster so we can adjust our server
// rebalance rate.
c.servers.SetNumNodes(resp.NumNodes)
// Convert []*NodeServerInfo to []*servers.Server
nomadServers := make([]*servers.Server, 0, len(resp.Servers))
for _, s := range resp.Servers {
addr, err := resolveServer(s.RPCAdvertiseAddr)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Warn("ignoring invalid server", "error", err, "server", s.RPCAdvertiseAddr)
continue
}
e := &servers.Server{Addr: addr}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
nomadServers = append(nomadServers, e)
}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
if len(nomadServers) == 0 {
return noServersErr
}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
c.servers.SetServers(nomadServers)
2015-08-21 00:49:04 +00:00
return nil
}
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
// AllocStateUpdated asynchronously updates the server with the current state
// of an allocations and its tasks.
func (c *Client) AllocStateUpdated(alloc *structs.Allocation) {
2017-05-31 21:05:47 +00:00
if alloc.Terminated() {
// Terminated, mark for GC if we're still tracking this alloc
// runner. If it's not being tracked that means the server has
// already GC'd it (see removeAlloc).
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(alloc.ID)
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
if err == nil {
c.garbageCollector.MarkForCollection(alloc.ID, ar)
// Trigger a GC in case we're over thresholds and just
// waiting for eligible allocs.
c.garbageCollector.Trigger()
}
}
// Strip all the information that can be reconstructed at the server. Only
// send the fields that are updatable by the client.
stripped := new(structs.Allocation)
stripped.ID = alloc.ID
stripped.NodeID = c.NodeID()
stripped.TaskStates = alloc.TaskStates
stripped.ClientStatus = alloc.ClientStatus
stripped.ClientDescription = alloc.ClientDescription
2017-07-03 04:49:56 +00:00
stripped.DeploymentStatus = alloc.DeploymentStatus
stripped.NetworkStatus = alloc.NetworkStatus
c.pendingUpdates.add(stripped)
}
// PutAllocation stores an allocation or returns an error if it could not be stored.
func (c *Client) PutAllocation(alloc *structs.Allocation) error {
return c.stateDB.PutAllocation(alloc)
}
// allocSync is a long lived function that batches allocation updates to the
// server.
func (c *Client) allocSync() {
2016-02-22 05:32:32 +00:00
syncTicker := time.NewTicker(allocSyncIntv)
updateTicks := 0
for {
select {
case <-c.shutdownCh:
2016-02-22 05:32:32 +00:00
syncTicker.Stop()
return
2016-02-22 05:32:32 +00:00
case <-syncTicker.C:
2016-02-20 05:44:23 +00:00
updateTicks++
toSync := c.pendingUpdates.nextBatch(c, updateTicks)
if len(toSync) == 0 {
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
syncTicker.Reset(allocSyncIntv)
continue
}
// Send to server.
args := structs.AllocUpdateRequest{
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
Alloc: toSync,
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{
Region: c.Region(),
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
}
var resp structs.GenericResponse
client: always wait 200ms before sending updates Always wait 200ms before calling the Node.UpdateAlloc RPC to send allocation updates to servers. Prior to this change we only reset the update ticker when an error was encountered. This meant the 200ms ticker was running while the RPC was being performed. If the RPC was slow due to network latency or server load and took >=200ms, the ticker would tick during the RPC. Then on the next loop only the select would randomly choose between the two viable cases: receive an update or fire the RPC again. If the RPC case won it would immediately loop again due to there being no updates to send. When the update chan receive is selected a single update is added to the slice. The odds are then 50/50 that the subsequent loop will send the single update instead of receiving any more updates. This could cause a couple of problems: 1. Since only a small number of updates are sent, the chan buffer may fill, applying backpressure, and slowing down other client operations. 2. The small number of updates sent may already be stale and not represent the current state of the allocation locally. A risk here is that it's hard to reason about how this will interact with the 50ms batches on servers when the servers under load. A further improvement would be to completely remove the alloc update chan and instead use a mutex to build a map of alloc updates. I wanted to test the lowest risk possible change on loaded servers first before making more drastic changes.
2020-11-24 17:14:27 +00:00
err := c.RPC("Node.UpdateAlloc", &args, &resp)
if err != nil {
// Error updating allocations, do *not* clear
// updates and retry after backoff
c.logger.Error("error updating allocations", "error", err)
// refill the updates queue with updates that we failed to make
c.pendingUpdates.restore(toSync)
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
syncTicker.Reset(c.retryIntv(allocSyncRetryIntv))
client: always wait 200ms before sending updates Always wait 200ms before calling the Node.UpdateAlloc RPC to send allocation updates to servers. Prior to this change we only reset the update ticker when an error was encountered. This meant the 200ms ticker was running while the RPC was being performed. If the RPC was slow due to network latency or server load and took >=200ms, the ticker would tick during the RPC. Then on the next loop only the select would randomly choose between the two viable cases: receive an update or fire the RPC again. If the RPC case won it would immediately loop again due to there being no updates to send. When the update chan receive is selected a single update is added to the slice. The odds are then 50/50 that the subsequent loop will send the single update instead of receiving any more updates. This could cause a couple of problems: 1. Since only a small number of updates are sent, the chan buffer may fill, applying backpressure, and slowing down other client operations. 2. The small number of updates sent may already be stale and not represent the current state of the allocation locally. A risk here is that it's hard to reason about how this will interact with the 50ms batches on servers when the servers under load. A further improvement would be to completely remove the alloc update chan and instead use a mutex to build a map of alloc updates. I wanted to test the lowest risk possible change on loaded servers first before making more drastic changes.
2020-11-24 17:14:27 +00:00
continue
}
client: always wait 200ms before sending updates Always wait 200ms before calling the Node.UpdateAlloc RPC to send allocation updates to servers. Prior to this change we only reset the update ticker when an error was encountered. This meant the 200ms ticker was running while the RPC was being performed. If the RPC was slow due to network latency or server load and took >=200ms, the ticker would tick during the RPC. Then on the next loop only the select would randomly choose between the two viable cases: receive an update or fire the RPC again. If the RPC case won it would immediately loop again due to there being no updates to send. When the update chan receive is selected a single update is added to the slice. The odds are then 50/50 that the subsequent loop will send the single update instead of receiving any more updates. This could cause a couple of problems: 1. Since only a small number of updates are sent, the chan buffer may fill, applying backpressure, and slowing down other client operations. 2. The small number of updates sent may already be stale and not represent the current state of the allocation locally. A risk here is that it's hard to reason about how this will interact with the 50ms batches on servers when the servers under load. A further improvement would be to completely remove the alloc update chan and instead use a mutex to build a map of alloc updates. I wanted to test the lowest risk possible change on loaded servers first before making more drastic changes.
2020-11-24 17:14:27 +00:00
// Record that we've successfully synced these updates so that it's
// written to disk
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
c.allocLock.RLock()
for _, update := range toSync {
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
if ar, ok := c.allocs[update.ID]; ok {
ar.AcknowledgeState(&arstate.State{
ClientStatus: update.ClientStatus,
ClientDescription: update.ClientDescription,
DeploymentStatus: update.DeploymentStatus,
TaskStates: update.TaskStates,
NetworkStatus: update.NetworkStatus,
})
}
}
c.allocLock.RUnlock()
// Successfully updated allocs. Reset ticker to give loop time to
// receive new alloc updates. Otherwise if the RPC took the ticker
// interval we may call it in a tight loop reading empty updates.
updateTicks = 0
client: de-duplicate alloc updates and gate during restore (#17074) When client nodes are restarted, all allocations that have been scheduled on the node have their modify index updated, including terminal allocations. There are several contributing factors: * The `allocSync` method that updates the servers isn't gated on first contact with the servers. This means that if a server updates the desired state while the client is down, the `allocSync` races with the `Node.ClientGetAlloc` RPC. This will typically result in the client updating the server with "running" and then immediately thereafter "complete". * The `allocSync` method unconditionally sends the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC even if it's possible to assert that the server has definitely seen the client state. The allocrunner may queue-up updates even if we gate sending them. So then we end up with a race between the allocrunner updating its internal state to overwrite the previous update and `allocSync` sending the bogus or duplicate update. This changeset adds tracking of server-acknowledged state to the allocrunner. This state gets checked in the `allocSync` before adding the update to the batch, and updated when `Node.UpdateAlloc` returns successfully. To implement this we need to be able to equality-check the updates against the last acknowledged state. We also need to add the last acknowledged state to the client state DB, otherwise we'd drop unacknowledged updates across restarts. The client restart test has been expanded to cover a variety of allocation states, including allocs stopped before shutdown, allocs stopped by the server while the client is down, and allocs that have been completely GC'd on the server while the client is down. I've also bench tested scenarios where the task workload is killed while the client is down, resulting in a failed restore. Fixes #16381
2023-05-11 13:05:24 +00:00
syncTicker.Reset(allocSyncIntv)
}
}
}
// allocUpdates holds the results of receiving updated allocations from the
// servers.
type allocUpdates struct {
// pulled is the set of allocations that were downloaded from the servers.
pulled map[string]*structs.Allocation
// filtered is the set of allocations that were not pulled because their
// AllocModifyIndex didn't change.
filtered map[string]struct{}
// migrateTokens are a list of tokens necessary for when clients pull data
// from authorized volumes
migrateTokens map[string]string
}
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
// watchAllocations is used to scan for updates to allocations
func (c *Client) watchAllocations(updates chan *allocUpdates) {
// The request and response for getting the map of allocations that should
// be running on the Node to their AllocModifyIndex which is incremented
// when the allocation is updated by the servers.
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
req := structs.NodeSpecificRequest{
NodeID: c.NodeID(),
SecretID: c.secretNodeID(),
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{
Region: c.Region(),
// Make a consistent read query when the client starts
// to avoid acting on stale data that predates this
// client state before a client restart.
//
// After the first request, only require monotonically
// increasing state.
AllowStale: false,
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
},
}
var resp structs.NodeClientAllocsResponse
// The request and response for pulling down the set of allocations that are
// new, or updated server side.
allocsReq := structs.AllocsGetRequest{
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{
Region: c.Region(),
AllowStale: true,
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
}
var allocsResp structs.AllocsGetResponse
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
OUTER:
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
for {
// Get the allocation modify index map, blocking for updates. We will
// use this to determine exactly what allocations need to be downloaded
// in full.
resp = structs.NodeClientAllocsResponse{}
err := c.RPC("Node.GetClientAllocs", &req, &resp)
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
if err != nil {
// Shutdown often causes EOF errors, so check for shutdown first
select {
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
default:
}
// COMPAT: Remove in 0.6. This is to allow the case in which the
// servers are not fully upgraded before the clients register. This
// can cause the SecretID to be lost
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "node secret ID does not match") {
c.logger.Debug("secret mismatch; re-registering node", "error", err)
c.retryRegisterNode()
} else if err != noServersErr {
c.logger.Error("error querying node allocations", "error", err)
}
2015-08-24 00:40:14 +00:00
retry := c.retryIntv(getAllocRetryIntv)
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
select {
2018-04-04 01:05:28 +00:00
case <-c.rpcRetryWatcher():
continue
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
case <-time.After(retry):
continue
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
// Check for shutdown
select {
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
default:
}
// Filter all allocations whose AllocModifyIndex was not incremented.
// These are the allocations who have either not been updated, or whose
// updates are a result of the client sending an update for the alloc.
// This lets us reduce the network traffic to the server as we don't
// need to pull all the allocations.
var pull []string
filtered := make(map[string]struct{})
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
var pullIndex uint64
for allocID, modifyIndex := range resp.Allocs {
// Pull the allocation if we don't have an alloc runner for the
// allocation or if the alloc runner requires an updated allocation.
//XXX Part of Client alloc index tracking exp
c.allocLock.RLock()
currentAR, ok := c.allocs[allocID]
c.allocLock.RUnlock()
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
// Ignore alloc updates for allocs that are invalid because of initialization errors
c.invalidAllocsLock.Lock()
_, isInvalid := c.invalidAllocs[allocID]
c.invalidAllocsLock.Unlock()
if (!ok || modifyIndex > currentAR.Alloc().AllocModifyIndex) && !isInvalid {
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
// Only pull allocs that are required. Filtered
// allocs might be at a higher index, so ignore
// it.
if modifyIndex > pullIndex {
pullIndex = modifyIndex
}
pull = append(pull, allocID)
} else {
filtered[allocID] = struct{}{}
}
}
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
// Pull the allocations that passed filtering.
allocsResp.Allocs = nil
var pulledAllocs map[string]*structs.Allocation
if len(pull) != 0 {
// Pull the allocations that need to be updated.
allocsReq.AllocIDs = pull
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
allocsReq.MinQueryIndex = pullIndex - 1
allocsResp = structs.AllocsGetResponse{}
if err := c.RPC("Alloc.GetAllocs", &allocsReq, &allocsResp); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error querying updated allocations", "error", err)
retry := c.retryIntv(getAllocRetryIntv)
select {
2018-04-04 01:05:28 +00:00
case <-c.rpcRetryWatcher():
continue
case <-time.After(retry):
continue
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
// Ensure that we received all the allocations we wanted
pulledAllocs = make(map[string]*structs.Allocation, len(allocsResp.Allocs))
for _, alloc := range allocsResp.Allocs {
// handle an old Server
alloc.Canonicalize()
pulledAllocs[alloc.ID] = alloc
}
for _, desiredID := range pull {
if _, ok := pulledAllocs[desiredID]; !ok {
// We didn't get everything we wanted. Do not update the
// MinQueryIndex, sleep and then retry.
2017-01-11 21:24:23 +00:00
wait := c.retryIntv(2 * time.Second)
select {
2017-01-11 21:24:23 +00:00
case <-time.After(wait):
// Wait for the server we contact to receive the
// allocations
2017-01-21 00:30:40 +00:00
continue OUTER
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
// Check for shutdown
select {
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
default:
}
}
c.logger.Debug("updated allocations", "index", resp.Index,
"total", len(resp.Allocs), "pulled", len(allocsResp.Allocs), "filtered", len(filtered))
// After the first request, only require monotonically increasing state.
req.AllowStale = true
if resp.Index > req.MinQueryIndex {
req.MinQueryIndex = resp.Index
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
}
// Push the updates.
update := &allocUpdates{
filtered: filtered,
pulled: pulledAllocs,
migrateTokens: resp.MigrateTokens,
}
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
select {
case updates <- update:
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
// updateNode signals the client to send the updated
// Node to the server.
func (c *Client) updateNode() {
select {
case c.triggerNodeUpdate <- struct{}{}:
// Node update goroutine was released to execute
default:
// Node update goroutine was already running
}
}
// watchNodeUpdates blocks until it is edge triggered. Once triggered,
// it will update the client node copy and re-register the node.
func (c *Client) watchNodeUpdates() {
var hasChanged bool
timer := stoppedTimer()
defer timer.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-timer.C:
c.logger.Debug("state changed, updating node and re-registering")
c.retryRegisterNode()
hasChanged = false
case <-c.triggerNodeUpdate:
2018-03-01 14:48:26 +00:00
if hasChanged {
continue
}
hasChanged = true
2018-03-01 14:48:26 +00:00
timer.Reset(c.retryIntv(nodeUpdateRetryIntv))
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
// runAllocs is invoked when we get an updated set of allocations
func (c *Client) runAllocs(update *allocUpdates) {
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
// Get the existing allocs
2015-08-23 22:06:47 +00:00
c.allocLock.RLock()
existing := make(map[string]uint64, len(c.allocs))
for id, ar := range c.allocs {
existing[id] = ar.Alloc().AllocModifyIndex
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
2015-08-23 22:06:47 +00:00
c.allocLock.RUnlock()
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
// Diff the existing and updated allocations
diff := diffAllocs(existing, update)
c.logger.Debug("allocation updates", "added", len(diff.added), "removed", len(diff.removed),
"updated", len(diff.updated), "ignored", len(diff.ignore))
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
errs := 0
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
// Remove the old allocations
for _, remove := range diff.removed {
c.removeAlloc(remove)
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
// Update the existing allocations
for _, update := range diff.updated {
c.updateAlloc(update)
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
// Make room for new allocations before running
if err := c.garbageCollector.MakeRoomFor(diff.added); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error making room for new allocations", "error", err)
errs++
}
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
// Start the new allocations
for _, add := range diff.added {
migrateToken := update.migrateTokens[add.ID]
if err := c.addAlloc(add, migrateToken); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error adding alloc", "error", err, "alloc_id", add.ID)
errs++
// We mark the alloc as failed and send an update to the server
// We track the fact that creating an allocrunner failed so that we don't send updates again
if add.ClientStatus != structs.AllocClientStatusFailed {
c.handleInvalidAllocs(add, err)
}
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
}
// Mark servers as having been contacted so blocked tasks that failed
// to restore can now restart.
c.serversContactedOnce.Do(func() {
close(c.serversContactedCh)
})
// Trigger the GC once more now that new allocs are started that could
2018-03-11 19:03:47 +00:00
// have caused thresholds to be exceeded
c.garbageCollector.Trigger()
c.logger.Debug("allocation updates applied", "added", len(diff.added), "removed", len(diff.removed),
"updated", len(diff.updated), "ignored", len(diff.ignore), "errors", errs)
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
// makeFailedAlloc creates a stripped down version of the allocation passed in
// with its status set to failed and other fields needed for the server to be
// able to examine deployment and task states
func makeFailedAlloc(add *structs.Allocation, err error) *structs.Allocation {
stripped := new(structs.Allocation)
stripped.ID = add.ID
stripped.NodeID = add.NodeID
stripped.ClientStatus = structs.AllocClientStatusFailed
stripped.ClientDescription = fmt.Sprintf("Unable to add allocation due to error: %v", err)
// Copy task states if it exists in the original allocation
if add.TaskStates != nil {
stripped.TaskStates = add.TaskStates
} else {
stripped.TaskStates = make(map[string]*structs.TaskState)
}
failTime := time.Now()
if add.DeploymentStatus.HasHealth() {
// Never change deployment health once it has been set
stripped.DeploymentStatus = add.DeploymentStatus.Copy()
} else {
stripped.DeploymentStatus = &structs.AllocDeploymentStatus{
Healthy: pointer.Of(false),
Timestamp: failTime,
}
}
taskGroup := add.Job.LookupTaskGroup(add.TaskGroup)
if taskGroup == nil {
return stripped
}
for _, task := range taskGroup.Tasks {
ts, ok := stripped.TaskStates[task.Name]
if !ok {
ts = &structs.TaskState{}
stripped.TaskStates[task.Name] = ts
}
if ts.FinishedAt.IsZero() {
ts.FinishedAt = failTime
}
}
return stripped
}
// removeAlloc is invoked when we should remove an allocation because it has
// been removed by the server.
func (c *Client) removeAlloc(allocID string) {
2015-08-29 21:33:30 +00:00
c.allocLock.Lock()
defer c.allocLock.Unlock()
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, ok := c.allocs[allocID]
2015-08-23 22:06:47 +00:00
if !ok {
c.invalidAllocsLock.Lock()
2019-01-09 16:53:39 +00:00
if _, ok := c.invalidAllocs[allocID]; ok {
// Removing from invalid allocs map if present
delete(c.invalidAllocs, allocID)
} else {
// Alloc is unknown, log a warning.
c.logger.Warn("cannot remove nonexistent alloc", "alloc_id", allocID, "error", "alloc not found")
}
c.invalidAllocsLock.Unlock()
return
2015-08-23 22:06:47 +00:00
}
// Stop tracking alloc runner as it's been GC'd by the server
delete(c.allocs, allocID)
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
// Ensure the GC has a reference and then collect. Collecting through the GC
// applies rate limiting
c.garbageCollector.MarkForCollection(allocID, ar)
// GC immediately since the server has GC'd it
go c.garbageCollector.Collect(allocID)
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
// updateAlloc is invoked when we should update an allocation
func (c *Client) updateAlloc(update *structs.Allocation) {
2018-12-12 19:45:45 +00:00
ar, err := c.getAllocRunner(update.ID)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Warn("cannot update nonexistent alloc", "alloc_id", update.ID)
return
2015-08-23 22:06:47 +00:00
}
2016-02-20 03:51:55 +00:00
Update alloc after reconnect and enforece client heartbeat order (#15068) * scheduler: allow updates after alloc reconnects When an allocation reconnects to a cluster the scheduler needs to run special logic to handle the reconnection, check if a replacement was create and stop one of them. If the allocation kept running while the node was disconnected, it will be reconnected with `ClientStatus: running` and the node will have `Status: ready`. This combination is the same as the normal steady state of allocation, where everything is running as expected. In order to differentiate between the two states (an allocation that is reconnecting and one that is just running) the scheduler needs an extra piece of state. The current implementation uses the presence of a `TaskClientReconnected` task event to detect when the allocation has reconnected and thus must go through the reconnection process. But this event remains even after the allocation is reconnected, causing all future evals to consider the allocation as still reconnecting. This commit changes the reconnect logic to use an `AllocState` to register when the allocation was reconnected. This provides the following benefits: - Only a limited number of task states are kept, and they are used for many other events. It's possible that, upon reconnecting, several actions are triggered that could cause the `TaskClientReconnected` event to be dropped. - Task events are set by clients and so their timestamps are subject to time skew from servers. This prevents using time to determine if an allocation reconnected after a disconnect event. - Disconnect events are already stored as `AllocState` and so storing reconnects there as well makes it the only source of information required. With the new logic, the reconnection logic is only triggered if the last `AllocState` is a disconnect event, meaning that the allocation has not been reconnected yet. After the reconnection is handled, the new `ClientStatus` is store in `AllocState` allowing future evals to skip the reconnection logic. * scheduler: prevent spurious placement on reconnect When a client reconnects it makes two independent RPC calls: - `Node.UpdateStatus` to heartbeat and set its status as `ready`. - `Node.UpdateAlloc` to update the status of its allocations. These two calls can happen in any order, and in case the allocations are updated before a heartbeat it causes the state to be the same as a node being disconnected: the node status will still be `disconnected` while the allocation `ClientStatus` is set to `running`. The current implementation did not handle this order of events properly, and the scheduler would create an unnecessary placement since it considered the allocation was being disconnected. This extra allocation would then be quickly stopped by the heartbeat eval. This commit adds a new code path to handle this order of events. If the node is `disconnected` and the allocation `ClientStatus` is `running` the scheduler will check if the allocation is actually reconnecting using its `AllocState` events. * rpc: only allow alloc updates from `ready` nodes Clients interact with servers using three main RPC methods: - `Node.GetAllocs` reads allocation data from the server and writes it to the client. - `Node.UpdateAlloc` reads allocation from from the client and writes them to the server. - `Node.UpdateStatus` writes the client status to the server and is used as the heartbeat mechanism. These three methods are called periodically by the clients and are done so independently from each other, meaning that there can't be any assumptions in their ordering. This can generate scenarios that are hard to reason about and to code for. For example, when a client misses too many heartbeats it will be considered `down` or `disconnected` and the allocations it was running are set to `lost` or `unknown`. When connectivity is restored the to rest of the cluster, the natural mental model is to think that the client will heartbeat first and then update its allocations status into the servers. But since there's no inherit order in these calls the reverse is just as possible: the client updates the alloc status and then heartbeats. This results in a state where allocs are, for example, `running` while the client is still `disconnected`. This commit adds a new verification to the `Node.UpdateAlloc` method to reject updates from nodes that are not `ready`, forcing clients to heartbeat first. Since this check is done server-side there is no need to coordinate operations client-side: they can continue sending these requests independently and alloc update will succeed after the heartbeat is done. * chagelog: add entry for #15068 * code review * client: skip terminal allocations on reconnect When the client reconnects with the server it synchronizes the state of its allocations by sending data using the `Node.UpdateAlloc` RPC and fetching data using the `Node.GetClientAllocs` RPC. If the data fetch happens before the data write, `unknown` allocations will still be in this state and would trigger the `allocRunner.Reconnect` flow. But when the server `DesiredStatus` for the allocation is `stop` the client should not reconnect the allocation. * apply more code review changes * scheduler: persist changes to reconnected allocs Reconnected allocs have a new AllocState entry that must be persisted by the plan applier. * rpc: read node ID from allocs in UpdateAlloc The AllocUpdateRequest struct is used in three disjoint use cases: 1. Stripped allocs from clients Node.UpdateAlloc RPC using the Allocs, and WriteRequest fields 2. Raft log message using the Allocs, Evals, and WriteRequest fields 3. Plan updates using the AllocsStopped, AllocsUpdated, and Job fields Adding a new field that would only be used in one these cases (1) made things more confusing and error prone. While in theory an AllocUpdateRequest could send allocations from different nodes, in practice this never actually happens since only clients call this method with their own allocations. * scheduler: remove logic to handle exceptional case This condition could only be hit if, somehow, the allocation status was set to "running" while the client was "unknown". This was addressed by enforcing an order in "Node.UpdateStatus" and "Node.UpdateAlloc" RPC calls, so this scenario is not expected to happen. Adding unnecessary code to the scheduler makes it harder to read and reason about it. * more code review * remove another unused test
2022-11-04 20:25:11 +00:00
// Reconnect unknown allocations if they were updated and are not terminal.
reconnect := update.ClientStatus == structs.AllocClientStatusUnknown &&
update.AllocModifyIndex > ar.Alloc().AllocModifyIndex &&
!update.ServerTerminalStatus()
if reconnect {
err = ar.Reconnect(update)
if err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error reconnecting alloc", "alloc_id", update.ID, "alloc_modify_index", update.AllocModifyIndex, "error", err)
}
return
}
// Update local copy of alloc
if err := c.stateDB.PutAllocation(update); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error persisting updated alloc locally", "error", err, "alloc_id", update.ID)
}
// Update alloc runner
ar.Update(update)
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
}
// addAlloc is invoked when we should add an allocation
func (c *Client) addAlloc(alloc *structs.Allocation, migrateToken string) error {
2017-01-05 21:06:56 +00:00
c.allocLock.Lock()
defer c.allocLock.Unlock()
// Check if we already have an alloc runner
2016-12-13 20:34:23 +00:00
if _, ok := c.allocs[alloc.ID]; ok {
c.logger.Debug("dropping duplicate add allocation request", "alloc_id", alloc.ID)
2016-12-13 20:34:23 +00:00
return nil
}
2017-01-05 21:06:56 +00:00
// Initialize local copy of alloc before creating the alloc runner so
// we can't end up with an alloc runner that does not have an alloc.
if err := c.stateDB.PutAllocation(alloc); err != nil {
return err
}
// Collect any preempted allocations to pass into the previous alloc watcher
var preemptedAllocs map[string]allocwatcher.AllocRunnerMeta
if len(alloc.PreemptedAllocations) > 0 {
preemptedAllocs = make(map[string]allocwatcher.AllocRunnerMeta)
for _, palloc := range alloc.PreemptedAllocations {
preemptedAllocs[palloc] = c.allocs[palloc]
}
}
// Since only the Client has access to other AllocRunners and the RPC
// client, create the previous allocation watcher here.
watcherConfig := allocwatcher.Config{
Alloc: alloc,
PreviousRunner: c.allocs[alloc.PreviousAllocation],
PreemptedRunners: preemptedAllocs,
RPC: c,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
Config: c.GetConfig(),
MigrateToken: migrateToken,
Logger: c.logger,
}
prevAllocWatcher, prevAllocMigrator := allocwatcher.NewAllocWatcher(watcherConfig)
arConf := &config.AllocRunnerConfig{
Alloc: alloc,
Logger: c.logger,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
ClientConfig: c.GetConfig(),
StateDB: c.stateDB,
Consul: c.consulService,
ConsulProxies: c.consulProxies,
ConsulSI: c.tokensClient,
Vault: c.vaultClient,
StateUpdater: c,
DeviceStatsReporter: c,
PrevAllocWatcher: prevAllocWatcher,
PrevAllocMigrator: prevAllocMigrator,
CSI Plugin Registration (#6555) This changeset implements the initial registration and fingerprinting of CSI Plugins as part of #5378. At a high level, it introduces the following: * A `csi_plugin` stanza as part of a Nomad task configuration, to allow a task to expose that it is a plugin. * A new task runner hook: `csi_plugin_supervisor`. This hook does two things. When the `csi_plugin` stanza is detected, it will automatically configure the plugin task to receive bidirectional mounts to the CSI intermediary directory. At runtime, it will then perform an initial heartbeat of the plugin and handle submitting it to the new `dynamicplugins.Registry` for further use by the client, and then run a lightweight heartbeat loop that will emit task events when health changes. * The `dynamicplugins.Registry` for handling plugins that run as Nomad tasks, in contrast to the existing catalog that requires `go-plugin` type plugins and to know the plugin configuration in advance. * The `csimanager` which fingerprints CSI plugins, in a similar way to `drivermanager` and `devicemanager`. It currently only fingerprints the NodeID from the plugin, and assumes that all plugins are monolithic. Missing features * We do not use the live updates of the `dynamicplugin` registry in the `csimanager` yet. * We do not deregister the plugins from the client when they shutdown yet, they just become indefinitely marked as unhealthy. This is deliberate until we figure out how we should manage deploying new versions of plugins/transitioning them.
2019-10-22 13:20:26 +00:00
DynamicRegistry: c.dynamicRegistry,
CSIManager: c.csimanager,
CpusetManager: c.cpusetManager,
DeviceManager: c.devicemanager,
DriverManager: c.drivermanager,
ServiceRegWrapper: c.serviceRegWrapper,
CheckStore: c.checkStore,
RPCClient: c,
Getter: c.getter,
}
2017-05-02 20:31:56 +00:00
ar, err := c.allocrunnerFactory(arConf)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Store the alloc runner.
c.allocs[alloc.ID] = ar
// Maybe mark the alloc for halt on missing server heartbeats
c.heartbeatStop.allocHook(alloc)
go ar.Run()
2015-08-23 21:54:52 +00:00
return nil
2015-08-23 02:31:22 +00:00
}
// setupConsulTokenClient configures a tokenClient for managing consul service
// identity tokens.
func (c *Client) setupConsulTokenClient() error {
tc := consulApi.NewIdentitiesClient(c.logger, c.deriveSIToken)
c.tokensClient = tc
return nil
}
2016-08-18 03:28:48 +00:00
// setupVaultClient creates an object to periodically renew tokens and secrets
// with vault.
func (c *Client) setupVaultClient() error {
var err error
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
c.vaultClient, err = vaultclient.NewVaultClient(c.GetConfig().VaultConfig, c.logger, c.deriveToken)
if err != nil {
2016-08-18 03:28:48 +00:00
return err
}
if c.vaultClient == nil {
c.logger.Error("failed to create vault client")
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create vault client")
}
2016-09-14 20:30:01 +00:00
// Start renewing tokens and secrets
c.vaultClient.Start()
2016-08-18 03:28:48 +00:00
return nil
}
// setupNomadServiceRegistrationHandler sets up the registration handler to use
// for native service discovery.
func (c *Client) setupNomadServiceRegistrationHandler() {
cfg := nsd.ServiceRegistrationHandlerCfg{
Datacenter: c.Datacenter(),
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
Enabled: c.GetConfig().NomadServiceDiscovery,
NodeID: c.NodeID(),
NodeSecret: c.secretNodeID(),
Region: c.Region(),
RPCFn: c.RPC,
CheckWatcher: serviceregistration.NewCheckWatcher(
c.logger, nsd.NewStatusGetter(c.checkStore),
),
}
c.nomadService = nsd.NewServiceRegistrationHandler(c.logger, &cfg)
}
2016-08-30 01:30:06 +00:00
// deriveToken takes in an allocation and a set of tasks and derives vault
// tokens for each of the tasks, unwraps all of them using the supplied vault
// client and returns a map of unwrapped tokens, indexed by the task name.
func (c *Client) deriveToken(alloc *structs.Allocation, taskNames []string, vclient *vaultapi.Client) (map[string]string, error) {
vlogger := c.logger.Named("vault")
verifiedTasks, err := verifiedTasks(vlogger, alloc, taskNames)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// DeriveVaultToken of nomad server can take in a set of tasks and
// creates tokens for all the tasks.
req := &structs.DeriveVaultTokenRequest{
NodeID: c.NodeID(),
SecretID: c.secretNodeID(),
AllocID: alloc.ID,
Tasks: verifiedTasks,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{
Region: c.Region(),
AllowStale: false,
MinQueryIndex: alloc.CreateIndex,
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
}
// Derive the tokens
// namespace is handled via nomad/vault
var resp structs.DeriveVaultTokenResponse
if err := c.RPC("Node.DeriveVaultToken", &req, &resp); err != nil {
vlogger.Error("error making derive token RPC", "error", err)
2016-10-23 01:20:50 +00:00
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DeriveVaultToken RPC failed: %v", err)
}
if resp.Error != nil {
vlogger.Error("error deriving vault tokens", "error", resp.Error)
return nil, structs.NewWrappedServerError(resp.Error)
}
if resp.Tasks == nil {
vlogger.Error("error derivng vault token", "error", "invalid response")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to derive vault tokens: invalid response")
}
unwrappedTokens := make(map[string]string)
// Retrieve the wrapped tokens from the response and unwrap it
for _, taskName := range verifiedTasks {
// Get the wrapped token
wrappedToken, ok := resp.Tasks[taskName]
if !ok {
vlogger.Error("wrapped token missing for task", "task_name", taskName)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrapped token missing for task %q", taskName)
}
// Unwrap the vault token
unwrapResp, err := vclient.Logical().Unwrap(wrappedToken)
if err != nil {
2018-04-03 21:29:22 +00:00
if structs.VaultUnrecoverableError.MatchString(err.Error()) {
return nil, err
}
// The error is recoverable
return nil, structs.NewRecoverableError(
fmt.Errorf("failed to unwrap the token for task %q: %v", taskName, err), true)
}
// Validate the response
var validationErr error
if unwrapResp == nil {
validationErr = fmt.Errorf("Vault returned nil secret when unwrapping")
} else if unwrapResp.Auth == nil {
validationErr = fmt.Errorf("Vault returned unwrap secret with nil Auth. Secret warnings: %v", unwrapResp.Warnings)
} else if unwrapResp.Auth.ClientToken == "" {
validationErr = fmt.Errorf("Vault returned unwrap secret with empty Auth.ClientToken. Secret warnings: %v", unwrapResp.Warnings)
}
2018-04-03 21:29:22 +00:00
if validationErr != nil {
vlogger.Warn("error unwrapping token", "error", err)
2018-04-03 21:29:22 +00:00
return nil, structs.NewRecoverableError(validationErr, true)
}
// Append the unwrapped token to the return value
unwrappedTokens[taskName] = unwrapResp.Auth.ClientToken
}
return unwrappedTokens, nil
}
// deriveSIToken takes an allocation and a set of tasks and derives Consul
// Service Identity tokens for each of the tasks by requesting them from the
// Nomad Server.
func (c *Client) deriveSIToken(alloc *structs.Allocation, taskNames []string) (map[string]string, error) {
tasks, err := verifiedTasks(c.logger, alloc, taskNames)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req := &structs.DeriveSITokenRequest{
client: send node secret with every client-to-server RPC (#16799) In Nomad 1.5.3 we fixed a security bug that allowed bypass of ACL checks if the request came thru a client node first. But this fix broke (knowingly) the identification of many client-to-server RPCs. These will be now measured as if they were anonymous. The reason for this is that many client-to-server RPCs do not send the node secret and instead rely on the protection of mTLS. This changeset ensures that the node secret is being sent with every client-to-server RPC request. In a future version of Nomad we can add enforcement on the server side, but this was left out of this changeset to reduce risks to the safe upgrade path. Sending the node secret as an auth token introduces a new problem during initial introduction of a client. Clients send many RPCs concurrently with `Node.Register`, but until the node is registered the node secret is unknown to the server and will be rejected as invalid. This causes permission denied errors. To fix that, this changeset introduces a gate on having successfully made a `Node.Register` RPC before any other RPCs can be sent (except for `Status.Ping`, which we need earlier but which also ignores the error because that handler doesn't do an authorization check). This ensures that we only send requests with a node secret already known to the server. This also makes client startup a little easier to reason about because we know `Node.Register` must succeed first, and it should make for a good place to hook in future plans for secure introduction of nodes. The tradeoff is that an existing client that has running allocs will take slightly longer (a second or two) to transition to ready after a restart, because the transition in `Node.UpdateStatus` is gated at the server by first submitting `Node.UpdateAlloc` with client alloc updates.
2023-06-22 15:06:49 +00:00
NodeID: c.NodeID(),
SecretID: c.secretNodeID(),
AllocID: alloc.ID,
Tasks: tasks,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{
Region: c.Region(),
AuthToken: c.secretNodeID(),
},
}
// Nicely ask Nomad Server for the tokens.
var resp structs.DeriveSITokenResponse
if err := c.RPC("Node.DeriveSIToken", &req, &resp); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error making derive token RPC", "error", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("DeriveSIToken RPC failed: %v", err)
}
if err := resp.Error; err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error deriving SI tokens", "error", err)
return nil, structs.NewWrappedServerError(err)
}
if len(resp.Tokens) == 0 {
c.logger.Error("error deriving SI tokens", "error", "invalid_response")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to derive SI tokens: invalid response")
}
// NOTE: Unlike with the Vault integration, Nomad Server replies with the
// actual Consul SI token (.SecretID), because otherwise each Nomad
// Client would need to be blessed with 'acl:write' permissions to read the
// secret value given the .AccessorID, which does not fit well in the Consul
// security model.
//
// https://www.consul.io/api/acl/tokens.html#read-a-token
// https://www.consul.io/docs/internals/security.html
m := maps.Clone(resp.Tokens)
return m, nil
}
// verifiedTasks asserts each task in taskNames actually exists in the given alloc,
// otherwise an error is returned.
func verifiedTasks(logger hclog.Logger, alloc *structs.Allocation, taskNames []string) ([]string, error) {
if alloc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("nil allocation")
}
if len(taskNames) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing task names")
}
group := alloc.Job.LookupTaskGroup(alloc.TaskGroup)
if group == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("group name in allocation is not present in job")
}
verifiedTasks := make([]string, 0, len(taskNames))
// confirm the requested task names actually exist in the allocation
for _, taskName := range taskNames {
if !taskIsPresent(taskName, group.Tasks) {
logger.Error("task not found in the allocation", "task_name", taskName)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("task %q not found in allocation", taskName)
}
verifiedTasks = append(verifiedTasks, taskName)
}
return verifiedTasks, nil
}
func taskIsPresent(taskName string, tasks []*structs.Task) bool {
for _, task := range tasks {
if task.Name == taskName {
return true
}
}
return false
}
2018-03-11 17:39:04 +00:00
// triggerDiscovery causes a Consul discovery to begin (if one hasn't already)
func (c *Client) triggerDiscovery() {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
config := c.GetConfig()
if config.ConsulConfig.ClientAutoJoin != nil && *config.ConsulConfig.ClientAutoJoin {
select {
case c.triggerDiscoveryCh <- struct{}{}:
// Discovery goroutine was released to execute
default:
// Discovery goroutine was already running
}
}
}
// consulDiscovery waits for the signal to attempt server discovery via Consul.
// It's intended to be started in a goroutine. See triggerDiscovery() for
// causing consul discovery from other code locations.
func (c *Client) consulDiscovery() {
for {
select {
case <-c.triggerDiscoveryCh:
if err := c.consulDiscoveryImpl(); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("error discovering nomad servers", "error", err)
}
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
func (c *Client) consulDiscoveryImpl() error {
consulLogger := c.logger.Named("consul")
dcs, err := c.consulCatalog.Datacenters()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("client.consul: unable to query Consul datacenters: %v", err)
}
if len(dcs) > 2 {
// Query the local DC first, then shuffle the
// remaining DCs. Future heartbeats will cause Nomad
// Clients to fixate on their local datacenter so
// it's okay to talk with remote DCs. If the no
// Nomad servers are available within
// datacenterQueryLimit, the next heartbeat will pick
// a new set of servers so it's okay.
shuffleStrings(dcs[1:])
dcs = dcs[0:helper.Min(len(dcs), datacenterQueryLimit)]
}
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
serviceName := c.GetConfig().ConsulConfig.ServerServiceName
var mErr multierror.Error
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
var nomadServers servers.Servers
consulLogger.Debug("bootstrap contacting Consul DCs", "consul_dcs", dcs)
DISCOLOOP:
for _, dc := range dcs {
consulOpts := &consulapi.QueryOptions{
AllowStale: true,
Datacenter: dc,
Near: "_agent",
WaitTime: consul.DefaultQueryWaitDuration,
}
consulServices, _, err := c.consulCatalog.Service(serviceName, consul.ServiceTagRPC, consulOpts)
if err != nil {
mErr.Errors = append(mErr.Errors, fmt.Errorf("unable to query service %+q from Consul datacenter %+q: %v", serviceName, dc, err))
continue
}
for _, s := range consulServices {
port := strconv.Itoa(s.ServicePort)
addrstr := s.ServiceAddress
if addrstr == "" {
addrstr = s.Address
}
addr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr("tcp", net.JoinHostPort(addrstr, port))
if err != nil {
mErr.Errors = append(mErr.Errors, err)
continue
}
client: use RPC address and not serf after initial Consul discovery (#16217) Nomad servers can advertise independent IP addresses for `serf` and `rpc`. Somewhat unexpectedly, the `serf` address is also used for both Serf and server-to-server RPC communication (including Raft RPC). The address advertised for `rpc` is only used for client-to-server RPC. This split was introduced intentionally in Nomad 0.8. When clients are using Consul discovery for connecting to servers, they get an initial discovery set from Consul and use the correct `rpc` tag in Consul to get a list of adddresses for servers. The client then makes a `Status.Peers` RPC to get the list of those servers that are raft peers. But this endpoint is shared between servers and clients, and provides the address used for Raft. Most of the time this is harmless because servers will bind on 0.0.0.0 anyways., But in topologies where servers are on a private network and clients are on separate subnets (or even public subnets), clients will make initial contact with the server to get the list of peers but then populate their local server set with unreachable addresses. Cluster administrators can work around this problem by using `server_join` with specific IP addresses (or DNS names), because the `Node.UpdateStatus` endpoint returns the correct set of RPC addresses when updating the node. So once a client has registered, it will get the correct set of RPC addresses. This changeset updates the client logic to query `Status.Members` instead of `Status.Peers`, and then extract the correctly advertised address and port from the response body.
2023-03-02 18:36:45 +00:00
srv := &servers.Server{Addr: addr}
nomadServers = append(nomadServers, srv)
}
client: use RPC address and not serf after initial Consul discovery (#16217) Nomad servers can advertise independent IP addresses for `serf` and `rpc`. Somewhat unexpectedly, the `serf` address is also used for both Serf and server-to-server RPC communication (including Raft RPC). The address advertised for `rpc` is only used for client-to-server RPC. This split was introduced intentionally in Nomad 0.8. When clients are using Consul discovery for connecting to servers, they get an initial discovery set from Consul and use the correct `rpc` tag in Consul to get a list of adddresses for servers. The client then makes a `Status.Peers` RPC to get the list of those servers that are raft peers. But this endpoint is shared between servers and clients, and provides the address used for Raft. Most of the time this is harmless because servers will bind on 0.0.0.0 anyways., But in topologies where servers are on a private network and clients are on separate subnets (or even public subnets), clients will make initial contact with the server to get the list of peers but then populate their local server set with unreachable addresses. Cluster administrators can work around this problem by using `server_join` with specific IP addresses (or DNS names), because the `Node.UpdateStatus` endpoint returns the correct set of RPC addresses when updating the node. So once a client has registered, it will get the correct set of RPC addresses. This changeset updates the client logic to query `Status.Members` instead of `Status.Peers`, and then extract the correctly advertised address and port from the response body.
2023-03-02 18:36:45 +00:00
if len(nomadServers) > 0 {
break DISCOLOOP
}
}
2018-01-09 23:26:53 +00:00
if len(nomadServers) == 0 {
if len(mErr.Errors) > 0 {
return mErr.ErrorOrNil()
}
return fmt.Errorf("no Nomad Servers advertising service %q in Consul datacenters: %+q", serviceName, dcs)
}
consulLogger.Info("discovered following servers", "servers", nomadServers)
// Fire the retry trigger if we have updated the set of servers.
if c.servers.SetServers(nomadServers) {
// Start rebalancing
c.servers.RebalanceServers()
// Notify waiting rpc calls. If a goroutine just failed an RPC call and
// isn't receiving on this chan yet they'll still retry eventually.
// This is a shortcircuit for the longer retry intervals.
c.fireRpcRetryWatcher()
}
2018-04-04 01:05:28 +00:00
return nil
}
// emitStats collects host resource usage stats periodically
func (c *Client) emitStats() {
2018-02-18 15:19:40 +00:00
// Determining NodeClass to be emitted
var emittedNodeClass string
if emittedNodeClass = c.Node().NodeClass; emittedNodeClass == "" {
emittedNodeClass = "none"
}
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// Assign labels directly before emitting stats so the information expected
// is ready
2018-02-18 15:19:40 +00:00
c.baseLabels = []metrics.Label{
{Name: "node_id", Value: c.NodeID()},
{Name: "datacenter", Value: c.Datacenter()},
{Name: "node_class", Value: emittedNodeClass},
{Name: "node_pool", Value: c.Node().NodePool},
2018-02-18 15:19:40 +00:00
}
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// Start collecting host stats right away and then keep collecting every
// collection interval
next := time.NewTimer(0)
defer next.Stop()
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
for {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
config := c.GetConfig()
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
select {
case <-next.C:
2016-12-12 06:58:28 +00:00
err := c.hostStatsCollector.Collect()
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
next.Reset(config.StatsCollectionInterval)
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
if err != nil {
c.logger.Warn("error fetching host resource usage stats", "error", err)
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
} else if config.PublishNodeMetrics {
2019-09-18 23:13:14 +00:00
// Publish Node metrics if operator has opted in
c.emitHostStats()
}
c.emitClientMetrics()
2016-05-09 15:55:19 +00:00
case <-c.shutdownCh:
return
}
}
}
2016-05-31 02:02:03 +00:00
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// setGaugeForMemoryStats proxies metrics for memory specific statistics
func (c *Client) setGaugeForMemoryStats(nodeID string, hStats *stats.HostStats, baseLabels []metrics.Label) {
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "memory", "total"}, float32(hStats.Memory.Total), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "memory", "available"}, float32(hStats.Memory.Available), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "memory", "used"}, float32(hStats.Memory.Used), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "memory", "free"}, float32(hStats.Memory.Free), baseLabels)
}
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// setGaugeForCPUStats proxies metrics for CPU specific statistics
func (c *Client) setGaugeForCPUStats(nodeID string, hStats *stats.HostStats, baseLabels []metrics.Label) {
labels := make([]metrics.Label, len(baseLabels))
copy(labels, baseLabels)
2016-05-31 02:02:03 +00:00
for _, cpu := range hStats.CPU {
labels := append(labels, metrics.Label{
Name: "cpu",
Value: cpu.CPU,
})
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "cpu", "total"}, float32(cpu.Total), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "cpu", "user"}, float32(cpu.User), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "cpu", "idle"}, float32(cpu.Idle), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "cpu", "system"}, float32(cpu.System), labels)
2016-05-31 02:02:03 +00:00
}
}
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// setGaugeForDiskStats proxies metrics for disk specific statistics
func (c *Client) setGaugeForDiskStats(nodeID string, hStats *stats.HostStats, baseLabels []metrics.Label) {
labels := make([]metrics.Label, len(baseLabels))
copy(labels, baseLabels)
2016-05-31 02:02:03 +00:00
for _, disk := range hStats.DiskStats {
labels := append(labels, metrics.Label{
Name: "disk",
Value: disk.Device,
})
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "disk", "size"}, float32(disk.Size), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "disk", "used"}, float32(disk.Used), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "disk", "available"}, float32(disk.Available), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "disk", "used_percent"}, float32(disk.UsedPercent), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "host", "disk", "inodes_percent"}, float32(disk.InodesUsedPercent), labels)
2016-05-31 02:02:03 +00:00
}
}
2017-09-04 02:56:47 +00:00
// setGaugeForAllocationStats proxies metrics for allocation specific statistics
func (c *Client) setGaugeForAllocationStats(nodeID string, baseLabels []metrics.Label) {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
node := c.GetConfig().Node
2018-10-03 16:47:18 +00:00
total := node.NodeResources
res := node.ReservedResources
2018-10-04 21:33:09 +00:00
allocated := c.getAllocatedResources(node)
// Emit allocated
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocated", "memory"}, float32(allocated.Flattened.Memory.MemoryMB), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocated", "max_memory"}, float32(allocated.Flattened.Memory.MemoryMaxMB), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocated", "disk"}, float32(allocated.Shared.DiskMB), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocated", "cpu"}, float32(allocated.Flattened.Cpu.CpuShares), baseLabels)
2018-10-03 16:47:18 +00:00
for _, n := range allocated.Flattened.Networks {
labels := append(baseLabels, metrics.Label{ //nolint:gocritic
Name: "device",
Value: n.Device,
})
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocated", "network"}, float32(n.MBits), labels)
}
// Emit unallocated
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unallocatedMem := total.Memory.MemoryMB - res.Memory.MemoryMB - allocated.Flattened.Memory.MemoryMB
unallocatedDisk := total.Disk.DiskMB - res.Disk.DiskMB - allocated.Shared.DiskMB
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unallocatedCpu := total.Cpu.CpuShares - res.Cpu.CpuShares - allocated.Flattened.Cpu.CpuShares
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "unallocated", "memory"}, float32(unallocatedMem), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "unallocated", "disk"}, float32(unallocatedDisk), baseLabels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "unallocated", "cpu"}, float32(unallocatedCpu), baseLabels)
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totalComparable := total.Comparable()
for _, n := range totalComparable.Flattened.Networks {
// Determined the used resources
var usedMbits int
totalIdx := allocated.Flattened.Networks.NetIndex(n)
if totalIdx != -1 {
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usedMbits = allocated.Flattened.Networks[totalIdx].MBits
}
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unallocatedMbits := n.MBits - usedMbits
labels := append(baseLabels, metrics.Label{ //nolint:gocritic
Name: "device",
Value: n.Device,
})
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "unallocated", "network"}, float32(unallocatedMbits), labels)
}
}
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// No labels are required so we emit with only a key/value syntax
func (c *Client) setGaugeForUptime(hStats *stats.HostStats, baseLabels []metrics.Label) {
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "uptime"}, float32(hStats.Uptime), baseLabels)
}
// emitHostStats pushes host resource usage stats to remote metrics collection sinks
func (c *Client) emitHostStats() {
nodeID := c.NodeID()
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hStats := c.hostStatsCollector.Stats()
labels := c.labels()
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c.setGaugeForMemoryStats(nodeID, hStats, labels)
c.setGaugeForUptime(hStats, labels)
c.setGaugeForCPUStats(nodeID, hStats, labels)
c.setGaugeForDiskStats(nodeID, hStats, labels)
}
// emitClientMetrics emits lower volume client metrics
func (c *Client) emitClientMetrics() {
nodeID := c.NodeID()
labels := c.labels()
c.setGaugeForAllocationStats(nodeID, labels)
// Emit allocation metrics
blocked, migrating, pending, running, terminal := 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
for _, ar := range c.getAllocRunners() {
switch ar.AllocState().ClientStatus {
case structs.AllocClientStatusPending:
switch {
case ar.IsWaiting():
blocked++
case ar.IsMigrating():
migrating++
default:
pending++
}
case structs.AllocClientStatusRunning:
running++
case structs.AllocClientStatusComplete, structs.AllocClientStatusFailed:
terminal++
}
}
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocations", "migrating"}, float32(migrating), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocations", "blocked"}, float32(blocked), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocations", "pending"}, float32(pending), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocations", "running"}, float32(running), labels)
metrics.SetGaugeWithLabels([]string{"client", "allocations", "terminal"}, float32(terminal), labels)
}
// labels takes the base labels and appends the node state
func (c *Client) labels() []metrics.Label {
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
node := c.Node()
return append(c.baseLabels,
client: fix data races in config handling (#14139) Before this change, Client had 2 copies of the config object: config and configCopy. There was no guidance around which to use where (other than configCopy's comment to pass it to alloc runners), both are shared among goroutines and mutated in data racy ways. At least at one point I think the idea was to have `config` be mutable and then grab a lock to overwrite `configCopy`'s pointer atomically. This would have allowed alloc runners to read their config copies in data race safe ways, but this isn't how the current implementation worked. This change takes the following approach to safely handling configs in the client: 1. `Client.config` is the only copy of the config and all access must go through the `Client.configLock` mutex 2. Since the mutex *only protects the config pointer itself and not fields inside the Config struct:* all config mutation must be done on a *copy* of the config, and then Client's config pointer is overwritten while the mutex is acquired. Alloc runners and other goroutines with the old config pointer will not see config updates. 3. Deep copying is implemented on the Config struct to satisfy the previous approach. The TLS Keyloader is an exception because it has its own internal locking to support mutating in place. An unfortunate complication but one I couldn't find a way to untangle in a timely fashion. 4. To facilitate deep copying I made an *internally backward incompatible API change:* our `helper/funcs` used to turn containers (slices and maps) with 0 elements into nils. This probably saves a few memory allocations but makes it very easy to cause panics. Since my new config handling approach uses more copying, it became very difficult to ensure all code that used containers on configs could handle nils properly. Since this code has caused panics in the past, I fixed it: nil containers are copied as nil, but 0-element containers properly return a new 0-element container. No more "downgrading to nil!"
2022-08-18 23:32:04 +00:00
metrics.Label{Name: "node_status", Value: node.Status},
metrics.Label{Name: "node_scheduling_eligibility", Value: node.SchedulingEligibility},
)
}
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func (c *Client) getAllocatedResources(selfNode *structs.Node) *structs.ComparableResources {
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// Unfortunately the allocs only have IP so we need to match them to the
// device
cidrToDevice := make(map[*net.IPNet]string, len(selfNode.Resources.Networks))
for _, n := range selfNode.NodeResources.Networks {
_, ipnet, err := net.ParseCIDR(n.CIDR)
if err != nil {
continue
}
cidrToDevice[ipnet] = n.Device
}
// Sum the allocated resources
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var allocated structs.ComparableResources
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allocatedDeviceMbits := make(map[string]int)
for _, ar := range c.getAllocRunners() {
alloc := ar.Alloc()
if alloc.ServerTerminalStatus() || ar.AllocState().ClientTerminalStatus() {
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continue
}
// Add the resources
// COMPAT(0.11): Just use the allocated resources
allocated.Add(alloc.ComparableResources())
// Add the used network
if alloc.AllocatedResources != nil {
for _, tr := range alloc.AllocatedResources.Tasks {
for _, allocatedNetwork := range tr.Networks {
for cidr, dev := range cidrToDevice {
ip := net.ParseIP(allocatedNetwork.IP)
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
allocatedDeviceMbits[dev] += allocatedNetwork.MBits
break
}
}
}
}
} else if alloc.Resources != nil {
for _, allocatedNetwork := range alloc.Resources.Networks {
for cidr, dev := range cidrToDevice {
ip := net.ParseIP(allocatedNetwork.IP)
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
allocatedDeviceMbits[dev] += allocatedNetwork.MBits
break
}
}
}
}
}
// Clear the networks
allocated.Flattened.Networks = nil
for dev, speed := range allocatedDeviceMbits {
net := &structs.NetworkResource{
Device: dev,
MBits: speed,
}
allocated.Flattened.Networks = append(allocated.Flattened.Networks, net)
}
return &allocated
}
// GetTaskEventHandler returns an event handler for the given allocID and task name
func (c *Client) GetTaskEventHandler(allocID, taskName string) drivermanager.EventHandler {
c.allocLock.RLock()
defer c.allocLock.RUnlock()
if ar, ok := c.allocs[allocID]; ok {
return ar.GetTaskEventHandler(taskName)
}
return nil
}
// group wraps a func() in a goroutine and provides a way to block until it
// exits. Inspired by https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/sync/errgroup
type group struct {
wg sync.WaitGroup
}
// Go starts f in a goroutine and must be called before Wait.
func (g *group) Go(f func()) {
g.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer g.wg.Done()
f()
}()
}
func (g *group) AddCh(ch <-chan struct{}) {
g.Go(func() {
<-ch
})
}
// Wait for all goroutines to exit. Must be called after all calls to Go
// complete.
func (g *group) Wait() {
g.wg.Wait()
}
// pendingClientUpdates are the set of allocation updates that the client is
// waiting to send
type pendingClientUpdates struct {
updates map[string]*structs.Allocation
lock sync.Mutex
}
func newPendingClientUpdates() *pendingClientUpdates {
return &pendingClientUpdates{
updates: make(map[string]*structs.Allocation, 64),
}
}
// add overwrites a pending update. The updates we get from the allocrunner are
// lightweight copies of its *structs.Allocation (i.e. just the client state),
// serialized with an internal lock. So the latest update is always the
// authoritative one, and the server only cares about that one.
func (p *pendingClientUpdates) add(alloc *structs.Allocation) {
p.lock.Lock()
defer p.lock.Unlock()
p.updates[alloc.ID] = alloc
}
// restore refills the pending updates map, but only if a newer update hasn't come in
func (p *pendingClientUpdates) restore(toRestore []*structs.Allocation) {
p.lock.Lock()
defer p.lock.Unlock()
for _, alloc := range toRestore {
if _, ok := p.updates[alloc.ID]; !ok {
p.updates[alloc.ID] = alloc
}
}
}
// nextBatch returns a list of client allocation updates we need to make in this
// tick of the allocSync. It returns nil if there's no updates to make yet. The
// caller is responsible for calling restore() if it can't successfully send the
// updates.
func (p *pendingClientUpdates) nextBatch(c *Client, updateTicks int) []*structs.Allocation {
p.lock.Lock()
defer p.lock.Unlock()
// Fast path if there are no pending updates
if len(p.updates) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Ensure we never send an update before we've had at least one sync from
// the server
select {
case <-c.serversContactedCh:
default:
return nil
}
toSync, urgent := p.filterAcknowledgedUpdatesLocked(c)
// Only update every 5th tick if there's no priority updates
if updateTicks%5 != 0 && !urgent {
return nil
}
// Clear here so that allocrunners can queue up the next set of updates
// while we're waiting to hear from the server
maps.Clear(p.updates)
return toSync
}
// filteredAcknowledgedUpdatesLocked returns a list of client alloc updates with
// the already-acknowledged updates removed, and the highest priority of any
// update. note: this method requires that p.lock is held
func (p *pendingClientUpdates) filterAcknowledgedUpdatesLocked(c *Client) ([]*structs.Allocation, bool) {
var urgent bool
sync := make([]*structs.Allocation, 0, len(p.updates))
c.allocLock.RLock()
defer c.allocLock.RUnlock()
for allocID, update := range p.updates {
if ar, ok := c.allocs[allocID]; ok {
switch ar.GetUpdatePriority(update) {
case cstructs.AllocUpdatePriorityUrgent:
sync = append(sync, update)
urgent = true
case cstructs.AllocUpdatePriorityTypical:
sync = append(sync, update)
case cstructs.AllocUpdatePriorityNone:
// update is dropped
}
} else {
// no allocrunner (typically a failed placement), so we need
// to send update
sync = append(sync, update)
}
}
return sync, urgent
}