2400 lines
84 KiB
Go
2400 lines
84 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package vault
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/armon/go-metrics"
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"github.com/golang/protobuf/proto"
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"github.com/hashicorp/errwrap"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-secure-stdlib/strutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-sockaddr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/command/server"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity/mfa"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/metricsutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/namespace"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/internalshared/configutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/framework"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/consts"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/errutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/jsonutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/policyutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/wrapping"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/vault/quotas"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/vault/tokens"
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uberAtomic "go.uber.org/atomic"
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)
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const (
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replTimeout = 1 * time.Second
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EnvVaultDisableLocalAuthMountEntities = "VAULT_DISABLE_LOCAL_AUTH_MOUNT_ENTITIES"
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// base path to store locked users
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coreLockedUsersPath = "core/login/lockedUsers/"
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)
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var (
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// DefaultMaxRequestDuration is the amount of time we'll wait for a request
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// to complete, unless overridden on a per-handler basis
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DefaultMaxRequestDuration = 90 * time.Second
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egpDebugLogging bool
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// if this returns an error, the request should be blocked and the error
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// should be returned to the client
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enterpriseBlockRequestIfError = blockRequestIfErrorImpl
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)
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// HandlerProperties is used to seed configuration into a vaulthttp.Handler.
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// It's in this package to avoid a circular dependency
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type HandlerProperties struct {
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Core *Core
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ListenerConfig *configutil.Listener
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DisablePrintableCheck bool
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RecoveryMode bool
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RecoveryToken *uberAtomic.String
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}
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// fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies returns the entity object for the given entity
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// ID. If the entity is merged into a different entity object, the entity into
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// which the given entity ID is merged into will be returned. This function
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// also returns the cumulative list of policies that the entity is entitled to
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// if skipDeriveEntityPolicies is set to false. This list includes the policies from the
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// entity itself and from all the groups in which the given entity ID is a member of.
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func (c *Core) fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx context.Context, tokenNS *namespace.Namespace, entityID string, skipDeriveEntityPolicies bool) (*identity.Entity, map[string][]string, error) {
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if entityID == "" || c.identityStore == nil {
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return nil, nil, nil
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}
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// c.logger.Debug("entity set on the token", "entity_id", te.EntityID)
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// Fetch the entity
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entity, err := c.identityStore.MemDBEntityByID(entityID, false)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to lookup entity using its ID", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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if entity == nil {
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// If there was no corresponding entity object found, it is
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// possible that the entity got merged into another entity. Try
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// finding entity based on the merged entity index.
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entity, err = c.identityStore.MemDBEntityByMergedEntityID(entityID, false)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to lookup entity in merged entity ID index", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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policies := make(map[string][]string)
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if entity != nil && !skipDeriveEntityPolicies {
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// c.logger.Debug("entity successfully fetched; adding entity policies to token's policies to create ACL")
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// Attach the policies on the entity
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if len(entity.Policies) != 0 {
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policies[entity.NamespaceID] = append(policies[entity.NamespaceID], entity.Policies...)
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}
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groupPolicies, err := c.identityStore.groupPoliciesByEntityID(entity.ID)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to fetch group policies", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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policyApplicationMode, err := c.GetGroupPolicyApplicationMode(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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// Filter and add the policies to the resultant set
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for nsID, nsPolicies := range groupPolicies {
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ns, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, nsID, c)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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if ns == nil {
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return nil, nil, namespace.ErrNoNamespace
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}
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// If we're only applying policies to namespaces within the same
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// hierarchy, then skip any policies not found in the same
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// hierarchy
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if policyApplicationMode == groupPolicyApplicationModeWithinNamespaceHierarchy {
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if tokenNS.Path != ns.Path && !ns.HasParent(tokenNS) {
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continue
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}
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}
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nsPolicies = strutil.RemoveDuplicates(nsPolicies, false)
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if len(nsPolicies) != 0 {
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policies[nsID] = append(policies[nsID], nsPolicies...)
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}
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}
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}
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return entity, policies, err
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}
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func (c *Core) fetchACLTokenEntryAndEntity(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (*ACL, *logical.TokenEntry, *identity.Entity, map[string][]string, error) {
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defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "fetch_acl_and_token"}, time.Now())
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// Ensure there is a client token
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if req.ClientToken == "" {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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if c.tokenStore == nil {
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c.logger.Error("token store is unavailable")
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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// Resolve the token policy
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var te *logical.TokenEntry
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switch req.TokenEntry() {
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case nil:
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var err error
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te, err = c.tokenStore.Lookup(ctx, req.ClientToken)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to lookup acl token", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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// Set the token entry here since it has not been cached yet
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req.SetTokenEntry(te)
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default:
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te = req.TokenEntry()
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}
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// Ensure the token is valid
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if te == nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// CIDR checks bind all tokens except non-expiring root tokens
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if te.TTL != 0 && len(te.BoundCIDRs) > 0 {
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var valid bool
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remoteSockAddr, err := sockaddr.NewSockAddr(req.Connection.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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if c.Logger().IsDebug() {
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c.Logger().Debug("could not parse remote addr into sockaddr", "error", err, "remote_addr", req.Connection.RemoteAddr)
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}
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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for _, cidr := range te.BoundCIDRs {
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if cidr.Contains(remoteSockAddr) {
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valid = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !valid {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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}
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policyNames := make(map[string][]string)
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// Add tokens policies
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policyNames[te.NamespaceID] = append(policyNames[te.NamespaceID], te.Policies...)
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tokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, c)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to fetch token namespace", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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if tokenNS == nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to fetch token namespace", "error", namespace.ErrNoNamespace)
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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// Add identity policies from all the namespaces
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entity, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, tokenNS, te.EntityID, te.NoIdentityPolicies)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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for nsID, nsPolicies := range identityPolicies {
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policyNames[nsID] = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(policyNames[nsID], nsPolicies...), false)
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}
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// Attach token's namespace information to the context. Wrapping tokens by
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// should be able to be used anywhere, so we also special case behavior.
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var tokenCtx context.Context
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if len(policyNames) == 1 &&
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len(policyNames[te.NamespaceID]) == 1 &&
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(policyNames[te.NamespaceID][0] == responseWrappingPolicyName ||
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policyNames[te.NamespaceID][0] == controlGroupPolicyName) &&
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(strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "sys/wrapping/unwrap") ||
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strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "sys/wrapping/lookup") ||
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strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "sys/wrapping/rewrap")) {
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// Use the request namespace; will find the copy of the policy for the
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// local namespace
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tokenCtx = ctx
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} else {
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// Use the token's namespace for looking up policy
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tokenCtx = namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, tokenNS)
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}
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// Add the inline policy if it's set
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policies := make([]*Policy, 0)
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if te.InlinePolicy != "" {
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inlinePolicy, err := ParseACLPolicy(tokenNS, te.InlinePolicy)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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policies = append(policies, inlinePolicy)
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}
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// Construct the corresponding ACL object. ACL construction should be
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// performed on the token's namespace.
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acl, err := c.policyStore.ACL(tokenCtx, entity, policyNames, policies...)
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if err != nil {
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c.logger.Error("failed to construct ACL", "error", err)
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError
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}
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return acl, te, entity, identityPolicies, nil
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}
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func (c *Core) CheckToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, unauth bool) (*logical.Auth, *logical.TokenEntry, error) {
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defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "check_token"}, time.Now())
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var acl *ACL
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var te *logical.TokenEntry
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var entity *identity.Entity
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var identityPolicies map[string][]string
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var err error
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// Even if unauth, if a token is provided, there's little reason not to
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// gather as much info as possible for the audit log and to e.g. control
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// trace mode for EGPs.
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if !unauth || (unauth && req.ClientToken != "") {
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acl, te, entity, identityPolicies, err = c.fetchACLTokenEntryAndEntity(ctx, req)
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// In the unauth case we don't want to fail the command, since it's
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// unauth, we just have no information to attach to the request, so
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// ignore errors...this was best-effort anyways
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if err != nil && !unauth {
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return nil, te, err
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}
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}
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if entity != nil && entity.Disabled {
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c.logger.Warn("permission denied as the entity on the token is disabled")
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return nil, te, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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if te != nil && te.EntityID != "" && entity == nil {
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if c.perfStandby {
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return nil, nil, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward
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}
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c.logger.Warn("permission denied as the entity on the token is invalid")
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return nil, te, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Check if this is a root protected path
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rootPath := c.router.RootPath(ctx, req.Path)
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if rootPath && unauth {
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return nil, nil, errors.New("cannot access root path in unauthenticated request")
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}
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// At this point we won't be forwarding a raw request; we should delete
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// authorization headers as appropriate
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switch req.ClientTokenSource {
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case logical.ClientTokenFromVaultHeader:
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delete(req.Headers, consts.AuthHeaderName)
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case logical.ClientTokenFromAuthzHeader:
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if headers, ok := req.Headers["Authorization"]; ok {
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retHeaders := make([]string, 0, len(headers))
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for _, v := range headers {
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if strings.HasPrefix(v, "Bearer ") {
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continue
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}
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retHeaders = append(retHeaders, v)
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}
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req.Headers["Authorization"] = retHeaders
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}
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}
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// When we receive a write of either type, rather than require clients to
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// PUT/POST and trust the operation, we ask the backend to give us the real
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// skinny -- if the backend implements an existence check, it can tell us
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// whether a particular resource exists. Then we can mark it as an update
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// or creation as appropriate.
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if req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation || req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation {
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existsResp, checkExists, resourceExists, err := c.router.RouteExistenceCheck(ctx, req)
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switch err {
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case logical.ErrUnsupportedPath:
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// fail later via bad path to avoid confusing items in the log
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checkExists = false
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case logical.ErrRelativePath:
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return nil, te, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
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case nil:
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if existsResp != nil && existsResp.IsError() {
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return nil, te, existsResp.Error()
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}
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// Otherwise, continue on
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default:
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c.logger.Error("failed to run existence check", "error", err)
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if _, ok := err.(errutil.UserError); ok {
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return nil, te, err
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} else {
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return nil, te, ErrInternalError
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}
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}
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switch {
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case !checkExists:
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// No existence check, so always treat it as an update operation, which is how it is pre 0.5
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req.Operation = logical.UpdateOperation
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case resourceExists:
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// It exists, so force an update operation
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req.Operation = logical.UpdateOperation
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case !resourceExists:
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// It doesn't exist, force a create operation
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req.Operation = logical.CreateOperation
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default:
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panic("unreachable code")
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}
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}
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// Create the auth response
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auth := &logical.Auth{
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ClientToken: req.ClientToken,
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Accessor: req.ClientTokenAccessor,
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}
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var clientID string
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var isTWE bool
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if te != nil {
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auth.IdentityPolicies = identityPolicies[te.NamespaceID]
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auth.TokenPolicies = te.Policies
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auth.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(te.Policies, identityPolicies[te.NamespaceID]...), false)
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auth.Metadata = te.Meta
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auth.DisplayName = te.DisplayName
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auth.EntityID = te.EntityID
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delete(identityPolicies, te.NamespaceID)
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auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies = identityPolicies
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// Store the entity ID in the request object
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req.EntityID = te.EntityID
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auth.TokenType = te.Type
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auth.TTL = te.TTL
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if te.CreationTime > 0 {
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auth.IssueTime = time.Unix(te.CreationTime, 0)
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}
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clientID, isTWE = te.CreateClientID()
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req.ClientID = clientID
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}
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// Check the standard non-root ACLs. Return the token entry if it's not
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// allowed so we can decrement the use count.
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authResults := c.performPolicyChecks(ctx, acl, te, req, entity, &PolicyCheckOpts{
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Unauth: unauth,
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RootPrivsRequired: rootPath,
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})
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auth.PolicyResults = &logical.PolicyResults{
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Allowed: authResults.Allowed,
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}
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|
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if !authResults.Allowed {
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retErr := authResults.Error
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|
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// If we get a control group error and we are a performance standby,
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// restore the client token information to the request so that we can
|
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// forward this request properly to the active node.
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if retErr.ErrorOrNil() != nil && checkErrControlGroupTokenNeedsCreated(retErr) &&
|
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c.perfStandby && len(req.ClientToken) != 0 {
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switch req.ClientTokenSource {
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case logical.ClientTokenFromVaultHeader:
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req.Headers[consts.AuthHeaderName] = []string{req.ClientToken}
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case logical.ClientTokenFromAuthzHeader:
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req.Headers["Authorization"] = append(req.Headers["Authorization"], fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", req.ClientToken))
|
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}
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// We also return the appropriate error so that the caller can forward the
|
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// request to the active node
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return auth, te, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward
|
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}
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|
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if authResults.Error.ErrorOrNil() == nil || authResults.DeniedError {
|
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retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied)
|
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}
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return auth, te, retErr
|
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}
|
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|
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if authResults.ACLResults != nil && len(authResults.ACLResults.GrantingPolicies) > 0 {
|
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auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies = authResults.ACLResults.GrantingPolicies
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}
|
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if authResults.SentinelResults != nil && len(authResults.SentinelResults.GrantingPolicies) > 0 {
|
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auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies = append(auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies, authResults.SentinelResults.GrantingPolicies...)
|
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}
|
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|
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// If it is an authenticated ( i.e with vault token ) request, increment client count
|
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if !unauth && c.activityLog != nil {
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c.activityLog.HandleTokenUsage(ctx, te, clientID, isTWE)
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}
|
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return auth, te, nil
|
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}
|
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|
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// HandleRequest is used to handle a new incoming request
|
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func (c *Core) HandleRequest(httpCtx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (resp *logical.Response, err error) {
|
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return c.switchedLockHandleRequest(httpCtx, req, true)
|
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}
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|
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func (c *Core) switchedLockHandleRequest(httpCtx context.Context, req *logical.Request, doLocking bool) (resp *logical.Response, err error) {
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if doLocking {
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c.stateLock.RLock()
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defer c.stateLock.RUnlock()
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}
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if c.Sealed() {
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return nil, consts.ErrSealed
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}
|
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if c.standby && !c.perfStandby {
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return nil, consts.ErrStandby
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}
|
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|
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if c.activeContext == nil || c.activeContext.Err() != nil {
|
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return nil, errors.New("active context canceled after getting state lock")
|
|
}
|
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|
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(c.activeContext)
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go func(ctx context.Context, httpCtx context.Context) {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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case <-httpCtx.Done():
|
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cancel()
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}
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}(ctx, httpCtx)
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|
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ns, err := namespace.FromContext(httpCtx)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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cancel()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse namespace from http context: %w", err)
|
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}
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|
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ctx = namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, ns)
|
|
inFlightReqID, ok := httpCtx.Value(logical.CtxKeyInFlightRequestID{}).(string)
|
|
if ok {
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, logical.CtxKeyInFlightRequestID{}, inFlightReqID)
|
|
}
|
|
resp, err = c.handleCancelableRequest(ctx, req)
|
|
req.SetTokenEntry(nil)
|
|
cancel()
|
|
return resp, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) handleCancelableRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (resp *logical.Response, err error) {
|
|
// Allowing writing to a path ending in / makes it extremely difficult to
|
|
// understand user intent for the filesystem-like backends (kv,
|
|
// cubbyhole) -- did they want a key named foo/ or did they want to write
|
|
// to a directory foo/ with no (or forgotten) key, or...? It also affects
|
|
// lookup, because paths ending in / are considered prefixes by some
|
|
// backends. Basically, it's all just terrible, so don't allow it.
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "/") &&
|
|
(req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation ||
|
|
req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation ||
|
|
req.Operation == logical.PatchOperation) {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse("cannot write to a path ending in '/'"), nil
|
|
}
|
|
waitGroup, err := waitForReplicationState(ctx, c, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MountPoint will not always be set at this point, so we ensure the req contains it
|
|
// as it is depended on by some functionality (e.g. quotas)
|
|
req.MountPoint = c.router.MatchingMount(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
|
|
// Decrement the wait group when our request is done
|
|
if waitGroup != nil {
|
|
defer waitGroup.Done()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.MissingRequiredState(req.RequiredState(), c.perfStandby) {
|
|
return nil, logical.ErrMissingRequiredState
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = c.PopulateTokenEntry(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Always forward requests that are using a limited use count token.
|
|
if c.perfStandby && req.ClientTokenRemainingUses > 0 {
|
|
// Prevent forwarding on local-only requests.
|
|
return nil, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not parse namespace from http context: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var requestBodyToken string
|
|
var returnRequestAuthToken bool
|
|
|
|
// req.Path will be relative by this point. The prefix check is first
|
|
// to fail faster if we're not in this situation since it's a hot path
|
|
switch {
|
|
case strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/wrapping/"), strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/"):
|
|
// Get the token ns info; if we match the paths below we want to
|
|
// swap in the token context (but keep the relative path)
|
|
te := req.TokenEntry()
|
|
newCtx := ctx
|
|
if te != nil {
|
|
ns, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, c)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.Logger().Warn("error looking up namespace from the token's namespace ID", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if ns != nil {
|
|
newCtx = namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, ns)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
switch req.Path {
|
|
// Route the token wrapping request to its respective sys NS
|
|
case "sys/wrapping/lookup", "sys/wrapping/rewrap", "sys/wrapping/unwrap":
|
|
ctx = newCtx
|
|
// A lookup on a token that is about to expire returns nil, which means by the
|
|
// time we can validate a wrapping token lookup will return nil since it will
|
|
// be revoked after the call. So we have to do the validation here.
|
|
valid, err := c.validateWrappingToken(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("error validating wrapping token: %s", err.Error())), logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
return nil, consts.ErrInvalidWrappingToken
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The -self paths have no meaning outside of the token NS, so
|
|
// requests for these paths always go to the token NS
|
|
case "auth/token/lookup-self", "auth/token/renew-self", "auth/token/revoke-self":
|
|
ctx = newCtx
|
|
returnRequestAuthToken = true
|
|
|
|
// For the following operations, we can set the proper namespace context
|
|
// using the token's embedded nsID if a relative path was provided.
|
|
// The operation will still be gated by ACLs, which are checked later.
|
|
case "auth/token/lookup", "auth/token/renew", "auth/token/revoke", "auth/token/revoke-orphan":
|
|
token, ok := req.Data["token"]
|
|
// If the token is not present (e.g. a bad request), break out and let the backend
|
|
// handle the error
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// If this is a token lookup request and if the token is not
|
|
// explicitly provided, it will use the client token so we simply set
|
|
// the context to the client token's context.
|
|
if req.Path == "auth/token/lookup" {
|
|
ctx = newCtx
|
|
}
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if token == nil {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid token"), logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
// We don't care if the token is a server side consistent token or not. Either way, we're going
|
|
// to be returning it for these paths instead of the short token stored in vault.
|
|
requestBodyToken = token.(string)
|
|
if IsSSCToken(token.(string)) {
|
|
token, err = c.CheckSSCToken(ctx, token.(string), c.isLoginRequest(ctx, req), c.perfStandby)
|
|
|
|
// If we receive an error from CheckSSCToken, we can assume the token is bad somehow, and the client
|
|
// should receive a 403 bad token error like they do for all other invalid tokens, unless the error
|
|
// specifies that we should forward the request or retry the request.
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward) || errors.Is(err, logical.ErrMissingRequiredState) {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse("bad token"), logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
req.Data["token"] = token
|
|
}
|
|
_, nsID := namespace.SplitIDFromString(token.(string))
|
|
if nsID != "" {
|
|
ns, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, nsID, c)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.Logger().Warn("error looking up namespace from the token's namespace ID", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if ns != nil {
|
|
ctx = namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, ns)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The following relative sys/leases/ paths handles re-routing requests
|
|
// to the proper namespace using the lease ID on applicable paths.
|
|
case strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/leases/"):
|
|
switch req.Path {
|
|
// For the following operations, we can set the proper namespace context
|
|
// using the lease's embedded nsID if a relative path was provided.
|
|
// The operation will still be gated by ACLs, which are checked later.
|
|
case "sys/leases/lookup", "sys/leases/renew", "sys/leases/revoke", "sys/leases/revoke-force":
|
|
leaseID, ok := req.Data["lease_id"]
|
|
// If lease ID is not present, break out and let the backend handle the error
|
|
if !ok || leaseID == nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
_, nsID := namespace.SplitIDFromString(leaseID.(string))
|
|
if nsID != "" {
|
|
ns, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, nsID, c)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.Logger().Warn("error looking up namespace from the lease's namespace ID", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if ns != nil {
|
|
ctx = namespace.ContextWithNamespace(ctx, ns)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prevent any metrics requests to be forwarded from a standby node.
|
|
// Instead, we return an error since we cannot be sure if we have an
|
|
// active token store to validate the provided token.
|
|
case strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/metrics"):
|
|
if c.standby && !c.perfStandby {
|
|
return nil, ErrCannotForwardLocalOnly
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ns, err = namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("could not parse namespace from http context: {{err}}", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !hasNamespaces(c) && ns.Path != "" {
|
|
return nil, logical.CodedError(403, "namespaces feature not enabled")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
walState := &logical.WALState{}
|
|
ctx = logical.IndexStateContext(ctx, walState)
|
|
var auth *logical.Auth
|
|
if c.isLoginRequest(ctx, req) {
|
|
resp, auth, err = c.handleLoginRequest(ctx, req)
|
|
} else {
|
|
resp, auth, err = c.handleRequest(ctx, req)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err == nil && c.requestResponseCallback != nil {
|
|
c.requestResponseCallback(c.router.MatchingBackend(ctx, req.Path), req, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we saved the token in the request, we should return it in the response
|
|
// data.
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Data != nil {
|
|
if _, ok := resp.Data["error"]; !ok {
|
|
if requestBodyToken != "" {
|
|
resp.Data["id"] = requestBodyToken
|
|
} else if returnRequestAuthToken && req.InboundSSCToken != "" {
|
|
resp.Data["id"] = req.InboundSSCToken
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && requestBodyToken != "" {
|
|
// if a client token has already been set and the request body token's internal token
|
|
// is equal to that value, then we can return the original request body token
|
|
tok, _ := c.DecodeSSCToken(requestBodyToken)
|
|
if resp.Auth.ClientToken == tok {
|
|
resp.Auth.ClientToken = requestBodyToken
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure we don't leak internal data
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
if resp.Secret != nil {
|
|
resp.Secret.InternalData = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if resp.Auth != nil {
|
|
resp.Auth.InternalData = nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We are wrapping if there is anything to wrap (not a nil response) and a
|
|
// TTL was specified for the token. Errors on a call should be returned to
|
|
// the caller, so wrapping is turned off if an error is hit and the error
|
|
// is logged to the audit log.
|
|
wrapping := resp != nil &&
|
|
err == nil &&
|
|
!resp.IsError() &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo != nil &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo.TTL != 0 &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo.Token == ""
|
|
|
|
if wrapping {
|
|
cubbyResp, cubbyErr := c.wrapInCubbyhole(ctx, req, resp, auth)
|
|
// If not successful, returns either an error response from the
|
|
// cubbyhole backend or an error; if either is set, set resp and err to
|
|
// those and continue so that that's what we audit log. Otherwise
|
|
// finish the wrapping and audit log that.
|
|
if cubbyResp != nil || cubbyErr != nil {
|
|
resp = cubbyResp
|
|
err = cubbyErr
|
|
} else {
|
|
wrappingResp := &logical.Response{
|
|
WrapInfo: resp.WrapInfo,
|
|
Warnings: resp.Warnings,
|
|
}
|
|
resp = wrappingResp
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auditResp := resp
|
|
// When unwrapping we want to log the actual response that will be written
|
|
// out. We still want to return the raw value to avoid automatic updating
|
|
// to any of it.
|
|
if req.Path == "sys/wrapping/unwrap" &&
|
|
resp != nil &&
|
|
resp.Data != nil &&
|
|
resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody] != nil {
|
|
|
|
// Decode the JSON
|
|
if resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBodyAlreadyJSONDecoded] != nil {
|
|
delete(resp.Data, logical.HTTPRawBodyAlreadyJSONDecoded)
|
|
} else {
|
|
httpResp := &logical.HTTPResponse{}
|
|
err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody].([]byte), httpResp)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to unmarshal wrapped HTTP response for audit logging", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auditResp = logical.HTTPResponseToLogicalResponse(httpResp)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string
|
|
var nonHMACRespDataKeys []string
|
|
entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if entry != nil {
|
|
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards.
|
|
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok {
|
|
nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards.
|
|
if auditResp != nil {
|
|
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_response_keys"); ok {
|
|
nonHMACRespDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the response
|
|
if !isControlGroupRun(req) {
|
|
switch req.Path {
|
|
case "sys/replication/dr/status", "sys/replication/performance/status", "sys/replication/status":
|
|
default:
|
|
logInput := &logical.LogInput{
|
|
Auth: auth,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
Response: auditResp,
|
|
OuterErr: err,
|
|
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
|
|
NonHMACRespDataKeys: nonHMACRespDataKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
if auditErr := c.auditBroker.LogResponse(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); auditErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to audit response", "request_path", req.Path, "error", auditErr)
|
|
return nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if walState.LocalIndex != 0 || walState.ReplicatedIndex != 0 {
|
|
walState.ClusterID = c.ClusterID()
|
|
if walState.LocalIndex == 0 {
|
|
if c.perfStandby {
|
|
walState.LocalIndex = LastRemoteWAL(c)
|
|
} else {
|
|
walState.LocalIndex = LastWAL(c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if walState.ReplicatedIndex == 0 {
|
|
if c.perfStandby {
|
|
walState.ReplicatedIndex = LastRemoteUpstreamWAL(c)
|
|
} else {
|
|
walState.ReplicatedIndex = LastRemoteWAL(c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req.SetResponseState(walState)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isControlGroupRun(req *logical.Request) bool {
|
|
return req.ControlGroup != nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) doRouting(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (*logical.Response, error) {
|
|
// If we're replicating and we get a read-only error from a backend, need to forward to primary
|
|
resp, err := c.router.Route(ctx, req)
|
|
if shouldForward(c, resp, err) {
|
|
return forward(ctx, c, req)
|
|
}
|
|
return resp, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) isLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) bool {
|
|
return c.router.LoginPath(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) handleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
|
|
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_request"}, time.Now())
|
|
|
|
var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string
|
|
entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if entry != nil {
|
|
// Set here so the audit log has it even if authorization fails
|
|
req.MountType = entry.Type
|
|
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value.
|
|
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok {
|
|
nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to get namespace from context", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate the token
|
|
auth, te, ctErr := c.CheckToken(ctx, req, false)
|
|
if ctErr == logical.ErrRelativePath {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), nil, ctErr
|
|
}
|
|
if ctErr == logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward {
|
|
return nil, nil, ctErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Updating in-flight request data with client/entity ID
|
|
inFlightReqID, ok := ctx.Value(logical.CtxKeyInFlightRequestID{}).(string)
|
|
if ok && req.ClientID != "" {
|
|
c.UpdateInFlightReqData(inFlightReqID, req.ClientID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We run this logic first because we want to decrement the use count even
|
|
// in the case of an error (assuming we can successfully look up; if we
|
|
// need to forward, we exit before now)
|
|
if te != nil && !isControlGroupRun(req) {
|
|
// Attempt to use the token (decrement NumUses)
|
|
var err error
|
|
te, err = c.tokenStore.UseToken(ctx, te)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to use token", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, nil, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if te == nil {
|
|
// Token has been revoked by this point
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied)
|
|
return nil, nil, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if te.NumUses == tokenRevocationPending {
|
|
// We defer a revocation until after logic has run, since this is a
|
|
// valid request (this is the token's final use). We pass the ID in
|
|
// directly just to be safe in case something else modifies te later.
|
|
defer func(id string) {
|
|
nsActiveCtx := namespace.ContextWithNamespace(c.activeContext, ns)
|
|
leaseID, err := c.expiration.CreateOrFetchRevocationLeaseByToken(nsActiveCtx, te)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
err = c.expiration.LazyRevoke(ctx, leaseID)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to revoke token", "error", err)
|
|
retResp = nil
|
|
retAuth = nil
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
}
|
|
if retResp != nil && retResp.Secret != nil &&
|
|
// Some backends return a TTL even without a Lease ID
|
|
retResp.Secret.LeaseID != "" {
|
|
retResp = logical.ErrorResponse("Secret cannot be returned; token had one use left, so leased credentials were immediately revoked.")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}(te.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ctErr != nil {
|
|
newCtErr, cgResp, cgAuth, cgRetErr := checkNeedsCG(ctx, c, req, auth, ctErr, nonHMACReqDataKeys)
|
|
switch {
|
|
case newCtErr != nil:
|
|
ctErr = newCtErr
|
|
case cgResp != nil || cgAuth != nil:
|
|
if cgRetErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, cgRetErr)
|
|
}
|
|
return cgResp, cgAuth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we
|
|
// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct
|
|
switch {
|
|
case ctErr == ErrInternalError,
|
|
errwrap.Contains(ctErr, ErrInternalError.Error()),
|
|
ctErr == logical.ErrPermissionDenied,
|
|
errwrap.Contains(ctErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied.Error()):
|
|
switch ctErr.(type) {
|
|
case *multierror.Error:
|
|
retErr = ctErr
|
|
default:
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ctErr)
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrInvalidRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !isControlGroupRun(req) {
|
|
logInput := &logical.LogInput{
|
|
Auth: auth,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
OuterErr: ctErr,
|
|
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if errwrap.Contains(retErr, ErrInternalError.Error()) {
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attach the display name
|
|
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
|
|
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the request
|
|
if !isControlGroupRun(req) {
|
|
logInput := &logical.LogInput{
|
|
Auth: auth,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := enterpriseBlockRequestIfError(c, ns.Path, req.Path); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, multierror.Append(retErr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leaseGenerated := false
|
|
loginRole := c.DetermineRoleFromLoginRequest(req.MountPoint, req.Data, ctx)
|
|
quotaResp, quotaErr := c.applyLeaseCountQuota(ctx, "as.Request{
|
|
Path: req.Path,
|
|
MountPath: strings.TrimPrefix(req.MountPoint, ns.Path),
|
|
Role: loginRole,
|
|
NamespacePath: ns.Path,
|
|
})
|
|
if quotaErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to apply quota", "path", req.Path, "error", quotaErr)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, quotaErr)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !quotaResp.Allowed {
|
|
if c.logger.IsTrace() {
|
|
c.logger.Trace("request rejected due to lease count quota violation", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, fmt.Errorf("request path %q: %w", req.Path, quotas.ErrLeaseCountQuotaExceeded))
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if quotaResp.Access != nil {
|
|
quotaAckErr := c.ackLeaseQuota(quotaResp.Access, leaseGenerated)
|
|
if quotaAckErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, quotaAckErr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
// Route the request
|
|
resp, routeErr := c.doRouting(ctx, req)
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
|
|
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
|
|
var wrapTTL time.Duration
|
|
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
|
|
var sealWrap bool
|
|
|
|
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
|
|
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case wrapTTL == 0:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If the wrap format hasn't been set by the response, set it to
|
|
// the request format
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
|
|
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if wrapTTL > 0 {
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
|
|
TTL: wrapTTL,
|
|
Format: wrapFormat,
|
|
CreationPath: creationPath,
|
|
SealWrap: sealWrap,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If there is a secret, we must register it with the expiration manager.
|
|
// We exclude renewal of a lease, since it does not need to be re-registered
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/renew") &&
|
|
!strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/leases/renew") {
|
|
// KV mounts should return the TTL but not register
|
|
// for a lease as this provides a massive slowdown
|
|
registerLease := true
|
|
|
|
matchingMountEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if matchingMountEntry == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unable to retrieve kv mount entry from router")
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch matchingMountEntry.Type {
|
|
case "kv", "generic":
|
|
// If we are kv type, first see if we are an older passthrough
|
|
// backend, and otherwise check the mount entry options.
|
|
matchingBackend := c.router.MatchingBackend(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if matchingBackend == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unable to retrieve kv backend from router")
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ptbe, ok := matchingBackend.(*PassthroughBackend); ok {
|
|
if !ptbe.GeneratesLeases() {
|
|
registerLease = false
|
|
resp.Secret.Renewable = false
|
|
}
|
|
} else if matchingMountEntry.Options == nil || matchingMountEntry.Options["leased_passthrough"] != "true" {
|
|
registerLease = false
|
|
resp.Secret.Renewable = false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "plugin":
|
|
// If we are a plugin type and the plugin name is "kv" check the
|
|
// mount entry options.
|
|
if matchingMountEntry.Config.PluginName == "kv" && (matchingMountEntry.Options == nil || matchingMountEntry.Options["leased_passthrough"] != "true") {
|
|
registerLease = false
|
|
resp.Secret.Renewable = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if registerLease {
|
|
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if sysView == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, resp.Secret.TTL, 0, resp.Secret.MaxTTL, 0, time.Time{})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
for _, warning := range warnings {
|
|
resp.AddWarning(warning)
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Secret.TTL = ttl
|
|
|
|
registerFunc, funcGetErr := getLeaseRegisterFunc(c)
|
|
if funcGetErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, funcGetErr)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leaseID, err := registerFunc(ctx, req, resp, loginRole)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to register lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
leaseGenerated = true
|
|
resp.Secret.LeaseID = leaseID
|
|
|
|
// Count the lease creation
|
|
ttl_label := metricsutil.TTLBucket(resp.Secret.TTL)
|
|
mountPointWithoutNs := ns.TrimmedPath(req.MountPoint)
|
|
c.MetricSink().IncrCounterWithLabels(
|
|
[]string{"secret", "lease", "creation"},
|
|
1,
|
|
[]metrics.Label{
|
|
metricsutil.NamespaceLabel(ns),
|
|
{"secret_engine", req.MountType},
|
|
{"mount_point", mountPointWithoutNs},
|
|
{"creation_ttl", ttl_label},
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only the token store is allowed to return an auth block, for any
|
|
// other request this is an internal error.
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil {
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unexpected Auth response for non-token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fetch the namespace to which the token belongs
|
|
tokenNS, err := NamespaceByID(ctx, te.NamespaceID, c)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to fetch token's namespace", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, err)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if tokenNS == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error(namespace.ErrNoNamespace.Error())
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, namespace.ErrNoNamespace)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, tokenNS, resp.Auth.EntityID, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Best-effort clean up on error, so we log the cleanup error as a
|
|
// warning but still return as internal error.
|
|
if err := c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, resp.Auth.ClientToken); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up token lease from entity and policy lookup failure", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We skip expiration manager registration for token renewal since it
|
|
// does not need to be re-registered
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") {
|
|
// We build the "policies" list to be returned by starting with
|
|
// token policies, and add identity policies right after this
|
|
// conditional
|
|
tok, _ := c.DecodeSSCToken(req.InboundSSCToken)
|
|
if resp.Auth.ClientToken == tok {
|
|
resp.Auth.ClientToken = req.InboundSSCToken
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Auth.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(resp.Auth.TokenPolicies, policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
} else {
|
|
resp.Auth.TokenPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(resp.Auth.Policies, policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
|
|
switch resp.Auth.TokenType {
|
|
case logical.TokenTypeBatch:
|
|
case logical.TokenTypeService:
|
|
if !c.perfStandby {
|
|
registeredTokenEntry := &logical.TokenEntry{
|
|
TTL: auth.TTL,
|
|
Policies: auth.TokenPolicies,
|
|
Path: resp.Auth.CreationPath,
|
|
NamespaceID: ns.ID,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(ctx, registeredTokenEntry, resp.Auth, c.DetermineRoleFromLoginRequest(req.MountPoint, req.Data, ctx)); err != nil {
|
|
// Best-effort clean up on error, so we log the cleanup error as
|
|
// a warning but still return as internal error.
|
|
if err := c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, resp.Auth.ClientToken); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up token lease during auth/token/ request", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to register token lease during auth/token/ request", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if registeredTokenEntry.ExternalID != "" {
|
|
resp.Auth.ClientToken = registeredTokenEntry.ExternalID
|
|
}
|
|
leaseGenerated = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We do these later since it's not meaningful for backends/expmgr to
|
|
// have what is purely a snapshot of current identity policies, and
|
|
// plugins can be confused if they are checking contents of
|
|
// Auth.Policies instead of Auth.TokenPolicies
|
|
resp.Auth.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(resp.Auth.Policies, identityPolicies[te.NamespaceID]...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
resp.Auth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies[te.NamespaceID], policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
delete(identityPolicies, te.NamespaceID)
|
|
resp.Auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies = identityPolicies
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp != nil &&
|
|
req.Path == "cubbyhole/response" &&
|
|
len(te.Policies) == 1 &&
|
|
te.Policies[0] == responseWrappingPolicyName {
|
|
resp.AddWarning("Reading from 'cubbyhole/response' is deprecated. Please use sys/wrapping/unwrap to unwrap responses, as it provides additional security checks and other benefits.")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Return the response and error
|
|
if routeErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, routeErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleLoginRequest is used to handle a login request, which is an
|
|
// unauthenticated request to the backend.
|
|
func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
|
|
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_login_request"}, time.Now())
|
|
|
|
req.Unauthenticated = true
|
|
|
|
var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string
|
|
entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
if entry != nil {
|
|
// Set here so the audit log has it even if authorization fails
|
|
req.MountType = entry.Type
|
|
// Get and set ignored HMAC'd value.
|
|
if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok {
|
|
nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Do an unauth check. This will cause EGP policies to be checked
|
|
var auth *logical.Auth
|
|
var ctErr error
|
|
auth, _, ctErr = c.CheckToken(ctx, req, true)
|
|
if ctErr == logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward {
|
|
return nil, nil, ctErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Updating in-flight request data with client/entity ID
|
|
inFlightReqID, ok := ctx.Value(logical.CtxKeyInFlightRequestID{}).(string)
|
|
if ok && req.ClientID != "" {
|
|
c.UpdateInFlightReqData(inFlightReqID, req.ClientID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ctErr != nil {
|
|
// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we
|
|
// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct
|
|
var errType error
|
|
switch ctErr {
|
|
case ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied:
|
|
errType = ctErr
|
|
default:
|
|
errType = logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logInput := &logical.LogInput{
|
|
Auth: auth,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
OuterErr: ctErr,
|
|
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if errType != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType)
|
|
}
|
|
if ctErr == ErrInternalError {
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch req.Path {
|
|
case "sys/replication/dr/status", "sys/replication/performance/status", "sys/replication/status":
|
|
default:
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned,
|
|
// e.g. if a token was provided.
|
|
logInput := &logical.LogInput{
|
|
Auth: auth,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token,
|
|
// so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here.
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unexpected login request for token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check if user lockout feature is disabled
|
|
isUserLockoutDisabled, err := c.isUserLockoutDisabled(entry)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if user lockout feature is not disabled, check if the user is locked
|
|
if !isUserLockoutDisabled {
|
|
isloginUserLocked, err := c.isUserLocked(ctx, entry, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if isloginUserLocked {
|
|
return nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Route the request
|
|
resp, routeErr := c.doRouting(ctx, req)
|
|
|
|
// if routeErr has invalid credentials error, update the userFailedLoginMap
|
|
if routeErr != nil && routeErr == logical.ErrInvalidCredentials {
|
|
err := c.failedUserLoginProcess(ctx, entry, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil, resp.Error()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
|
|
var wrapTTL time.Duration
|
|
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
|
|
var sealWrap bool
|
|
|
|
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
|
|
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case wrapTTL == 0:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
|
|
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if wrapTTL > 0 {
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
|
|
TTL: wrapTTL,
|
|
Format: wrapFormat,
|
|
CreationPath: creationPath,
|
|
SealWrap: sealWrap,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A login request should never return a secret!
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unexpected Secret response for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to get namespace from context", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && req.Path != "sys/mfa/validate" {
|
|
leaseGenerated := false
|
|
|
|
// by placing this after the authorization check, we don't leak
|
|
// information about locked namespaces to unauthenticated clients.
|
|
if err := enterpriseBlockRequestIfError(c, ns.Path, req.Path); err != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The request successfully authenticated itself. Run the quota checks
|
|
// before creating lease.
|
|
quotaResp, quotaErr := c.applyLeaseCountQuota(ctx, "as.Request{
|
|
Path: req.Path,
|
|
MountPath: strings.TrimPrefix(req.MountPoint, ns.Path),
|
|
Role: c.DetermineRoleFromLoginRequest(req.MountPoint, req.Data, ctx),
|
|
NamespacePath: ns.Path,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if quotaErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to apply quota", "path", req.Path, "error", quotaErr)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, quotaErr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !quotaResp.Allowed {
|
|
if c.logger.IsTrace() {
|
|
c.logger.Trace("request rejected due to lease count quota violation", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, fmt.Errorf("request path %q: %w", req.Path, quotas.ErrLeaseCountQuotaExceeded))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if quotaResp.Access != nil {
|
|
quotaAckErr := c.ackLeaseQuota(quotaResp.Access, leaseGenerated)
|
|
if quotaAckErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, quotaAckErr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
var entity *identity.Entity
|
|
auth = resp.Auth
|
|
|
|
mEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
|
|
if auth.Alias != nil &&
|
|
mEntry != nil &&
|
|
c.identityStore != nil {
|
|
|
|
if mEntry.Local && os.Getenv(EnvVaultDisableLocalAuthMountEntities) != "" {
|
|
goto CREATE_TOKEN
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias
|
|
// information
|
|
auth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType
|
|
auth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor
|
|
auth.Alias.Local = mEntry.Local
|
|
|
|
if auth.Alias.Name == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("missing name in alias")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
// Fetch the entity for the alias, or create an entity if one
|
|
// doesn't exist.
|
|
entity, entityCreated, err := c.identityStore.CreateOrFetchEntity(ctx, auth.Alias)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
switch auth.Alias.Local {
|
|
case true:
|
|
// Only create a new entity if the error was a readonly error and the creation flag is true
|
|
// i.e the entity was in the middle of being created
|
|
if entityCreated && errors.Is(err, logical.ErrReadOnly) {
|
|
entity, err = possiblyForwardEntityCreation(ctx, c, err, auth, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), errCreateEntityUnimplemented) {
|
|
resp.AddWarning("primary cluster doesn't yet issue entities for local auth mounts; falling back to not issuing entities for local auth mounts")
|
|
goto CREATE_TOKEN
|
|
} else {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
err = updateLocalAlias(ctx, c, auth, entity)
|
|
default:
|
|
entity, entityCreated, err = possiblyForwardAliasCreation(ctx, c, err, auth, entity)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if entity == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if entity.Disabled {
|
|
return nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth.EntityID = entity.ID
|
|
auth.EntityCreated = entityCreated
|
|
validAliases, err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(ctx, auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases, req.MountAccessor)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
auth.GroupAliases = validAliases
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CREATE_TOKEN:
|
|
// Determine the source of the login
|
|
source := c.router.MatchingMount(ctx, req.Path)
|
|
|
|
// Login MFA
|
|
entity, _, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, ns, auth.EntityID, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
// finding the MFAEnforcementConfig that matches the ns and either of
|
|
// entityID, MountAccessor, GroupID, or Auth type.
|
|
matchedMfaEnforcementList, err := c.buildMFAEnforcementConfigList(ctx, entity, req.Path)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to find MFAEnforcement configuration, error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// (for the context, a response warning above says: "primary cluster
|
|
// doesn't yet issue entities for local auth mounts; falling back
|
|
// to not issuing entities for local auth mounts")
|
|
// based on the above, if the entity is nil, check if MFAEnforcementConfig
|
|
// is configured or not. If not, continue as usual, but if there
|
|
// is something, then report an error indicating that the user is not
|
|
// allowed to login because there is no entity associated with it.
|
|
// This is because an entity is needed to enforce MFA.
|
|
if entity == nil && len(matchedMfaEnforcementList) > 0 {
|
|
// this logic means that an MFAEnforcementConfig was configured with
|
|
// only mount type or mount accessor
|
|
return nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The resp.Auth has been populated with the information that is required for MFA validation
|
|
// This is why, the MFA check is placed at this point. The resp.Auth is going to be fully cached
|
|
// in memory so that it would be used to return to the user upon MFA validation is completed.
|
|
if entity != nil {
|
|
if len(matchedMfaEnforcementList) == 0 && len(req.MFACreds) > 0 {
|
|
resp.AddWarning("Found MFA header but failed to find MFA Enforcement Config")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If X-Vault-MFA header is supplied to the login request,
|
|
// run single-phase login MFA check, else run two-phase login MFA check
|
|
if len(matchedMfaEnforcementList) > 0 && len(req.MFACreds) > 0 {
|
|
for _, eConfig := range matchedMfaEnforcementList {
|
|
err = c.validateLoginMFA(ctx, eConfig, entity, req.Connection.RemoteAddr, req.MFACreds)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if len(matchedMfaEnforcementList) > 0 && len(req.MFACreds) == 0 {
|
|
mfaRequestID, err := uuid.GenerateUUID()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// sending back the MFARequirement config
|
|
mfaRequirement := &logical.MFARequirement{
|
|
MFARequestID: mfaRequestID,
|
|
MFAConstraints: make(map[string]*logical.MFAConstraintAny),
|
|
}
|
|
for _, eConfig := range matchedMfaEnforcementList {
|
|
mfaAny, err := c.buildMfaEnforcementResponse(eConfig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
mfaRequirement.MFAConstraints[eConfig.Name] = mfaAny
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// for two phased MFA enforcement, we should not return the regular auth
|
|
// response. This flag is indicate to store the auth response for later
|
|
// and return MFARequirement only
|
|
respAuth := &MFACachedAuthResponse{
|
|
CachedAuth: resp.Auth,
|
|
RequestPath: req.Path,
|
|
RequestNSID: ns.ID,
|
|
RequestNSPath: ns.Path,
|
|
RequestConnRemoteAddr: req.Connection.RemoteAddr, // this is needed for the DUO method
|
|
TimeOfStorage: time.Now(),
|
|
RequestID: mfaRequestID,
|
|
}
|
|
err = possiblyForwardSaveCachedAuthResponse(ctx, c, respAuth)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
auth = nil
|
|
resp.Auth = &logical.Auth{
|
|
MFARequirement: mfaRequirement,
|
|
}
|
|
resp.AddWarning("A login request was issued that is subject to MFA validation. Please make sure to validate the login by sending another request to mfa/validate endpoint.")
|
|
// going to return early before generating the token
|
|
// the user receives the mfaRequirement, and need to use the
|
|
// login MFA validate endpoint to get the token
|
|
return resp, auth, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends
|
|
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
|
|
|
|
leaseGen, respTokenCreate, errCreateToken := c.LoginCreateToken(ctx, ns, req.Path, source, resp, req.Data)
|
|
leaseGenerated = leaseGen
|
|
if errCreateToken != nil {
|
|
return respTokenCreate, nil, errCreateToken
|
|
}
|
|
resp = respTokenCreate
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Successful login, remove any entry from userFailedLoginInfo map
|
|
// if it exists. This is done for batch tokens (for oss & ent)
|
|
// For service tokens on oss it is taken care by core RegisterAuth function.
|
|
// For service tokens on ent it is taken care by registerAuth RPC calls.
|
|
// This update is done as part of registerAuth of RPC calls from standby
|
|
// to active node. This is added there to reduce RPC calls
|
|
if !isUserLockoutDisabled && (auth.TokenType == logical.TokenTypeBatch) {
|
|
loginUserInfoKey := FailedLoginUser{
|
|
aliasName: auth.Alias.Name,
|
|
mountAccessor: auth.Alias.MountAccessor,
|
|
}
|
|
err = updateUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, c, loginUserInfoKey, nil, true)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if we were already going to return some error from this login, do that.
|
|
// if not, we will then check if the API is locked for the requesting
|
|
// namespace, to avoid leaking locked namespaces to unauthenticated clients.
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Data != nil {
|
|
if _, ok := resp.Data["error"]; ok {
|
|
return resp, auth, routeErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if routeErr != nil {
|
|
return resp, auth, routeErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// this check handles the bad login credential case
|
|
if err := enterpriseBlockRequestIfError(c, ns.Path, req.Path); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, multierror.Append(retErr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp, auth, routeErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LoginCreateToken creates a token as a result of a login request.
|
|
// If MFA is enforced, mfa/validate endpoint calls this functions
|
|
// after successful MFA validation to generate the token.
|
|
func (c *Core) LoginCreateToken(ctx context.Context, ns *namespace.Namespace, reqPath, mountPoint string, resp *logical.Response, loginRequestData map[string]interface{}) (bool, *logical.Response, error) {
|
|
auth := resp.Auth
|
|
|
|
source := strings.TrimPrefix(mountPoint, credentialRoutePrefix)
|
|
source = strings.ReplaceAll(source, "/", "-")
|
|
|
|
// Prepend the source to the display name
|
|
auth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, "-")
|
|
|
|
// Determine mount type
|
|
mountEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(ctx, reqPath)
|
|
if mountEntry == nil {
|
|
return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to find a matching mount")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(ctx, reqPath)
|
|
if sysView == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", reqPath)
|
|
return false, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tokenTTL, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, auth.TTL, auth.Period, auth.MaxTTL, auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, time.Time{})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
for _, warning := range warnings {
|
|
resp.AddWarning(warning)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(ctx, ns, auth.EntityID, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth.TokenPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(auth.Policies, !auth.NoDefaultPolicy)
|
|
allPolicies := policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(auth.TokenPolicies, identityPolicies[ns.ID]...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
|
|
// Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens. We check
|
|
// this on auth.Policies including derived ones from Identity before
|
|
// actually making the token.
|
|
for _, policy := range allPolicies {
|
|
if policy == "root" {
|
|
return false, logical.ErrorResponse("auth methods cannot create root tokens"), logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
if strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) {
|
|
return false, logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("cannot assign policy %q", policy)), logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var registerFunc RegisterAuthFunc
|
|
var funcGetErr error
|
|
// Batch tokens should not be forwarded to perf standby
|
|
if auth.TokenType == logical.TokenTypeBatch {
|
|
registerFunc = c.RegisterAuth
|
|
} else {
|
|
registerFunc, funcGetErr = getAuthRegisterFunc(c)
|
|
}
|
|
if funcGetErr != nil {
|
|
return false, nil, funcGetErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leaseGenerated := false
|
|
err = registerFunc(ctx, tokenTTL, reqPath, auth, c.DetermineRoleFromLoginRequest(mountPoint, loginRequestData, ctx))
|
|
switch {
|
|
case err == nil:
|
|
if auth.TokenType != logical.TokenTypeBatch {
|
|
leaseGenerated = true
|
|
}
|
|
case err == ErrInternalError:
|
|
return false, nil, err
|
|
default:
|
|
return false, logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies[ns.ID], policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy)
|
|
delete(identityPolicies, ns.ID)
|
|
auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies = identityPolicies
|
|
auth.Policies = allPolicies
|
|
|
|
// Count the successful token creation
|
|
ttl_label := metricsutil.TTLBucket(tokenTTL)
|
|
// Do not include namespace path in mount point; already present as separate label.
|
|
mountPointWithoutNs := ns.TrimmedPath(mountPoint)
|
|
c.metricSink.IncrCounterWithLabels(
|
|
[]string{"token", "creation"},
|
|
1,
|
|
[]metrics.Label{
|
|
metricsutil.NamespaceLabel(ns),
|
|
{"auth_method", mountEntry.Type},
|
|
{"mount_point", mountPointWithoutNs},
|
|
{"creation_ttl", ttl_label},
|
|
{"token_type", auth.TokenType.String()},
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return leaseGenerated, resp, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// failedUserLoginProcess updates the userFailedLoginMap with login count and last failed
|
|
// login time for users with failed login attempt
|
|
// If the user gets locked for current login attempt, it updates the storage entry too
|
|
func (c *Core) failedUserLoginProcess(ctx context.Context, mountEntry *MountEntry, req *logical.Request) error {
|
|
// get the user lockout configuration for the user
|
|
userLockoutConfiguration := c.getUserLockoutConfiguration(mountEntry)
|
|
|
|
// determine the key for userFailedLoginInfo map
|
|
loginUserInfoKey, err := c.getLoginUserInfoKey(ctx, mountEntry, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// get entry from userFailedLoginInfo map for the key
|
|
userFailedLoginInfo, err := getUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, c, loginUserInfoKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// update the last failed login time with current time
|
|
failedLoginInfo := FailedLoginInfo{
|
|
lastFailedLoginTime: int(time.Now().Unix()),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// set the failed login count value for the entry in userFailedLoginInfo map
|
|
switch userFailedLoginInfo {
|
|
case nil: // entry does not exist in userfailedLoginMap
|
|
failedLoginInfo.count = 1
|
|
default:
|
|
failedLoginInfo.count = userFailedLoginInfo.count + 1
|
|
|
|
// if counter reset, set the count value to 1 as this gets counted as new entry
|
|
lastFailedLoginTime := time.Unix(int64(userFailedLoginInfo.lastFailedLoginTime), 0)
|
|
counterResetDuration := userLockoutConfiguration.LockoutCounterReset
|
|
if time.Now().After(lastFailedLoginTime.Add(counterResetDuration)) {
|
|
failedLoginInfo.count = 1
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// update the userFailedLoginInfo map with the updated/new entry
|
|
err = updateUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, c, loginUserInfoKey, &failedLoginInfo, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if failed login count has reached threshold, create a storage entry as the user got locked
|
|
if failedLoginInfo.count >= uint(userLockoutConfiguration.LockoutThreshold) {
|
|
// user locked
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("could not parse namespace from http context: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
storageUserLockoutPath := fmt.Sprintf(coreLockedUsersPath+"%s/%s/%s", ns.ID, loginUserInfoKey.mountAccessor, loginUserInfoKey.aliasName)
|
|
compressedBytes, err := jsonutil.EncodeJSONAndCompress(failedLoginInfo.lastFailedLoginTime, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to encode or compress failed login user entry", "error", err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create an entry
|
|
entry := &logical.StorageEntry{
|
|
Key: storageUserLockoutPath,
|
|
Value: compressedBytes,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write to the physical backend
|
|
if err := c.barrier.Put(ctx, entry); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to persist failed login user entry", "error", err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getLoginUserInfoKey gets failedUserLoginInfo map key for login user
|
|
func (c *Core) getLoginUserInfoKey(ctx context.Context, mountEntry *MountEntry, req *logical.Request) (FailedLoginUser, error) {
|
|
userInfo := FailedLoginUser{}
|
|
aliasName, err := c.aliasNameFromLoginRequest(ctx, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return userInfo, err
|
|
}
|
|
if aliasName == "" {
|
|
return userInfo, errors.New("failed to determine alias name from login request")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
userInfo.aliasName = aliasName
|
|
userInfo.mountAccessor = mountEntry.Accessor
|
|
return userInfo, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isUserLockoutDisabled checks if user lockout feature to prevent brute forcing is disabled
|
|
// Auth types userpass, ldap and approle support this feature
|
|
// precedence: environment var setting >> auth tune setting >> config file setting >> default (enabled)
|
|
func (c *Core) isUserLockoutDisabled(mountEntry *MountEntry) (bool, error) {
|
|
if !strutil.StrListContains(configutil.GetSupportedUserLockoutsAuthMethods(), mountEntry.Type) {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// check environment variable
|
|
var disableUserLockout bool
|
|
if disableUserLockoutEnv := os.Getenv(consts.VaultDisableUserLockout); disableUserLockoutEnv != "" {
|
|
var err error
|
|
disableUserLockout, err = strconv.ParseBool(disableUserLockoutEnv)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, errors.New("Error parsing the environment variable VAULT_DISABLE_USER_LOCKOUT")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if disableUserLockout {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// read auth tune for mount entry
|
|
userLockoutConfigFromMount := mountEntry.Config.UserLockoutConfig
|
|
if userLockoutConfigFromMount != nil && userLockoutConfigFromMount.DisableLockout {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// read config for auth type from config file
|
|
userLockoutConfiguration := c.getUserLockoutFromConfig(mountEntry.Type)
|
|
if userLockoutConfiguration.DisableLockout {
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// default
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isUserLocked determines if the login user is locked
|
|
func (c *Core) isUserLocked(ctx context.Context, mountEntry *MountEntry, req *logical.Request) (locked bool, err error) {
|
|
// get userFailedLoginInfo map key for login user
|
|
loginUserInfoKey, err := c.getLoginUserInfoKey(ctx, mountEntry, req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// get entry from userFailedLoginInfo map for the key
|
|
userFailedLoginInfo, err := getUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, c, loginUserInfoKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
userLockoutConfiguration := c.getUserLockoutConfiguration(mountEntry)
|
|
|
|
switch userFailedLoginInfo {
|
|
case nil:
|
|
// entry not found in userFailedLoginInfo map, check storage to re-verify
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("could not parse namespace from http context: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
storageUserLockoutPath := fmt.Sprintf(coreLockedUsersPath+"%s/%s/%s", ns.ID, loginUserInfoKey.mountAccessor, loginUserInfoKey.aliasName)
|
|
existingEntry, err := c.barrier.Get(ctx, storageUserLockoutPath)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
var lastLoginTime int
|
|
if existingEntry == nil {
|
|
// no storage entry found, user is not locked
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = jsonutil.DecodeJSON(existingEntry.Value, &lastLoginTime)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if time passed from last login time is within lockout duration, the user is locked
|
|
if time.Now().Unix()-int64(lastLoginTime) < int64(userLockoutConfiguration.LockoutDuration.Seconds()) {
|
|
// user locked
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
} else {
|
|
// user is not locked. Entry is stale, remove this from storage
|
|
if err := c.barrier.Delete(ctx, storageUserLockoutPath); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to cleanup storage entry for user", "path", storageUserLockoutPath, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
// entry found in userFailedLoginInfo map, check if the user is locked
|
|
isCountOverLockoutThreshold := userFailedLoginInfo.count >= uint(userLockoutConfiguration.LockoutThreshold)
|
|
isWithinLockoutDuration := time.Now().Unix()-int64(userFailedLoginInfo.lastFailedLoginTime) < int64(userLockoutConfiguration.LockoutDuration.Seconds())
|
|
|
|
if isCountOverLockoutThreshold && isWithinLockoutDuration {
|
|
// user locked
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getUserLockoutConfiguration gets the user lockout configuration for a mount entry
|
|
// it checks the config file and auth tune values
|
|
// precedence: auth tune >> config file values for auth type >> config file values for all type
|
|
// >> default user lockout values
|
|
// getUserLockoutFromConfig call in this function takes care of config file precedence
|
|
func (c *Core) getUserLockoutConfiguration(mountEntry *MountEntry) (userLockoutConfig UserLockoutConfig) {
|
|
// get user configuration values from config file
|
|
userLockoutConfig = c.getUserLockoutFromConfig(mountEntry.Type)
|
|
|
|
authTuneUserLockoutConfig := mountEntry.Config.UserLockoutConfig
|
|
// if user lockout is not configured using auth tune, return values from config file
|
|
if authTuneUserLockoutConfig == nil {
|
|
return userLockoutConfig
|
|
}
|
|
// replace values in return with config file configuration
|
|
// for fields that are not configured using auth tune
|
|
if authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutThreshold != 0 {
|
|
userLockoutConfig.LockoutThreshold = authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutThreshold
|
|
}
|
|
if authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutDuration != 0 {
|
|
userLockoutConfig.LockoutDuration = authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutDuration
|
|
}
|
|
if authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutCounterReset != 0 {
|
|
userLockoutConfig.LockoutCounterReset = authTuneUserLockoutConfig.LockoutCounterReset
|
|
}
|
|
if authTuneUserLockoutConfig.DisableLockout {
|
|
userLockoutConfig.DisableLockout = authTuneUserLockoutConfig.DisableLockout
|
|
}
|
|
return userLockoutConfig
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getUserLockoutFromConfig gets the userlockout configuration for given mount type from config file
|
|
// it reads the user lockout configuration from server config
|
|
// it has values for "all" type and any mountType that is configured using config file
|
|
// "all" type values are updated in shared config with default values i.e; if "all" type is
|
|
// not configured in config file, it is updated in shared config with default configuration
|
|
// If "all" type is configured in config file, any missing fields are updated with default values
|
|
// similarly missing values for a given mount type in config file are updated with "all" type
|
|
// default values
|
|
// If user_lockout configuration is not configured using config file at all, defaults are returned
|
|
func (c *Core) getUserLockoutFromConfig(mountType string) UserLockoutConfig {
|
|
defaultUserLockoutConfig := UserLockoutConfig{
|
|
LockoutThreshold: configutil.UserLockoutThresholdDefault,
|
|
LockoutDuration: configutil.UserLockoutDurationDefault,
|
|
LockoutCounterReset: configutil.UserLockoutCounterResetDefault,
|
|
DisableLockout: configutil.DisableUserLockoutDefault,
|
|
}
|
|
conf := c.rawConfig.Load()
|
|
if conf == nil {
|
|
return defaultUserLockoutConfig
|
|
}
|
|
userlockouts := conf.(*server.Config).UserLockouts
|
|
if userlockouts == nil {
|
|
return defaultUserLockoutConfig
|
|
}
|
|
for _, userLockoutConfig := range userlockouts {
|
|
switch userLockoutConfig.Type {
|
|
case "all":
|
|
defaultUserLockoutConfig = UserLockoutConfig{
|
|
LockoutThreshold: userLockoutConfig.LockoutThreshold,
|
|
LockoutDuration: userLockoutConfig.LockoutDuration,
|
|
LockoutCounterReset: userLockoutConfig.LockoutCounterReset,
|
|
DisableLockout: userLockoutConfig.DisableLockout,
|
|
}
|
|
case mountType:
|
|
return UserLockoutConfig{
|
|
LockoutThreshold: userLockoutConfig.LockoutThreshold,
|
|
LockoutDuration: userLockoutConfig.LockoutDuration,
|
|
LockoutCounterReset: userLockoutConfig.LockoutCounterReset,
|
|
DisableLockout: userLockoutConfig.DisableLockout,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return defaultUserLockoutConfig
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) buildMfaEnforcementResponse(eConfig *mfa.MFAEnforcementConfig) (*logical.MFAConstraintAny, error) {
|
|
mfaAny := &logical.MFAConstraintAny{
|
|
Any: []*logical.MFAMethodID{},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, methodID := range eConfig.MFAMethodIDs {
|
|
mConfig, err := c.loginMFABackend.MemDBMFAConfigByID(methodID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get methodID %s from MFA config table, error: %v", methodID, err)
|
|
}
|
|
var duoUsePasscode bool
|
|
if mConfig.Type == mfaMethodTypeDuo {
|
|
duoConf, ok := mConfig.Config.(*mfa.Config_DuoConfig)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid MFA configuration type")
|
|
}
|
|
duoUsePasscode = duoConf.DuoConfig.UsePasscode
|
|
}
|
|
mfaMethod := &logical.MFAMethodID{
|
|
Type: mConfig.Type,
|
|
ID: methodID,
|
|
UsesPasscode: mConfig.Type == mfaMethodTypeTOTP || duoUsePasscode,
|
|
Name: mConfig.Name,
|
|
}
|
|
mfaAny.Any = append(mfaAny.Any, mfaMethod)
|
|
}
|
|
return mfaAny, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func blockRequestIfErrorImpl(_ *Core, _, _ string) error { return nil }
|
|
|
|
// RegisterAuth uses a logical.Auth object to create a token entry in the token
|
|
// store, and registers a corresponding token lease to the expiration manager.
|
|
// role is the login role used as part of the creation of the token entry. If not
|
|
// relevant, can be omitted (by being provided as "").
|
|
func (c *Core) RegisterAuth(ctx context.Context, tokenTTL time.Duration, path string, auth *logical.Auth, role string) error {
|
|
// We first assign token policies to what was returned from the backend
|
|
// via auth.Policies. Then, we get the full set of policies into
|
|
// auth.Policies from the backend + entity information -- this is not
|
|
// stored in the token, but we perform sanity checks on it and return
|
|
// that information to the user.
|
|
|
|
// Generate a token
|
|
ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
te := logical.TokenEntry{
|
|
Path: path,
|
|
Meta: auth.Metadata,
|
|
DisplayName: auth.DisplayName,
|
|
CreationTime: time.Now().Unix(),
|
|
TTL: tokenTTL,
|
|
NumUses: auth.NumUses,
|
|
EntityID: auth.EntityID,
|
|
BoundCIDRs: auth.BoundCIDRs,
|
|
Policies: auth.TokenPolicies,
|
|
NamespaceID: ns.ID,
|
|
ExplicitMaxTTL: auth.ExplicitMaxTTL,
|
|
Period: auth.Period,
|
|
Type: auth.TokenType,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if te.TTL == 0 && (len(te.Policies) != 1 || te.Policies[0] != "root") {
|
|
c.logger.Error("refusing to create a non-root zero TTL token")
|
|
return ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := c.tokenStore.create(ctx, &te); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to create token", "error", err)
|
|
return ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate the client token, accessor, and TTL
|
|
auth.ClientToken = te.ID
|
|
auth.Accessor = te.Accessor
|
|
auth.TTL = te.TTL
|
|
auth.Orphan = te.Parent == ""
|
|
|
|
switch auth.TokenType {
|
|
case logical.TokenTypeBatch:
|
|
// Ensure it's not marked renewable since it isn't
|
|
auth.Renewable = false
|
|
case logical.TokenTypeService:
|
|
// Register with the expiration manager
|
|
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(ctx, &te, auth, role); err != nil {
|
|
if err := c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, te.ID); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up token lease during login request", "request_path", path, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Error("failed to register token lease during login request", "request_path", path, "error", err)
|
|
return ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
if te.ExternalID != "" {
|
|
auth.ClientToken = te.ExternalID
|
|
}
|
|
// Successful login, remove any entry from userFailedLoginInfo map
|
|
// if it exists. This is done for service tokens (for oss) here.
|
|
// For ent it is taken care by registerAuth RPC calls.
|
|
if auth.Alias != nil {
|
|
loginUserInfoKey := FailedLoginUser{
|
|
aliasName: auth.Alias.Name,
|
|
mountAccessor: auth.Alias.MountAccessor,
|
|
}
|
|
err = c.UpdateUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, loginUserInfoKey, nil, true)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetUserFailedLoginInfo gets the failed login information for a user based on alias name and mountAccessor
|
|
func (c *Core) GetUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx context.Context, userKey FailedLoginUser) *FailedLoginInfo {
|
|
c.userFailedLoginInfoLock.Lock()
|
|
value, exists := c.userFailedLoginInfo[userKey]
|
|
c.userFailedLoginInfoLock.Unlock()
|
|
if exists {
|
|
return value
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateUserFailedLoginInfo updates the failed login information for a user based on alias name and mountAccessor
|
|
func (c *Core) UpdateUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx context.Context, userKey FailedLoginUser, failedLoginInfo *FailedLoginInfo, deleteEntry bool) error {
|
|
c.userFailedLoginInfoLock.Lock()
|
|
switch deleteEntry {
|
|
case false:
|
|
// create or update entry in the map
|
|
c.userFailedLoginInfo[userKey] = failedLoginInfo
|
|
default:
|
|
// delete the entry from the map
|
|
delete(c.userFailedLoginInfo, userKey)
|
|
}
|
|
c.userFailedLoginInfoLock.Unlock()
|
|
// check if the update worked
|
|
failedLoginResp := c.GetUserFailedLoginInfo(ctx, userKey)
|
|
if (failedLoginResp == nil && !deleteEntry) || (failedLoginResp != nil && deleteEntry) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update entry in userFailedLoginInfo map")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PopulateTokenEntry looks up req.ClientToken in the token store and uses
|
|
// it to set other fields in req. Does nothing if ClientToken is empty
|
|
// or a JWT token, or for service tokens that don't exist in the token store.
|
|
// Should be called with read stateLock held.
|
|
func (c *Core) PopulateTokenEntry(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) error {
|
|
if req.ClientToken == "" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Also attach the accessor if we have it. This doesn't fail if it
|
|
// doesn't exist because the request may be to an unauthenticated
|
|
// endpoint/login endpoint where a bad current token doesn't matter, or
|
|
// a token from a Vault version pre-accessors. We ignore errors for
|
|
// JWTs.
|
|
token := req.ClientToken
|
|
var err error
|
|
req.InboundSSCToken = token
|
|
decodedToken := token
|
|
if IsSSCToken(token) {
|
|
// If ForwardToActive is set to ForwardSSCTokenToActive, we ignore
|
|
// whether the endpoint is a login request, as since we have the token
|
|
// forwarded to us, we should treat it as an unauthenticated endpoint
|
|
// and ensure the token is populated too regardless.
|
|
// Notably, this is important for some endpoints, such as endpoints
|
|
// such as sys/ui/mounts/internal, which is unauthenticated but a token
|
|
// may be provided to be used.
|
|
// Without the check to see if
|
|
// c.ForwardToActive() == ForwardSSCTokenToActive unauthenticated
|
|
// requests that do not use a token but were provided one anyway
|
|
// could fail with a 412.
|
|
// We only follow this behaviour if we're a perf standby, as
|
|
// this behaviour only makes sense in that case as only they
|
|
// could be missing the token population.
|
|
// Without ForwardToActive being set to ForwardSSCTokenToActive,
|
|
// behaviours that rely on this functionality also wouldn't make
|
|
// much sense, as they would fail with 412 required index not present
|
|
// as perf standbys aren't guaranteed to have the WAL state
|
|
// for new tokens.
|
|
unauth := c.isLoginRequest(ctx, req)
|
|
if c.ForwardToActive() == ForwardSSCTokenToActive && c.perfStandby {
|
|
unauth = false
|
|
}
|
|
decodedToken, err = c.CheckSSCToken(ctx, token, unauth, c.perfStandby)
|
|
// If we receive an error from CheckSSCToken, we can assume the token is bad somehow, and the client
|
|
// should receive a 403 bad token error like they do for all other invalid tokens, unless the error
|
|
// specifies that we should forward the request or retry the request.
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward) || errors.Is(err, logical.ErrMissingRequiredState) {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return logical.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
req.ClientToken = decodedToken
|
|
// We ignore the token returned from CheckSSCToken here as Lookup also
|
|
// decodes the SSCT, and it may need the original SSCT to check state.
|
|
te, err := c.LookupToken(ctx, token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// If we're missing required state, return that error
|
|
// as-is to the client
|
|
if errors.Is(err, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward) || errors.Is(err, logical.ErrMissingRequiredState) {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// If we have two dots but the second char is a dot it's a vault
|
|
// token of the form s.SOMETHING.nsid, not a JWT
|
|
if !IsJWT(token) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error performing token check: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err == nil && te != nil {
|
|
req.ClientTokenAccessor = te.Accessor
|
|
req.ClientTokenRemainingUses = te.NumUses
|
|
req.SetTokenEntry(te)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) CheckSSCToken(ctx context.Context, token string, unauth bool, isPerfStandby bool) (string, error) {
|
|
if unauth && token != "" {
|
|
// This token shouldn't really be here, but alas it was sent along with the request
|
|
// Since we're already knee deep in the token checking code pre-existing token checking
|
|
// code, we have to deal with this token whether we like it or not. So, we'll just try
|
|
// to get the inner token, and if that fails, return the token as-is. We intentionally
|
|
// will skip any token checks, because this is an unauthenticated paths and the token
|
|
// is just a nuisance rather than a means of auth.
|
|
|
|
// We cannot return whatever we like here, because if we do then CheckToken, which looks up
|
|
// the corresponding lease, will not find the token entry and lease. There are unauth'ed
|
|
// endpoints that use the token entry (such as sys/ui/mounts/internal) to do custom token
|
|
// checks, which would then fail. Therefore, we must try to get whatever thing is tied to
|
|
// token entries, but we must explicitly not do any SSC Token checks.
|
|
tok, err := c.DecodeSSCToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil || tok == "" {
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return tok, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return c.checkSSCTokenInternal(ctx, token, isPerfStandby)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DecodeSSCToken returns the random part of an SSCToken without
|
|
// performing any signature or WAL checks.
|
|
func (c *Core) DecodeSSCToken(token string) (string, error) {
|
|
// Skip batch and old style service tokens. These can have the prefix "b.",
|
|
// "s." (for old tokens) or "hvb."
|
|
if !IsSSCToken(token) {
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
tok, err := c.DecodeSSCTokenInternal(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return tok.Random, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DecodeSSCTokenInternal is a helper used to get the inner part of a SSC token without
|
|
// checking the token signature or the WAL index.
|
|
func (c *Core) DecodeSSCTokenInternal(token string) (*tokens.Token, error) {
|
|
signedToken := &tokens.SignedToken{}
|
|
|
|
// Skip batch and old style service tokens. These can have the prefix "b.",
|
|
// "s." (for old tokens) or "hvb."
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(token, consts.ServiceTokenPrefix) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not service token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Consider the suffix of the token only when unmarshalling
|
|
suffixToken := token[4:]
|
|
|
|
tokenBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(suffixToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("can't decode token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = proto.Unmarshal(tokenBytes, signedToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
plainToken := &tokens.Token{}
|
|
err2 := proto.Unmarshal([]byte(signedToken.Token), plainToken)
|
|
if err2 != nil {
|
|
return nil, err2
|
|
}
|
|
return plainToken, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) checkSSCTokenInternal(ctx context.Context, token string, isPerfStandby bool) (string, error) {
|
|
signedToken := &tokens.SignedToken{}
|
|
|
|
// Skip batch and old style service tokens. These can have the prefix "b.",
|
|
// "s." (for old tokens) or "hvb."
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(token, consts.ServiceTokenPrefix) {
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check token length to guess if this is an server side consistent token or not.
|
|
// Note that even when the DisableSSCTokens flag is set, index
|
|
// bearing tokens that have already been given out may still be used.
|
|
if !IsSSCToken(token) {
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Consider the suffix of the token only when unmarshalling
|
|
suffixToken := token[4:]
|
|
|
|
tokenBytes, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(suffixToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("cannot decode token", "error", err)
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = proto.Unmarshal(tokenBytes, signedToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("error occurred when unmarshalling ssc token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
hm, err := c.tokenStore.CalculateSignedTokenHMAC(signedToken.Token)
|
|
if !hmac.Equal(hm, signedToken.Hmac) {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("token mac for %+v is incorrect: err %w", signedToken, err)
|
|
}
|
|
plainToken := &tokens.Token{}
|
|
err = proto.Unmarshal([]byte(signedToken.Token), plainToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Disregard SSCT on perf-standbys for non-raft storage
|
|
if c.perfStandby && c.getRaftBackend() == nil {
|
|
return plainToken.Random, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ep := int(plainToken.IndexEpoch)
|
|
if ep < c.tokenStore.GetSSCTokensGenerationCounter() {
|
|
return plainToken.Random, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requiredWalState := &logical.WALState{ClusterID: c.ClusterID(), LocalIndex: plainToken.LocalIndex, ReplicatedIndex: 0}
|
|
if c.HasWALState(requiredWalState, isPerfStandby) {
|
|
return plainToken.Random, nil
|
|
}
|
|
// Make sure to forward the request instead of checking the token if the flag
|
|
// is set and we're on a perf standby
|
|
if c.ForwardToActive() == ForwardSSCTokenToActive && isPerfStandby {
|
|
return "", logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward
|
|
}
|
|
// In this case, the server side consistent token cannot be used on this node. We return the appropriate
|
|
// status code.
|
|
return "", logical.ErrMissingRequiredState
|
|
}
|