1094 lines
29 KiB
Go
1094 lines
29 KiB
Go
package keysutil
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
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uuid "github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/errutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/kdf"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
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)
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// Careful with iota; don't put anything before it in this const block because
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// we need the default of zero to be the old-style KDF
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const (
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Kdf_hmac_sha256_counter = iota // built-in helper
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Kdf_hkdf_sha256 // golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf
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)
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// Or this one...we need the default of zero to be the original AES256-GCM96
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const (
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KeyType_AES256_GCM96 = iota
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KeyType_ECDSA_P256
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KeyType_ED25519
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KeyType_RSA2048
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KeyType_RSA4096
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)
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const ErrTooOld = "ciphertext or signature version is disallowed by policy (too old)"
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type RestoreInfo struct {
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Time time.Time `json:"time"`
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Version int `json:"version"`
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}
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type BackupInfo struct {
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Time time.Time `json:"time"`
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Version int `json:"version"`
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}
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type SigningResult struct {
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Signature string
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PublicKey []byte
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}
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type ecdsaSignature struct {
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R, S *big.Int
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}
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type KeyType int
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func (kt KeyType) EncryptionSupported() bool {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (kt KeyType) DecryptionSupported() bool {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (kt KeyType) SigningSupported() bool {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ED25519, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (kt KeyType) HashSignatureInput() bool {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (kt KeyType) DerivationSupported() bool {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ED25519:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (kt KeyType) String() string {
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switch kt {
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case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
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return "aes256-gcm96"
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case KeyType_ECDSA_P256:
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return "ecdsa-p256"
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case KeyType_ED25519:
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return "ed25519"
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case KeyType_RSA2048:
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return "rsa-2048"
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case KeyType_RSA4096:
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return "rsa-4096"
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}
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return "[unknown]"
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}
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type KeyData struct {
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Policy *Policy `json:"policy"`
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ArchivedKeys *archivedKeys `json:"archived_keys"`
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}
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// KeyEntry stores the key and metadata
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type KeyEntry struct {
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// AES or some other kind that is a pure byte slice like ED25519
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Key []byte `json:"key"`
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// Key used for HMAC functions
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HMACKey []byte `json:"hmac_key"`
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// Time of creation
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CreationTime time.Time `json:"time"`
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EC_X *big.Int `json:"ec_x"`
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EC_Y *big.Int `json:"ec_y"`
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EC_D *big.Int `json:"ec_d"`
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RSAKey *rsa.PrivateKey `json:"rsa_key"`
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// The public key in an appropriate format for the type of key
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FormattedPublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
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// This is deprecated (but still filled) in favor of the value above which
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// is more precise
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DeprecatedCreationTime int64 `json:"creation_time"`
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}
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// deprecatedKeyEntryMap is used to allow JSON marshal/unmarshal
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type deprecatedKeyEntryMap map[int]KeyEntry
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// MarshalJSON implements JSON marshaling
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func (kem deprecatedKeyEntryMap) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
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intermediate := map[string]KeyEntry{}
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for k, v := range kem {
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intermediate[strconv.Itoa(k)] = v
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}
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return json.Marshal(&intermediate)
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}
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// MarshalJSON implements JSON unmarshaling
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func (kem deprecatedKeyEntryMap) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
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intermediate := map[string]KeyEntry{}
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if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(data, &intermediate); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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for k, v := range intermediate {
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keyval, err := strconv.Atoi(k)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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kem[keyval] = v
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}
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return nil
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}
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// keyEntryMap is used to allow JSON marshal/unmarshal
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type keyEntryMap map[string]KeyEntry
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// Policy is the struct used to store metadata
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type Policy struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Key []byte `json:"key,omitempty"` //DEPRECATED
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Keys keyEntryMap `json:"keys"`
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// Derived keys MUST provide a context and the master underlying key is
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// never used. If convergent encryption is true, the context will be used
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// as the nonce as well.
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Derived bool `json:"derived"`
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KDF int `json:"kdf"`
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ConvergentEncryption bool `json:"convergent_encryption"`
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// Whether the key is exportable
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Exportable bool `json:"exportable"`
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// The minimum version of the key allowed to be used for decryption
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MinDecryptionVersion int `json:"min_decryption_version"`
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// The minimum version of the key allowed to be used for encryption
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MinEncryptionVersion int `json:"min_encryption_version"`
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// The latest key version in this policy
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LatestVersion int `json:"latest_version"`
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// The latest key version in the archive. We never delete these, so this is
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// a max.
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ArchiveVersion int `json:"archive_version"`
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// Whether the key is allowed to be deleted
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DeletionAllowed bool `json:"deletion_allowed"`
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// The version of the convergent nonce to use
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ConvergentVersion int `json:"convergent_version"`
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// The type of key
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Type KeyType `json:"type"`
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// BackupInfo indicates the information about the backup action taken on
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// this policy
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BackupInfo *BackupInfo `json:"backup_info"`
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// RestoreInfo indicates the information about the restore action taken on
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// this policy
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RestoreInfo *RestoreInfo `json:"restore_info"`
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// AllowPlaintextBackup allows taking backup of the policy in plaintext
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AllowPlaintextBackup bool `json:"allow_plaintext_backup"`
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}
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// ArchivedKeys stores old keys. This is used to keep the key loading time sane
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// when there are huge numbers of rotations.
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type archivedKeys struct {
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Keys []KeyEntry `json:"keys"`
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}
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func (p *Policy) LoadArchive(storage logical.Storage) (*archivedKeys, error) {
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archive := &archivedKeys{}
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raw, err := storage.Get("archive/" + p.Name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if raw == nil {
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archive.Keys = make([]KeyEntry, 0)
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return archive, nil
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}
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if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(raw.Value, archive); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return archive, nil
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}
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func (p *Policy) storeArchive(archive *archivedKeys, storage logical.Storage) error {
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// Encode the policy
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buf, err := json.Marshal(archive)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Write the policy into storage
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err = storage.Put(&logical.StorageEntry{
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Key: "archive/" + p.Name,
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Value: buf,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// handleArchiving manages the movement of keys to and from the policy archive.
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// This should *ONLY* be called from Persist() since it assumes that the policy
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// will be persisted afterwards.
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func (p *Policy) handleArchiving(storage logical.Storage) error {
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// We need to move keys that are no longer accessible to archivedKeys, and keys
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// that now need to be accessible back here.
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//
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// For safety, because there isn't really a good reason to, we never delete
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// keys from the archive even when we move them back.
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// Check if we have the latest minimum version in the current set of keys
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_, keysContainsMinimum := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.MinDecryptionVersion)]
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// Sanity checks
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switch {
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case p.MinDecryptionVersion < 1:
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return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is less than 1", p.MinDecryptionVersion)
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case p.LatestVersion < 1:
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return fmt.Errorf("latest version of %d is less than 1", p.LatestVersion)
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case !keysContainsMinimum && p.ArchiveVersion != p.LatestVersion:
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return fmt.Errorf("need to move keys from archive but archive version not up-to-date")
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case p.ArchiveVersion > p.LatestVersion:
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return fmt.Errorf("archive version of %d is greater than the latest version %d",
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p.ArchiveVersion, p.LatestVersion)
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case p.MinEncryptionVersion > 0 && p.MinEncryptionVersion < p.MinDecryptionVersion:
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return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is greater than minimum encryption version %d",
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p.MinDecryptionVersion, p.MinEncryptionVersion)
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case p.MinDecryptionVersion > p.LatestVersion:
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return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is greater than the latest version %d",
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p.MinDecryptionVersion, p.LatestVersion)
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}
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archive, err := p.LoadArchive(storage)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if !keysContainsMinimum {
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// Need to move keys *from* archive
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for i := p.MinDecryptionVersion; i <= p.LatestVersion; i++ {
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p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(i)] = archive.Keys[i]
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Need to move keys *to* archive
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// We need a size that is equivalent to the latest version (number of keys)
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// but adding one since slice numbering starts at 0 and we're indexing by
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// key version
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if len(archive.Keys) < p.LatestVersion+1 {
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// Increase the size of the archive slice
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newKeys := make([]KeyEntry, p.LatestVersion+1)
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copy(newKeys, archive.Keys)
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archive.Keys = newKeys
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}
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// We are storing all keys in the archive, so we ensure that it is up to
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// date up to p.LatestVersion
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for i := p.ArchiveVersion + 1; i <= p.LatestVersion; i++ {
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archive.Keys[i] = p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(i)]
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p.ArchiveVersion = i
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}
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err = p.storeArchive(archive, storage)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Perform deletion afterwards so that if there is an error saving we
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// haven't messed with the current policy
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for i := p.LatestVersion - len(p.Keys) + 1; i < p.MinDecryptionVersion; i++ {
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delete(p.Keys, strconv.Itoa(i))
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (p *Policy) Persist(storage logical.Storage) error {
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err := p.handleArchiving(storage)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Encode the policy
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buf, err := p.Serialize()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Write the policy into storage
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err = storage.Put(&logical.StorageEntry{
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Key: "policy/" + p.Name,
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Value: buf,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (p *Policy) Serialize() ([]byte, error) {
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return json.Marshal(p)
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}
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func (p *Policy) NeedsUpgrade() bool {
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// Ensure we've moved from Key -> Keys
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if p.Key != nil && len(p.Key) > 0 {
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return true
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}
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// With archiving, past assumptions about the length of the keys map are no
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// longer valid
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if p.LatestVersion == 0 && len(p.Keys) != 0 {
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return true
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}
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// We disallow setting the version to 0, since they start at 1 since moving
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// to rotate-able keys, so update if it's set to 0
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if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
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return true
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}
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// On first load after an upgrade, copy keys to the archive
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if p.ArchiveVersion == 0 {
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return true
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}
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// Need to write the version
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if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion == 0 {
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return true
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}
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if p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey == nil || len(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey) == 0 {
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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func (p *Policy) Upgrade(storage logical.Storage) error {
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persistNeeded := false
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// Ensure we've moved from Key -> Keys
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if p.Key != nil && len(p.Key) > 0 {
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p.MigrateKeyToKeysMap()
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persistNeeded = true
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}
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// With archiving, past assumptions about the length of the keys map are no
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// longer valid
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if p.LatestVersion == 0 && len(p.Keys) != 0 {
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p.LatestVersion = len(p.Keys)
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persistNeeded = true
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}
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// We disallow setting the version to 0, since they start at 1 since moving
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// to rotate-able keys, so update if it's set to 0
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if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
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p.MinDecryptionVersion = 1
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persistNeeded = true
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}
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// On first load after an upgrade, copy keys to the archive
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if p.ArchiveVersion == 0 {
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persistNeeded = true
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}
|
|
|
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if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion == 0 {
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p.ConvergentVersion = 1
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persistNeeded = true
|
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}
|
|
|
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if p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey == nil || len(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey) == 0 {
|
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entry := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)]
|
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hmacKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytes(32)
|
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if err != nil {
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return err
|
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}
|
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entry.HMACKey = hmacKey
|
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p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)] = entry
|
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persistNeeded = true
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}
|
|
|
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if persistNeeded {
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err := p.Persist(storage)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
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return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
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return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeriveKey is used to derive the encryption key that should be used depending
|
|
// on the policy. If derivation is disabled the raw key is used and no context
|
|
// is required, otherwise the KDF mode is used with the context to derive the
|
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// proper key.
|
|
func (p *Policy) DeriveKey(context []byte, ver int) ([]byte, error) {
|
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if !p.Type.DerivationSupported() {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("derivation not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.Keys == nil || p.LatestVersion == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unable to access the key; no key versions found"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ver <= 0 || ver > p.LatestVersion {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid key version"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fast-path non-derived keys
|
|
if !p.Derived {
|
|
return p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure a context is provided
|
|
if len(context) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "missing 'context' for key derivation; the key was created using a derived key, which means additional, per-request information must be included in order to perform operations with the key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch p.KDF {
|
|
case Kdf_hmac_sha256_counter:
|
|
prf := kdf.HMACSHA256PRF
|
|
prfLen := kdf.HMACSHA256PRFLen
|
|
return kdf.CounterMode(prf, prfLen, p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key, context, 256)
|
|
|
|
case Kdf_hkdf_sha256:
|
|
reader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key, nil, context)
|
|
derBytes := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
|
|
derBytes.Grow(32)
|
|
limReader := &io.LimitedReader{
|
|
R: reader,
|
|
N: 32,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
|
|
n, err := derBytes.ReadFrom(limReader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error reading returned derived bytes: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if n != 32 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to read enough derived bytes, needed 32, got %d", n)}
|
|
}
|
|
return derBytes.Bytes(), nil
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_ED25519:
|
|
// We use the limited reader containing the derived bytes as the
|
|
// "random" input to the generation function
|
|
_, pri, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(limReader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error generating derived key: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
return pri, nil
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported key type for derivation"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported key derivation mode"}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) Encrypt(ver int, context, nonce []byte, value string) (string, error) {
|
|
if !p.Type.EncryptionSupported() {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message encryption not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Decode the plaintext value
|
|
plaintext, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(value)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case ver == 0:
|
|
ver = p.LatestVersion
|
|
case ver < 0:
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is negative"}
|
|
case ver > p.LatestVersion:
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is higher than the latest key version"}
|
|
case ver < p.MinEncryptionVersion:
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is less than the minimum encryption key version"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var ciphertext []byte
|
|
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
|
|
// Derive the key that should be used
|
|
key, err := p.DeriveKey(context, ver)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Setup the cipher
|
|
aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Setup the GCM AEAD
|
|
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(aesCipher)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.ConvergentEncryption {
|
|
switch p.ConvergentVersion {
|
|
case 1:
|
|
if len(nonce) != gcm.NonceSize() {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("base64-decoded nonce must be %d bytes long when using convergent encryption with this key", gcm.NonceSize())}
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
nonceHmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, context)
|
|
nonceHmac.Write(plaintext)
|
|
nonceSum := nonceHmac.Sum(nil)
|
|
nonce = nonceSum[:gcm.NonceSize()]
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Compute random nonce
|
|
nonce, err = uuid.GenerateRandomBytes(gcm.NonceSize())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt and tag with GCM
|
|
ciphertext = gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, nil)
|
|
|
|
// Place the encrypted data after the nonce
|
|
if !p.ConvergentEncryption || p.ConvergentVersion > 1 {
|
|
ciphertext = append(nonce, ciphertext...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
|
|
key := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].RSAKey
|
|
ciphertext, err = rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.Reader, &key.PublicKey, plaintext, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("failed to RSA encrypt the plaintext: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert to base64
|
|
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext)
|
|
|
|
// Prepend some information
|
|
encoded = "vault:v" + strconv.Itoa(ver) + ":" + encoded
|
|
|
|
return encoded, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) Decrypt(context, nonce []byte, value string) (string, error) {
|
|
if !p.Type.DecryptionSupported() {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message decryption not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the prefix
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(value, "vault:v") {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: no prefix"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion == 1 && (nonce == nil || len(nonce) == 0) {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid convergent nonce supplied"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
splitVerCiphertext := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(value, "vault:v"), ":", 2)
|
|
if len(splitVerCiphertext) != 2 {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: wrong number of fields"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ver, err := strconv.Atoi(splitVerCiphertext[0])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: version number could not be decoded"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ver == 0 {
|
|
// Compatibility mode with initial implementation, where keys start at
|
|
// zero
|
|
ver = 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ver > p.LatestVersion {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: version is too new"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.MinDecryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinDecryptionVersion {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: ErrTooOld}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Decode the base64
|
|
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(splitVerCiphertext[1])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: could not decode base64"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var plain []byte
|
|
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
|
|
key, err := p.DeriveKey(context, ver)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Setup the cipher
|
|
aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Setup the GCM AEAD
|
|
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(aesCipher)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(decoded) < gcm.NonceSize() {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext length"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Extract the nonce and ciphertext
|
|
var ciphertext []byte
|
|
if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion < 2 {
|
|
ciphertext = decoded
|
|
} else {
|
|
nonce = decoded[:gcm.NonceSize()]
|
|
ciphertext = decoded[gcm.NonceSize():]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify and Decrypt
|
|
plain, err = gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: unable to decrypt"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
|
|
key := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].RSAKey
|
|
plain, err = rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.Reader, key, decoded, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("failed to RSA decrypt the ciphertext: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(plain), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) HMACKey(version int) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case version < 0:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key version does not exist (cannot be negative)")
|
|
case version > p.LatestVersion:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key version does not exist; latest key version is %d", p.LatestVersion)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(version)].HMACKey == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no HMAC key exists for that key version")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(version)].HMACKey, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) Sign(ver int, context, input []byte, algorithm string) (*SigningResult, error) {
|
|
if !p.Type.SigningSupported() {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("message signing not supported for key type %v", p.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case ver == 0:
|
|
ver = p.LatestVersion
|
|
case ver < 0:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is negative"}
|
|
case ver > p.LatestVersion:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is higher than the latest key version"}
|
|
case p.MinEncryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinEncryptionVersion:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is less than the minimum encryption key version"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var sig []byte
|
|
var pubKey []byte
|
|
var err error
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256:
|
|
keyParams := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)]
|
|
key := &ecdsa.PrivateKey{
|
|
PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{
|
|
Curve: elliptic.P256(),
|
|
X: keyParams.EC_X,
|
|
Y: keyParams.EC_Y,
|
|
},
|
|
D: keyParams.EC_D,
|
|
}
|
|
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, input)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
marshaledSig, err := asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{
|
|
R: r,
|
|
S: s,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
sig = marshaledSig
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_ED25519:
|
|
var key ed25519.PrivateKey
|
|
|
|
if p.Derived {
|
|
// Derive the key that should be used
|
|
var err error
|
|
key, err = p.DeriveKey(context, ver)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deriving key: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
pubKey = key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
|
|
} else {
|
|
key = ed25519.PrivateKey(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per docs, do not pre-hash ed25519; it does two passes and performs
|
|
// its own hashing
|
|
sig, err = key.Sign(rand.Reader, input, crypto.Hash(0))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
|
|
key := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].RSAKey
|
|
|
|
var algo crypto.Hash
|
|
switch algorithm {
|
|
case "sha2-224":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA224
|
|
case "sha2-256":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA256
|
|
case "sha2-384":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA384
|
|
case "sha2-512":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA512
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported algorithm %s", algorithm)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sig, err = rsa.SignPSS(rand.Reader, key, algo, input, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert to base64
|
|
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
|
|
|
|
res := &SigningResult{
|
|
Signature: "vault:v" + strconv.Itoa(ver) + ":" + encoded,
|
|
PublicKey: pubKey,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) VerifySignature(context, input []byte, sig, algorithm string) (bool, error) {
|
|
if !p.Type.SigningSupported() {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message verification not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the prefix
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(sig, "vault:v") {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: no prefix"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
splitVerSig := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(sig, "vault:v"), ":", 2)
|
|
if len(splitVerSig) != 2 {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: wrong number of fields"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ver, err := strconv.Atoi(splitVerSig[0])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: version number could not be decoded"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ver > p.LatestVersion {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: version is too new"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.MinDecryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinDecryptionVersion {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: ErrTooOld}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(splitVerSig[1])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid base64 signature value"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256:
|
|
var ecdsaSig ecdsaSignature
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sigBytes, &ecdsaSig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "supplied signature is invalid"}
|
|
}
|
|
if rest != nil && len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "supplied signature contains extra data"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyParams := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)]
|
|
key := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
|
|
Curve: elliptic.P256(),
|
|
X: keyParams.EC_X,
|
|
Y: keyParams.EC_Y,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ecdsa.Verify(key, input, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S), nil
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_ED25519:
|
|
var key ed25519.PrivateKey
|
|
|
|
if p.Derived {
|
|
// Derive the key that should be used
|
|
var err error
|
|
key, err = p.DeriveKey(context, ver)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deriving key: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
key = ed25519.PrivateKey(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ed25519.Verify(key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), input, sigBytes), nil
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
|
|
key := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].RSAKey
|
|
|
|
var algo crypto.Hash
|
|
switch algorithm {
|
|
case "sha2-224":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA224
|
|
case "sha2-256":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA256
|
|
case "sha2-384":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA384
|
|
case "sha2-512":
|
|
algo = crypto.SHA512
|
|
default:
|
|
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported algorithm %s", algorithm)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = rsa.VerifyPSS(&key.PublicKey, algo, input, sigBytes, nil)
|
|
|
|
return err == nil, nil
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: "no valid key type found"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) Rotate(storage logical.Storage) error {
|
|
if p.Keys == nil {
|
|
// This is an initial key rotation when generating a new policy. We
|
|
// don't need to call migrate here because if we've called getPolicy to
|
|
// get the policy in the first place it will have been run.
|
|
p.Keys = keyEntryMap{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.LatestVersion += 1
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
entry := KeyEntry{
|
|
CreationTime: now,
|
|
DeprecatedCreationTime: now.Unix(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hmacKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytes(32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
entry.HMACKey = hmacKey
|
|
|
|
switch p.Type {
|
|
case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
|
|
// Generate a 256bit key
|
|
newKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytes(32)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
entry.Key = newKey
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256:
|
|
privKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
entry.EC_D = privKey.D
|
|
entry.EC_X = privKey.X
|
|
entry.EC_Y = privKey.Y
|
|
derBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(privKey.Public())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error marshaling public key: %s", err)
|
|
}
|
|
pemBlock := &pem.Block{
|
|
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
|
|
Bytes: derBytes,
|
|
}
|
|
pemBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(pemBlock)
|
|
if pemBytes == nil || len(pemBytes) == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error PEM-encoding public key")
|
|
}
|
|
entry.FormattedPublicKey = string(pemBytes)
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_ED25519:
|
|
pub, pri, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
entry.Key = pri
|
|
entry.FormattedPublicKey = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub)
|
|
|
|
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA4096:
|
|
bitSize := 2048
|
|
if p.Type == KeyType_RSA4096 {
|
|
bitSize = 4096
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
entry.RSAKey, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, bitSize)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)] = entry
|
|
|
|
// This ensures that with new key creations min decryption version is set
|
|
// to 1 rather than the int default of 0, since keys start at 1 (either
|
|
// fresh or after migration to the key map)
|
|
if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
|
|
p.MinDecryptionVersion = 1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return p.Persist(storage)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (p *Policy) MigrateKeyToKeysMap() {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
p.Keys = keyEntryMap{
|
|
"1": KeyEntry{
|
|
Key: p.Key,
|
|
CreationTime: now,
|
|
DeprecatedCreationTime: now.Unix(),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
p.Key = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Backup should be called with an exclusive lock held on the policy
|
|
func (p *Policy) Backup(storage logical.Storage) (string, error) {
|
|
if !p.Exportable {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("exporting is disallowed on the policy")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !p.AllowPlaintextBackup {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("plaintext backup is disallowed on the policy")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create a record of this backup operation in the policy
|
|
p.BackupInfo = &BackupInfo{
|
|
Time: time.Now(),
|
|
Version: p.LatestVersion,
|
|
}
|
|
err := p.Persist(storage)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to persist policy with backup info: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load the archive only after persisting the policy as the archive can get
|
|
// adjusted while persisting the policy
|
|
archivedKeys, err := p.LoadArchive(storage)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyData := &KeyData{
|
|
Policy: p,
|
|
ArchivedKeys: archivedKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encodedBackup, err := jsonutil.EncodeJSON(keyData)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(encodedBackup), nil
|
|
}
|