open-vault/website/content/docs/agent/autoauth/index.mdx
Tom Proctor 9ad06611a4
agent: Docs for auto-auth and limited-use tokens (#12918)
There are a number of auth methods that support creating tokens with a limited number of uses. However, Vault Agent doesn't track the uses remaining for its auto-auth token, so it may result in flaky permission denied responses if that limit is hit and Vault Agent remains unaware.
2021-10-25 18:25:24 +01:00

180 lines
8.3 KiB
Plaintext

---
layout: docs
page_title: Vault Agent Auto-Auth
description: |-
Vault Agent's Auto-Auth functionality allows easy and automatic
authentication to Vault in a variety of environments.
---
# Vault Agent Auto-Auth
The Auto-Auth functionality of Vault Agent allows for easy authentication in a
wide variety of environments.
## Functionality
Auto-Auth consists of two parts: a Method, which is the authentication method
that should be used in the current environment; and any number of Sinks, which
are locations where the agent should write a token any time the current token
value has changed.
When the agent is started with Auto-Auth enabled, it will attempt to acquire a
Vault token using the configured Method. On failure, it will exponentially back
off and then retry. On success, unless the auth method is configured to wrap
the tokens, it will keep the resulting token renewed until renewal is no longer
allowed or fails, at which point it will attempt to reauthenticate.
Every time an authentication is successful, the token is written to the
configured Sinks, subject to their configuration.
## Advanced Functionality
Sinks support some advanced features, including the ability for the written
values to be encrypted or
[response-wrapped](/docs/concepts/response-wrapping).
Both mechanisms can be used concurrently; in this case, the value will be
response-wrapped, then encrypted.
### Response-Wrapping Tokens
There are two ways that tokens can be response-wrapped by the agent:
1. By the auth method. This allows the end client to introspect the
`creation_path` of the token, helping prevent Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks. However, because the agent cannot then unwrap the token and rewrap
it without modifying the `creation_path`, the agent is not able to renew the
token; it is up to the end client to renew the token. The agent stays
daemonized in this mode since some auth methods allow for reauthentication
on certain events.
2. By any of the token sinks. Because more than one sink can be configured, the
token must be wrapped after it is fetched, rather than wrapped by Vault as
it's being returned. As a result, the `creation_path` will always be
`sys/wrapping/wrap`, and validation of this field cannot be used as
protection against MITM attacks. However, this mode allows the agent to keep
the token renewed for the end client and automatically reauthenticate when
it expires.
### Encrypting Tokens
~> This is experimental; if input/output formats change we will make every
effort to provide backwards compatibility.
Tokens can be encrypted, using a Diffie-Hellman exchange to generate an
ephemeral key. In this mechanism, the client receiving the token writes a
generated public key to a file. The sink responsible for writing the token to
that client looks for this public key and uses it to compute a shared secret
key, which is then used to encrypt the token via AES-GCM. The nonce, encrypted
payload, and the sink's public key are then written to the output file, where
the client can compute the shared secret and decrypt the token value.
~> NOTE: This is not a protection against MITM attacks! The purpose of this
feature is for forward-secrecy and coverage against bare token values being
persisted. A MITM that can write to the sink's output and/or client public-key
input files could attack this exchange.
To help mitigate MITM attacks, additional authenticated data (AAD) can be
provided to the agent. This data is written as part of the AES-GCM tag and must
match on both the agent and the client. This of course means that protecting
this AAD becomes important, but it provides another layer for an attacker to
have to overcome. For instance, if the attacker has access to the file system
where the token is being written, but not to read agent configuration or read
environment variables, this AAD can be generated and passed to the agent and
the client in ways that would be difficult for the attacker to find.
When using AAD, it is always a good idea for this to be as fresh as possible;
generate a value and pass it to your client and agent on startup. Additionally,
agent uses a Trust On First Use model; after it finds a generated public key,
it will reuse that public key instead of looking for new values that have been
written.
If writing a client that uses this feature, it will likely be helpful to look
at the
[dhutil](https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/master/helper/dhutil/dhutil.go)
library. This shows the expected format of the public key input and envelope
output formats.
## Configuration
The top level `auto_auth` block has two configuration entries:
- `method` `(object: required)` - Configuration for the method
- `sinks` `(array of objects: optional)` - Configuration for the sinks
### Configuration (Method)
~> Auto-auth does not support using tokens with a limited number of uses. Vault
Agent does not track the number of uses remaining, and may allow the token to
expire before attempting to renew it. For example, if using AppRole auto-auth,
you must use 0 (meaning unlimited) as the value for
[`token_num_uses`](https://www.vaultproject.io/api-docs/auth/approle#token_num_uses).
These are common configuration values that live within the `method` block:
- `type` `(string: required)` - The type of the method to use, e.g. `aws`,
`gcp`, `azure`, etc. _Note_: when using HCL this can be used as the key for
the block, e.g. `method "aws" {...}`.
- `mount_path` `(string: optional)` - The mount path of the method. If not
specified, defaults to a value of `auth/<method type>`.
- `namespace` `(string: optional)` - The default namespace path for the mount.
If not specified, defaults to the root namespace.
- `wrap_ttl` `(string or integer: optional)` - If specified, the written token
will be response-wrapped by the agent. This is more secure than wrapping by
sinks, but does not allow the agent to keep the token renewed or
automatically reauthenticate when it expires. Rather than a simple string,
the written value will be a JSON-encoded
[SecretWrapInfo](https://godoc.org/github.com/hashicorp/vault/api#SecretWrapInfo)
structure. Values can be an integer number of seconds or a stringish value
like `5m`.
- `max_backoff` `(string or integer: "5m")` - The maximum time Agent will delay
before retrying after a failed auth attempt. The backoff will start at 1 second
and double (with some randomness) after successive failures, capped by `max_backoff.`
- `config` `(object: required)` - Configuration of the method itself. See the
sidebar for information about each method.
### Configuration (Sinks)
These configuration values are common to all Sinks:
- `type` `(string: required)` - The type of the method to use, e.g. `file`.
_Note_: when using HCL this can be used as the key for the block, e.g. `sink "file" {...}`.
- `wrap_ttl` `(string or integer: optional)` - If specified, the written token
will be response-wrapped by the sink. This is less secure than wrapping by
the method, but allows the agent to keep the token renewed and automatically
reauthenticate when it expires. Rather than a simple string, the written
value will be a JSON-encoded
[SecretWrapInfo](https://godoc.org/github.com/hashicorp/vault/api#SecretWrapInfo)
structure. Values can be an integer number of seconds or a stringish value
like `5m`.
- `dh_type` `(string: optional)` - If specified, the type of Diffie-Hellman exchange to
perform, meaning, which ciphers and/or curves. Currently only `curve25519` is
supported.
- `dh_path` `(string: required if dh_type is set)` - The path from which the
agent should read the client's initial parameters (e.g. curve25519 public
key).
- `derive_key` `(bool: false)` - If specified, the final encryption key is
calculated by using HKDF-SHA256 to derive a key from the calculated shared
secret and the two public keys for enhanced security. This is recommended
if backward compatibility isn't a concern.
- `aad` `(string: optional)` - If specified, additional authenticated data to
use with the AES-GCM encryption of the token. Can be any string, including
serialized data.
- `aad_env_var` `(string: optional)` - If specified, AAD will be read from the
given environment variable rather than a value in the configuration file.
- `config` `(object: required)` - Configuration of the sink itself. See the
sidebar for information about each sink.