108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
108 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package vault
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"encoding/base64"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-secure-stdlib/strutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
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)
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// validRedirect checks whether uri is in allowed using special handling for loopback uris.
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// Ref: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3
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func validRedirect(uri string, allowed []string) bool {
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inputURI, err := url.Parse(uri)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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// if uri isn't a loopback, just string search the allowed list
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if !strutil.StrListContains([]string{"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"}, inputURI.Hostname()) {
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return strutil.StrListContains(allowed, uri)
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}
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// otherwise, search for a match in a port-agnostic manner, per the OAuth RFC.
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inputURI.Host = inputURI.Hostname()
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for _, a := range allowed {
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allowedURI, err := url.Parse(a)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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allowedURI.Host = allowedURI.Hostname()
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if inputURI.String() == allowedURI.String() {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// computeHashClaim computes the hash value to be used for the at_hash
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// and c_hash claims. For details on how this value is computed and the
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// class of attacks it's used to prevent, see the spec at
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// - https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#CodeIDToken
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// - https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDToken
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// - https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#TokenSubstitution
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func computeHashClaim(alg string, input string) (string, error) {
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signatureAlgToHash := map[jose.SignatureAlgorithm]func() hash.Hash{
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jose.RS256: sha256.New,
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jose.RS384: sha512.New384,
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jose.RS512: sha512.New,
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jose.ES256: sha256.New,
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jose.ES384: sha512.New384,
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jose.ES512: sha512.New,
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// We use the Ed25519 curve key for EdDSA, which uses
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// SHA-512 for its digest algorithm. See details at
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// https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues/1125.
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jose.EdDSA: sha512.New,
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}
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newHash, ok := signatureAlgToHash[jose.SignatureAlgorithm(alg)]
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if !ok {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported signature algorithm: %q", alg)
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}
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h := newHash()
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// Writing to the hash will never return an error
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_, _ = h.Write([]byte(input))
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sum := h.Sum(nil)
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:len(sum)/2]), nil
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}
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// computeCodeChallenge computes a Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)
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// code challenge given a code verifier and code challenge method.
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func computeCodeChallenge(verifier string, method string) (string, error) {
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switch method {
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case codeChallengeMethodPlain:
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return verifier, nil
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case codeChallengeMethodS256:
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hf := sha256.New()
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hf.Write([]byte(verifier))
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return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hf.Sum(nil)), nil
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default:
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid code challenge method %q", method)
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}
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}
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// authCodeUsedPKCE returns true if the given entry was granted using PKCE.
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func authCodeUsedPKCE(entry *authCodeCacheEntry) bool {
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return entry.codeChallenge != "" && entry.codeChallengeMethod != ""
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}
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// basicAuth returns the username/password provided in the logical.Request's
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// authorization header and a bool indicating if the request used basic
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// authentication.
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func basicAuth(req *logical.Request) (string, string, bool) {
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headerReq := &http.Request{Header: req.Headers}
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return headerReq.BasicAuth()
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}
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