1335 lines
40 KiB
Go
1335 lines
40 KiB
Go
package pki
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"regexp"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-secure-stdlib/strutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/framework"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/certutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/errutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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"github.com/ryanuber/go-glob"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
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cbbasn1 "golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1"
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"golang.org/x/net/idna"
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)
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type inputBundle struct {
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role *roleEntry
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req *logical.Request
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apiData *framework.FieldData
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}
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var (
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// A note on hostnameRegex: although we set the StrictDomainName option
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// when doing the idna conversion, this appears to only affect output, not
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// input, so it will allow e.g. host^123.example.com straight through. So
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// we still need to use this to check the output.
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hostnameRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(\*\.)?(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])\.?$`)
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oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
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oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17}
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)
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func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
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for _, e := range extensions {
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if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func getFormat(data *framework.FieldData) string {
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format := data.Get("format").(string)
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switch format {
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case "pem":
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case "der":
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case "pem_bundle":
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default:
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format = ""
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}
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return format
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}
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// Fetches the CA info. Unlike other certificates, the CA info is stored
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// in the backend as a CertBundle, because we are storing its private key
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func fetchCAInfo(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (*certutil.CAInfoBundle, error) {
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bundleEntry, err := req.Storage.Get(ctx, "config/ca_bundle")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
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}
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if bundleEntry == nil {
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return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "backend must be configured with a CA certificate/key"}
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}
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var bundle certutil.CertBundle
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if err := bundleEntry.DecodeJSON(&bundle); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to decode local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
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}
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parsedBundle, err := bundle.ToParsedCertBundle()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
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}
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if parsedBundle.Certificate == nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "stored CA information not able to be parsed"}
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}
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caInfo := &certutil.CAInfoBundle{*parsedBundle, nil}
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entries, err := getURLs(ctx, req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
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}
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if entries == nil {
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entries = &certutil.URLEntries{
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IssuingCertificates: []string{},
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CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
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OCSPServers: []string{},
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}
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}
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caInfo.URLs = entries
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return caInfo, nil
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}
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// Allows fetching certificates from the backend; it handles the slightly
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// separate pathing for CA, CRL, and revoked certificates.
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func fetchCertBySerial(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, prefix, serial string) (*logical.StorageEntry, error) {
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var path, legacyPath string
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var err error
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var certEntry *logical.StorageEntry
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hyphenSerial := normalizeSerial(serial)
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colonSerial := strings.Replace(strings.ToLower(serial), "-", ":", -1)
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switch {
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// Revoked goes first as otherwise ca/crl get hardcoded paths which fail if
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// we actually want revocation info
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case strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "revoked/"):
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legacyPath = "revoked/" + colonSerial
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path = "revoked/" + hyphenSerial
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case serial == "ca":
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path = "ca"
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case serial == "crl":
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path = "crl"
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default:
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legacyPath = "certs/" + colonSerial
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path = "certs/" + hyphenSerial
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}
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certEntry, err = req.Storage.Get(ctx, path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error fetching certificate %s: %s", serial, err)}
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}
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if certEntry != nil {
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if certEntry.Value == nil || len(certEntry.Value) == 0 {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("returned certificate bytes for serial %s were empty", serial)}
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}
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return certEntry, nil
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}
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// If legacyPath is unset, it's going to be a CA or CRL; return immediately
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if legacyPath == "" {
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return nil, nil
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}
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// Retrieve the old-style path. We disregard errors here because they
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// always manifest on windows, and thus the initial check for a revoked
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// cert fails would return an error when the cert isn't revoked, preventing
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// the happy path from working.
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certEntry, _ = req.Storage.Get(ctx, legacyPath)
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if certEntry == nil {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if certEntry.Value == nil || len(certEntry.Value) == 0 {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("returned certificate bytes for serial %s were empty", serial)}
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}
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// Update old-style paths to new-style paths
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certEntry.Key = path
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if err = req.Storage.Put(ctx, certEntry); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error saving certificate with serial %s to new location", serial)}
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}
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if err = req.Storage.Delete(ctx, legacyPath); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deleting certificate with serial %s from old location", serial)}
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}
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return certEntry, nil
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}
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// Given a set of requested names for a certificate, verifies that all of them
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// match the various toggles set in the role for controlling issuance.
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// If one does not pass, it is returned in the string argument.
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func validateNames(b *backend, data *inputBundle, names []string) string {
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for _, name := range names {
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sanitizedName := name
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emailDomain := sanitizedName
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isEmail := false
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isWildcard := false
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// If it has an @, assume it is an email address and separate out the
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// user from the hostname portion so that we can act on the hostname.
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// Note that this matches behavior from the alt_names parameter. If it
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// ends up being problematic for users, I guess that could be separated
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// into dns_names and email_names in the future to be explicit, but I
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// don't think this is likely.
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if strings.Contains(sanitizedName, "@") {
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splitEmail := strings.Split(sanitizedName, "@")
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if len(splitEmail) != 2 {
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return name
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}
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sanitizedName = splitEmail[1]
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emailDomain = splitEmail[1]
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isEmail = true
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}
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// If we have an asterisk as the first part of the domain name, mark it
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// as wildcard and set the sanitized name to the remainder of the
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// domain
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if strings.HasPrefix(sanitizedName, "*.") {
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sanitizedName = sanitizedName[2:]
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isWildcard = true
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}
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// Email addresses using wildcard domain names do not make sense
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if isEmail && isWildcard {
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return name
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}
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// AllowAnyName is checked after this because EnforceHostnames still
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// applies when allowing any name. Also, we check the sanitized name to
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// ensure that we are not either checking a full email address or a
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// wildcard prefix.
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if data.role.EnforceHostnames {
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p := idna.New(
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idna.StrictDomainName(true),
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idna.VerifyDNSLength(true),
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)
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converted, err := p.ToASCII(sanitizedName)
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if err != nil {
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return name
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}
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if !hostnameRegex.MatchString(converted) {
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return name
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}
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}
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// Self-explanatory
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if data.role.AllowAnyName {
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continue
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}
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// The following blocks all work the same basic way:
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// 1) If a role allows a certain class of base (localhost, token
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// display name, role-configured domains), perform further tests
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//
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// 2) If there is a perfect match on either the sanitized name or it's an
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// email address with a perfect match on the hostname portion, allow it
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//
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// 3) If subdomains are allowed, we check based on the sanitized name;
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// note that if not a wildcard, will be equivalent to the email domain
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// for email checks, and we already checked above for both a wildcard
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// and email address being present in the same name
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// 3a) First we check for a non-wildcard subdomain, as in <name>.<base>
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// 3b) Then we check if it's a wildcard and the base domain is a match
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//
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// Variances are noted in-line
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if data.role.AllowLocalhost {
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if sanitizedName == "localhost" ||
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sanitizedName == "localdomain" ||
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(isEmail && emailDomain == "localhost") ||
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(isEmail && emailDomain == "localdomain") {
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continue
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}
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if data.role.AllowSubdomains {
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// It is possible, if unlikely, to have a subdomain of "localhost"
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localhost") ||
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(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localhost") {
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continue
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}
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// A subdomain of "localdomain" is also not entirely uncommon
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localdomain") ||
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(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localdomain") {
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continue
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}
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}
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}
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if data.role.AllowTokenDisplayName {
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if name == data.req.DisplayName {
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continue
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}
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if data.role.AllowSubdomains {
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if isEmail {
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// If it's an email address, we need to parse the token
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// display name in order to do a proper comparison of the
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// subdomain
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if strings.Contains(data.req.DisplayName, "@") {
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splitDisplay := strings.Split(data.req.DisplayName, "@")
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if len(splitDisplay) == 2 {
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// Compare the sanitized name against the hostname
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// portion of the email address in the broken
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// display name
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+splitDisplay[1]) {
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continue
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+data.req.DisplayName) ||
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(isWildcard && sanitizedName == data.req.DisplayName) {
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continue
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}
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}
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}
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if len(data.role.AllowedDomains) > 0 {
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valid := false
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for _, currDomain := range data.role.AllowedDomains {
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// If there is, say, a trailing comma, ignore it
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if currDomain == "" {
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continue
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}
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if data.role.AllowedDomainsTemplate {
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isTemplate, _ := framework.ValidateIdentityTemplate(currDomain)
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if isTemplate && data.req.EntityID != "" {
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tmpCurrDomain, err := framework.PopulateIdentityTemplate(currDomain, data.req.EntityID, b.System())
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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currDomain = tmpCurrDomain
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}
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}
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// First, allow an exact match of the base domain if that role flag
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// is enabled
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if data.role.AllowBareDomains &&
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(strings.EqualFold(sanitizedName, currDomain) ||
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(isEmail && strings.EqualFold(emailDomain, currDomain)) ||
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// Handle the use case of AllowedDomain being an email address
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(isEmail && strings.EqualFold(name, currDomain))) {
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valid = true
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break
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}
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if data.role.AllowSubdomains {
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+currDomain) ||
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(isWildcard && strings.EqualFold(sanitizedName, currDomain)) {
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valid = true
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break
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}
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}
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if data.role.AllowGlobDomains &&
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strings.Contains(currDomain, "*") &&
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glob.Glob(currDomain, sanitizedName) {
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valid = true
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break
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}
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}
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if valid {
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continue
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}
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}
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return name
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}
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return ""
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}
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// validateOtherSANs checks if the values requested are allowed. If an OID
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// isn't allowed, it will be returned as the first string. If a value isn't
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// allowed, it will be returned as the second string. Empty strings + error
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// means everything is okay.
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func validateOtherSANs(data *inputBundle, requested map[string][]string) (string, string, error) {
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if len(data.role.AllowedOtherSANs) == 1 && data.role.AllowedOtherSANs[0] == "*" {
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// Anything is allowed
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return "", "", nil
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}
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allowed, err := parseOtherSANs(data.role.AllowedOtherSANs)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing role's allowed SANs: %w", err)
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}
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for oid, names := range requested {
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for _, name := range names {
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allowedNames, ok := allowed[oid]
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if !ok {
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return oid, "", nil
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}
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valid := false
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for _, allowedName := range allowedNames {
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if glob.Glob(allowedName, name) {
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valid = true
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break
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}
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}
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|
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if !valid {
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return oid, name, nil
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}
|
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}
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}
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return "", "", nil
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}
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|
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func parseOtherSANs(others []string) (map[string][]string, error) {
|
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result := map[string][]string{}
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for _, other := range others {
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splitOther := strings.SplitN(other, ";", 2)
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if len(splitOther) != 2 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected a semicolon in other SAN %q", other)
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}
|
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splitType := strings.SplitN(splitOther[1], ":", 2)
|
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if len(splitType) != 2 {
|
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected a colon in other SAN %q", other)
|
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}
|
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switch {
|
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case strings.EqualFold(splitType[0], "utf8"):
|
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case strings.EqualFold(splitType[0], "utf-8"):
|
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default:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("only utf8 other SANs are supported; found non-supported type in other SAN %q", other)
|
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}
|
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result[splitOther[0]] = append(result[splitOther[0]], splitType[1])
|
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}
|
|
|
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return result, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func validateSerialNumber(data *inputBundle, serialNumber string) string {
|
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valid := false
|
|
if len(data.role.AllowedSerialNumbers) > 0 {
|
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for _, currSerialNumber := range data.role.AllowedSerialNumbers {
|
|
if currSerialNumber == "" {
|
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continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
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if (strings.Contains(currSerialNumber, "*") &&
|
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glob.Glob(currSerialNumber, serialNumber)) ||
|
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currSerialNumber == serialNumber {
|
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valid = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
return serialNumber
|
|
} else {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func generateCert(ctx context.Context,
|
|
b *backend,
|
|
input *inputBundle,
|
|
caSign *certutil.CAInfoBundle,
|
|
isCA bool,
|
|
randomSource io.Reader) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
|
|
if input.role == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "no role found in data bundle"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if input.role.KeyType == "rsa" && input.role.KeyBits < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := generateCreationBundle(b, input, caSign, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if data.Params == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "nil parameters received from parameter bundle generation"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if isCA {
|
|
data.Params.IsCA = isCA
|
|
data.Params.PermittedDNSDomains = input.apiData.Get("permitted_dns_domains").([]string)
|
|
|
|
if data.SigningBundle == nil {
|
|
// Generating a self-signed root certificate
|
|
entries, err := getURLs(ctx, input.req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if entries == nil {
|
|
entries = &certutil.URLEntries{
|
|
IssuingCertificates: []string{},
|
|
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
|
|
OCSPServers: []string{},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
data.Params.URLs = entries
|
|
|
|
if input.role.MaxPathLength == nil {
|
|
data.Params.MaxPathLength = -1
|
|
} else {
|
|
data.Params.MaxPathLength = *input.role.MaxPathLength
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedBundle, err := certutil.CreateCertificateWithRandomSource(data, randomSource)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// N.B.: This is only meant to be used for generating intermediate CAs.
|
|
// It skips some sanity checks.
|
|
func generateIntermediateCSR(b *backend, input *inputBundle, randomSource io.Reader) (*certutil.ParsedCSRBundle, error) {
|
|
creation, err := generateCreationBundle(b, input, nil, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if creation.Params == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "nil parameters received from parameter bundle generation"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addBasicConstraints := input.apiData != nil && input.apiData.Get("add_basic_constraints").(bool)
|
|
parsedBundle, err := certutil.CreateCSRWithRandomSource(creation, addBasicConstraints, randomSource)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func signCert(b *backend,
|
|
data *inputBundle,
|
|
caSign *certutil.CAInfoBundle,
|
|
isCA bool,
|
|
useCSRValues bool) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
|
|
if data.role == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "no role found in data bundle"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
csrString := data.apiData.Get("csr").(string)
|
|
if csrString == "" {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("\"csr\" is empty")}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pemBytes := []byte(csrString)
|
|
pemBlock, pemBytes := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
|
|
if pemBlock == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "csr contains no data"}
|
|
}
|
|
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(pemBlock.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("certificate request could not be parsed: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch data.role.KeyType {
|
|
case "rsa":
|
|
// Verify that the key matches the role type
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires keys of type %s",
|
|
data.role.KeyType)}
|
|
}
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the key is at least 2048 bits
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the bit size is at least the size specified in the role
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < data.role.KeyBits {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires a minimum of a %d-bit key, but CSR's key is %d bits",
|
|
data.role.KeyBits,
|
|
pubKey.N.BitLen())}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "ec":
|
|
// Verify that the key matches the role type
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.ECDSA {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires keys of type %s",
|
|
data.role.KeyType)}
|
|
}
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the bit size is at least the size specified in the role
|
|
if pubKey.Params().BitSize < data.role.KeyBits {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires a minimum of a %d-bit key, but CSR's key is %d bits",
|
|
data.role.KeyBits,
|
|
pubKey.Params().BitSize)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "ed25519":
|
|
// Verify that the key matches the role type
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm(x509.Ed25519) {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires keys of type %s",
|
|
data.role.KeyType)}
|
|
}
|
|
_, ok := csr.PublicKey.(ed25519.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "any":
|
|
// We only care about running RSA < 2048 bit checks, so if not RSA
|
|
// break out
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Run RSA < 2048 bit checks
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creation, err := generateCreationBundle(b, data, caSign, csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if creation.Params == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "nil parameters received from parameter bundle generation"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creation.Params.IsCA = isCA
|
|
creation.Params.UseCSRValues = useCSRValues
|
|
|
|
if isCA {
|
|
creation.Params.PermittedDNSDomains = data.apiData.Get("permitted_dns_domains").([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedBundle, err := certutil.SignCertificate(creation)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// otherNameRaw describes a name related to a certificate which is not in one
|
|
// of the standard name formats. RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6:
|
|
// OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
// type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
|
|
// value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
|
|
type otherNameRaw struct {
|
|
TypeID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
|
Value asn1.RawValue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type otherNameUtf8 struct {
|
|
oid string
|
|
value string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ExtractUTF8String returns the UTF8 string contained in the Value, or an error
|
|
// if none is present.
|
|
func (oraw *otherNameRaw) extractUTF8String() (*otherNameUtf8, error) {
|
|
svalue := cryptobyte.String(oraw.Value.Bytes)
|
|
var outTag cbbasn1.Tag
|
|
var val cryptobyte.String
|
|
read := svalue.ReadAnyASN1(&val, &outTag)
|
|
|
|
if read && outTag == asn1.TagUTF8String {
|
|
return &otherNameUtf8{oid: oraw.TypeID.String(), value: string(val)}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no UTF-8 string found in OtherName")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (o otherNameUtf8) String() string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s;%s:%s", o.oid, "UTF-8", o.value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func getOtherSANsFromX509Extensions(exts []pkix.Extension) ([]otherNameUtf8, error) {
|
|
var ret []otherNameUtf8
|
|
for _, ext := range exts {
|
|
if !ext.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
err := forEachSAN(ext.Value, func(tag int, data []byte) error {
|
|
if tag != 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var other otherNameRaw
|
|
_, err := asn1.UnmarshalWithParams(data, &other, "tag:0")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("could not parse requested other SAN: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
val, err := other.extractUTF8String()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
ret = append(ret, *val)
|
|
return nil
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func forEachSAN(extension []byte, callback func(tag int, data []byte) error) error {
|
|
// RFC 5280, 4.2.1.6
|
|
|
|
// SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
|
|
//
|
|
// GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
|
|
// otherName [0] OtherName,
|
|
// rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
|
|
// dNSName [2] IA5String,
|
|
// x400Address [3] ORAddress,
|
|
// directoryName [4] Name,
|
|
// ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
|
|
// uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
|
|
// iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
|
|
// registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
|
|
var seq asn1.RawValue
|
|
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(extension, &seq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
} else if len(rest) != 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("x509: trailing data after X.509 extension")
|
|
}
|
|
if !seq.IsCompound || seq.Tag != 16 || seq.Class != 0 {
|
|
return asn1.StructuralError{Msg: "bad SAN sequence"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rest = seq.Bytes
|
|
for len(rest) > 0 {
|
|
var v asn1.RawValue
|
|
rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(rest, &v)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := callback(v.Tag, v.FullBytes); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// generateCreationBundle is a shared function that reads parameters supplied
|
|
// from the various endpoints and generates a CreationParameters with the
|
|
// parameters that can be used to issue or sign
|
|
func generateCreationBundle(b *backend, data *inputBundle, caSign *certutil.CAInfoBundle, csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (*certutil.CreationBundle, error) {
|
|
// Read in names -- CN, DNS and email addresses
|
|
var cn string
|
|
var ridSerialNumber string
|
|
dnsNames := []string{}
|
|
emailAddresses := []string{}
|
|
{
|
|
if csr != nil && data.role.UseCSRCommonName {
|
|
cn = csr.Subject.CommonName
|
|
}
|
|
if cn == "" {
|
|
cn = data.apiData.Get("common_name").(string)
|
|
if cn == "" && data.role.RequireCN {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: `the common_name field is required, or must be provided in a CSR with "use_csr_common_name" set to true, unless "require_cn" is set to false`}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ridSerialNumber = data.apiData.Get("serial_number").(string)
|
|
|
|
// only take serial number from CSR if one was not supplied via API
|
|
if ridSerialNumber == "" && csr != nil {
|
|
ridSerialNumber = csr.Subject.SerialNumber
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if csr != nil && data.role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
dnsNames = csr.DNSNames
|
|
emailAddresses = csr.EmailAddresses
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cn != "" && !data.apiData.Get("exclude_cn_from_sans").(bool) {
|
|
if strings.Contains(cn, "@") {
|
|
// Note: emails are not disallowed if the role's email protection
|
|
// flag is false, because they may well be included for
|
|
// informational purposes; it is up to the verifying party to
|
|
// ensure that email addresses in a subject alternate name can be
|
|
// used for the purpose for which they are presented
|
|
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, cn)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Only add to dnsNames if it's actually a DNS name but convert
|
|
// idn first
|
|
p := idna.New(
|
|
idna.StrictDomainName(true),
|
|
idna.VerifyDNSLength(true),
|
|
)
|
|
converted, err := p.ToASCII(cn)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
if hostnameRegex.MatchString(converted) {
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, converted)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if csr == nil || !data.role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
cnAltRaw, ok := data.apiData.GetOk("alt_names")
|
|
if ok {
|
|
cnAlt := strutil.ParseDedupAndSortStrings(cnAltRaw.(string), ",")
|
|
for _, v := range cnAlt {
|
|
if strings.Contains(v, "@") {
|
|
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, v)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Only add to dnsNames if it's actually a DNS name but
|
|
// convert idn first
|
|
p := idna.New(
|
|
idna.StrictDomainName(true),
|
|
idna.VerifyDNSLength(true),
|
|
)
|
|
converted, err := p.ToASCII(v)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
if hostnameRegex.MatchString(converted) {
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, converted)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the CN. This ensures that the CN is checked even if it's
|
|
// excluded from SANs.
|
|
if cn != "" {
|
|
badName := validateNames(b, data, []string{cn})
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"common name %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ridSerialNumber != "" {
|
|
badName := validateSerialNumber(data, ridSerialNumber)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"serial_number %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for bad email and/or DNS names
|
|
badName := validateNames(b, data, dnsNames)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"subject alternate name %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
badName = validateNames(b, data, emailAddresses)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"email address %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// otherSANsInput has the same format as the other_sans HTTP param in the
|
|
// Vault PKI API: it is a list of strings of the form <oid>;<type>:<value>
|
|
// where <type> must be UTF8/UTF-8.
|
|
var otherSANsInput []string
|
|
// otherSANs is the output of parseOtherSANs(otherSANsInput): its keys are
|
|
// the <oid> value, its values are of the form [<type>, <value>]
|
|
var otherSANs map[string][]string
|
|
if sans := data.apiData.Get("other_sans").([]string); len(sans) > 0 {
|
|
otherSANsInput = sans
|
|
}
|
|
if data.role.UseCSRSANs && csr != nil && len(csr.Extensions) > 0 {
|
|
others, err := getOtherSANsFromX509Extensions(csr.Extensions)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Errorf("could not parse requested other SAN: %w", err).Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, other := range others {
|
|
otherSANsInput = append(otherSANsInput, other.String())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(otherSANsInput) > 0 {
|
|
requested, err := parseOtherSANs(otherSANsInput)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Errorf("could not parse requested other SAN: %w", err).Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
badOID, badName, err := validateOtherSANs(data, requested)
|
|
switch {
|
|
case err != nil:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
case len(badName) > 0:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"other SAN %s not allowed for OID %s by this role", badName, badOID)}
|
|
case len(badOID) > 0:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"other SAN OID %s not allowed by this role", badOID)}
|
|
default:
|
|
otherSANs = requested
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get and verify any IP SANs
|
|
ipAddresses := []net.IP{}
|
|
{
|
|
if csr != nil && data.role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
if len(csr.IPAddresses) > 0 {
|
|
if !data.role.AllowIPSANs {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"IP Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but was provided some via CSR")}
|
|
}
|
|
ipAddresses = csr.IPAddresses
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ipAlt := data.apiData.Get("ip_sans").([]string)
|
|
if len(ipAlt) > 0 {
|
|
if !data.role.AllowIPSANs {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"IP Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but was provided %s", ipAlt)}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, v := range ipAlt {
|
|
parsedIP := net.ParseIP(v)
|
|
if parsedIP == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"the value '%s' is not a valid IP address", v)}
|
|
}
|
|
ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, parsedIP)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
URIs := []*url.URL{}
|
|
{
|
|
if csr != nil && data.role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
if len(csr.URIs) > 0 {
|
|
if len(data.role.AllowedURISANs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"URI Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but were provided via CSR"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validate uri sans
|
|
for _, uri := range csr.URIs {
|
|
valid := false
|
|
for _, allowed := range data.role.AllowedURISANs {
|
|
validURI := glob.Glob(allowed, uri.String())
|
|
if validURI {
|
|
valid = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"URI Subject Alternative Names were provided via CSR which are not valid for this role"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
URIs = append(URIs, uri)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
uriAlt := data.apiData.Get("uri_sans").([]string)
|
|
if len(uriAlt) > 0 {
|
|
if len(data.role.AllowedURISANs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"URI Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but were provided via the API"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, uri := range uriAlt {
|
|
valid := false
|
|
for _, allowed := range data.role.AllowedURISANs {
|
|
validURI := glob.Glob(allowed, uri)
|
|
if validURI {
|
|
valid = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !valid {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"URI Subject Alternative Names were provided via the API which are not valid for this role"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedURI, err := url.Parse(uri)
|
|
if parsedURI == nil || err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"the provided URI Subject Alternative Name '%s' is not a valid URI", uri),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
URIs = append(URIs, parsedURI)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Most of these could also be RemoveDuplicateStable, or even
|
|
// leave duplicates in, but OU is the one most likely to be duplicated.
|
|
subject := pkix.Name{
|
|
CommonName: cn,
|
|
SerialNumber: ridSerialNumber,
|
|
Country: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.Country, false),
|
|
Organization: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.Organization, false),
|
|
OrganizationalUnit: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.OU, false),
|
|
Locality: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.Locality, false),
|
|
Province: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.Province, false),
|
|
StreetAddress: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.StreetAddress, false),
|
|
PostalCode: strutil.RemoveDuplicatesStable(data.role.PostalCode, false),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the TTL and verify it against the max allowed
|
|
var ttl time.Duration
|
|
var maxTTL time.Duration
|
|
var notAfter time.Time
|
|
var err error
|
|
{
|
|
ttl = time.Duration(data.apiData.Get("ttl").(int)) * time.Second
|
|
notAfterAlt := data.role.NotAfter
|
|
if notAfterAlt == "" {
|
|
notAfterAltRaw, ok := data.apiData.GetOk("not_after")
|
|
if ok {
|
|
notAfterAlt = notAfterAltRaw.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
if ttl > 0 && notAfterAlt != "" {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{
|
|
Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"Either ttl or not_after should be provided. Both should not be provided in the same request."),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ttl == 0 && data.role.TTL > 0 {
|
|
ttl = data.role.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if data.role.MaxTTL > 0 {
|
|
maxTTL = data.role.MaxTTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ttl == 0 {
|
|
ttl = b.System().DefaultLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
if maxTTL == 0 {
|
|
maxTTL = b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
if ttl > maxTTL {
|
|
ttl = maxTTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if notAfterAlt != "" {
|
|
notAfter, err = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, notAfterAlt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
notAfter = time.Now().Add(ttl)
|
|
}
|
|
// If it's not self-signed, verify that the issued certificate won't be
|
|
// valid past the lifetime of the CA certificate
|
|
if caSign != nil &&
|
|
notAfter.After(caSign.Certificate.NotAfter) && !data.role.AllowExpirationPastCA {
|
|
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"cannot satisfy request, as TTL would result in notAfter %s that is beyond the expiration of the CA certificate at %s", notAfter.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), caSign.Certificate.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339Nano))}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creation := &certutil.CreationBundle{
|
|
Params: &certutil.CreationParameters{
|
|
Subject: subject,
|
|
DNSNames: strutil.RemoveDuplicates(dnsNames, false),
|
|
EmailAddresses: strutil.RemoveDuplicates(emailAddresses, false),
|
|
IPAddresses: ipAddresses,
|
|
URIs: URIs,
|
|
OtherSANs: otherSANs,
|
|
KeyType: data.role.KeyType,
|
|
KeyBits: data.role.KeyBits,
|
|
SignatureBits: data.role.SignatureBits,
|
|
NotAfter: notAfter,
|
|
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsage(parseKeyUsages(data.role.KeyUsage)),
|
|
ExtKeyUsage: parseExtKeyUsages(data.role),
|
|
ExtKeyUsageOIDs: data.role.ExtKeyUsageOIDs,
|
|
PolicyIdentifiers: data.role.PolicyIdentifiers,
|
|
BasicConstraintsValidForNonCA: data.role.BasicConstraintsValidForNonCA,
|
|
NotBeforeDuration: data.role.NotBeforeDuration,
|
|
},
|
|
SigningBundle: caSign,
|
|
CSR: csr,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't deal with URLs or max path length if it's self-signed, as these
|
|
// normally come from the signing bundle
|
|
if caSign == nil {
|
|
return creation, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This will have been read in from the getURLs function
|
|
creation.Params.URLs = caSign.URLs
|
|
|
|
// If the max path length in the role is not nil, it was specified at
|
|
// generation time with the max_path_length parameter; otherwise derive it
|
|
// from the signing certificate
|
|
if data.role.MaxPathLength != nil {
|
|
creation.Params.MaxPathLength = *data.role.MaxPathLength
|
|
} else {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case caSign.Certificate.MaxPathLen < 0:
|
|
creation.Params.MaxPathLength = -1
|
|
case caSign.Certificate.MaxPathLen == 0 &&
|
|
caSign.Certificate.MaxPathLenZero:
|
|
// The signing function will ensure that we do not issue a CA cert
|
|
creation.Params.MaxPathLength = 0
|
|
default:
|
|
// If this takes it to zero, we handle this case later if
|
|
// necessary
|
|
creation.Params.MaxPathLength = caSign.Certificate.MaxPathLen - 1
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return creation, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func convertRespToPKCS8(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
privRaw, ok := resp.Data["private_key"]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
priv, ok := privRaw.(string)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: could not parse original value as string")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
privKeyTypeRaw, ok := resp.Data["private_key_type"]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: %q not found in response", "private_key_type")
|
|
}
|
|
privKeyType, ok := privKeyTypeRaw.(certutil.PrivateKeyType)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: could not parse original type value as string")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var keyData []byte
|
|
var pemUsed bool
|
|
var err error
|
|
var signer crypto.Signer
|
|
|
|
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(priv))
|
|
if block == nil {
|
|
keyData, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(priv)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: error decoding original value: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
keyData = block.Bytes
|
|
pemUsed = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch privKeyType {
|
|
case certutil.RSAPrivateKey:
|
|
signer, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(keyData)
|
|
case certutil.ECPrivateKey:
|
|
signer, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(keyData)
|
|
default:
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("unknown private key type %q", privKeyType)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: error parsing previous key: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyData, err = x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(signer)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("error converting response to pkcs8: error marshaling pkcs8 key: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if pemUsed {
|
|
block.Type = "PRIVATE KEY"
|
|
block.Bytes = keyData
|
|
resp.Data["private_key"] = strings.TrimSpace(string(pem.EncodeToMemory(block)))
|
|
} else {
|
|
resp.Data["private_key"] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(keyData)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func handleOtherCSRSANs(in *x509.CertificateRequest, sans map[string][]string) error {
|
|
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
DNSNames: in.DNSNames,
|
|
IPAddresses: in.IPAddresses,
|
|
EmailAddresses: in.EmailAddresses,
|
|
URIs: in.URIs,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := handleOtherSANs(certTemplate, sans); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(certTemplate.ExtraExtensions) > 0 {
|
|
for _, v := range certTemplate.ExtraExtensions {
|
|
in.ExtraExtensions = append(in.ExtraExtensions, v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func handleOtherSANs(in *x509.Certificate, sans map[string][]string) error {
|
|
// If other SANs is empty we return which causes normal Go stdlib parsing
|
|
// of the other SAN types
|
|
if len(sans) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var rawValues []asn1.RawValue
|
|
|
|
// We need to generate an IMPLICIT sequence for compatibility with OpenSSL
|
|
// -- it's an open question what the default for RFC 5280 actually is, see
|
|
// https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5091 -- so we have to use
|
|
// cryptobyte because using the asn1 package's marshaling always produces
|
|
// an EXPLICIT sequence. Note that asn1 is way too magical according to
|
|
// agl, and cryptobyte is modeled after the CBB/CBS bits that agl put into
|
|
// boringssl.
|
|
for oid, vals := range sans {
|
|
for _, val := range vals {
|
|
var b cryptobyte.Builder
|
|
oidStr, err := stringToOid(oid)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
b.AddASN1ObjectIdentifier(oidStr)
|
|
b.AddASN1(cbbasn1.Tag(0).ContextSpecific().Constructed(), func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddASN1(cbbasn1.UTF8String, func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
|
|
b.AddBytes([]byte(val))
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
m, err := b.Bytes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: 0, Class: 2, IsCompound: true, Bytes: m})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If other SANs is empty we return which causes normal Go stdlib parsing
|
|
// of the other SAN types
|
|
if len(rawValues) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Append any existing SANs, sans marshalling
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, marshalSANs(in.DNSNames, in.EmailAddresses, in.IPAddresses, in.URIs)...)
|
|
|
|
// Marshal and add to ExtraExtensions
|
|
ext := pkix.Extension{
|
|
// This is the defined OID for subjectAltName
|
|
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier(oidExtensionSubjectAltName),
|
|
}
|
|
var err error
|
|
ext.Value, err = asn1.Marshal(rawValues)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
in.ExtraExtensions = append(in.ExtraExtensions, ext)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: Taken from the Go source code since it's not public, and used in the
|
|
// modified function below (which also uses these consts upstream)
|
|
const (
|
|
nameTypeOther = 0
|
|
nameTypeEmail = 1
|
|
nameTypeDNS = 2
|
|
nameTypeURI = 6
|
|
nameTypeIP = 7
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Note: Taken from the Go source code since it's not public, plus changed to not marshal
|
|
// marshalSANs marshals a list of addresses into a the contents of an X.509
|
|
// SubjectAlternativeName extension.
|
|
func marshalSANs(dnsNames, emailAddresses []string, ipAddresses []net.IP, uris []*url.URL) []asn1.RawValue {
|
|
var rawValues []asn1.RawValue
|
|
for _, name := range dnsNames {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeDNS, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(name)})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, email := range emailAddresses {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeEmail, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(email)})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, rawIP := range ipAddresses {
|
|
// If possible, we always want to encode IPv4 addresses in 4 bytes.
|
|
ip := rawIP.To4()
|
|
if ip == nil {
|
|
ip = rawIP
|
|
}
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeIP, Class: 2, Bytes: ip})
|
|
}
|
|
for _, uri := range uris {
|
|
rawValues = append(rawValues, asn1.RawValue{Tag: nameTypeURI, Class: 2, Bytes: []byte(uri.String())})
|
|
}
|
|
return rawValues
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func stringToOid(in string) (asn1.ObjectIdentifier, error) {
|
|
split := strings.Split(in, ".")
|
|
ret := make(asn1.ObjectIdentifier, 0, len(split))
|
|
for _, v := range split {
|
|
i, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
ret = append(ret, i)
|
|
}
|
|
return asn1.ObjectIdentifier(ret), nil
|
|
}
|