78aaa3ca92
* wip * all-seals * typo * add note about unreplicated items * italics * word-smithing
319 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
319 lines
15 KiB
Plaintext
---
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layout: docs
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page_title: Seal/Unseal
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description: >-
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A Vault must be unsealed before it can access its data. Likewise, it can be
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sealed to lock it down.
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---
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# Seal/Unseal
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When a Vault server is started, it starts in a _sealed_ state. In this
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state, Vault is configured to know where and how to access the physical
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storage, but doesn't know how to decrypt any of it.
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_Unsealing_ is the process of obtaining the plaintext root key necessary to
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read the decryption key to decrypt the data, allowing access to the Vault.
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Prior to unsealing, almost no operations are possible with Vault. For
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example authentication, managing the mount tables, etc. are all not possible.
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The only possible operations are to unseal the Vault and check the status
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of the seal.
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## Why?
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The data stored by Vault is encrypted. Vault needs the _encryption key_ in order
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to decrypt the data. The encryption key is also stored with the data
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(in the _keyring_), but encrypted with another encryption key known as the _root key_.
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Therefore, to decrypt the data, Vault must decrypt the encryption key
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which requires the root key. Unsealing is the process of getting access to
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this root key. The root key is stored alongside all other Vault data,
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but is encrypted by yet another mechanism: the unseal key.
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To recap: most Vault data is encrypted using the encryption key in the keyring;
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the keyring is encrypted by the root key; and the root key is encrypted by
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the unseal key.
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## Shamir seals
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![Shahir seals](/img/vault-shamir-seal.png)
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The default Vault config uses a Shamir seal. Instead of distributing the unseal
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key as a single key to an operator, Vault uses an algorithm known as
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[Shamir's Secret Sharing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing)
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to split the key into shares. A certain threshold of shares is required to
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reconstruct the unseal key, which is then used to decrypt the root key.
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This is the _unseal_ process: the shares are added one at a time (in any
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order) until enough shares are present to reconstruct the key and
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decrypt the root key.
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## Unsealing
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The unseal process is done by running `vault operator unseal` or via the API.
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This process is stateful: each key can be entered via multiple mechanisms from
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multiple client machines and it will work. This allows each shares of the root
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key to be on a distinct client machine for better security.
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Note that when using the Shamir seal with multiple nodes, each node must be
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unsealed with the required threshold of shares. Partial unsealing of each node
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is not distributed across the cluster.
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Once a Vault node is unsealed, it remains unsealed until one of these things happens:
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1. It is resealed via the API (see below).
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2. The server is restarted.
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3. Vault's storage layer encounters an unrecoverable error.
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-> **Note:** Unsealing makes the process of automating a Vault install
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difficult. Automated tools can easily install, configure, and start Vault,
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but unsealing it using Shamir is a very manual process. For most users
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Auto Unseal will provide a better experience.
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## Sealing
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There is also an API to seal the Vault. This will throw away the root
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key in memory and require another unseal process to restore it. Sealing
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only requires a single operator with root privileges.
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This way, if there is a detected intrusion, the Vault data can be locked
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quickly to try to minimize damages. It can't be accessed again without
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access to the root key shares.
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## Auto Unseal
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-> **Note:** The Seal Wrap functionality is enabled by default. For this
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reason, the seal provider (HSM or cloud KMS) must be available throughout
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Vault's runtime and not just during the unseal process. Refer to the [Seal
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Wrap](/vault/docs/enterprise/sealwrap) documentation for more information.
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Auto Unseal was developed to aid in reducing the operational complexity of
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keeping the unseal key secure. This feature delegates the responsibility of
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securing the unseal key from users to a trusted device or service. At startup
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Vault will connect to the device or service implementing the seal and ask it
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to decrypt the root key Vault read from storage.
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![Auto Unseal](/img/vault-auto-unseal.png)
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There are certain operations in Vault besides unsealing that
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require a quorum of users to perform, e.g. generating a root token. When
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using a Shamir seal the unseal keys must be provided to authorize these
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operations. When using Auto Unseal these operations require _recovery
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keys_ instead.
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Just as the initialization process with a Shamir seal yields unseal keys,
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initializing with an Auto Unseal yields recovery keys.
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It is still possible to seal a Vault node using the API. In this case Vault
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will remain sealed until restarted, or the unseal API is used, which with Auto
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Unseal requires the recovery key fragments instead of the unseal key fragments
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that would be provided with Shamir. The process remains the same.
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For a list of examples and supported providers, please see the
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[seal documentation](/vault/docs/configuration/seal).
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-> **Warning:** Recovery keys cannot decrypt the root key, and thus are not
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sufficient to unseal Vault if the Auto Unseal mechanism isn't working. They
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are purely an authorization mechanism. Using Auto Unseal
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creates a strict Vault lifecycle dependency on the underlying seal mechanism.
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This means that if the seal mechanism (such as the Cloud KMS key) becomes unavailable,
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or deleted before the seal is migrated, then there is no ability to recover
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access to the Vault cluster until the mechanism is available again. **If the seal
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mechanism or its keys are permanently deleted, then the Vault cluster cannot be recovered, even
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from backups.**
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To mitigate this risk, we recommend careful controls around management of the seal
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mechanism, for example using
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[AWS Service Control Policies](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/organizations/latest/userguide/orgs_manage_policies_scps.html)
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or similar.
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With Vault Enterprise secondary clusters (disaster or performance) can have a
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seal configured independently of the primary, and when properly configured guards
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against *some* of this risk. Unreplicated items such as local mounts could still
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be lost.
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## Recovery Key
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When Vault is initialized while using an HSM or KMS, rather than unseal keys
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being returned to the operator, recovery keys are returned. These are generated
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from an internal recovery key that is split via Shamir's Secret Sharing, similar
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to Vault's treatment of unseal keys when running without an HSM or KMS.
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Details about initialization and rekeying follow. When performing an operation
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that uses recovery keys, such as `generate-root`, selection of the recovery
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keys for this purpose, rather than the barrier unseal keys, is automatic.
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### Initialization
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When initializing, the split is performed according to the following CLI flags
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and their API equivalents in the [/sys/init](/vault/api-docs/system/init) endpoint:
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- `recovery-shares`: The number of shares into which to split the recovery
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key. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_shares` value in the API
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endpoint.
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- `recovery-threshold`: The threshold of shares required to reconstruct the
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recovery key. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_threshold` value in
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the API endpoint.
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- `recovery-pgp-keys`: The PGP keys to use to encrypt the returned recovery
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key shares. This value is equivalent to the `recovery_pgp_keys` value in the
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API endpoint, although as with `pgp_keys` the object in the API endpoint is
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an array, not a string.
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Additionally, Vault will refuse to initialize if the option has not been set to
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generate a key, and no key is found. See
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[Configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11) for more details.
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### Rekeying
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#### Unseal Key
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Vault's unseal key can be rekeyed using a normal `vault operator rekey`
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operation from the CLI or the matching API calls. The rekey operation is
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authorized by meeting the threshold of recovery keys. After rekeying, the new
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barrier key is wrapped by the HSM or KMS and stored like the previous key; it is not
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returned to the users that submitted their recovery keys.
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#### Recovery Key
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The recovery key can be rekeyed to change the number of shares/threshold or to
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target different key holders via different PGP keys. When using the Vault CLI,
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this is performed by using the `-target=recovery` flag to `vault operator rekey`.
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Via the API, the rekey operation is performed with the same parameters as the
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[normal `/sys/rekey`
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endpoint](/vault/api-docs/system/rekey); however, the
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API prefix for this operation is at `/sys/rekey-recovery-key` rather than
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`/sys/rekey`.
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## Seal Migration
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The Seal migration process cannot be performed without downtime, and due to the
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technical underpinnings of the seal implementations, the process requires that
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you briefly take the whole cluster down. While experiencing some downtime may
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be unavoidable, we believe that switching seals is a rare event and that the
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inconvenience of the downtime is an acceptable trade-off.
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~> **NOTE**: A backup should be taken before starting seal migration in case
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something goes wrong.
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~> **NOTE**: Seal migration operation will require both old and new seals to be
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available during the migration. For example, migration from Auto Unseal to Shamir
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seal will require that the service backing the Auto Unseal is accessible during
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the migration.
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~> **NOTE**: Seal migration from Auto Unseal to Auto Unseal of the same type is
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supported since Vault 1.6.0. However, there is a current limitation that
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prevents migrating from AWSKMS to AWSKMS; all other seal migrations of the same
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type are supported. Seal migration from One Auto Unseal type (AWS KMS) to
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different Auto Unseal type (HSM, Azure KMS, etc.) is also supported on older
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versions as well.
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### Migration post Vault 1.5.1
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These steps are common for seal migrations between any supported kinds and for
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any storage backend.
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1. Take a standby node down and update the [seal
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configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal).
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- If the migration is from Shamir seal to Auto seal, add the desired new Auto
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seal block to the configuration.
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- If the migration is from Auto seal to Shamir seal, add `disabled = "true"`
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to the old seal block.
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- If the migration is from Auto seal to another Auto seal, add `disabled =
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"true"` to the old seal block and add the desired new Auto seal block.
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Now, bring the standby node back up and run the unseal command on each key, by
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supplying the `-migrate` flag.
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- Supply Shamir unseal keys if the old seal was Shamir, which will be migrated
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as the recovery keys for the Auto seal.
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- Supply recovery keys if the old seal is one of Auto seals, which will be
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migrated as the recovery keys of the new Auto seal, or as Shamir unseal
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keys if the new seal is Shamir.
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1. Perform step 1 for all the standby nodes, one at a time. It is necessary to
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bring back the downed standby node before moving on to the other standby nodes,
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specifically when Integrated Storage is in use for it helps to retain the
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quorum.
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1. [Step down](/vault/docs/commands/operator/step-down) the
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active node. One of the standby nodes will become the new active node.
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When using Integrated Storage, ensure that quorum is reached and a leader is
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elected.
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1. The new active node will perform the migration. Monitor the server log in
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the active node to witness the completion of the seal migration process.
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Wait for a little while for the migration information to replicate to all the
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nodes in case of Integrated Storage. In enterprise Vault, switching an Auto seal
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implies that the seal wrapped storage entries get re-wrapped. Monitor the log
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and wait until this process is complete (look for `seal re-wrap completed`).
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1. Seal migration is now completed. Take down the old active node, update its
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configuration to use the new seal blocks (completely unaware of the old seal type)
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,and bring it back up. It will be auto-unsealed if the new seal is one of the
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Auto seals, or will require unseal keys if the new seal is Shamir.
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1. At this point, configuration files of all the nodes can be updated to only have the
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new seal information. Standby nodes can be restarted right away and the active
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node can be restarted upon a leadership change.
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### Migration pre 1.5.1
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#### Migration From Shamir to Auto Unseal
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To migrate from Shamir keys to Auto Unseal, take your server cluster offline and
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update the [seal configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) with the appropriate
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seal configuration. Bring your server back up and leave the rest of the nodes
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offline if using multi-server mode, then run the unseal process with the
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`-migrate` flag and bring the rest of the cluster online.
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All unseal commands must specify the `-migrate` flag. Once the required
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threshold of unseal keys are entered, unseal keys will be migrated to recovery
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keys.
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`$ vault operator unseal -migrate`
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#### Migration From Auto Unseal to Shamir
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To migrate from Auto Unseal to Shamir keys, take your server cluster offline
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and update the [seal configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) and add `disabled
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= "true"` to the seal block. This allows the migration to use this information
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to decrypt the key but will not unseal Vault. When you bring your server back
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up, run the unseal process with the `-migrate` flag and use the Recovery Keys
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to perform the migration. All unseal commands must specify the `-migrate` flag.
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Once the required threshold of recovery keys are entered, the recovery keys
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will be migrated to be used as unseal keys.
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#### Migration From Auto Unseal to Auto Unseal
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~> **NOTE**: Migration between same Auto Unseal types is supported in Vault
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1.6.0 and higher. For these pre-1.5.1 steps, it is only possible to migrate from
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one type of Auto Unseal to a different type (ie Transit -> AWSKMS).
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To migrate from Auto Unseal to a different Auto Unseal configuration, take your
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server cluster offline and update the existing [seal
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configuration](/vault/docs/configuration/seal) and add `disabled = "true"` to the seal
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block. Then add another seal block to describe the new seal.
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When you bring your server back up, run the unseal process with the `-migrate`
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flag and use the Recovery Keys to perform the migration. All unseal commands
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must specify the `-migrate` flag. Once the required threshold of recovery keys
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are entered, the recovery keys will be kept and used as recovery keys in the new
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seal.
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#### Migration with Integrated Storage
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Integrated Storage uses the Raft protocol underneath, which requires a quorum of
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servers to be online before the cluster is functional. Therefore, bringing the
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cluster back up one node at a time with the seal configuration updated, will not
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work in this case. Follow the same steps for each kind of migration described
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above with the exception that after the cluster is taken offline, update the
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seal configurations of all the nodes appropriately and bring them all back up.
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When the quorum of nodes are back up, Raft will elect a leader and the leader
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node that will perform the migration. The migrated information will be replicated to
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all other cluster peers and when the peers eventually become the leader,
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migration will not happen again on the peer nodes.
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