open-vault/sdk/helper/keysutil/policy.go
Scott Miller 4bc458c1ee
Add a helper function for safely grabbing a keyEntry by version (#10080)
* Add a helper function for safely grabbing a keyEntry by version

* Return by value
2020-10-07 08:21:31 -05:00

1693 lines
45 KiB
Go

package keysutil
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"path"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
"github.com/hashicorp/errwrap"
uuid "github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/errutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/jsonutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/kdf"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
)
// Careful with iota; don't put anything before it in this const block because
// we need the default of zero to be the old-style KDF
const (
Kdf_hmac_sha256_counter = iota // built-in helper
Kdf_hkdf_sha256 // golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf
)
// Or this one...we need the default of zero to be the original AES256-GCM96
const (
KeyType_AES256_GCM96 = iota
KeyType_ECDSA_P256
KeyType_ED25519
KeyType_RSA2048
KeyType_RSA4096
KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305
KeyType_ECDSA_P384
KeyType_ECDSA_P521
KeyType_AES128_GCM96
KeyType_RSA3072
)
const (
// ErrTooOld is returned whtn the ciphertext or signatures's key version is
// too old.
ErrTooOld = "ciphertext or signature version is disallowed by policy (too old)"
// DefaultVersionTemplate is used when no version template is provided.
DefaultVersionTemplate = "vault:v{{version}}:"
)
type RestoreInfo struct {
Time time.Time `json:"time"`
Version int `json:"version"`
}
type BackupInfo struct {
Time time.Time `json:"time"`
Version int `json:"version"`
}
type SigningResult struct {
Signature string
PublicKey []byte
}
type ecdsaSignature struct {
R, S *big.Int
}
type KeyType int
func (kt KeyType) EncryptionSupported() bool {
switch kt {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
return true
}
return false
}
func (kt KeyType) DecryptionSupported() bool {
switch kt {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
return true
}
return false
}
func (kt KeyType) SigningSupported() bool {
switch kt {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ECDSA_P384, KeyType_ECDSA_P521, KeyType_ED25519, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
return true
}
return false
}
func (kt KeyType) HashSignatureInput() bool {
switch kt {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ECDSA_P384, KeyType_ECDSA_P521, KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
return true
}
return false
}
func (kt KeyType) DerivationSupported() bool {
switch kt {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305, KeyType_ED25519:
return true
}
return false
}
func (kt KeyType) String() string {
switch kt {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96:
return "aes128-gcm96"
case KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
return "aes256-gcm96"
case KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
return "chacha20-poly1305"
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256:
return "ecdsa-p256"
case KeyType_ECDSA_P384:
return "ecdsa-p384"
case KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
return "ecdsa-p521"
case KeyType_ED25519:
return "ed25519"
case KeyType_RSA2048:
return "rsa-2048"
case KeyType_RSA3072:
return "rsa-3072"
case KeyType_RSA4096:
return "rsa-4096"
}
return "[unknown]"
}
type KeyData struct {
Policy *Policy `json:"policy"`
ArchivedKeys *archivedKeys `json:"archived_keys"`
}
// KeyEntry stores the key and metadata
type KeyEntry struct {
// AES or some other kind that is a pure byte slice like ED25519
Key []byte `json:"key"`
// Key used for HMAC functions
HMACKey []byte `json:"hmac_key"`
// Time of creation
CreationTime time.Time `json:"time"`
EC_X *big.Int `json:"ec_x"`
EC_Y *big.Int `json:"ec_y"`
EC_D *big.Int `json:"ec_d"`
RSAKey *rsa.PrivateKey `json:"rsa_key"`
// The public key in an appropriate format for the type of key
FormattedPublicKey string `json:"public_key"`
// If convergent is enabled, the version (falling back to what's in the
// policy)
ConvergentVersion int `json:"convergent_version"`
// This is deprecated (but still filled) in favor of the value above which
// is more precise
DeprecatedCreationTime int64 `json:"creation_time"`
}
// deprecatedKeyEntryMap is used to allow JSON marshal/unmarshal
type deprecatedKeyEntryMap map[int]KeyEntry
// MarshalJSON implements JSON marshaling
func (kem deprecatedKeyEntryMap) MarshalJSON() ([]byte, error) {
intermediate := map[string]KeyEntry{}
for k, v := range kem {
intermediate[strconv.Itoa(k)] = v
}
return json.Marshal(&intermediate)
}
// MarshalJSON implements JSON unmarshalling
func (kem deprecatedKeyEntryMap) UnmarshalJSON(data []byte) error {
intermediate := map[string]KeyEntry{}
if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(data, &intermediate); err != nil {
return err
}
for k, v := range intermediate {
keyval, err := strconv.Atoi(k)
if err != nil {
return err
}
kem[keyval] = v
}
return nil
}
// keyEntryMap is used to allow JSON marshal/unmarshal
type keyEntryMap map[string]KeyEntry
// PolicyConfig is used to create a new policy
type PolicyConfig struct {
// The name of the policy
Name string `json:"name"`
// The type of key
Type KeyType
// Derived keys MUST provide a context and the master underlying key is
// never used.
Derived bool
KDF int
ConvergentEncryption bool
// Whether the key is exportable
Exportable bool
// Whether the key is allowed to be deleted
DeletionAllowed bool
// AllowPlaintextBackup allows taking backup of the policy in plaintext
AllowPlaintextBackup bool
// VersionTemplate is used to prefix the ciphertext with information about
// the key version. It must inclide {{version}} and a delimiter between the
// version prefix and the ciphertext.
VersionTemplate string
// StoragePrefix is used to add a prefix when storing and retrieving the
// policy object.
StoragePrefix string
}
// NewPolicy takes a policy config and returns a Policy with those settings.
func NewPolicy(config PolicyConfig) *Policy {
return &Policy{
l: new(sync.RWMutex),
Name: config.Name,
Type: config.Type,
Derived: config.Derived,
KDF: config.KDF,
ConvergentEncryption: config.ConvergentEncryption,
ConvergentVersion: -1,
Exportable: config.Exportable,
DeletionAllowed: config.DeletionAllowed,
AllowPlaintextBackup: config.AllowPlaintextBackup,
VersionTemplate: config.VersionTemplate,
StoragePrefix: config.StoragePrefix,
}
}
// LoadPolicy will load a policy from the provided storage path and set the
// necessary un-exported variables. It is particularly useful when accessing a
// policy without the lock manager.
func LoadPolicy(ctx context.Context, s logical.Storage, path string) (*Policy, error) {
raw, err := s.Get(ctx, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if raw == nil {
return nil, nil
}
var policy Policy
err = jsonutil.DecodeJSON(raw.Value, &policy)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
policy.l = new(sync.RWMutex)
return &policy, nil
}
// Policy is the struct used to store metadata
type Policy struct {
// This is a pointer on purpose: if we are running with cache disabled we
// need to actually swap in the lock manager's lock for this policy with
// the local lock.
l *sync.RWMutex
// writeLocked allows us to implement Lock() and Unlock()
writeLocked bool
// Stores whether it's been deleted. This acts as a guard for operations
// that may write data, e.g. if one request rotates and that request is
// served after a delete.
deleted uint32
Name string `json:"name"`
Key []byte `json:"key,omitempty"` //DEPRECATED
Keys keyEntryMap `json:"keys"`
// Derived keys MUST provide a context and the master underlying key is
// never used. If convergent encryption is true, the context will be used
// as the nonce as well.
Derived bool `json:"derived"`
KDF int `json:"kdf"`
ConvergentEncryption bool `json:"convergent_encryption"`
// Whether the key is exportable
Exportable bool `json:"exportable"`
// The minimum version of the key allowed to be used for decryption
MinDecryptionVersion int `json:"min_decryption_version"`
// The minimum version of the key allowed to be used for encryption
MinEncryptionVersion int `json:"min_encryption_version"`
// The latest key version in this policy
LatestVersion int `json:"latest_version"`
// The latest key version in the archive. We never delete these, so this is
// a max.
ArchiveVersion int `json:"archive_version"`
// ArchiveMinVersion is the minimum version of the key in the archive.
ArchiveMinVersion int `json:"archive_min_version"`
// MinAvailableVersion is the minimum version of the key present. All key
// versions before this would have been deleted.
MinAvailableVersion int `json:"min_available_version"`
// Whether the key is allowed to be deleted
DeletionAllowed bool `json:"deletion_allowed"`
// The version of the convergent nonce to use
ConvergentVersion int `json:"convergent_version"`
// The type of key
Type KeyType `json:"type"`
// BackupInfo indicates the information about the backup action taken on
// this policy
BackupInfo *BackupInfo `json:"backup_info"`
// RestoreInfo indicates the information about the restore action taken on
// this policy
RestoreInfo *RestoreInfo `json:"restore_info"`
// AllowPlaintextBackup allows taking backup of the policy in plaintext
AllowPlaintextBackup bool `json:"allow_plaintext_backup"`
// VersionTemplate is used to prefix the ciphertext with information about
// the key version. It must inclide {{version}} and a delimiter between the
// version prefix and the ciphertext.
VersionTemplate string `json:"version_template"`
// StoragePrefix is used to add a prefix when storing and retrieving the
// policy object.
StoragePrefix string `json:"storage_prefix"`
// versionPrefixCache stores caches of version prefix strings and the split
// version template.
versionPrefixCache sync.Map
}
func (p *Policy) Lock(exclusive bool) {
if exclusive {
p.l.Lock()
p.writeLocked = true
} else {
p.l.RLock()
}
}
func (p *Policy) Unlock() {
if p.writeLocked {
p.writeLocked = false
p.l.Unlock()
} else {
p.l.RUnlock()
}
}
// ArchivedKeys stores old keys. This is used to keep the key loading time sane
// when there are huge numbers of rotations.
type archivedKeys struct {
Keys []KeyEntry `json:"keys"`
}
func (p *Policy) LoadArchive(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage) (*archivedKeys, error) {
archive := &archivedKeys{}
raw, err := storage.Get(ctx, path.Join(p.StoragePrefix, "archive", p.Name))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if raw == nil {
archive.Keys = make([]KeyEntry, 0)
return archive, nil
}
if err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(raw.Value, archive); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return archive, nil
}
func (p *Policy) storeArchive(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage, archive *archivedKeys) error {
// Encode the policy
buf, err := json.Marshal(archive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Write the policy into storage
err = storage.Put(ctx, &logical.StorageEntry{
Key: path.Join(p.StoragePrefix, "archive", p.Name),
Value: buf,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// handleArchiving manages the movement of keys to and from the policy archive.
// This should *ONLY* be called from Persist() since it assumes that the policy
// will be persisted afterwards.
func (p *Policy) handleArchiving(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage) error {
// We need to move keys that are no longer accessible to archivedKeys, and keys
// that now need to be accessible back here.
//
// For safety, because there isn't really a good reason to, we never delete
// keys from the archive even when we move them back.
// Check if we have the latest minimum version in the current set of keys
_, keysContainsMinimum := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.MinDecryptionVersion)]
// Sanity checks
switch {
case p.MinDecryptionVersion < 1:
return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is less than 1", p.MinDecryptionVersion)
case p.LatestVersion < 1:
return fmt.Errorf("latest version of %d is less than 1", p.LatestVersion)
case !keysContainsMinimum && p.ArchiveVersion != p.LatestVersion:
return fmt.Errorf("need to move keys from archive but archive version not up-to-date")
case p.ArchiveVersion > p.LatestVersion:
return fmt.Errorf("archive version of %d is greater than the latest version %d",
p.ArchiveVersion, p.LatestVersion)
case p.MinEncryptionVersion > 0 && p.MinEncryptionVersion < p.MinDecryptionVersion:
return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is greater than minimum encryption version %d",
p.MinDecryptionVersion, p.MinEncryptionVersion)
case p.MinDecryptionVersion > p.LatestVersion:
return fmt.Errorf("minimum decryption version of %d is greater than the latest version %d",
p.MinDecryptionVersion, p.LatestVersion)
}
archive, err := p.LoadArchive(ctx, storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !keysContainsMinimum {
// Need to move keys *from* archive
for i := p.MinDecryptionVersion; i <= p.LatestVersion; i++ {
p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(i)] = archive.Keys[i-p.MinAvailableVersion]
}
return nil
}
// Need to move keys *to* archive
// We need a size that is equivalent to the latest version (number of keys)
// but adding one since slice numbering starts at 0 and we're indexing by
// key version
if len(archive.Keys)+p.MinAvailableVersion < p.LatestVersion+1 {
// Increase the size of the archive slice
newKeys := make([]KeyEntry, p.LatestVersion-p.MinAvailableVersion+1)
copy(newKeys, archive.Keys)
archive.Keys = newKeys
}
// We are storing all keys in the archive, so we ensure that it is up to
// date up to p.LatestVersion
for i := p.ArchiveVersion + 1; i <= p.LatestVersion; i++ {
archive.Keys[i-p.MinAvailableVersion] = p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(i)]
p.ArchiveVersion = i
}
// Trim the keys if required
if p.ArchiveMinVersion < p.MinAvailableVersion {
archive.Keys = archive.Keys[p.MinAvailableVersion-p.ArchiveMinVersion:]
p.ArchiveMinVersion = p.MinAvailableVersion
}
err = p.storeArchive(ctx, storage, archive)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Perform deletion afterwards so that if there is an error saving we
// haven't messed with the current policy
for i := p.LatestVersion - len(p.Keys) + 1; i < p.MinDecryptionVersion; i++ {
delete(p.Keys, strconv.Itoa(i))
}
return nil
}
func (p *Policy) Persist(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage) (retErr error) {
if atomic.LoadUint32(&p.deleted) == 1 {
return errors.New("key has been deleted, not persisting")
}
// Other functions will take care of restoring other values; this is just
// responsible for archiving and keys since the archive function can modify
// keys. At the moment one of the other functions calling persist will also
// roll back keys, but better safe than sorry and this doesn't happen
// enough to worry about the speed tradeoff.
priorArchiveVersion := p.ArchiveVersion
var priorKeys keyEntryMap
if p.Keys != nil {
priorKeys = keyEntryMap{}
for k, v := range p.Keys {
priorKeys[k] = v
}
}
defer func() {
if retErr != nil {
p.ArchiveVersion = priorArchiveVersion
p.Keys = priorKeys
}
}()
err := p.handleArchiving(ctx, storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Encode the policy
buf, err := p.Serialize()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Write the policy into storage
err = storage.Put(ctx, &logical.StorageEntry{
Key: path.Join(p.StoragePrefix, "policy", p.Name),
Value: buf,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (p *Policy) Serialize() ([]byte, error) {
return json.Marshal(p)
}
func (p *Policy) NeedsUpgrade() bool {
// Ensure we've moved from Key -> Keys
if p.Key != nil && len(p.Key) > 0 {
return true
}
// With archiving, past assumptions about the length of the keys map are no
// longer valid
if p.LatestVersion == 0 && len(p.Keys) != 0 {
return true
}
// We disallow setting the version to 0, since they start at 1 since moving
// to rotate-able keys, so update if it's set to 0
if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
return true
}
// On first load after an upgrade, copy keys to the archive
if p.ArchiveVersion == 0 {
return true
}
// Need to write the version if zero; for version 3 on we set this to -1 to
// ignore it since we store this information in each key entry
if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion == 0 {
return true
}
if p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey == nil || len(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey) == 0 {
return true
}
return false
}
func (p *Policy) Upgrade(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage, randReader io.Reader) (retErr error) {
priorKey := p.Key
priorLatestVersion := p.LatestVersion
priorMinDecryptionVersion := p.MinDecryptionVersion
priorConvergentVersion := p.ConvergentVersion
var priorKeys keyEntryMap
if p.Keys != nil {
priorKeys = keyEntryMap{}
for k, v := range p.Keys {
priorKeys[k] = v
}
}
defer func() {
if retErr != nil {
p.Key = priorKey
p.LatestVersion = priorLatestVersion
p.MinDecryptionVersion = priorMinDecryptionVersion
p.ConvergentVersion = priorConvergentVersion
p.Keys = priorKeys
}
}()
persistNeeded := false
// Ensure we've moved from Key -> Keys
if p.Key != nil && len(p.Key) > 0 {
p.MigrateKeyToKeysMap()
persistNeeded = true
}
// With archiving, past assumptions about the length of the keys map are no
// longer valid
if p.LatestVersion == 0 && len(p.Keys) != 0 {
p.LatestVersion = len(p.Keys)
persistNeeded = true
}
// We disallow setting the version to 0, since they start at 1 since moving
// to rotate-able keys, so update if it's set to 0
if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
p.MinDecryptionVersion = 1
persistNeeded = true
}
// On first load after an upgrade, copy keys to the archive
if p.ArchiveVersion == 0 {
persistNeeded = true
}
if p.ConvergentEncryption && p.ConvergentVersion == 0 {
p.ConvergentVersion = 1
persistNeeded = true
}
if p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey == nil || len(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)].HMACKey) == 0 {
entry := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)]
hmacKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytesWithReader(32, randReader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entry.HMACKey = hmacKey
p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)] = entry
persistNeeded = true
}
if persistNeeded {
err := p.Persist(ctx, storage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// GetKey is used to derive the encryption key that should be used depending
// on the policy. If derivation is disabled the raw key is used and no context
// is required, otherwise the KDF mode is used with the context to derive the
// proper key.
func (p *Policy) GetKey(context []byte, ver, numBytes int) ([]byte, error) {
// Fast-path non-derived keys
if !p.Derived {
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return keyEntry.Key, nil
}
return p.DeriveKey(context, nil, ver, numBytes)
}
// DeriveKey is used to derive a symmetric key given a context and salt. This does not
// check the policies Derived flag, but just implements the derivation logic. GetKey
// is responsible for switching on the policy config.
func (p *Policy) DeriveKey(context, salt []byte, ver int, numBytes int) ([]byte, error) {
if !p.Type.DerivationSupported() {
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("derivation not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
}
if p.Keys == nil || p.LatestVersion == 0 {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unable to access the key; no key versions found"}
}
if ver <= 0 || ver > p.LatestVersion {
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid key version"}
}
// Ensure a context is provided
if len(context) == 0 {
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "missing 'context' for key derivation; the key was created using a derived key, which means additional, per-request information must be included in order to perform operations with the key"}
}
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch p.KDF {
case Kdf_hmac_sha256_counter:
prf := kdf.HMACSHA256PRF
prfLen := kdf.HMACSHA256PRFLen
return kdf.CounterMode(prf, prfLen, keyEntry.Key, append(context, salt...), 256)
case Kdf_hkdf_sha256:
reader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, keyEntry.Key, salt, context)
derBytes := bytes.NewBuffer(nil)
derBytes.Grow(numBytes)
limReader := &io.LimitedReader{
R: reader,
N: int64(numBytes),
}
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
n, err := derBytes.ReadFrom(limReader)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error reading returned derived bytes: %v", err)}
}
if n != int64(numBytes) {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to read enough derived bytes, needed %d, got %d", numBytes, n)}
}
return derBytes.Bytes(), nil
case KeyType_ED25519:
// We use the limited reader containing the derived bytes as the
// "random" input to the generation function
_, pri, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(limReader)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error generating derived key: %v", err)}
}
return pri, nil
default:
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported key type for derivation"}
}
default:
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported key derivation mode"}
}
}
func (p *Policy) safeGetKeyEntry(ver int) (KeyEntry, error) {
keyVerStr := strconv.Itoa(ver)
keyEntry, ok := p.Keys[keyVerStr]
if !ok {
return keyEntry, errutil.UserError{Err: "no such key version"}
}
return keyEntry, nil
}
func (p *Policy) convergentVersion(ver int) int {
if !p.ConvergentEncryption {
return 0
}
convergentVersion := p.ConvergentVersion
if convergentVersion == 0 {
// For some reason, not upgraded yet
convergentVersion = 1
}
currKey := p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)]
if currKey.ConvergentVersion != 0 {
convergentVersion = currKey.ConvergentVersion
}
return convergentVersion
}
func (p *Policy) Encrypt(ver int, context, nonce []byte, value string) (string, error) {
if !p.Type.EncryptionSupported() {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message encryption not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
}
// Decode the plaintext value
plaintext, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(value)
if err != nil {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
}
switch {
case ver == 0:
ver = p.LatestVersion
case ver < 0:
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is negative"}
case ver > p.LatestVersion:
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is higher than the latest key version"}
case ver < p.MinEncryptionVersion:
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for encryption is less than the minimum encryption key version"}
}
var ciphertext []byte
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
hmacKey := context
var encKey []byte
var deriveHMAC bool
encBytes := 32
hmacBytes := 0
if p.convergentVersion(ver) > 2 {
deriveHMAC = true
hmacBytes = 32
}
if p.Type == KeyType_AES128_GCM96 {
encBytes = 16
}
key, err := p.GetKey(context, ver, encBytes+hmacBytes)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if len(key) < encBytes+hmacBytes {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: "could not derive key, length too small"}
}
encKey = key[:encBytes]
if len(encKey) != encBytes {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: "could not derive enc key, length not correct"}
}
if deriveHMAC {
hmacKey = key[encBytes:]
if len(hmacKey) != hmacBytes {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: "could not derive hmac key, length not correct"}
}
}
ciphertext, err = p.SymmetricEncryptRaw(ver, encKey, plaintext,
SymmetricOpts{
Convergent: p.ConvergentEncryption,
HMACKey: hmacKey,
Nonce: nonce,
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
key := keyEntry.RSAKey
ciphertext, err = rsa.EncryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.Reader, &key.PublicKey, plaintext, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("failed to RSA encrypt the plaintext: %v", err)}
}
default:
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
}
// Convert to base64
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext)
// Prepend some information
encoded = p.getVersionPrefix(ver) + encoded
return encoded, nil
}
func (p *Policy) Decrypt(context, nonce []byte, value string) (string, error) {
if !p.Type.DecryptionSupported() {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message decryption not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
}
tplParts, err := p.getTemplateParts()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Verify the prefix
if !strings.HasPrefix(value, tplParts[0]) {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: no prefix"}
}
splitVerCiphertext := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(value, tplParts[0]), tplParts[1], 2)
if len(splitVerCiphertext) != 2 {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: wrong number of fields"}
}
ver, err := strconv.Atoi(splitVerCiphertext[0])
if err != nil {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: version number could not be decoded"}
}
if ver == 0 {
// Compatibility mode with initial implementation, where keys start at
// zero
ver = 1
}
if ver > p.LatestVersion {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: version is too new"}
}
if p.MinDecryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinDecryptionVersion {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: ErrTooOld}
}
convergentVersion := p.convergentVersion(ver)
if convergentVersion == 1 && (nonce == nil || len(nonce) == 0) {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid convergent nonce supplied"}
}
// Decode the base64
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(splitVerCiphertext[1])
if err != nil {
return "", errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext: could not decode base64"}
}
var plain []byte
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
numBytes := 32
if p.Type == KeyType_AES128_GCM96 {
numBytes = 16
}
encKey, err := p.GetKey(context, ver, numBytes)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if len(encKey) != numBytes {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: "could not derive enc key, length not correct"}
}
plain, err = p.SymmetricDecryptRaw(encKey, decoded,
SymmetricOpts{
Convergent: p.ConvergentEncryption,
ConvergentVersion: p.ConvergentVersion,
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
key := keyEntry.RSAKey
plain, err = rsa.DecryptOAEP(sha256.New(), rand.Reader, key, decoded, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("failed to RSA decrypt the ciphertext: %v", err)}
}
default:
return "", errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(plain), nil
}
func (p *Policy) HMACKey(version int) ([]byte, error) {
switch {
case version < 0:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key version does not exist (cannot be negative)")
case version > p.LatestVersion:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("key version does not exist; latest key version is %d", p.LatestVersion)
}
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(version)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if keyEntry.HMACKey == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no HMAC key exists for that key version")
}
return keyEntry.HMACKey, nil
}
func (p *Policy) Sign(ver int, context, input []byte, hashAlgorithm HashType, sigAlgorithm string, marshaling MarshalingType) (*SigningResult, error) {
if !p.Type.SigningSupported() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("message signing not supported for key type %v", p.Type)
}
switch {
case ver == 0:
ver = p.LatestVersion
case ver < 0:
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is negative"}
case ver > p.LatestVersion:
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is higher than the latest key version"}
case p.MinEncryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinEncryptionVersion:
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested version for signing is less than the minimum encryption key version"}
}
var sig []byte
var pubKey []byte
var err error
keyParams, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ECDSA_P384, KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
var curveBits int
var curve elliptic.Curve
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P384:
curveBits = 384
curve = elliptic.P384()
case KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
curveBits = 521
curve = elliptic.P521()
default:
curveBits = 256
curve = elliptic.P256()
}
key := &ecdsa.PrivateKey{
PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: curve,
X: keyParams.EC_X,
Y: keyParams.EC_Y,
},
D: keyParams.EC_D,
}
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, input)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch marshaling {
case MarshalingTypeASN1:
// This is used by openssl and X.509
sig, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{
R: r,
S: s,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case MarshalingTypeJWS:
// This is used by JWS
// First we have to get the length of the curve in bytes. Although
// we only support 256 now, we'll do this in an agnostic way so we
// can reuse this marshaling if we support e.g. 521. Getting the
// number of bytes without rounding up would be 65.125 so we need
// to add one in that case.
keyLen := curveBits / 8
if curveBits%8 > 0 {
keyLen++
}
// Now create the output array
sig = make([]byte, keyLen*2)
rb := r.Bytes()
sb := s.Bytes()
copy(sig[keyLen-len(rb):], rb)
copy(sig[2*keyLen-len(sb):], sb)
default:
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested marshaling type is invalid"}
}
case KeyType_ED25519:
var key ed25519.PrivateKey
if p.Derived {
// Derive the key that should be used
var err error
key, err = p.GetKey(context, ver, 32)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deriving key: %v", err)}
}
pubKey = key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
} else {
key = ed25519.PrivateKey(keyParams.Key)
}
// Per docs, do not pre-hash ed25519; it does two passes and performs
// its own hashing
sig, err = key.Sign(rand.Reader, input, crypto.Hash(0))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
key := keyParams.RSAKey
var algo crypto.Hash
switch hashAlgorithm {
case HashTypeSHA1:
algo = crypto.SHA1
case HashTypeSHA2224:
algo = crypto.SHA224
case HashTypeSHA2256:
algo = crypto.SHA256
case HashTypeSHA2384:
algo = crypto.SHA384
case HashTypeSHA2512:
algo = crypto.SHA512
default:
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported hash algorithm"}
}
if sigAlgorithm == "" {
sigAlgorithm = "pss"
}
switch sigAlgorithm {
case "pss":
sig, err = rsa.SignPSS(rand.Reader, key, algo, input, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
case "pkcs1v15":
sig, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand.Reader, key, algo, input)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
default:
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported rsa signature algorithm %s", sigAlgorithm)}
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)
}
// Convert to base64
var encoded string
switch marshaling {
case MarshalingTypeASN1:
encoded = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
case MarshalingTypeJWS:
encoded = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig)
}
res := &SigningResult{
Signature: p.getVersionPrefix(ver) + encoded,
PublicKey: pubKey,
}
return res, nil
}
func (p *Policy) VerifySignature(context, input []byte, hashAlgorithm HashType, sigAlgorithm string, marshaling MarshalingType, sig string) (bool, error) {
if !p.Type.SigningSupported() {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("message verification not supported for key type %v", p.Type)}
}
tplParts, err := p.getTemplateParts()
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// Verify the prefix
if !strings.HasPrefix(sig, tplParts[0]) {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: no prefix"}
}
splitVerSig := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(sig, tplParts[0]), tplParts[1], 2)
if len(splitVerSig) != 2 {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: wrong number of fields"}
}
ver, err := strconv.Atoi(splitVerSig[0])
if err != nil {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: version number could not be decoded"}
}
if ver > p.LatestVersion {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid signature: version is too new"}
}
if p.MinDecryptionVersion > 0 && ver < p.MinDecryptionVersion {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: ErrTooOld}
}
var sigBytes []byte
switch marshaling {
case MarshalingTypeASN1:
sigBytes, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(splitVerSig[1])
case MarshalingTypeJWS:
sigBytes, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(splitVerSig[1])
default:
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "requested marshaling type is invalid"}
}
if err != nil {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid base64 signature value"}
}
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ECDSA_P384, KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
var curve elliptic.Curve
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P384:
curve = elliptic.P384()
case KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
curve = elliptic.P521()
default:
curve = elliptic.P256()
}
var ecdsaSig ecdsaSignature
switch marshaling {
case MarshalingTypeASN1:
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sigBytes, &ecdsaSig)
if err != nil {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "supplied signature is invalid"}
}
if rest != nil && len(rest) != 0 {
return false, errutil.UserError{Err: "supplied signature contains extra data"}
}
case MarshalingTypeJWS:
paramLen := len(sigBytes) / 2
rb := sigBytes[:paramLen]
sb := sigBytes[paramLen:]
ecdsaSig.R = new(big.Int)
ecdsaSig.R.SetBytes(rb)
ecdsaSig.S = new(big.Int)
ecdsaSig.S.SetBytes(sb)
}
keyParams, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
key := &ecdsa.PublicKey{
Curve: curve,
X: keyParams.EC_X,
Y: keyParams.EC_Y,
}
return ecdsa.Verify(key, input, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S), nil
case KeyType_ED25519:
var key ed25519.PrivateKey
if p.Derived {
// Derive the key that should be used
var err error
key, err = p.GetKey(context, ver, 32)
if err != nil {
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deriving key: %v", err)}
}
} else {
key = ed25519.PrivateKey(p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(ver)].Key)
}
return ed25519.Verify(key.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey), input, sigBytes), nil
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
keyEntry, err := p.safeGetKeyEntry(ver)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
key := keyEntry.RSAKey
var algo crypto.Hash
switch hashAlgorithm {
case HashTypeSHA1:
algo = crypto.SHA1
case HashTypeSHA2224:
algo = crypto.SHA224
case HashTypeSHA2256:
algo = crypto.SHA256
case HashTypeSHA2384:
algo = crypto.SHA384
case HashTypeSHA2512:
algo = crypto.SHA512
default:
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: "unsupported hash algorithm"}
}
if sigAlgorithm == "" {
sigAlgorithm = "pss"
}
switch sigAlgorithm {
case "pss":
err = rsa.VerifyPSS(&key.PublicKey, algo, input, sigBytes, nil)
case "pkcs1v15":
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(&key.PublicKey, algo, input, sigBytes)
default:
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported rsa signature algorithm %s", sigAlgorithm)}
}
return err == nil, nil
default:
return false, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported key type %v", p.Type)}
}
}
func (p *Policy) Rotate(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage, randReader io.Reader) (retErr error) {
priorLatestVersion := p.LatestVersion
priorMinDecryptionVersion := p.MinDecryptionVersion
var priorKeys keyEntryMap
if p.Keys != nil {
priorKeys = keyEntryMap{}
for k, v := range p.Keys {
priorKeys[k] = v
}
}
defer func() {
if retErr != nil {
p.LatestVersion = priorLatestVersion
p.MinDecryptionVersion = priorMinDecryptionVersion
p.Keys = priorKeys
}
}()
if p.Keys == nil {
// This is an initial key rotation when generating a new policy. We
// don't need to call migrate here because if we've called getPolicy to
// get the policy in the first place it will have been run.
p.Keys = keyEntryMap{}
}
p.LatestVersion += 1
now := time.Now()
entry := KeyEntry{
CreationTime: now,
DeprecatedCreationTime: now.Unix(),
}
hmacKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytesWithReader(32, randReader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entry.HMACKey = hmacKey
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96, KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
// Default to 256 bit key
numBytes := 32
if p.Type == KeyType_AES128_GCM96 {
numBytes = 16
}
newKey, err := uuid.GenerateRandomBytesWithReader(numBytes, randReader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entry.Key = newKey
case KeyType_ECDSA_P256, KeyType_ECDSA_P384, KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
var curve elliptic.Curve
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_ECDSA_P384:
curve = elliptic.P384()
case KeyType_ECDSA_P521:
curve = elliptic.P521()
default:
curve = elliptic.P256()
}
privKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(curve, rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entry.EC_D = privKey.D
entry.EC_X = privKey.X
entry.EC_Y = privKey.Y
derBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(privKey.Public())
if err != nil {
return errwrap.Wrapf("error marshaling public key: {{err}}", err)
}
pemBlock := &pem.Block{
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
Bytes: derBytes,
}
pemBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(pemBlock)
if pemBytes == nil || len(pemBytes) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("error PEM-encoding public key")
}
entry.FormattedPublicKey = string(pemBytes)
case KeyType_ED25519:
pub, pri, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(randReader)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entry.Key = pri
entry.FormattedPublicKey = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(pub)
case KeyType_RSA2048, KeyType_RSA3072, KeyType_RSA4096:
bitSize := 2048
if p.Type == KeyType_RSA3072 {
bitSize = 3072
}
if p.Type == KeyType_RSA4096 {
bitSize = 4096
}
entry.RSAKey, err = rsa.GenerateKey(randReader, bitSize)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if p.ConvergentEncryption {
if p.ConvergentVersion == -1 || p.ConvergentVersion > 1 {
entry.ConvergentVersion = currentConvergentVersion
}
}
p.Keys[strconv.Itoa(p.LatestVersion)] = entry
// This ensures that with new key creations min decryption version is set
// to 1 rather than the int default of 0, since keys start at 1 (either
// fresh or after migration to the key map)
if p.MinDecryptionVersion == 0 {
p.MinDecryptionVersion = 1
}
return p.Persist(ctx, storage)
}
func (p *Policy) MigrateKeyToKeysMap() {
now := time.Now()
p.Keys = keyEntryMap{
"1": KeyEntry{
Key: p.Key,
CreationTime: now,
DeprecatedCreationTime: now.Unix(),
},
}
p.Key = nil
}
// Backup should be called with an exclusive lock held on the policy
func (p *Policy) Backup(ctx context.Context, storage logical.Storage) (out string, retErr error) {
if !p.Exportable {
return "", fmt.Errorf("exporting is disallowed on the policy")
}
if !p.AllowPlaintextBackup {
return "", fmt.Errorf("plaintext backup is disallowed on the policy")
}
priorBackupInfo := p.BackupInfo
defer func() {
if retErr != nil {
p.BackupInfo = priorBackupInfo
}
}()
// Create a record of this backup operation in the policy
p.BackupInfo = &BackupInfo{
Time: time.Now(),
Version: p.LatestVersion,
}
err := p.Persist(ctx, storage)
if err != nil {
return "", errwrap.Wrapf("failed to persist policy with backup info: {{err}}", err)
}
// Load the archive only after persisting the policy as the archive can get
// adjusted while persisting the policy
archivedKeys, err := p.LoadArchive(ctx, storage)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
keyData := &KeyData{
Policy: p,
ArchivedKeys: archivedKeys,
}
encodedBackup, err := jsonutil.EncodeJSON(keyData)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(encodedBackup), nil
}
func (p *Policy) getTemplateParts() ([]string, error) {
partsRaw, ok := p.versionPrefixCache.Load("template-parts")
if ok {
return partsRaw.([]string), nil
}
template := p.VersionTemplate
if template == "" {
template = DefaultVersionTemplate
}
tplParts := strings.Split(template, "{{version}}")
if len(tplParts) != 2 {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "error parsing version template"}
}
p.versionPrefixCache.Store("template-parts", tplParts)
return tplParts, nil
}
func (p *Policy) getVersionPrefix(ver int) string {
prefixRaw, ok := p.versionPrefixCache.Load(ver)
if ok {
return prefixRaw.(string)
}
template := p.VersionTemplate
if template == "" {
template = DefaultVersionTemplate
}
prefix := strings.Replace(template, "{{version}}", strconv.Itoa(ver), -1)
p.versionPrefixCache.Store(ver, prefix)
return prefix
}
// SymmetricOpts are the arguments to symmetric operations that are "optional", e.g.
// not always used. This improves the aesthetics of calls to those functions.
type SymmetricOpts struct {
// Whether to use convergent encryption
Convergent bool
// The version of the convergent encryption scheme
ConvergentVersion int
// The nonce, if not randomly generated
Nonce []byte
// Additional data to include in AEAD authentication
AdditionalData []byte
// The HMAC key, for generating IVs in convergent encryption
HMACKey []byte
}
// Symmetrically encrypt a plaintext given the convergence configuration and appropriate keys
func (p *Policy) SymmetricEncryptRaw(ver int, encKey, plaintext []byte, opts SymmetricOpts) ([]byte, error) {
var aead cipher.AEAD
var err error
nonce := opts.Nonce
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
// Setup the cipher
aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
// Setup the GCM AEAD
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(aesCipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
aead = gcm
case KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
cha, err := chacha20poly1305.New(encKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
aead = cha
}
if opts.Convergent {
convergentVersion := p.convergentVersion(ver)
switch convergentVersion {
case 1:
if len(opts.Nonce) != aead.NonceSize() {
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("base64-decoded nonce must be %d bytes long when using convergent encryption with this key", aead.NonceSize())}
}
case 2, 3:
if len(opts.HMACKey) == 0 {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("invalid hmac key length of zero")}
}
nonceHmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, opts.HMACKey)
nonceHmac.Write(plaintext)
nonceSum := nonceHmac.Sum(nil)
nonce = nonceSum[:aead.NonceSize()]
default:
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unhandled convergent version %d", convergentVersion)}
}
} else if len(nonce) == 0 {
// Compute random nonce
nonce, err = uuid.GenerateRandomBytes(aead.NonceSize())
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
}
// Encrypt and tag with AEAD
ciphertext := aead.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, opts.AdditionalData)
// Place the encrypted data after the nonce
if !opts.Convergent || p.convergentVersion(ver) > 1 {
ciphertext = append(nonce, ciphertext...)
}
return ciphertext, nil
}
// Symmetrically decrypt a ciphertext given the convergence configuration and appropriate keys
func (p *Policy) SymmetricDecryptRaw(encKey, ciphertext []byte, opts SymmetricOpts) ([]byte, error) {
var aead cipher.AEAD
var nonce []byte
switch p.Type {
case KeyType_AES128_GCM96, KeyType_AES256_GCM96:
// Setup the cipher
aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(encKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
// Setup the GCM AEAD
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(aesCipher)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
aead = gcm
case KeyType_ChaCha20_Poly1305:
cha, err := chacha20poly1305.New(encKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
}
aead = cha
}
if len(ciphertext) < aead.NonceSize() {
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "invalid ciphertext length"}
}
// Extract the nonce and ciphertext
var trueCT []byte
if opts.Convergent && opts.ConvergentVersion == 1 {
trueCT = ciphertext
} else {
nonce = ciphertext[:aead.NonceSize()]
trueCT = ciphertext[aead.NonceSize():]
}
// Verify and Decrypt
plain, err := aead.Open(nil, nonce, trueCT, opts.AdditionalData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return plain, nil
}