1076cea5d1
because of mount max TTL constraint. This ups the mount max to force the test to work as expected.
1186 lines
34 KiB
Go
1186 lines
34 KiB
Go
package pki
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/certutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/errutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/parseutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/strutil"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical/framework"
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"github.com/ryanuber/go-glob"
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)
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type certExtKeyUsage int
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const (
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serverExtKeyUsage certExtKeyUsage = 1 << iota
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clientExtKeyUsage
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codeSigningExtKeyUsage
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emailProtectionExtKeyUsage
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)
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type creationBundle struct {
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CommonName string
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OU []string
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Organization []string
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DNSNames []string
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EmailAddresses []string
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IPAddresses []net.IP
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IsCA bool
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KeyType string
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KeyBits int
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SigningBundle *caInfoBundle
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NotAfter time.Time
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KeyUsage x509.KeyUsage
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ExtKeyUsage certExtKeyUsage
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// Only used when signing a CA cert
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UseCSRValues bool
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PermittedDNSDomains []string
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// URLs to encode into the certificate
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URLs *urlEntries
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// The maximum path length to encode
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MaxPathLength int
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}
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type caInfoBundle struct {
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certutil.ParsedCertBundle
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URLs *urlEntries
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}
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func (b *caInfoBundle) GetCAChain() []*certutil.CertBlock {
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chain := []*certutil.CertBlock{}
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// Include issuing CA in Chain, not including Root Authority
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if (len(b.Certificate.AuthorityKeyId) > 0 &&
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!bytes.Equal(b.Certificate.AuthorityKeyId, b.Certificate.SubjectKeyId)) ||
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(len(b.Certificate.AuthorityKeyId) == 0 &&
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!bytes.Equal(b.Certificate.RawIssuer, b.Certificate.RawSubject)) {
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chain = append(chain, &certutil.CertBlock{
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Certificate: b.Certificate,
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Bytes: b.CertificateBytes,
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})
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if b.CAChain != nil && len(b.CAChain) > 0 {
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chain = append(chain, b.CAChain...)
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}
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}
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return chain
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}
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var (
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hostnameRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(([a-zA-Z0-9]|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9\-]*[a-zA-Z0-9])\.)*([A-Za-z0-9]|[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9\-]*[A-Za-z0-9])$`)
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oidExtensionBasicConstraints = []int{2, 5, 29, 19}
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)
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func oidInExtensions(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier, extensions []pkix.Extension) bool {
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for _, e := range extensions {
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if e.Id.Equal(oid) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func getFormat(data *framework.FieldData) string {
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format := data.Get("format").(string)
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switch format {
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case "pem":
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case "der":
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case "pem_bundle":
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default:
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format = ""
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}
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return format
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}
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func validateKeyTypeLength(keyType string, keyBits int) *logical.Response {
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switch keyType {
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case "rsa":
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switch keyBits {
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case 2048:
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case 4096:
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case 8192:
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default:
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return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
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"unsupported bit length for RSA key: %d", keyBits))
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}
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case "ec":
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switch keyBits {
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case 224:
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case 256:
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case 384:
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case 521:
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default:
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return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
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"unsupported bit length for EC key: %d", keyBits))
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}
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default:
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return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf(
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"unknown key type %s", keyType))
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Fetches the CA info. Unlike other certificates, the CA info is stored
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// in the backend as a CertBundle, because we are storing its private key
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func fetchCAInfo(req *logical.Request) (*caInfoBundle, error) {
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bundleEntry, err := req.Storage.Get("config/ca_bundle")
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
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}
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if bundleEntry == nil {
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return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "backend must be configured with a CA certificate/key"}
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}
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var bundle certutil.CertBundle
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if err := bundleEntry.DecodeJSON(&bundle); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to decode local CA certificate/key: %v", err)}
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}
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parsedBundle, err := bundle.ToParsedCertBundle()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: err.Error()}
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}
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if parsedBundle.Certificate == nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: "stored CA information not able to be parsed"}
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}
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caInfo := &caInfoBundle{*parsedBundle, nil}
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entries, err := getURLs(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
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}
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if entries == nil {
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entries = &urlEntries{
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IssuingCertificates: []string{},
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CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
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OCSPServers: []string{},
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}
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}
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caInfo.URLs = entries
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return caInfo, nil
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}
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// Allows fetching certificates from the backend; it handles the slightly
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// separate pathing for CA, CRL, and revoked certificates.
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func fetchCertBySerial(req *logical.Request, prefix, serial string) (*logical.StorageEntry, error) {
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var path, legacyPath string
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var err error
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var certEntry *logical.StorageEntry
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hyphenSerial := normalizeSerial(serial)
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colonSerial := strings.Replace(strings.ToLower(serial), "-", ":", -1)
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switch {
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// Revoked goes first as otherwise ca/crl get hardcoded paths which fail if
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// we actually want revocation info
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case strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "revoked/"):
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legacyPath = "revoked/" + colonSerial
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path = "revoked/" + hyphenSerial
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case serial == "ca":
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path = "ca"
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case serial == "crl":
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path = "crl"
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default:
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legacyPath = "certs/" + colonSerial
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path = "certs/" + hyphenSerial
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}
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certEntry, err = req.Storage.Get(path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error fetching certificate %s: %s", serial, err)}
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}
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if certEntry != nil {
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if certEntry.Value == nil || len(certEntry.Value) == 0 {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("returned certificate bytes for serial %s were empty", serial)}
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}
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return certEntry, nil
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}
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// If legacyPath is unset, it's going to be a CA or CRL; return immediately
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if legacyPath == "" {
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return nil, nil
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}
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// Retrieve the old-style path
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certEntry, err = req.Storage.Get(legacyPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error fetching certificate %s: %s", serial, err)}
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}
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if certEntry == nil {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if certEntry.Value == nil || len(certEntry.Value) == 0 {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("returned certificate bytes for serial %s were empty", serial)}
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}
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// Update old-style paths to new-style paths
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certEntry.Key = path
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if err = req.Storage.Put(certEntry); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error saving certificate with serial %s to new location", serial)}
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}
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if err = req.Storage.Delete(legacyPath); err != nil {
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return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error deleting certificate with serial %s from old location", serial)}
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}
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return certEntry, nil
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}
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// Given a set of requested names for a certificate, verifies that all of them
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// match the various toggles set in the role for controlling issuance.
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// If one does not pass, it is returned in the string argument.
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func validateNames(req *logical.Request, names []string, role *roleEntry) string {
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for _, name := range names {
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sanitizedName := name
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emailDomain := name
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isEmail := false
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isWildcard := false
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// If it has an @, assume it is an email address and separate out the
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// user from the hostname portion so that we can act on the hostname.
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// Note that this matches behavior from the alt_names parameter. If it
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// ends up being problematic for users, I guess that could be separated
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// into dns_names and email_names in the future to be explicit, but I
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// don't think this is likely.
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if strings.Contains(name, "@") {
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splitEmail := strings.Split(name, "@")
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if len(splitEmail) != 2 {
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return name
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}
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sanitizedName = splitEmail[1]
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emailDomain = splitEmail[1]
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isEmail = true
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}
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// If we have an asterisk as the first part of the domain name, mark it
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// as wildcard and set the sanitized name to the remainder of the
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// domain
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if strings.HasPrefix(sanitizedName, "*.") {
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sanitizedName = sanitizedName[2:]
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isWildcard = true
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}
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|
// Email addresses using wildcard domain names do not make sense
|
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if isEmail && isWildcard {
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return name
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}
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// AllowAnyName is checked after this because EnforceHostnames still
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// applies when allowing any name. Also, we check the sanitized name to
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// ensure that we are not either checking a full email address or a
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// wildcard prefix.
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if role.EnforceHostnames {
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if !hostnameRegex.MatchString(sanitizedName) {
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return name
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}
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}
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|
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// Self-explanatory
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if role.AllowAnyName {
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continue
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}
|
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// The following blocks all work the same basic way:
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// 1) If a role allows a certain class of base (localhost, token
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// display name, role-configured domains), perform further tests
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//
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// 2) If there is a perfect match on either the name itself or it's an
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// email address with a perfect match on the hostname portion, allow it
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//
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// 3) If subdomains are allowed, we check based on the sanitized name;
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// note that if not a wildcard, will be equivalent to the email domain
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// for email checks, and we already checked above for both a wildcard
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// and email address being present in the same name
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// 3a) First we check for a non-wildcard subdomain, as in <name>.<base>
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// 3b) Then we check if it's a wildcard and the base domain is a match
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//
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// Variances are noted in-line
|
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|
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if role.AllowLocalhost {
|
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if name == "localhost" ||
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name == "localdomain" ||
|
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(isEmail && emailDomain == "localhost") ||
|
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(isEmail && emailDomain == "localdomain") {
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continue
|
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}
|
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|
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if role.AllowSubdomains {
|
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// It is possible, if unlikely, to have a subdomain of "localhost"
|
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localhost") ||
|
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(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localhost") {
|
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continue
|
|
}
|
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|
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// A subdomain of "localdomain" is also not entirely uncommon
|
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, ".localdomain") ||
|
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(isWildcard && sanitizedName == "localdomain") {
|
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continue
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
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|
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if role.AllowTokenDisplayName {
|
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if name == req.DisplayName {
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continue
|
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}
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|
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if role.AllowSubdomains {
|
|
if isEmail {
|
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// If it's an email address, we need to parse the token
|
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// display name in order to do a proper comparison of the
|
|
// subdomain
|
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if strings.Contains(req.DisplayName, "@") {
|
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splitDisplay := strings.Split(req.DisplayName, "@")
|
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if len(splitDisplay) == 2 {
|
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// Compare the sanitized name against the hostname
|
|
// portion of the email address in the roken
|
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// display name
|
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if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+splitDisplay[1]) {
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continue
|
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}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+req.DisplayName) ||
|
|
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == req.DisplayName) {
|
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continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
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if role.AllowedDomains != "" {
|
|
valid := false
|
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for _, currDomain := range strings.Split(role.AllowedDomains, ",") {
|
|
// If there is, say, a trailing comma, ignore it
|
|
if currDomain == "" {
|
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continue
|
|
}
|
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|
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// First, allow an exact match of the base domain if that role flag
|
|
// is enabled
|
|
if role.AllowBareDomains &&
|
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(name == currDomain ||
|
|
(isEmail && emailDomain == currDomain)) {
|
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valid = true
|
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break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if role.AllowSubdomains {
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(sanitizedName, "."+currDomain) ||
|
|
(isWildcard && sanitizedName == currDomain) {
|
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valid = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
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if role.AllowGlobDomains &&
|
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strings.Contains(currDomain, "*") &&
|
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glob.Glob(currDomain, name) {
|
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valid = true
|
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break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if valid {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//panic(fmt.Sprintf("\nName is %s\nRole is\n%#v\n", name, role))
|
|
return name
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func generateCert(b *backend,
|
|
role *roleEntry,
|
|
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
|
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isCA bool,
|
|
req *logical.Request,
|
|
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
|
|
if role.KeyType == "rsa" && role.KeyBits < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, nil, req, data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if isCA {
|
|
creationBundle.IsCA = isCA
|
|
|
|
creationBundle.PermittedDNSDomains = data.Get("permitted_dns_domains").([]string)
|
|
|
|
if signingBundle == nil {
|
|
// Generating a self-signed root certificate
|
|
entries, err := getURLs(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to fetch URL information: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if entries == nil {
|
|
entries = &urlEntries{
|
|
IssuingCertificates: []string{},
|
|
CRLDistributionPoints: []string{},
|
|
OCSPServers: []string{},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
creationBundle.URLs = entries
|
|
|
|
if role.MaxPathLength == nil {
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = -1
|
|
} else {
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = *role.MaxPathLength
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedBundle, err := createCertificate(creationBundle)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// N.B.: This is only meant to be used for generating intermediate CAs.
|
|
// It skips some sanity checks.
|
|
func generateIntermediateCSR(b *backend,
|
|
role *roleEntry,
|
|
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
|
|
req *logical.Request,
|
|
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCSRBundle, error) {
|
|
|
|
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, nil, req, data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedBundle, err := createCSR(creationBundle)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func signCert(b *backend,
|
|
role *roleEntry,
|
|
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
|
|
isCA bool,
|
|
useCSRValues bool,
|
|
req *logical.Request,
|
|
data *framework.FieldData) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
|
|
csrString := data.Get("csr").(string)
|
|
if csrString == "" {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("\"csr\" is empty")}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pemBytes := []byte(csrString)
|
|
pemBlock, pemBytes := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
|
|
if pemBlock == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "csr contains no data"}
|
|
}
|
|
csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(pemBlock.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("certificate request could not be parsed: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch role.KeyType {
|
|
case "rsa":
|
|
// Verify that the key matches the role type
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires keys of type %s",
|
|
role.KeyType)}
|
|
}
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the key is at least 2048 bits
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the bit size is at least the size specified in the role
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < role.KeyBits {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires a minimum of a %d-bit key, but CSR's key is %d bits",
|
|
role.KeyBits,
|
|
pubKey.N.BitLen())}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "ec":
|
|
// Verify that the key matches the role type
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.ECDSA {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires keys of type %s",
|
|
role.KeyType)}
|
|
}
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the bit size is at least the size specified in the role
|
|
if pubKey.Params().BitSize < role.KeyBits {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"role requires a minimum of a %d-bit key, but CSR's key is %d bits",
|
|
role.KeyBits,
|
|
pubKey.Params().BitSize)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "any":
|
|
// We only care about running RSA < 2048 bit checks, so if not RSA
|
|
// break out
|
|
if csr.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Run RSA < 2048 bit checks
|
|
pubKey, ok := csr.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "could not parse CSR's public key"}
|
|
}
|
|
if pubKey.N.BitLen() < 2048 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "RSA keys < 2048 bits are unsafe and not supported"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creationBundle, err := generateCreationBundle(b, role, signingBundle, csr, req, data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creationBundle.IsCA = isCA
|
|
creationBundle.UseCSRValues = useCSRValues
|
|
|
|
if isCA {
|
|
creationBundle.PermittedDNSDomains = data.Get("permitted_dns_domains").([]string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parsedBundle, err := signCertificate(creationBundle, csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return parsedBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// generateCreationBundle is a shared function that reads parameters supplied
|
|
// from the various endpoints and generates a creationBundle with the
|
|
// parameters that can be used to issue or sign
|
|
func generateCreationBundle(b *backend,
|
|
role *roleEntry,
|
|
signingBundle *caInfoBundle,
|
|
csr *x509.CertificateRequest,
|
|
req *logical.Request,
|
|
data *framework.FieldData) (*creationBundle, error) {
|
|
var err error
|
|
var ok bool
|
|
|
|
// Read in names -- CN, DNS and email addresses
|
|
var cn string
|
|
dnsNames := []string{}
|
|
emailAddresses := []string{}
|
|
{
|
|
if csr != nil && role.UseCSRCommonName {
|
|
cn = csr.Subject.CommonName
|
|
}
|
|
if cn == "" {
|
|
cn = data.Get("common_name").(string)
|
|
if cn == "" {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: `the common_name field is required, or must be provided in a CSR with "use_csr_common_name" set to true`}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if csr != nil && role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
dnsNames = csr.DNSNames
|
|
emailAddresses = csr.EmailAddresses
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !data.Get("exclude_cn_from_sans").(bool) {
|
|
if strings.Contains(cn, "@") {
|
|
// Note: emails are not disallowed if the role's email protection
|
|
// flag is false, because they may well be included for
|
|
// informational purposes; it is up to the verifying party to
|
|
// ensure that email addresses in a subject alternate name can be
|
|
// used for the purpose for which they are presented
|
|
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, cn)
|
|
} else {
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, cn)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if csr == nil || !role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
cnAltRaw, ok := data.GetOk("alt_names")
|
|
if ok {
|
|
cnAlt := strutil.ParseDedupLowercaseAndSortStrings(cnAltRaw.(string), ",")
|
|
for _, v := range cnAlt {
|
|
if strings.Contains(v, "@") {
|
|
emailAddresses = append(emailAddresses, v)
|
|
} else {
|
|
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the CN. This ensures that the CN is checked even if it's
|
|
// excluded from SANs.
|
|
badName := validateNames(req, []string{cn}, role)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"common name %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for bad email and/or DNS names
|
|
badName = validateNames(req, dnsNames, role)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"subject alternate name %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
badName = validateNames(req, emailAddresses, role)
|
|
if len(badName) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"email address %s not allowed by this role", badName)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get and verify any IP SANs
|
|
ipAddresses := []net.IP{}
|
|
var ipAltInt interface{}
|
|
{
|
|
if csr != nil && role.UseCSRSANs {
|
|
if len(csr.IPAddresses) > 0 {
|
|
if !role.AllowIPSANs {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"IP Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but was provided some via CSR")}
|
|
}
|
|
ipAddresses = csr.IPAddresses
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ipAltInt, ok = data.GetOk("ip_sans")
|
|
if ok {
|
|
ipAlt := ipAltInt.(string)
|
|
if len(ipAlt) != 0 {
|
|
if !role.AllowIPSANs {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"IP Subject Alternative Names are not allowed in this role, but was provided %s", ipAlt)}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, v := range strings.Split(ipAlt, ",") {
|
|
parsedIP := net.ParseIP(v)
|
|
if parsedIP == nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"the value '%s' is not a valid IP address", v)}
|
|
}
|
|
ipAddresses = append(ipAddresses, parsedIP)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set OU (organizationalUnit) values if specified in the role
|
|
ou := []string{}
|
|
{
|
|
if role.OU != "" {
|
|
ou = strutil.RemoveDuplicates(strutil.ParseStringSlice(role.OU, ","), false)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set O (organization) values if specified in the role
|
|
organization := []string{}
|
|
{
|
|
if role.Organization != "" {
|
|
organization = strutil.RemoveDuplicates(strutil.ParseStringSlice(role.Organization, ","), false)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the TTL and verify it against the max allowed
|
|
var ttl time.Duration
|
|
var maxTTL time.Duration
|
|
var notAfter time.Time
|
|
{
|
|
ttl = time.Duration(data.Get("ttl").(int)) * time.Second
|
|
|
|
if ttl == 0 {
|
|
if role.TTL != "" {
|
|
ttl, err = parseutil.ParseDurationSecond(role.TTL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"invalid role ttl: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if role.MaxTTL != "" {
|
|
maxTTL, err = parseutil.ParseDurationSecond(role.MaxTTL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"invalid role max_ttl: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ttl == 0 {
|
|
ttl = b.System().DefaultLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
if maxTTL == 0 {
|
|
maxTTL = b.System().MaxLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
if ttl > maxTTL {
|
|
ttl = maxTTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
notAfter = time.Now().Add(ttl)
|
|
|
|
// If it's not self-signed, verify that the issued certificate won't be
|
|
// valid past the lifetime of the CA certificate
|
|
if signingBundle != nil &&
|
|
notAfter.After(signingBundle.Certificate.NotAfter) && !role.AllowExpirationPastCA {
|
|
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: fmt.Sprintf(
|
|
"cannot satisfy request, as TTL is beyond the expiration of the CA certificate")}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build up usages
|
|
var extUsage certExtKeyUsage
|
|
{
|
|
if role.ServerFlag {
|
|
extUsage = extUsage | serverExtKeyUsage
|
|
}
|
|
if role.ClientFlag {
|
|
extUsage = extUsage | clientExtKeyUsage
|
|
}
|
|
if role.CodeSigningFlag {
|
|
extUsage = extUsage | codeSigningExtKeyUsage
|
|
}
|
|
if role.EmailProtectionFlag {
|
|
extUsage = extUsage | emailProtectionExtKeyUsage
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
creationBundle := &creationBundle{
|
|
CommonName: cn,
|
|
OU: ou,
|
|
Organization: organization,
|
|
DNSNames: dnsNames,
|
|
EmailAddresses: emailAddresses,
|
|
IPAddresses: ipAddresses,
|
|
KeyType: role.KeyType,
|
|
KeyBits: role.KeyBits,
|
|
SigningBundle: signingBundle,
|
|
NotAfter: notAfter,
|
|
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsage(parseKeyUsages(role.KeyUsage)),
|
|
ExtKeyUsage: extUsage,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't deal with URLs or max path length if it's self-signed, as these
|
|
// normally come from the signing bundle
|
|
if signingBundle == nil {
|
|
return creationBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This will have been read in from the getURLs function
|
|
creationBundle.URLs = signingBundle.URLs
|
|
|
|
// If the max path length in the role is not nil, it was specified at
|
|
// generation time with the max_path_length parameter; otherwise derive it
|
|
// from the signing certificate
|
|
if role.MaxPathLength != nil {
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = *role.MaxPathLength
|
|
} else {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen < 0:
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = -1
|
|
case signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen == 0 &&
|
|
signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLenZero:
|
|
// The signing function will ensure that we do not issue a CA cert
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = 0
|
|
default:
|
|
// If this takes it to zero, we handle this case later if
|
|
// necessary
|
|
creationBundle.MaxPathLength = signingBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen - 1
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return creationBundle, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addKeyUsages adds approrpiate key usages to the template given the creation
|
|
// information
|
|
func addKeyUsages(creationInfo *creationBundle, certTemplate *x509.Certificate) {
|
|
if creationInfo.IsCA {
|
|
certTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsage(x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.KeyUsage = creationInfo.KeyUsage
|
|
|
|
if creationInfo.ExtKeyUsage&serverExtKeyUsage != 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth)
|
|
}
|
|
if creationInfo.ExtKeyUsage&clientExtKeyUsage != 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth)
|
|
}
|
|
if creationInfo.ExtKeyUsage&codeSigningExtKeyUsage != 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageCodeSigning)
|
|
}
|
|
if creationInfo.ExtKeyUsage&emailProtectionExtKeyUsage != 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage = append(certTemplate.ExtKeyUsage, x509.ExtKeyUsageEmailProtection)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Performs the heavy lifting of creating a certificate. Returns
|
|
// a fully-filled-in ParsedCertBundle.
|
|
func createCertificate(creationInfo *creationBundle) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
var err error
|
|
result := &certutil.ParsedCertBundle{}
|
|
|
|
serialNumber, err := certutil.GenerateSerialNumber()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := certutil.GeneratePrivateKey(creationInfo.KeyType,
|
|
creationInfo.KeyBits,
|
|
result); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subjKeyID, err := certutil.GetSubjKeyID(result.PrivateKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error getting subject key ID: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subject := pkix.Name{
|
|
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
|
|
OrganizationalUnit: creationInfo.OU,
|
|
Organization: creationInfo.Organization,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
|
|
Subject: subject,
|
|
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second),
|
|
NotAfter: creationInfo.NotAfter,
|
|
IsCA: false,
|
|
SubjectKeyId: subjKeyID,
|
|
DNSNames: creationInfo.DNSNames,
|
|
EmailAddresses: creationInfo.EmailAddresses,
|
|
IPAddresses: creationInfo.IPAddresses,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add this before calling addKeyUsages
|
|
if creationInfo.SigningBundle == nil {
|
|
certTemplate.IsCA = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This will only be filled in from the generation paths
|
|
if len(creationInfo.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.PermittedDNSDomains = creationInfo.PermittedDNSDomains
|
|
certTemplate.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addKeyUsages(creationInfo, certTemplate)
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.IssuingCertificateURL = creationInfo.URLs.IssuingCertificates
|
|
certTemplate.CRLDistributionPoints = creationInfo.URLs.CRLDistributionPoints
|
|
certTemplate.OCSPServer = creationInfo.URLs.OCSPServers
|
|
|
|
var certBytes []byte
|
|
if creationInfo.SigningBundle != nil {
|
|
switch creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKeyType {
|
|
case certutil.RSAPrivateKey:
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
|
|
case certutil.ECPrivateKey:
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
caCert := creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
|
|
certTemplate.AuthorityKeyId = caCert.SubjectKeyId
|
|
|
|
err = checkPermittedDNSDomains(certTemplate, caCert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, caCert, result.PrivateKey.Public(), creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKey)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Creating a self-signed root
|
|
if creationInfo.MaxPathLength == 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = 0
|
|
certTemplate.MaxPathLenZero = true
|
|
} else {
|
|
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = creationInfo.MaxPathLength
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch creationInfo.KeyType {
|
|
case "rsa":
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
|
|
case "ec":
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.AuthorityKeyId = subjKeyID
|
|
certTemplate.BasicConstraintsValid = true
|
|
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, certTemplate, result.PrivateKey.Public(), result.PrivateKey)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result.CertificateBytes = certBytes
|
|
result.Certificate, err = x509.ParseCertificate(certBytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if creationInfo.SigningBundle != nil {
|
|
if len(creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.AuthorityKeyId) > 0 &&
|
|
!bytes.Equal(creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.AuthorityKeyId, creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.SubjectKeyId) {
|
|
|
|
result.CAChain = []*certutil.CertBlock{
|
|
&certutil.CertBlock{
|
|
Certificate: creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate,
|
|
Bytes: creationInfo.SigningBundle.CertificateBytes,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
result.CAChain = append(result.CAChain, creationInfo.SigningBundle.CAChain...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Creates a CSR. This is currently only meant for use when
|
|
// generating an intermediate certificate.
|
|
func createCSR(creationInfo *creationBundle) (*certutil.ParsedCSRBundle, error) {
|
|
var err error
|
|
result := &certutil.ParsedCSRBundle{}
|
|
|
|
if err := certutil.GeneratePrivateKey(creationInfo.KeyType,
|
|
creationInfo.KeyBits,
|
|
result); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Like many root CAs, other information is ignored
|
|
subject := pkix.Name{
|
|
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
csrTemplate := &x509.CertificateRequest{
|
|
Subject: subject,
|
|
DNSNames: creationInfo.DNSNames,
|
|
EmailAddresses: creationInfo.EmailAddresses,
|
|
IPAddresses: creationInfo.IPAddresses,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch creationInfo.KeyType {
|
|
case "rsa":
|
|
csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
|
|
case "ec":
|
|
csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
csr, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, csrTemplate, result.PrivateKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result.CSRBytes = csr
|
|
result.CSR, err = x509.ParseCertificateRequest(csr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Performs the heavy lifting of generating a certificate from a CSR.
|
|
// Returns a ParsedCertBundle sans private keys.
|
|
func signCertificate(creationInfo *creationBundle,
|
|
csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (*certutil.ParsedCertBundle, error) {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case creationInfo == nil:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "nil creation info given to signCertificate"}
|
|
case creationInfo.SigningBundle == nil:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "nil signing bundle given to signCertificate"}
|
|
case csr == nil:
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "nil csr given to signCertificate"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := csr.CheckSignature()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "request signature invalid"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result := &certutil.ParsedCertBundle{}
|
|
|
|
serialNumber, err := certutil.GenerateSerialNumber()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
marshaledKey, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(csr.PublicKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("error marshalling public key: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
subjKeyID := sha1.Sum(marshaledKey)
|
|
|
|
caCert := creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate
|
|
|
|
subject := pkix.Name{
|
|
CommonName: creationInfo.CommonName,
|
|
OrganizationalUnit: creationInfo.OU,
|
|
Organization: creationInfo.Organization,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: serialNumber,
|
|
Subject: subject,
|
|
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second),
|
|
NotAfter: creationInfo.NotAfter,
|
|
SubjectKeyId: subjKeyID[:],
|
|
AuthorityKeyId: caCert.SubjectKeyId,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKeyType {
|
|
case certutil.RSAPrivateKey:
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.SHA256WithRSA
|
|
case certutil.ECPrivateKey:
|
|
certTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if creationInfo.UseCSRValues {
|
|
certTemplate.Subject = csr.Subject
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.DNSNames = csr.DNSNames
|
|
certTemplate.EmailAddresses = csr.EmailAddresses
|
|
certTemplate.IPAddresses = csr.IPAddresses
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.ExtraExtensions = csr.Extensions
|
|
} else {
|
|
certTemplate.DNSNames = creationInfo.DNSNames
|
|
certTemplate.EmailAddresses = creationInfo.EmailAddresses
|
|
certTemplate.IPAddresses = creationInfo.IPAddresses
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addKeyUsages(creationInfo, certTemplate)
|
|
|
|
var certBytes []byte
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.IssuingCertificateURL = creationInfo.URLs.IssuingCertificates
|
|
certTemplate.CRLDistributionPoints = creationInfo.URLs.CRLDistributionPoints
|
|
certTemplate.OCSPServer = creationInfo.SigningBundle.URLs.OCSPServers
|
|
|
|
if creationInfo.IsCA {
|
|
certTemplate.BasicConstraintsValid = true
|
|
certTemplate.IsCA = true
|
|
|
|
if creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLen == 0 &&
|
|
creationInfo.SigningBundle.Certificate.MaxPathLenZero {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: "signing certificate has a max path length of zero, and cannot issue further CA certificates"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certTemplate.MaxPathLen = creationInfo.MaxPathLength
|
|
if certTemplate.MaxPathLen == 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.MaxPathLenZero = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(creationInfo.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 {
|
|
certTemplate.PermittedDNSDomains = creationInfo.PermittedDNSDomains
|
|
certTemplate.PermittedDNSDomainsCritical = true
|
|
}
|
|
err = checkPermittedDNSDomains(certTemplate, caCert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.UserError{Err: err.Error()}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certBytes, err = x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, caCert, csr.PublicKey, creationInfo.SigningBundle.PrivateKey)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to create certificate: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result.CertificateBytes = certBytes
|
|
result.Certificate, err = x509.ParseCertificate(certBytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, errutil.InternalError{Err: fmt.Sprintf("unable to parse created certificate: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result.CAChain = creationInfo.SigningBundle.GetCAChain()
|
|
|
|
return result, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func checkPermittedDNSDomains(template, ca *x509.Certificate) error {
|
|
if len(ca.PermittedDNSDomains) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
namesToCheck := map[string]struct{}{
|
|
template.Subject.CommonName: struct{}{},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, name := range template.DNSNames {
|
|
namesToCheck[name] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var badName string
|
|
NameCheck:
|
|
for name := range namesToCheck {
|
|
for _, perm := range ca.PermittedDNSDomains {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case strings.HasPrefix(perm, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(name, perm):
|
|
// .example.com matches my.host.example.com and
|
|
// host.example.com but does not match example.com
|
|
break NameCheck
|
|
case perm == name:
|
|
break NameCheck
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
badName = name
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if badName == "" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("name %q disallowed by CA's permitted DNS domains", badName)
|
|
}
|