79cb82e133
* Add logic for using Auth.Period when handling auth login/renew requests * Set auth.TTL if not set in handleLoginRequest * Always set auth.TTL = te.TTL on handleLoginRequest, check TTL and period against sys values on RenewToken * Get sysView from le.Path, revert tests * Add back auth.Policies * Fix TokenStore tests, add resp warning when capping values * Use switch for ttl/period check on RenewToken * Move comments around
548 lines
17 KiB
Go
548 lines
17 KiB
Go
package vault
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/armon/go-metrics"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/consts"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/policyutil"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/strutil"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/wrapping"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
replTimeout = 10 * time.Second
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// HandleRequest is used to handle a new incoming request
|
|
func (c *Core) HandleRequest(req *logical.Request) (resp *logical.Response, err error) {
|
|
c.stateLock.RLock()
|
|
defer c.stateLock.RUnlock()
|
|
if c.sealed {
|
|
return nil, consts.ErrSealed
|
|
}
|
|
if c.standby {
|
|
return nil, consts.ErrStandby
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Allowing writing to a path ending in / makes it extremely difficult to
|
|
// understand user intent for the filesystem-like backends (kv,
|
|
// cubbyhole) -- did they want a key named foo/ or did they want to write
|
|
// to a directory foo/ with no (or forgotten) key, or...? It also affects
|
|
// lookup, because paths ending in / are considered prefixes by some
|
|
// backends. Basically, it's all just terrible, so don't allow it.
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "/") &&
|
|
(req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation ||
|
|
req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation) {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse("cannot write to a path ending in '/'"), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var auth *logical.Auth
|
|
if c.router.LoginPath(req.Path) {
|
|
resp, auth, err = c.handleLoginRequest(req)
|
|
} else {
|
|
resp, auth, err = c.handleRequest(req)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure we don't leak internal data
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
if resp.Secret != nil {
|
|
resp.Secret.InternalData = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if resp.Auth != nil {
|
|
resp.Auth.InternalData = nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We are wrapping if there is anything to wrap (not a nil response) and a
|
|
// TTL was specified for the token. Errors on a call should be returned to
|
|
// the caller, so wrapping is turned off if an error is hit and the error
|
|
// is logged to the audit log.
|
|
wrapping := resp != nil &&
|
|
err == nil &&
|
|
!resp.IsError() &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo != nil &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo.TTL != 0 &&
|
|
resp.WrapInfo.Token == ""
|
|
|
|
if wrapping {
|
|
cubbyResp, cubbyErr := c.wrapInCubbyhole(req, resp, auth)
|
|
// If not successful, returns either an error response from the
|
|
// cubbyhole backend or an error; if either is set, set resp and err to
|
|
// those and continue so that that's what we audit log. Otherwise
|
|
// finish the wrapping and audit log that.
|
|
if cubbyResp != nil || cubbyErr != nil {
|
|
resp = cubbyResp
|
|
err = cubbyErr
|
|
} else {
|
|
wrappingResp := &logical.Response{
|
|
WrapInfo: resp.WrapInfo,
|
|
Warnings: resp.Warnings,
|
|
}
|
|
resp = wrappingResp
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auditResp := resp
|
|
// When unwrapping we want to log the actual response that will be written
|
|
// out. We still want to return the raw value to avoid automatic updating
|
|
// to any of it.
|
|
if req.Path == "sys/wrapping/unwrap" &&
|
|
resp != nil &&
|
|
resp.Data != nil &&
|
|
resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody] != nil {
|
|
|
|
// Decode the JSON
|
|
httpResp := &logical.HTTPResponse{}
|
|
err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody].([]byte), httpResp)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to unmarshal wrapped HTTP response for audit logging", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auditResp = logical.HTTPResponseToLogicalResponse(httpResp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the response
|
|
if auditErr := c.auditBroker.LogResponse(auth, req, auditResp, c.auditedHeaders, err); auditErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit response", "request_path", req.Path, "error", auditErr)
|
|
return nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Core) handleRequest(req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
|
|
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_request"}, time.Now())
|
|
|
|
// Validate the token
|
|
auth, te, ctErr := c.checkToken(req, false)
|
|
// We run this logic first because we want to decrement the use count even in the case of an error
|
|
if te != nil {
|
|
// Attempt to use the token (decrement NumUses)
|
|
var err error
|
|
te, err = c.tokenStore.UseToken(te)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to use token", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, nil, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if te == nil {
|
|
// Token has been revoked by this point
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied)
|
|
return nil, nil, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if te.NumUses == -1 {
|
|
// We defer a revocation until after logic has run, since this is a
|
|
// valid request (this is the token's final use). We pass the ID in
|
|
// directly just to be safe in case something else modifies te later.
|
|
defer func(id string) {
|
|
err = c.tokenStore.Revoke(id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to revoke token", "error", err)
|
|
retResp = nil
|
|
retAuth = nil
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
}
|
|
if retResp != nil && retResp.Secret != nil &&
|
|
// Some backends return a TTL even without a Lease ID
|
|
retResp.Secret.LeaseID != "" {
|
|
retResp = logical.ErrorResponse("Secret cannot be returned; token had one use left, so leased credentials were immediately revoked.")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}(te.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ctErr != nil {
|
|
// If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we
|
|
// return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct
|
|
errType := logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
switch ctErr {
|
|
case ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied:
|
|
errType = ctErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(auth, req, c.auditedHeaders, ctErr); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if errType != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType)
|
|
}
|
|
if ctErr == ErrInternalError {
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attach the display name
|
|
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
|
|
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the request
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(auth, req, c.auditedHeaders, nil); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Route the request
|
|
resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(req)
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
|
|
var wrapTTL time.Duration
|
|
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
|
|
var sealWrap bool
|
|
|
|
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
|
|
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case wrapTTL == 0:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If the wrap format hasn't been set by the response, set it to
|
|
// the request format
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
|
|
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if wrapTTL > 0 {
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
|
|
TTL: wrapTTL,
|
|
Format: wrapFormat,
|
|
CreationPath: creationPath,
|
|
SealWrap: sealWrap,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If there is a secret, we must register it with the expiration manager.
|
|
// We exclude renewal of a lease, since it does not need to be re-registered
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/renew") &&
|
|
!strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/leases/renew") {
|
|
// Get the SystemView for the mount
|
|
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path)
|
|
if sysView == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unable to retrieve system view from router")
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply the default lease if none given
|
|
if resp.Secret.TTL == 0 {
|
|
resp.Secret.TTL = sysView.DefaultLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Limit the lease duration
|
|
maxTTL := sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
|
|
if resp.Secret.TTL > maxTTL {
|
|
resp.Secret.TTL = maxTTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// KV mounts should return the TTL but not register
|
|
// for a lease as this provides a massive slowdown
|
|
registerLease := true
|
|
matchingBackend := c.router.MatchingBackend(req.Path)
|
|
if matchingBackend == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unable to retrieve kv backend from router")
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
if ptbe, ok := matchingBackend.(*PassthroughBackend); ok {
|
|
if !ptbe.GeneratesLeases() {
|
|
registerLease = false
|
|
resp.Secret.Renewable = false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if registerLease {
|
|
leaseID, err := c.expiration.Register(req, resp)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Secret.LeaseID = leaseID
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the request was to renew a token, and if there are group aliases set
|
|
// in the auth object, then the group memberships should be refreshed
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") &&
|
|
resp != nil &&
|
|
resp.Auth != nil &&
|
|
resp.Auth.EntityID != "" &&
|
|
resp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil {
|
|
err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to refresh external group memberships", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only the token store is allowed to return an auth block, for any
|
|
// other request this is an internal error. We exclude renewal of a token,
|
|
// since it does not need to be re-registered
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") {
|
|
if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected Auth response for non-token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Register with the expiration manager. We use the token's actual path
|
|
// here because roles allow suffixes.
|
|
te, err := c.tokenStore.Lookup(resp.Auth.ClientToken)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to look up token", "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(te.Path, resp.Auth); err != nil {
|
|
c.tokenStore.Revoke(te.ID)
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError)
|
|
return nil, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp != nil &&
|
|
req.Path == "cubbyhole/response" &&
|
|
len(te.Policies) == 1 &&
|
|
te.Policies[0] == responseWrappingPolicyName {
|
|
resp.AddWarning("Reading from 'cubbyhole/response' is deprecated. Please use sys/wrapping/unwrap to unwrap responses, as it provides additional security checks and other benefits.")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Return the response and error
|
|
if routeErr != nil {
|
|
retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, routeErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp, auth, retErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleLoginRequest is used to handle a login request, which is an
|
|
// unauthenticated request to the backend.
|
|
func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) {
|
|
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_login_request"}, time.Now())
|
|
|
|
req.Unauthenticated = true
|
|
|
|
var auth *logical.Auth
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the request, auth is not available on login requests
|
|
// Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned,
|
|
// e.g. if a token was provided.
|
|
if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(auth, req, c.auditedHeaders, nil); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token,
|
|
// so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here.
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected login request for token backend", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Route the request
|
|
resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(req)
|
|
if resp != nil {
|
|
// If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response
|
|
var wrapTTL time.Duration
|
|
var wrapFormat, creationPath string
|
|
var sealWrap bool
|
|
|
|
// Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath
|
|
sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case wrapTTL == 0:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL:
|
|
wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" {
|
|
wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if wrapTTL > 0 {
|
|
resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{
|
|
TTL: wrapTTL,
|
|
Format: wrapFormat,
|
|
CreationPath: creationPath,
|
|
SealWrap: sealWrap,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A login request should never return a secret!
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unexpected Secret response for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token
|
|
if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil {
|
|
var entity *identity.Entity
|
|
auth = resp.Auth
|
|
|
|
if auth.Alias != nil {
|
|
// Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias
|
|
// information
|
|
auth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType
|
|
auth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor
|
|
|
|
if auth.Alias.Name == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("missing name in alias")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
// Check if an entity already exists for the given alias
|
|
entity, err = c.identityStore.entityByAliasFactors(auth.Alias.MountAccessor, auth.Alias.Name, false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If not, create one.
|
|
if entity == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Debug("core: creating a new entity", "alias", auth.Alias)
|
|
entity, err = c.identityStore.CreateEntity(auth.Alias)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if entity == nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth.EntityID = entity.ID
|
|
if auth.GroupAliases != nil {
|
|
err = c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if strutil.StrListSubset(auth.Policies, []string{"root"}) {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse("authentication backends cannot create root tokens"), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine the source of the login
|
|
source := c.router.MatchingMount(req.Path)
|
|
source = strings.TrimPrefix(source, credentialRoutePrefix)
|
|
source = strings.Replace(source, "/", "-", -1)
|
|
|
|
// Prepend the source to the display name
|
|
auth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, "-")
|
|
|
|
sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path)
|
|
if sysView == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", req.Path)
|
|
return nil, nil, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Start off with the sys default value, and update according to period/TTL
|
|
// from resp.Auth
|
|
tokenTTL := sysView.DefaultLeaseTTL()
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case auth.Period > time.Duration(0):
|
|
// Cap the period value to the sys max_ttl value. The auth backend should
|
|
// have checked for it on its login path, but we check here again for
|
|
// sanity.
|
|
if auth.Period > sysView.MaxLeaseTTL() {
|
|
auth.Period = sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
tokenTTL = auth.Period
|
|
case auth.TTL > time.Duration(0):
|
|
// Cap the TTL value. The auth backend should have checked for it on its
|
|
// login path (e.g. a call to b.SanitizeTTL), but we check here again for
|
|
// sanity.
|
|
if auth.TTL > sysView.MaxLeaseTTL() {
|
|
auth.TTL = sysView.MaxLeaseTTL()
|
|
}
|
|
tokenTTL = auth.TTL
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate a token
|
|
te := TokenEntry{
|
|
Path: req.Path,
|
|
Policies: auth.Policies,
|
|
Meta: auth.Metadata,
|
|
DisplayName: auth.DisplayName,
|
|
CreationTime: time.Now().Unix(),
|
|
TTL: tokenTTL,
|
|
NumUses: auth.NumUses,
|
|
EntityID: auth.EntityID,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
te.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(te.Policies, true)
|
|
|
|
// Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens
|
|
for _, policy := range te.Policies {
|
|
if strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) {
|
|
return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("cannot assign policy %q", policy)), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := c.tokenStore.create(&te); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to create token", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, auth, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Populate the client token, accessor, and TTL
|
|
auth.ClientToken = te.ID
|
|
auth.Accessor = te.Accessor
|
|
auth.Policies = te.Policies
|
|
auth.TTL = te.TTL
|
|
|
|
// Register with the expiration manager
|
|
if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(te.Path, auth); err != nil {
|
|
c.tokenStore.Revoke(te.ID)
|
|
c.logger.Error("core: failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err)
|
|
return nil, auth, ErrInternalError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends
|
|
req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resp, auth, routeErr
|
|
}
|