--- layout: guides page_title: Seal Wrap / FIPS 140-2 - Guides sidebar_title: Seal Wrap / FIPS 140-2 description: 'In this guide,' --- # Seal Wrap / FIPS 140-2 ~> **Enterprise Only:** Vault's HSM auto-unseal and Seal Wrap features are a part of _Vault Enterprise_. **_Vault Enterprise_** integrates with [HSM platforms](/docs/enterprise/hsm) to opt-in automatic [unsealing](/docs/concepts/seal#unsealing). HSM integration provides three pieces of special functionality: - **Master Key Wrapping**: Vault protects its master key by transiting it through the HSM for encryption rather than splitting into key shares - **Automatic Unsealing**: Vault stores its encrypted master key in storage, allowing for automatic unsealing - **Seal Wrapping** to provide FIPS KeyStorage-conforming functionality for Critical Security Parameters ![Unseal with HSM](/img/vault-hsm-autounseal.png) In some large organizations, there is a fair amount of complexity in designating key officers, who might be available to unseal Vault installations as the most common pattern is to deploy Vault immutably. As such automating unseal using an HSM provides a simplified yet secure way of unsealing Vault nodes as they get deployed. Vault pulls its encrypted master key from storage and transit it through the HSM for decryption via **PKCS \#11 API**. Once the master key is decrypted, Vault uses the master key to decrypt the encryption key to resume with Vault operations. ## Reference Material - [HashiCorp + AWS: Integrating CloudHSM with Vault Enterprise](https://www.hashicorp.com/resources/hashicorp-and-aws-integrating-cloudhsm-with-vault-e) webinar - [Seal Wrap documentation](/docs/enterprise/sealwrap) - [Vault Configuration - pkcs11 Seal](/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11) - [Vault Enterprise HSM Support](/docs/enterprise/hsm) - [NIST SC-12: Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management](https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/control/SC-12) - [NIST SC-13: Cryptographic Protection](https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/control/SC-13) ## Estimated Time to Complete 10 minutes ## Challenge The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 is a U.S. Government computer security standard used to accredit cryptography modules. If your product or service does not follow FIPS' security requirements, it may complicate your ability to operate with U.S. Government data. Aside from doing business with U.S. government, your organization may care about FIPS which approves various cryptographic ciphers for hashing, signature, key exchange, and encryption for security. ## Solution Integrate Vault with FIPS 140-2 certified HSM and enable the **_Seal Wrap_** feature to protect your data. Vault encrypts secrets using 256-bit AES in GCM mode with a randomly generated nonce prior to writing them to its persistent storage. By enabling seal wrap, Vault wraps your secrets with **an extra layer of encryption** leveraging the HSM encryption and decryption. ![Seal Wrap](/img/vault-seal-wrap.png) #### Benefits of the Seal Wrap: - Conformance with FIPS 140-2 directives on Key Storage and Key Transport as [certified by Leidos](/docs/enterprise/sealwrap#fips-140-2-compliance) - Supports FIPS level of security equal to HSM - For example, if you use Level 3 hardware encryption on an HSM, Vault will be using FIPS 140-2 Level 3 cryptography - Allows Vault to be deployed in high security [GRC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governance,_risk_management,_and_compliance) environments (e.g. PCI-DSS, HIPAA) where FIPS guidelines important for external audits - Pathway for Vault's use in managing Department of Defense's (DOD) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military secrets ## Prerequisites This intermediate operations guide assumes that you have: - A [supported HSM](/docs/enterprise/hsm) cluster to be integrated with Vault - Vault Enterprise Premium ## Steps This guide walks you through the following steps: 1. [Configure HSM Auto-unseal](#step1) 1. [Enable Seal Wrap](#step2) 1. [Test the Seal Wrap Feature](#step3) ### Step 1: Configure HSM Auto-unseal ((#step1)) When a Vault server is started, it normally starts in a sealed state where a quorum of existing unseal keys is required to unseal it. By integrating Vault with HSM, your Vault server can be automatically unsealed by the trusted HSM key provider. #### Task 1: Write a Vault configuration file To integrate your Vault Enterprise server with an HSM cluster, the configuration file must define the [`PKCS11 seal` stanza](/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11) providing necessary connection information. **Example: `config-hsm.hcl`** ```shell # Provide your AWS CloudHSM cluster connection information seal "pkcs11" { lib = "/opt/cloudhsm/lib/libcloudhsm_pkcs11.so" slot = "1" pin = "vault:Password1" key_label = "hsm_demo" hmac_key_label = "hsm_hmac_demo" generate_key = "true" } # Configure the storage backend for Vault storage "file" { path = "/tmp/vault" } # Addresses and ports on which Vault will respond to requests listener "tcp" { address = "127.0.0.1:8200" tls_disable = 1 } ui = true ``` > **NOTE:** For the purpose of this guide, the storage backend is set to the > local file system (`/tmp/vault`) to make the verification step easy. The example configuration defines the following in its **`seal`** stanza: - **`lib`** is set to the path to the PKCS \#11 library on the virtual machine where Vault Enterprise is installed - **`slot`** should be set to the slot number to use - **`pin`** is the PKCS \#11 PIN for login - **`key_label`** defines the label of the key you want to use - **`hmac_key_label`** defines the label of the key you want to use for HMACing. (NOTE: HMAC is optional and only used for mechanisms that do not support authenticated data.) - **`generate_key`** is set to `true`. If no existing key with the label specified by `key_label` can be found at Vault initialization time, Vault generates a key ~> **IMPORTANT:** Having Vault generate its own key is the easiest way to get up and running, but for security, Vault marks the key as **non-exportable**. If your HSM key backup strategy requires the key to be exportable, you should generate the key yourself. Refer to the [key generation attributes](/docs/configuration/seal/pkcs11#vault-key-generation-attributes). #### Task 2: Initialize your Vault Enterprise server Start the Vault server with your Vault configuration file. For example, if your configuration file is located at `/home/ec2-user/config-hsm.hcl`, the command would look like: ```shell-session $ vault server -config=/home/ec2-user/config-hsm.hcl SDK Version: 2.03 ==> Vault server configuration: HSM PKCS#11 Version: 2.40 HSM Library: Cavium PKCS#11 Interface HSM Library Version: 1.0 HSM Manufacturer ID: Cavium Networks HSM Type: pkcs11 Cgo: enabled Listener 1: tcp (addr: "127.0.0.1:8200", cluster address: "127.0.0.1:8201", tls: "disabled") Log Level: info Mlock: supported: true, enabled: false Storage: file Version: Vault v0.10.1+ent.hsm Version Sha: 0e628142d6b6e5cabfdb9680a6d669d38f15574f ==> Vault server started! Log data will stream in below: ``` In another terminal, set the `VAULT_ADDR` environment variable, and [initialize](/intro/getting-started/deploy#initializing-the-vault) your Vault server. **Example:** ```shell # Set the VAULT_ADDR environment variable $ export VAULT_ADDR="http://127.0.0.1:8200" # Initialize Vault $ vault operator init Recovery Key 1: 2bU2wOfmyMqYcsEYo4Mo9q4s/KAODgHHjcmZmFOo+XY= Initial Root Token: 8d726c6b-98ba-893f-23d5-be3d2fec480e Success! Vault is initialized Recovery key initialized with 1 key shares and a key threshold of 1. Please securely distribute the key shares printed above. ``` There is only a single master key created which is encrypted by the HSM using PKCS \#11, and then placed in the storage. When Vault needs to be unsealed, it grabs the HSM encrypted master key from the storage, round trips it through the HSM to decrypt the master key. ~> **NOTE:** When Vault is initialized while using an HSM, rather than unseal keys being returned to the operator, **recovery keys** are returned. These are generated from an internal recovery key that is [split via Shamir's Secret Sharing](/docs/enterprise/hsm/behavior#initialization), similar to Vault's treatment of unseal keys when running without an HSM. Some Vault operations such as generation of a root token require these recovery keys. Login to the Vault using the generated root token to verify. ```shell-session $ vault login 8d726c6b-98ba-893f-23d5-be3d2fec480e ``` #### Task 3: Verification Stop and restart the Vault server and then verify its status: ```shell-session $ vault status Key Value --- ----- Recovery Seal Type shamir Sealed false Total Recovery Shares 1 Threshold 1 Version 0.10.1+ent.hsm Cluster Name vault-cluster-80556565 Cluster ID 40316cdd-3d42-ec36-e7b0-6a7a0684568c HA Enabled false ``` The `Sealed` status is **`false`** which means that the Vault was automatically unsealed upon its start. You can proceed with Vault operations. ### Step 2: Enable Seal Wrap ((#step2)) -> **NOTE:** For FIPS 140-2 compliance, seal wrap requires FIPS 140-2 Certified HSM which is supported by _Vault Enterprise Premium_. For some values, seal wrapping is **always enabled** including the recovery key, any stored key shares, the master key, the keyring, and more. When working with the key/value secret engine, you can enable seal wrap to wrap all data. ### CLI command Check the enabled secret engines. ```shell-session $ vault secrets list -format=json { ... "secret/": { "type": "kv", "description": "key/value secret storage", "accessor": "kv_75820543", "config": { "default_lease_ttl": 0, "max_lease_ttl": 0, "force_no_cache": false }, "options": { "version": "1" }, "local": false, "seal_wrap": false }, ... ``` Notice that the `seal_wrap` parameter is set to **`false`**. > For the purpose of comparing seal wrapped data against unwrapped data, enable > additional key/value secret engine at the `secret2/` path. ```shell # Pass the '-seal-wrap' flag when you enable the KV workflow $ vault secrets enable -path=secret2/ -version=1 -seal-wrap kv ``` The above command enabled [key/value version 1](/docs/secrets/kv/kv-v1) with seal wrap feature enabled. ```shell-session $ vault secrets list -format=json { ... "secret2/": { "type": "kv", "description": "", "accessor": "kv_bdd74241", "config": { "default_lease_ttl": 0, "max_lease_ttl": 0, "force_no_cache": false }, "options": { "version": "1" }, "local": false, "seal_wrap": true }, ... ``` Notice that the `seal_wrap` parameter is set to **`true`** at `secret2/`. #### API call using cURL Check the enabled secret engines. ```shell-session $ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: ..." \ http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/mounts | jq ... "secret/": { "accessor": "kv_f05b8b9c", "config": { "default_lease_ttl": 0, "force_no_cache": false, "max_lease_ttl": 0 }, "description": "key/value secret storage", "local": false, "options": { "version": "2" }, "seal_wrap": false, "type": "kv" }, ... ``` Notice that the `seal_wrap` parameter is set to **`false`**. > For the purpose of comparing seal wrapped data against unwrapped data, enable > additional key/value secret engine at the `secret2/` path. ```shell # Set the seal_wrap parameter to true in the request payload $ tee payload.json < For the purpose of comparing seal wrapped data against unwrapped data, enable > additional key/value secret engine at the `secret2/` path. Select **Enable new engine**. - Enter **`secret2`** in the path field - Select **Version 1** for KV version - Select the check box for **Seal Wrap** ![Enable Secret Engine](/img/vault-seal-wrap-3.png) Click **Enable Engine**. ### Step 3: Test the Seal Wrap Feature ((#step3)) In this step, you are going to: 1. Write some test data 1. [View the encrypted secrets](#view-the-encrypted-secrets) #### CLI command Write a secret at `secret/unwrapped`. ```shell # Write a key named 'password' with its value 'my-long-password' $ vault kv put secret/unwrapped password="my-long-password" # Read the path to verify $ vault kv get secret/unwrapped ====== Data ====== Key Value --- ----- password my-long-password ``` Write the same secret at `secret2/wrapped`. ```shell # Write a key named 'password' with its value 'my-long-password' $ vault kv put secret2/wrapped password="my-long-password" # Read the path to verify $ vault kv get secret2/wrapped ====== Data ====== Key Value --- ----- password my-long-password ``` Using a valid token, you can write and read secrets the same way regardless of the seal wrap. #### API call using cURL Write a secret at `secret/unwrapped`. ```shell # Create a payload $ tee payload.json <