package http import ( "bytes" "context" "encoding/json" "errors" "fmt" "io" "io/fs" "io/ioutil" "mime" "net" "net/http" "net/http/pprof" "net/textproto" "net/url" "os" "regexp" "strings" "time" "github.com/NYTimes/gziphandler" "github.com/hashicorp/errwrap" "github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp" "github.com/hashicorp/go-secure-stdlib/parseutil" "github.com/hashicorp/go-sockaddr" "github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/namespace" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/internalshared/configutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/consts" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/jsonutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/pathmanager" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/vault" ) const ( // WrapTTLHeaderName is the name of the header containing a directive to // wrap the response WrapTTLHeaderName = "X-Vault-Wrap-TTL" // WrapFormatHeaderName is the name of the header containing the format to // wrap in; has no effect if the wrap TTL is not set WrapFormatHeaderName = "X-Vault-Wrap-Format" // NoRequestForwardingHeaderName is the name of the header telling Vault // not to use request forwarding NoRequestForwardingHeaderName = "X-Vault-No-Request-Forwarding" // MFAHeaderName represents the HTTP header which carries the credentials // required to perform MFA on any path. MFAHeaderName = "X-Vault-MFA" // canonicalMFAHeaderName is the MFA header value's format in the request // headers. Do not alter the casing of this string. canonicalMFAHeaderName = "X-Vault-Mfa" // PolicyOverrideHeaderName is the header set to request overriding // soft-mandatory Sentinel policies. PolicyOverrideHeaderName = "X-Vault-Policy-Override" VaultIndexHeaderName = "X-Vault-Index" VaultInconsistentHeaderName = "X-Vault-Inconsistent" VaultForwardHeaderName = "X-Vault-Forward" VaultInconsistentForward = "forward-active-node" VaultInconsistentFail = "fail" // DefaultMaxRequestSize is the default maximum accepted request size. This // is to prevent a denial of service attack where no Content-Length is // provided and the server is fed ever more data until it exhausts memory. // Can be overridden per listener. DefaultMaxRequestSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024 ) var ( // Set to false by stub_asset if the ui build tag isn't enabled uiBuiltIn = true // perfStandbyAlwaysForwardPaths is used to check a requested path against // the always forward list perfStandbyAlwaysForwardPaths = pathmanager.New() alwaysRedirectPaths = pathmanager.New() injectDataIntoTopRoutes = []string{ "/v1/sys/audit", "/v1/sys/audit/", "/v1/sys/audit-hash/", "/v1/sys/auth", "/v1/sys/auth/", "/v1/sys/config/cors", "/v1/sys/config/auditing/request-headers/", "/v1/sys/config/auditing/request-headers", "/v1/sys/capabilities", "/v1/sys/capabilities-accessor", "/v1/sys/capabilities-self", "/v1/sys/ha-status", "/v1/sys/key-status", "/v1/sys/mounts", "/v1/sys/mounts/", "/v1/sys/policy", "/v1/sys/policy/", "/v1/sys/rekey/backup", "/v1/sys/rekey/recovery-key-backup", "/v1/sys/remount", "/v1/sys/rotate", "/v1/sys/wrapping/wrap", } oidcProtectedPathRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^identity/oidc/provider/\w(([\w-.]+)?\w)?/userinfo$`) ) func init() { alwaysRedirectPaths.AddPaths([]string{ "sys/storage/raft/snapshot", "sys/storage/raft/snapshot-force", "!sys/storage/raft/snapshot-auto/config", }) } // Handler returns an http.Handler for the API. This can be used on // its own to mount the Vault API within another web server. func Handler(props *vault.HandlerProperties) http.Handler { core := props.Core // Create the muxer to handle the actual endpoints mux := http.NewServeMux() switch { case props.RecoveryMode: raw := vault.NewRawBackend(core) strategy := vault.GenerateRecoveryTokenStrategy(props.RecoveryToken) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/raw/", handleLogicalRecovery(raw, props.RecoveryToken)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/generate-recovery-token/attempt", handleSysGenerateRootAttempt(core, strategy)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/generate-recovery-token/update", handleSysGenerateRootUpdate(core, strategy)) default: // Handle non-forwarded paths mux.Handle("/v1/sys/config/state/", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/host-info", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/init", handleSysInit(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/seal-status", handleSysSealStatus(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/seal", handleSysSeal(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/step-down", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysStepDown(core))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/unseal", handleSysUnseal(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/leader", handleSysLeader(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/health", handleSysHealth(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/monitor", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/generate-root/attempt", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleAuditNonLogical(core, handleSysGenerateRootAttempt(core, vault.GenerateStandardRootTokenStrategy)))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/generate-root/update", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleAuditNonLogical(core, handleSysGenerateRootUpdate(core, vault.GenerateStandardRootTokenStrategy)))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey/init", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyInit(core, false))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey/update", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyUpdate(core, false))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey/verify", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyVerify(core, false))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey-recovery-key/init", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyInit(core, true))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey-recovery-key/update", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyUpdate(core, true))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/rekey-recovery-key/verify", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleSysRekeyVerify(core, true))) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/storage/raft/bootstrap", handleSysRaftBootstrap(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/storage/raft/join", handleSysRaftJoin(core)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/internal/ui/feature-flags", handleSysInternalFeatureFlags(core)) for _, path := range injectDataIntoTopRoutes { mux.Handle(path, handleRequestForwarding(core, handleLogicalWithInjector(core))) } mux.Handle("/v1/sys/", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleLogical(core))) mux.Handle("/v1/", handleRequestForwarding(core, handleLogical(core))) if core.UIEnabled() { if uiBuiltIn { mux.Handle("/ui/", http.StripPrefix("/ui/", gziphandler.GzipHandler(handleUIHeaders(core, handleUI(http.FileServer(&UIAssetWrapper{FileSystem: assetFS()})))))) mux.Handle("/robots.txt", gziphandler.GzipHandler(handleUIHeaders(core, handleUI(http.FileServer(&UIAssetWrapper{FileSystem: assetFS()}))))) } else { mux.Handle("/ui/", handleUIHeaders(core, handleUIStub())) } mux.Handle("/ui", handleUIRedirect()) mux.Handle("/", handleUIRedirect()) } // Register metrics path without authentication if enabled if props.ListenerConfig != nil && props.ListenerConfig.Telemetry.UnauthenticatedMetricsAccess { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/metrics", handleMetricsUnauthenticated(core)) } else { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/metrics", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) } if props.ListenerConfig != nil && props.ListenerConfig.Profiling.UnauthenticatedPProfAccess { for _, name := range []string{"goroutine", "threadcreate", "heap", "allocs", "block", "mutex"} { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/"+name, pprof.Handler(name)) } mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/", http.HandlerFunc(pprof.Index)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/cmdline", http.HandlerFunc(pprof.Cmdline)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/profile", http.HandlerFunc(pprof.Profile)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/symbol", http.HandlerFunc(pprof.Symbol)) mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/trace", http.HandlerFunc(pprof.Trace)) } else { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/pprof/", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) } if props.ListenerConfig != nil && props.ListenerConfig.InFlightRequestLogging.UnauthenticatedInFlightAccess { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/in-flight-req", handleUnAuthenticatedInFlightRequest(core)) } else { mux.Handle("/v1/sys/in-flight-req", handleLogicalNoForward(core)) } additionalRoutes(mux, core) } // Wrap the handler in another handler to trigger all help paths. helpWrappedHandler := wrapHelpHandler(mux, core) corsWrappedHandler := wrapCORSHandler(helpWrappedHandler, core) quotaWrappedHandler := rateLimitQuotaWrapping(corsWrappedHandler, core) genericWrappedHandler := genericWrapping(core, quotaWrappedHandler, props) // Wrap the handler with PrintablePathCheckHandler to check for non-printable // characters in the request path. printablePathCheckHandler := genericWrappedHandler if !props.DisablePrintableCheck { printablePathCheckHandler = cleanhttp.PrintablePathCheckHandler(genericWrappedHandler, nil) } return printablePathCheckHandler } type copyResponseWriter struct { wrapped http.ResponseWriter statusCode int body *bytes.Buffer } // newCopyResponseWriter returns an initialized newCopyResponseWriter func newCopyResponseWriter(wrapped http.ResponseWriter) *copyResponseWriter { w := ©ResponseWriter{ wrapped: wrapped, body: new(bytes.Buffer), statusCode: 200, } return w } func (w *copyResponseWriter) Header() http.Header { return w.wrapped.Header() } func (w *copyResponseWriter) Write(buf []byte) (int, error) { w.body.Write(buf) return w.wrapped.Write(buf) } func (w *copyResponseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) { w.statusCode = code w.wrapped.WriteHeader(code) } func handleAuditNonLogical(core *vault.Core, h http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { origBody := new(bytes.Buffer) reader := ioutil.NopCloser(io.TeeReader(r.Body, origBody)) r.Body = reader req, _, status, err := buildLogicalRequestNoAuth(core.PerfStandby(), w, r) if err != nil || status != 0 { respondError(w, status, err) return } if origBody != nil { r.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(origBody) } input := &logical.LogInput{ Request: req, } err = core.AuditLogger().AuditRequest(r.Context(), input) if err != nil { respondError(w, status, err) return } cw := newCopyResponseWriter(w) h.ServeHTTP(cw, r) data := make(map[string]interface{}) err = jsonutil.DecodeJSON(cw.body.Bytes(), &data) if err != nil { // best effort, ignore } httpResp := &logical.HTTPResponse{Data: data, Headers: cw.Header()} input.Response = logical.HTTPResponseToLogicalResponse(httpResp) err = core.AuditLogger().AuditResponse(r.Context(), input) if err != nil { respondError(w, status, err) } return }) } // wrapGenericHandler wraps the handler with an extra layer of handler where // tasks that should be commonly handled for all the requests and/or responses // are performed. func wrapGenericHandler(core *vault.Core, h http.Handler, props *vault.HandlerProperties) http.Handler { var maxRequestDuration time.Duration var maxRequestSize int64 if props.ListenerConfig != nil { maxRequestDuration = props.ListenerConfig.MaxRequestDuration maxRequestSize = props.ListenerConfig.MaxRequestSize } if maxRequestDuration == 0 { maxRequestDuration = vault.DefaultMaxRequestDuration } if maxRequestSize == 0 { maxRequestSize = DefaultMaxRequestSize } // Swallow this error since we don't want to pollute the logs and we also don't want to // return an HTTP error here. This information is best effort. hostname, _ := os.Hostname() return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // This block needs to be here so that upon sending SIGHUP, custom response // headers are also reloaded into the handlers. var customHeaders map[string][]*logical.CustomHeader if props.ListenerConfig != nil { la := props.ListenerConfig.Address listenerCustomHeaders := core.GetListenerCustomResponseHeaders(la) if listenerCustomHeaders != nil { customHeaders = listenerCustomHeaders.StatusCodeHeaderMap } } // saving start time for the in-flight requests inFlightReqStartTime := time.Now() nw := logical.NewStatusHeaderResponseWriter(w, customHeaders) // Set the Cache-Control header for all the responses returned // by Vault nw.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store") // Start with the request context ctx := r.Context() var cancelFunc context.CancelFunc // Add our timeout, but not for the monitor endpoint, as it's streaming if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "sys/monitor") { ctx, cancelFunc = context.WithCancel(ctx) } else { ctx, cancelFunc = context.WithTimeout(ctx, maxRequestDuration) } // if maxRequestSize < 0, no need to set context value // Add a size limiter if desired if maxRequestSize > 0 { ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "max_request_size", maxRequestSize) } ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, "original_request_path", r.URL.Path) r = r.WithContext(ctx) r = r.WithContext(namespace.ContextWithNamespace(r.Context(), namespace.RootNamespace)) // Set some response headers with raft node id (if applicable) and hostname, if available if core.RaftNodeIDHeaderEnabled() { nodeID := core.GetRaftNodeID() if nodeID != "" { nw.Header().Set("X-Vault-Raft-Node-ID", nodeID) } } if core.HostnameHeaderEnabled() && hostname != "" { nw.Header().Set("X-Vault-Hostname", hostname) } switch { case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/v1/"): newR, status := adjustRequest(core, r) if status != 0 { respondError(nw, status, nil) cancelFunc() return } r = newR case strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/ui"), r.URL.Path == "/robots.txt", r.URL.Path == "/": default: respondError(nw, http.StatusNotFound, nil) cancelFunc() return } // The uuid for the request is going to be generated when a logical // request is generated. But, here we generate one to be able to track // in-flight requests, and use that to update the req data with clientID inFlightReqID, err := uuid.GenerateUUID() if err != nil { respondError(nw, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate an identifier for the in-flight request")) } // adding an entry to the context to enable updating in-flight // data with ClientID in the logical layer r = r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), logical.CtxKeyInFlightRequestID{}, inFlightReqID)) // extracting the client address to be included in the in-flight request var clientAddr string headers := r.Header[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")] if len(headers) == 0 { clientAddr = r.RemoteAddr } else { clientAddr = headers[0] } // getting the request method requestMethod := r.Method // Storing the in-flight requests. Path should include namespace as well core.StoreInFlightReqData( inFlightReqID, vault.InFlightReqData{ StartTime: inFlightReqStartTime, ReqPath: r.URL.Path, ClientRemoteAddr: clientAddr, Method: requestMethod, }) defer func() { // Not expecting this fail, so skipping the assertion check core.FinalizeInFlightReqData(inFlightReqID, nw.StatusCode) }() // Setting the namespace in the header to be included in the error message ns := r.Header.Get(consts.NamespaceHeaderName) if ns != "" { nw.Header().Set(consts.NamespaceHeaderName, ns) } h.ServeHTTP(nw, r) cancelFunc() return }) } func WrapForwardedForHandler(h http.Handler, l *configutil.Listener) http.Handler { rejectNotPresent := l.XForwardedForRejectNotPresent hopSkips := l.XForwardedForHopSkips authorizedAddrs := l.XForwardedForAuthorizedAddrs rejectNotAuthz := l.XForwardedForRejectNotAuthorized return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { headers, headersOK := r.Header[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")] if !headersOK || len(headers) == 0 { if !rejectNotPresent { h.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("missing x-forwarded-for header and configured to reject when not present")) return } host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) if err != nil { // If not rejecting treat it like we just don't have a valid // header because we can't do a comparison against an address we // can't understand if !rejectNotPresent { h.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("error parsing client hostport: %w", err)) return } addr, err := sockaddr.NewIPAddr(host) if err != nil { // We treat this the same as the case above if !rejectNotPresent { h.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("error parsing client address: %w", err)) return } var found bool for _, authz := range authorizedAddrs { if authz.Contains(addr) { found = true break } } if !found { // If we didn't find it and aren't configured to reject, simply // don't trust it if !rejectNotAuthz { h.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("client address not authorized for x-forwarded-for and configured to reject connection")) return } // At this point we have at least one value and it's authorized // Split comma separated ones, which are common. This brings it in line // to the multiple-header case. var acc []string for _, header := range headers { vals := strings.Split(header, ",") for _, v := range vals { acc = append(acc, strings.TrimSpace(v)) } } indexToUse := int64(len(acc)) - 1 - hopSkips if indexToUse < 0 { // This is likely an error in either configuration or other // infrastructure. We could either deny the request, or we // could simply not trust the value. Denying the request is // "safer" since if this logic is configured at all there may // be an assumption it can always be trusted. Given that we can // deny accepting the request at all if it's not from an // authorized address, if we're at this point the address is // authorized (or we've turned off explicit rejection) and we // should assume that what comes in should be properly // formatted. respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Errorf("malformed x-forwarded-for configuration or request, hops to skip (%d) would skip before earliest chain link (chain length %d)", hopSkips, len(headers))) return } r.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(acc[indexToUse], port) h.ServeHTTP(w, r) return }) } // stripPrefix is a helper to strip a prefix from the path. It will // return false from the second return value if it the prefix doesn't exist. func stripPrefix(prefix, path string) (string, bool) { if !strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix) { return "", false } path = path[len(prefix):] if path == "" { return "", false } return path, true } func handleUIHeaders(core *vault.Core, h http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { header := w.Header() userHeaders, err := core.UIHeaders() if err != nil { respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err) return } if userHeaders != nil { for k := range userHeaders { v := userHeaders.Get(k) header.Set(k, v) } } h.ServeHTTP(w, req) }) } func handleUI(h http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { // The fileserver handler strips trailing slashes and does a redirect. // We don't want the redirect to happen so we preemptively trim the slash // here. req.URL.Path = strings.TrimSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/") h.ServeHTTP(w, req) return }) } func handleUIStub() http.Handler { stubHTML := `

Vault UI is not available in this binary.

To get Vault UI do one of the following:

` return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { w.Write([]byte(stubHTML)) }) } func handleUIRedirect() http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { http.Redirect(w, req, "/ui/", 307) return }) } type UIAssetWrapper struct { FileSystem http.FileSystem } func (fsw *UIAssetWrapper) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { file, err := fsw.FileSystem.Open(name) if err == nil { return file, nil } // serve index.html instead of 404ing if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) { file, err := fsw.FileSystem.Open("index.html") return file, err } return nil, err } func parseQuery(values url.Values) map[string]interface{} { data := map[string]interface{}{} for k, v := range values { // Skip the help key as this is a reserved parameter if k == "help" { continue } switch { case len(v) == 0: case len(v) == 1: data[k] = v[0] default: data[k] = v } } if len(data) > 0 { return data } return nil } func parseJSONRequest(perfStandby bool, r *http.Request, w http.ResponseWriter, out interface{}) (io.ReadCloser, error) { // Limit the maximum number of bytes to MaxRequestSize to protect // against an indefinite amount of data being read. reader := r.Body ctx := r.Context() maxRequestSize := ctx.Value("max_request_size") if maxRequestSize != nil { max, ok := maxRequestSize.(int64) if !ok { return nil, errors.New("could not parse max_request_size from request context") } if max > 0 { // MaxBytesReader won't do all the internal stuff it must unless it's // given a ResponseWriter that implements the internal http interface // requestTooLarger. So we let it have access to the underlying // ResponseWriter. inw := w if myw, ok := inw.(logical.WrappingResponseWriter); ok { inw = myw.Wrapped() } reader = http.MaxBytesReader(inw, r.Body, max) } } var origBody io.ReadWriter if perfStandby { // Since we're checking PerfStandby here we key on origBody being nil // or not later, so we need to always allocate so it's non-nil origBody = new(bytes.Buffer) reader = ioutil.NopCloser(io.TeeReader(reader, origBody)) } err := jsonutil.DecodeJSONFromReader(reader, out) if err != nil && err != io.EOF { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse JSON input: %w", err) } if origBody != nil { return ioutil.NopCloser(origBody), err } return nil, err } // parseFormRequest parses values from a form POST. // // A nil map will be returned if the format is empty or invalid. func parseFormRequest(r *http.Request) (map[string]interface{}, error) { maxRequestSize := r.Context().Value("max_request_size") if maxRequestSize != nil { max, ok := maxRequestSize.(int64) if !ok { return nil, errors.New("could not parse max_request_size from request context") } if max > 0 { r.Body = ioutil.NopCloser(io.LimitReader(r.Body, max)) } } if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil { return nil, err } var data map[string]interface{} if len(r.PostForm) != 0 { data = make(map[string]interface{}, len(r.PostForm)) for k, v := range r.PostForm { switch len(v) { case 0: case 1: data[k] = v[0] default: // Almost anywhere taking in a string list can take in comma // separated values, and really this is super niche anyways data[k] = strings.Join(v, ",") } } } return data, nil } // forwardBasedOnHeaders returns true if the request headers specify that // we should forward to the active node - either unconditionally or because // a specified state isn't present locally. func forwardBasedOnHeaders(core *vault.Core, r *http.Request) (bool, error) { rawForward := r.Header.Get(VaultForwardHeaderName) if rawForward != "" { if !core.AllowForwardingViaHeader() { return false, fmt.Errorf("forwarding via header %s disabled in configuration", VaultForwardHeaderName) } if rawForward == "active-node" { return true, nil } return false, nil } rawInconsistent := r.Header.Get(VaultInconsistentHeaderName) if rawInconsistent == "" { return false, nil } switch rawInconsistent { case VaultInconsistentForward: if !core.AllowForwardingViaHeader() { return false, fmt.Errorf("forwarding via header %s=%s disabled in configuration", VaultInconsistentHeaderName, VaultInconsistentForward) } default: return false, nil } return core.MissingRequiredState(r.Header.Values(VaultIndexHeaderName), core.PerfStandby()), nil } // handleRequestForwarding determines whether to forward a request or not, // falling back on the older behavior of redirecting the client func handleRequestForwarding(core *vault.Core, handler http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // Note if the client requested forwarding shouldForward, err := forwardBasedOnHeaders(core, r) if err != nil { respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err) return } // If we are a performance standby we can maybe handle the request. if core.PerfStandby() && !shouldForward { ns, err := namespace.FromContext(r.Context()) if err != nil { respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err) return } path := ns.TrimmedPath(r.URL.Path[len("/v1/"):]) switch { case !perfStandbyAlwaysForwardPaths.HasPath(path) && !alwaysRedirectPaths.HasPath(path): handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) return case strings.HasPrefix(path, "auth/token/create/"): isBatch, err := core.IsBatchTokenCreationRequest(r.Context(), path) if err == nil && isBatch { handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } } } // Note: in an HA setup, this call will also ensure that connections to // the leader are set up, as that happens once the advertised cluster // values are read during this function isLeader, leaderAddr, _, err := core.Leader() if err != nil { if err == vault.ErrHANotEnabled { // Standalone node, serve request normally handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } // Some internal error occurred respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err) return } if isLeader { // No forwarding needed, we're leader handler.ServeHTTP(w, r) return } if leaderAddr == "" { respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, fmt.Errorf("local node not active but active cluster node not found")) return } forwardRequest(core, w, r) return }) } func forwardRequest(core *vault.Core, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Header.Get(vault.IntNoForwardingHeaderName) != "" { respondStandby(core, w, r.URL) return } if r.Header.Get(NoRequestForwardingHeaderName) != "" { // Forwarding explicitly disabled, fall back to previous behavior core.Logger().Debug("handleRequestForwarding: forwarding disabled by client request") respondStandby(core, w, r.URL) return } ns, err := namespace.FromContext(r.Context()) if err != nil { respondError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err) return } path := ns.TrimmedPath(r.URL.Path[len("/v1/"):]) if alwaysRedirectPaths.HasPath(path) { respondStandby(core, w, r.URL) return } // Attempt forwarding the request. If we cannot forward -- perhaps it's // been disabled on the active node -- this will return with an // ErrCannotForward and we simply fall back statusCode, header, retBytes, err := core.ForwardRequest(r) if err != nil { if err == vault.ErrCannotForward { core.Logger().Debug("cannot forward request (possibly disabled on active node), falling back") } else { core.Logger().Error("forward request error", "error", err) } // Fall back to redirection respondStandby(core, w, r.URL) return } if header != nil { for k, v := range header { w.Header()[k] = v } } w.WriteHeader(statusCode) w.Write(retBytes) } // request is a helper to perform a request and properly exit in the // case of an error. func request(core *vault.Core, w http.ResponseWriter, rawReq *http.Request, r *logical.Request) (*logical.Response, bool, bool) { resp, err := core.HandleRequest(rawReq.Context(), r) if r.LastRemoteWAL() > 0 && !vault.WaitUntilWALShipped(rawReq.Context(), core, r.LastRemoteWAL()) { if resp == nil { resp = &logical.Response{} } resp.AddWarning("Timeout hit while waiting for local replicated cluster to apply primary's write; this client may encounter stale reads of values written during this operation.") } if errwrap.Contains(err, consts.ErrStandby.Error()) { respondStandby(core, w, rawReq.URL) return resp, false, false } if err != nil && errwrap.Contains(err, logical.ErrPerfStandbyPleaseForward.Error()) { return nil, false, true } if resp != nil && len(resp.Headers) > 0 { // Set this here so it will take effect regardless of any other type of // response processing header := w.Header() for k, v := range resp.Headers { for _, h := range v { header.Add(k, h) } } switch { case resp.Secret != nil, resp.Auth != nil, len(resp.Data) > 0, resp.Redirect != "", len(resp.Warnings) > 0, resp.WrapInfo != nil: // Nothing, resp has data default: // We have an otherwise totally empty response except for headers, // so nil out the response now that the headers are written out resp = nil } } // If vault's core has already written to the response writer do not add any // additional output. Headers have already been sent. If the response writer // is set but has not been written to it likely means there was some kind of // error if r.ResponseWriter != nil && r.ResponseWriter.Written() { return nil, true, false } if respondErrorCommon(w, r, resp, err) { return resp, false, false } return resp, true, false } // respondStandby is used to trigger a redirect in the case that this Vault is currently a hot standby func respondStandby(core *vault.Core, w http.ResponseWriter, reqURL *url.URL) { // Request the leader address _, redirectAddr, _, err := core.Leader() if err != nil { if err == vault.ErrHANotEnabled { // Standalone node, serve 503 err = errors.New("node is not active") respondError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, err) return } respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err) return } // If there is no leader, generate a 503 error if redirectAddr == "" { err = errors.New("no active Vault instance found") respondError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, err) return } // Parse the redirect location redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirectAddr) if err != nil { respondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err) return } // Generate a redirect URL finalURL := url.URL{ Scheme: redirectURL.Scheme, Host: redirectURL.Host, Path: reqURL.Path, RawQuery: reqURL.RawQuery, } // Ensure there is a scheme, default to https if finalURL.Scheme == "" { finalURL.Scheme = "https" } // If we have an address, redirect! We use a 307 code // because we don't actually know if its permanent and // the request method should be preserved. w.Header().Set("Location", finalURL.String()) w.WriteHeader(307) } // getTokenFromReq parse headers of the incoming request to extract token if // present it accepts Authorization Bearer (RFC6750) and X-Vault-Token header. // Returns true if the token was sourced from a Bearer header. func getTokenFromReq(r *http.Request) (string, bool) { if token := r.Header.Get(consts.AuthHeaderName); token != "" { return token, false } if headers, ok := r.Header["Authorization"]; ok { // Reference for Authorization header format: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7236#section-3 // If string does not start by 'Bearer ', it is not one we would use, // but might be used by plugins for _, v := range headers { if !strings.HasPrefix(v, "Bearer ") { continue } return strings.TrimSpace(v[7:]), true } } return "", false } // requestAuth adds the token to the logical.Request if it exists. func requestAuth(r *http.Request, req *logical.Request) { // Attach the header value if we have it token, fromAuthzHeader := getTokenFromReq(r) if token != "" { req.ClientToken = token req.ClientTokenSource = logical.ClientTokenFromVaultHeader if fromAuthzHeader { req.ClientTokenSource = logical.ClientTokenFromAuthzHeader } } } func requestPolicyOverride(r *http.Request, req *logical.Request) error { raw := r.Header.Get(PolicyOverrideHeaderName) if raw == "" { return nil } override, err := parseutil.ParseBool(raw) if err != nil { return err } req.PolicyOverride = override return nil } // requestWrapInfo adds the WrapInfo value to the logical.Request if wrap info exists func requestWrapInfo(r *http.Request, req *logical.Request) (*logical.Request, error) { // First try for the header value wrapTTL := r.Header.Get(WrapTTLHeaderName) if wrapTTL == "" { return req, nil } // If it has an allowed suffix parse as a duration string dur, err := parseutil.ParseDurationSecond(wrapTTL) if err != nil { return req, err } if int64(dur) < 0 { return req, fmt.Errorf("requested wrap ttl cannot be negative") } req.WrapInfo = &logical.RequestWrapInfo{ TTL: dur, } wrapFormat := r.Header.Get(WrapFormatHeaderName) switch wrapFormat { case "jwt": req.WrapInfo.Format = "jwt" } return req, nil } // parseMFAHeader parses the MFAHeaderName in the request headers and organizes // them with MFA method name as the index. func parseMFAHeader(req *logical.Request) error { if req == nil { return fmt.Errorf("request is nil") } if req.Headers == nil { return nil } // Reset and initialize the credentials in the request req.MFACreds = make(map[string][]string) for _, mfaHeaderValue := range req.Headers[canonicalMFAHeaderName] { // Skip the header with no value in it if mfaHeaderValue == "" { continue } // Handle the case where only method name is mentioned and no value // is supplied if !strings.Contains(mfaHeaderValue, ":") { // Mark the presence of method name, but set an empty set to it // indicating that there were no values supplied for the method if req.MFACreds[mfaHeaderValue] == nil { req.MFACreds[mfaHeaderValue] = []string{} } continue } shardSplits := strings.SplitN(mfaHeaderValue, ":", 2) if shardSplits[0] == "" { return fmt.Errorf("invalid data in header %q; missing method name or ID", MFAHeaderName) } if shardSplits[1] == "" { return fmt.Errorf("invalid data in header %q; missing method value", MFAHeaderName) } req.MFACreds[shardSplits[0]] = append(req.MFACreds[shardSplits[0]], shardSplits[1]) } return nil } // isForm tries to determine whether the request should be // processed as a form or as JSON. // // Virtually all existing use cases have assumed processing as JSON, // and there has not been a Content-Type requirement in the API. In order to // maintain backwards compatibility, this will err on the side of JSON. // The request will be considered a form only if: // // 1. The content type is "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" // 2. The start of the request doesn't look like JSON. For this test we // we expect the body to begin with { or [, ignoring leading whitespace. func isForm(head []byte, contentType string) bool { contentType, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentType) if err != nil || contentType != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" { return false } // Look for the start of JSON or not-JSON, skipping any insignificant // whitespace (per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7159#section-2). for _, c := range head { switch c { case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\r': continue case '[', '{': // JSON return false default: // not JSON return true } } return true } func respondError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, err error) { logical.RespondError(w, status, err) } func respondErrorAndData(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data interface{}, err error) { logical.RespondErrorAndData(w, status, data, err) } func respondErrorCommon(w http.ResponseWriter, req *logical.Request, resp *logical.Response, err error) bool { statusCode, newErr := logical.RespondErrorCommon(req, resp, err) if newErr == nil && statusCode == 0 { return false } // If ErrPermissionDenied occurs for OIDC protected resources (e.g., userinfo), // then respond with a JSON error format that complies with the specification. // This prevents the JSON error format from changing to a Vault-y format (i.e., // the format that results from respondError) after an OIDC access token expires. if oidcPermissionDenied(req.Path, err) { respondOIDCPermissionDenied(w) return true } if resp != nil { if data := resp.Data["data"]; data != nil { respondErrorAndData(w, statusCode, data, newErr) return true } } respondError(w, statusCode, newErr) return true } func respondOk(w http.ResponseWriter, body interface{}) { w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") if body == nil { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) } else { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) enc := json.NewEncoder(w) enc.Encode(body) } } // oidcPermissionDenied returns true if the given path matches the // UserInfo Endpoint published by Vault OIDC providers and the given // error is a logical.ErrPermissionDenied. func oidcPermissionDenied(path string, err error) bool { return errwrap.Contains(err, logical.ErrPermissionDenied.Error()) && oidcProtectedPathRegex.MatchString(path) } // respondOIDCPermissionDenied writes a response to the given w for // permission denied errors (expired token) on resources protected // by OIDC access tokens. Currently, the UserInfo Endpoint is the only // protected resource. See the following specifications for details: // - https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#UserInfoError // - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6750#section-3.1 func respondOIDCPermissionDenied(w http.ResponseWriter) { errorCode := "invalid_token" errorDescription := logical.ErrPermissionDenied.Error() w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json") w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", fmt.Sprintf("Bearer error=%q,error_description=%q", errorCode, errorDescription)) w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized) var oidcResponse struct { Error string `json:"error"` ErrorDescription string `json:"error_description"` } oidcResponse.Error = errorCode oidcResponse.ErrorDescription = errorDescription enc := json.NewEncoder(w) enc.Encode(oidcResponse) }