package vault import ( "context" "errors" "fmt" "strings" "time" "github.com/armon/go-metrics" "github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror" sockaddr "github.com/hashicorp/go-sockaddr" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/audit" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/consts" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/errutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/identity" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/jsonutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/policyutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/strutil" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/wrapping" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical" "github.com/hashicorp/vault/logical/framework" ) const ( replTimeout = 10 * time.Second ) var ( // DefaultMaxRequestDuration is the amount of time we'll wait for a request // to complete, unless overridden on a per-handler basis // FIXME: In 0.11 make this 90 seconds; for now keep it at essentially infinity if not set explicitly //DefaultMaxRequestDuration = 90 * time.Second DefaultMaxRequestDuration = 999999 * time.Hour ) // HanlderProperties is used to seed configuration into a vaulthttp.Handler. // It's in this package to avoid a circular dependency type HandlerProperties struct { Core *Core MaxRequestSize int64 MaxRequestDuration time.Duration DisablePrintableCheck bool } // fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies returns the entity object for the given entity // ID. If the entity is merged into a different entity object, the entity into // which the given entity ID is merged into will be returned. This function // also returns the cumulative list of policies that the entity is entitled to. // This list includes the policies from the entity itself and from all the // groups in which the given entity ID is a member of. func (c *Core) fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(entityID string) (*identity.Entity, []string, error) { if entityID == "" || c.identityStore == nil { return nil, nil, nil } //c.logger.Debug("entity set on the token", "entity_id", te.EntityID) // Fetch the entity entity, err := c.identityStore.MemDBEntityByID(entityID, false) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to lookup entity using its ID", "error", err) return nil, nil, err } if entity == nil { // If there was no corresponding entity object found, it is // possible that the entity got merged into another entity. Try // finding entity based on the merged entity index. entity, err = c.identityStore.MemDBEntityByMergedEntityID(entityID, false) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to lookup entity in merged entity ID index", "error", err) return nil, nil, err } } var policies []string if entity != nil { //c.logger.Debug("entity successfully fetched; adding entity policies to token's policies to create ACL") // Attach the policies on the entity policies = append(policies, entity.Policies...) groupPolicies, err := c.identityStore.groupPoliciesByEntityID(entity.ID) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to fetch group policies", "error", err) return nil, nil, err } // Attach the policies from all the groups policies = append(policies, groupPolicies...) } return entity, policies, err } func (c *Core) fetchACLTokenEntryAndEntity(req *logical.Request) (*ACL, *logical.TokenEntry, *identity.Entity, []string, error) { defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "fetch_acl_and_token"}, time.Now()) // Ensure there is a client token if req.ClientToken == "" { return nil, nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("missing client token") } if c.tokenStore == nil { c.logger.Error("token store is unavailable") return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError } // Resolve the token policy var te *logical.TokenEntry switch req.TokenEntry() { case nil: var err error te, err = c.tokenStore.Lookup(c.activeContext, req.ClientToken) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to lookup token", "error", err) return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError } default: te = req.TokenEntry() } // Ensure the token is valid if te == nil { return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } // CIDR checks bind all tokens except non-expiring root tokens if te.TTL != 0 && len(te.BoundCIDRs) > 0 { var valid bool remoteSockAddr, err := sockaddr.NewSockAddr(req.Connection.RemoteAddr) if err != nil { if c.Logger().IsDebug() { c.Logger().Debug("could not parse remote addr into sockaddr", "error", err, "remote_addr", req.Connection.RemoteAddr) } return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } for _, cidr := range te.BoundCIDRs { if cidr.Contains(remoteSockAddr) { valid = true break } } if !valid { return nil, nil, nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } } entity, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(te.EntityID) if err != nil { return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError } allPolicies := append(te.Policies, identityPolicies...) // Construct the corresponding ACL object acl, err := c.policyStore.ACL(c.activeContext, allPolicies...) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to construct ACL", "error", err) return nil, nil, nil, nil, ErrInternalError } return acl, te, entity, identityPolicies, nil } func (c *Core) checkToken(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, unauth bool) (*logical.Auth, *logical.TokenEntry, error) { defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "check_token"}, time.Now()) var acl *ACL var te *logical.TokenEntry var entity *identity.Entity var identityPolicies []string var err error // Even if unauth, if a token is provided, there's little reason not to // gather as much info as possible for the audit log and to e.g. control // trace mode for EGPs. if !unauth || (unauth && req.ClientToken != "") { acl, te, entity, identityPolicies, err = c.fetchACLTokenEntryAndEntity(req) // In the unauth case we don't want to fail the command, since it's // unauth, we just have no information to attach to the request, so // ignore errors...this was best-effort anyways if err != nil && !unauth { return nil, te, err } } if entity != nil && entity.Disabled { c.logger.Warn("permission denied as the entity on the token is disabled") return nil, te, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } if te != nil && te.EntityID != "" && entity == nil { c.logger.Warn("permission denied as the entity on the token is invalid") return nil, te, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } // Check if this is a root protected path rootPath := c.router.RootPath(req.Path) if rootPath && unauth { return nil, nil, errors.New("cannot access root path in unauthenticated request") } // When we receive a write of either type, rather than require clients to // PUT/POST and trust the operation, we ask the backend to give us the real // skinny -- if the backend implements an existence check, it can tell us // whether a particular resource exists. Then we can mark it as an update // or creation as appropriate. if req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation || req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation { checkExists, resourceExists, err := c.router.RouteExistenceCheck(ctx, req) switch err { case logical.ErrUnsupportedPath: // fail later via bad path to avoid confusing items in the log checkExists = false case nil: // Continue on default: c.logger.Error("failed to run existence check", "error", err) if _, ok := err.(errutil.UserError); ok { return nil, nil, err } else { return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } } switch { case checkExists == false: // No existence check, so always treat it as an update operation, which is how it is pre 0.5 req.Operation = logical.UpdateOperation case resourceExists == true: // It exists, so force an update operation req.Operation = logical.UpdateOperation case resourceExists == false: // It doesn't exist, force a create operation req.Operation = logical.CreateOperation default: panic("unreachable code") } } // Create the auth response auth := &logical.Auth{ ClientToken: req.ClientToken, Accessor: req.ClientTokenAccessor, Policies: identityPolicies, IdentityPolicies: identityPolicies, } if te != nil { auth.TokenPolicies = te.Policies auth.Policies = append(te.Policies, identityPolicies...) auth.Metadata = te.Meta auth.DisplayName = te.DisplayName auth.EntityID = te.EntityID // Store the entity ID in the request object req.EntityID = te.EntityID } // Check the standard non-root ACLs. Return the token entry if it's not // allowed so we can decrement the use count. authResults := c.performPolicyChecks(ctx, acl, te, req, entity, &PolicyCheckOpts{ Unauth: unauth, RootPrivsRequired: rootPath, }) if authResults.Error.ErrorOrNil() != nil { return auth, te, authResults.Error } if !authResults.Allowed { // Return auth for audit logging even if not allowed return auth, te, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } return auth, te, nil } // HandleRequest is used to handle a new incoming request func (c *Core) HandleRequest(httpCtx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (resp *logical.Response, err error) { c.stateLock.RLock() defer c.stateLock.RUnlock() if c.Sealed() { return nil, consts.ErrSealed } if c.standby { return nil, consts.ErrStandby } ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(c.activeContext) defer cancel() go func() { select { case <-ctx.Done(): case <-httpCtx.Done(): cancel() } }() // Allowing writing to a path ending in / makes it extremely difficult to // understand user intent for the filesystem-like backends (kv, // cubbyhole) -- did they want a key named foo/ or did they want to write // to a directory foo/ with no (or forgotten) key, or...? It also affects // lookup, because paths ending in / are considered prefixes by some // backends. Basically, it's all just terrible, so don't allow it. if strings.HasSuffix(req.Path, "/") && (req.Operation == logical.UpdateOperation || req.Operation == logical.CreateOperation) { return logical.ErrorResponse("cannot write to a path ending in '/'"), nil } var auth *logical.Auth if c.router.LoginPath(req.Path) { resp, auth, err = c.handleLoginRequest(ctx, req) } else { resp, auth, err = c.handleRequest(ctx, req) } // Ensure we don't leak internal data if resp != nil { if resp.Secret != nil { resp.Secret.InternalData = nil } if resp.Auth != nil { resp.Auth.InternalData = nil } } // We are wrapping if there is anything to wrap (not a nil response) and a // TTL was specified for the token. Errors on a call should be returned to // the caller, so wrapping is turned off if an error is hit and the error // is logged to the audit log. wrapping := resp != nil && err == nil && !resp.IsError() && resp.WrapInfo != nil && resp.WrapInfo.TTL != 0 && resp.WrapInfo.Token == "" if wrapping { cubbyResp, cubbyErr := c.wrapInCubbyhole(ctx, req, resp, auth) // If not successful, returns either an error response from the // cubbyhole backend or an error; if either is set, set resp and err to // those and continue so that that's what we audit log. Otherwise // finish the wrapping and audit log that. if cubbyResp != nil || cubbyErr != nil { resp = cubbyResp err = cubbyErr } else { wrappingResp := &logical.Response{ WrapInfo: resp.WrapInfo, Warnings: resp.Warnings, } resp = wrappingResp } } auditResp := resp // When unwrapping we want to log the actual response that will be written // out. We still want to return the raw value to avoid automatic updating // to any of it. if req.Path == "sys/wrapping/unwrap" && resp != nil && resp.Data != nil && resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody] != nil { // Decode the JSON if resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBodyAlreadyJSONDecoded] != nil { delete(resp.Data, logical.HTTPRawBodyAlreadyJSONDecoded) } else { httpResp := &logical.HTTPResponse{} err := jsonutil.DecodeJSON(resp.Data[logical.HTTPRawBody].([]byte), httpResp) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to unmarshal wrapped HTTP response for audit logging", "error", err) return nil, ErrInternalError } auditResp = logical.HTTPResponseToLogicalResponse(httpResp) } } var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string var nonHMACRespDataKeys []string entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path) if entry != nil { // Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards. if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok { nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string) } // Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. Reset those back to empty afterwards. if auditResp != nil { if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_response_keys"); ok { nonHMACRespDataKeys = rawVals.([]string) } } } // Create an audit trail of the response logInput := &audit.LogInput{ Auth: auth, Request: req, Response: auditResp, OuterErr: err, NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys, NonHMACRespDataKeys: nonHMACRespDataKeys, } if auditErr := c.auditBroker.LogResponse(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); auditErr != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to audit response", "request_path", req.Path, "error", auditErr) return nil, ErrInternalError } return } func (c *Core) handleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) { defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_request"}, time.Now()) var nonHMACReqDataKeys []string entry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path) if entry != nil { // Get and set ignored HMAC'd value. if rawVals, ok := entry.synthesizedConfigCache.Load("audit_non_hmac_request_keys"); ok { nonHMACReqDataKeys = rawVals.([]string) } } // Validate the token auth, te, ctErr := c.checkToken(ctx, req, false) // We run this logic first because we want to decrement the use count even in the case of an error if te != nil { // Attempt to use the token (decrement NumUses) var err error te, err = c.tokenStore.UseToken(ctx, te) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to use token", "error", err) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, nil, retErr } if te == nil { // Token has been revoked by this point retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, logical.ErrPermissionDenied) return nil, nil, retErr } if te.NumUses == tokenRevocationPending { // We defer a revocation until after logic has run, since this is a // valid request (this is the token's final use). We pass the ID in // directly just to be safe in case something else modifies te later. defer func(id string) { leaseID, err := c.expiration.CreateOrFetchRevocationLeaseByToken(te) if err == nil { err = c.expiration.Revoke(ctx, leaseID) } if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to revoke token", "error", err) retResp = nil retAuth = nil retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) } if retResp != nil && retResp.Secret != nil && // Some backends return a TTL even without a Lease ID retResp.Secret.LeaseID != "" { retResp = logical.ErrorResponse("Secret cannot be returned; token had one use left, so leased credentials were immediately revoked.") return } }(te.ID) } } if ctErr != nil { // If it is an internal error we return that, otherwise we // return invalid request so that the status codes can be correct errType := logical.ErrInvalidRequest switch ctErr { case ErrInternalError, logical.ErrPermissionDenied: errType = ctErr } logInput := &audit.LogInput{ Auth: auth, Request: req, OuterErr: ctErr, NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys, } if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err) } if errType != nil { retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, errType) } if ctErr == ErrInternalError { return nil, auth, retErr } return logical.ErrorResponse(ctErr.Error()), auth, retErr } // Attach the display name req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName // Create an audit trail of the request logInput := &audit.LogInput{ Auth: auth, Request: req, NonHMACReqDataKeys: nonHMACReqDataKeys, } if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } // Route the request resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(ctx, req) if resp != nil { // If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response var wrapTTL time.Duration var wrapFormat, creationPath string var sealWrap bool // Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL if resp.WrapInfo != nil { if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 { wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL } wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap resp.WrapInfo = nil } if req.WrapInfo != nil { if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 { switch { case wrapTTL == 0: wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL: wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL } } // If the wrap format hasn't been set by the response, set it to // the request format if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" { wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format } } if wrapTTL > 0 { resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{ TTL: wrapTTL, Format: wrapFormat, CreationPath: creationPath, SealWrap: sealWrap, } } } // If there is a secret, we must register it with the expiration manager. // We exclude renewal of a lease, since it does not need to be re-registered if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/renew") && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "sys/leases/renew") { // KV mounts should return the TTL but not register // for a lease as this provides a massive slowdown registerLease := true matchingMountEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path) if matchingMountEntry == nil { c.logger.Error("unable to retrieve kv mount entry from router") retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } switch matchingMountEntry.Type { case "kv", "generic": // If we are kv type, first see if we are an older passthrough // backend, and otherwise check the mount entry options. matchingBackend := c.router.MatchingBackend(req.Path) if matchingBackend == nil { c.logger.Error("unable to retrieve kv backend from router") retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } if ptbe, ok := matchingBackend.(*PassthroughBackend); ok { if !ptbe.GeneratesLeases() { registerLease = false resp.Secret.Renewable = false } } else if matchingMountEntry.Options == nil || matchingMountEntry.Options["leased_passthrough"] != "true" { registerLease = false resp.Secret.Renewable = false } case "plugin": // If we are a plugin type and the plugin name is "kv" check the // mount entry options. if matchingMountEntry.Config.PluginName == "kv" && (matchingMountEntry.Options == nil || matchingMountEntry.Options["leased_passthrough"] != "true") { registerLease = false resp.Secret.Renewable = false } } if registerLease { sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path) if sysView == nil { c.logger.Error("unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", req.Path) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } ttl, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, resp.Secret.TTL, 0, resp.Secret.MaxTTL, 0, time.Time{}) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } for _, warning := range warnings { resp.AddWarning(warning) } resp.Secret.TTL = ttl leaseID, err := c.expiration.Register(req, resp) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to register lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } resp.Secret.LeaseID = leaseID } } // If the request was to renew a token, and if there are group aliases set // in the auth object, then the group memberships should be refreshed if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") && resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && resp.Auth.EntityID != "" && resp.Auth.GroupAliases != nil && c.identityStore != nil { err := c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(resp.Auth.EntityID, resp.Auth.GroupAliases) if err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to refresh external group memberships", "error", err) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } } // Only the token store is allowed to return an auth block, for any // other request this is an internal error. We exclude renewal of a token, // since it does not need to be re-registered if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil && !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/renew") { if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") { c.logger.Error("unexpected Auth response for non-token backend", "request_path", req.Path) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } _, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(resp.Auth.EntityID) if err != nil { c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, te.ID) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } resp.Auth.TokenPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(resp.Auth.Policies, policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy) if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(resp.Auth.CreationPath, resp.Auth); err != nil { c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, te.ID) c.logger.Error("failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err) retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, ErrInternalError) return nil, auth, retErr } // We do these later since it's not meaningful for backends/expmgr to // have what is purely a snapshot of current identity policies, and // plugins can be confused if they are checking contents of // Auth.Policies instead of Auth.TokenPolicies resp.Auth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies, policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy) resp.Auth.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(resp.Auth.Policies, identityPolicies...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy) } if resp != nil && req.Path == "cubbyhole/response" && len(te.Policies) == 1 && te.Policies[0] == responseWrappingPolicyName { resp.AddWarning("Reading from 'cubbyhole/response' is deprecated. Please use sys/wrapping/unwrap to unwrap responses, as it provides additional security checks and other benefits.") } // Return the response and error if routeErr != nil { retErr = multierror.Append(retErr, routeErr) } return resp, auth, retErr } // handleLoginRequest is used to handle a login request, which is an // unauthenticated request to the backend. func (c *Core) handleLoginRequest(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request) (retResp *logical.Response, retAuth *logical.Auth, retErr error) { defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"core", "handle_login_request"}, time.Now()) req.Unauthenticated = true var auth *logical.Auth // Create an audit trail of the request, auth is not available on login requests // Create an audit trail of the request. Attach auth if it was returned, // e.g. if a token was provided. logInput := &audit.LogInput{ Auth: auth, Request: req, } if err := c.auditBroker.LogRequest(ctx, logInput, c.auditedHeaders); err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to audit request", "path", req.Path, "error", err) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } // The token store uses authentication even when creating a new token, // so it's handled in handleRequest. It should not be reached here. if strings.HasPrefix(req.Path, "auth/token/") { c.logger.Error("unexpected login request for token backend", "request_path", req.Path) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } // Route the request resp, routeErr := c.router.Route(ctx, req) if resp != nil { // If wrapping is used, use the shortest between the request and response var wrapTTL time.Duration var wrapFormat, creationPath string var sealWrap bool // Ensure no wrap info information is set other than, possibly, the TTL if resp.WrapInfo != nil { if resp.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 { wrapTTL = resp.WrapInfo.TTL } wrapFormat = resp.WrapInfo.Format creationPath = resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath sealWrap = resp.WrapInfo.SealWrap resp.WrapInfo = nil } if req.WrapInfo != nil { if req.WrapInfo.TTL > 0 { switch { case wrapTTL == 0: wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL case req.WrapInfo.TTL < wrapTTL: wrapTTL = req.WrapInfo.TTL } } if req.WrapInfo.Format != "" && wrapFormat == "" { wrapFormat = req.WrapInfo.Format } } if wrapTTL > 0 { resp.WrapInfo = &wrapping.ResponseWrapInfo{ TTL: wrapTTL, Format: wrapFormat, CreationPath: creationPath, SealWrap: sealWrap, } } } // A login request should never return a secret! if resp != nil && resp.Secret != nil { c.logger.Error("unexpected Secret response for login path", "request_path", req.Path) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } // If the response generated an authentication, then generate the token if resp != nil && resp.Auth != nil { var entity *identity.Entity auth = resp.Auth mEntry := c.router.MatchingMountEntry(req.Path) if auth.Alias != nil && mEntry != nil && !mEntry.Local && c.identityStore != nil { // Overwrite the mount type and mount path in the alias // information auth.Alias.MountType = req.MountType auth.Alias.MountAccessor = req.MountAccessor if auth.Alias.Name == "" { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("missing name in alias") } var err error // Fetch the entity for the alias, or create an entity if one // doesn't exist. entity, err = c.identityStore.CreateOrFetchEntity(auth.Alias) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } if entity == nil { return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create an entity for the authenticated alias") } if entity.Disabled { return nil, nil, logical.ErrPermissionDenied } auth.EntityID = entity.ID if auth.GroupAliases != nil { err = c.identityStore.refreshExternalGroupMembershipsByEntityID(auth.EntityID, auth.GroupAliases) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } } } // Determine the source of the login source := c.router.MatchingMount(req.Path) source = strings.TrimPrefix(source, credentialRoutePrefix) source = strings.Replace(source, "/", "-", -1) // Prepend the source to the display name auth.DisplayName = strings.TrimSuffix(source+auth.DisplayName, "-") sysView := c.router.MatchingSystemView(req.Path) if sysView == nil { c.logger.Error("unable to look up sys view for login path", "request_path", req.Path) return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } tokenTTL, warnings, err := framework.CalculateTTL(sysView, 0, auth.TTL, auth.Period, auth.MaxTTL, auth.ExplicitMaxTTL, time.Time{}) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } for _, warning := range warnings { resp.AddWarning(warning) } // We first assign token policies to what was returned from the backend // via auth.Policies. Then, we get the full set of policies into // auth.Policies from the backend + entity information -- this is not // stored in the token, but we perform sanity checks on it and return // that information to the user. // Generate a token te := logical.TokenEntry{ Path: req.Path, Meta: auth.Metadata, DisplayName: auth.DisplayName, CreationTime: time.Now().Unix(), TTL: tokenTTL, NumUses: auth.NumUses, EntityID: auth.EntityID, BoundCIDRs: auth.BoundCIDRs, } te.Policies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(auth.Policies, policyutil.AddDefaultPolicy) _, identityPolicies, err := c.fetchEntityAndDerivedPolicies(auth.EntityID) if err != nil { return nil, nil, ErrInternalError } auth.TokenPolicies = te.Policies allPolicies := policyutil.SanitizePolicies(append(te.Policies, identityPolicies...), policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy) // Prevent internal policies from being assigned to tokens. We check // this on auth.Policies including derived ones from Identity before // actually making the token. for _, policy := range allPolicies { if policy == "root" { return logical.ErrorResponse("auth methods cannot create root tokens"), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest } if strutil.StrListContains(nonAssignablePolicies, policy) { return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("cannot assign policy %q", policy)), nil, logical.ErrInvalidRequest } } if err := c.tokenStore.create(ctx, &te); err != nil { c.logger.Error("failed to create token", "error", err) return nil, auth, ErrInternalError } // Populate the client token, accessor, and TTL auth.ClientToken = te.ID auth.Accessor = te.Accessor auth.TTL = te.TTL // Register with the expiration manager if err := c.expiration.RegisterAuth(te.Path, auth); err != nil { c.tokenStore.revokeOrphan(ctx, te.ID) c.logger.Error("failed to register token lease", "request_path", req.Path, "error", err) return nil, auth, ErrInternalError } auth.IdentityPolicies = policyutil.SanitizePolicies(identityPolicies, policyutil.DoNotAddDefaultPolicy) auth.Policies = allPolicies // Attach the display name, might be used by audit backends req.DisplayName = auth.DisplayName } return resp, auth, routeErr }