--- layout: "docs" page_title: "Secret Backend: PKI" sidebar_current: "docs-secrets-pki" description: |- The PKI secret backend for Vault generates TLS certificates. --- # PKI Secret Backend Name: `pki` The PKI secret backend for Vault generates X.509 certificates dynamically based on configured roles. This means services can get certificates needed for both client and server authentication without going through the usual manual process of generating a private key and CSR, submitting to a CA, and waiting for a verification and signing process to complete. Vault's built-in authentication and authorization mechanisms provide the verification functionality. By keeping leases relatively short, revocations are less likely to be needed, keeping CRLs short and helping the backend scale to large workloads. This in turn allows each instance of a running application to have a unique certificate, eliminating sharing and the accompanying pain of revocation and rollover. In addition, by allowing revocation to mostly be forgone, this backend allows for ephemeral certificates; certificates can be fetched and stored in memory upon application startup and discarded upon shutdown, without ever being written to disk. This page will show a quick start for this backend. For detailed documentation on every path, use `vault path-help` after mounting the backend. ## Considerations To successfully deploy this backend, there are a number of important considerations to be aware of, as well as some preparatory steps that should be undertaken. You should read all of these *before* using this backend or generating the CA to use with this backend. ### Never use root CAs Vault storage is secure, but not as secure as a piece of paper in a bank vault. It is, after all, networked software. Your long-lived self-signed root CA's private key should instead be used to issue a shorter-lived intermediate CA certificate, and this is what you should put into Vault. This aligns with industry best practices. ### One CA Certificate, One Backend In order to vastly simplify both the configuration and codebase of the PKI backend, only one CA certificate is allowed per backend. If you want to issue certificates from multiple CAs, mount the PKI backend at multiple mount points with separate CA certificates in each. This also provides a convenient method of switching to a new CA certificate while keeping CRLs valid from the old CA certificate; simply mount a new backend and issue from there. ### Keep certificate lifetimes short, for CRL's sake This backend aligns with Vault's philosophy of short-lived secrets. As such it is not expected that CRLs will grow large; the only place a private key is ever returned is to the requesting client (this backend does *not* store generated private keys). In most cases, if the key is lost, the certificate can simply be ignored, as it will expire shortly. If a certificate must truly be revoked, the normal Vault revocation function can be used; alternately a root token can be used to revoke the certificate using the certificate's serial number. Any revocation action will cause the CRL to be regenerated. When the CRL is regenerated, any expired certificates are removed from the CRL (and any revoked, expired certificate are removed from backend storage). This backend does not support multiple CRL endpoints with sliding date windows; often such mechanisms will have the transition point a few days apart, but this gets into the expected realm of the actual certificate validity periods issued from this backend. A good rule of thumb for this backend would be to simply not issue certificates with a validity period greater than your maximum comfortable CRL lifetime. Alternately, you can control CRL caching behavior on the client to ensure that checks happen more often. Often multiple endpoints are used in case a single CRL endpoint is down so that clients don't have to figure out what to do with a lack of response. Run Vault in HA mode, and the CRL endpoint should be available even if a particular node is down. ### You must configure CRL information *in advance* This backend serves CRLs from a predictable location. That location must be encoded into your CA certificate if you want to allow applications to use the CRL endpoint encoded in certificates to find the CRL. Instructions for doing so are below. If you need to adjust this later, you will have to generate a new CA certificate using the same private key if you want to keep validity for already-issued certificates. ### No OCSP support, yet Vault's architecture does not currently allow for a binary protocol such as OCSP to be supported by a backend. As such, you should configure your software to use CRLs for revocation information, with a caching lifetime that feels good to you. Since you are following the advice above about keeping lifetimes short (right?), CRLs should not grow too large. ## Quick Start ### CA certificate In order for this backend to serve CRL information at the expected location, you will need to generate your CA certificate with this information. For OpenSSL, this means putting a value in the CA section with the appropriate URL; in this example the PKI backend is mounted at `pki`: ```text crlDistributionPoints = URI:https://vault.example.com:8200/v1/pki/crl ``` Adjust the URI as appropriate. ### Vault The first step to using the PKI backend is to mount it. Unlike the `generic` backend, the `pki` backend is not mounted by default. ```text $ vault mount pki Successfully mounted 'pki' at 'pki'! ``` Next, Vault must be configured with a root certificate and associated private key. This is done by writing the contents of a file or *stdin*: ```text $ vault write pki/config/ca pem_bundle="@ca_bundle.pem" Success! Data written to: pki/config/ca ``` or ``` $ cat bundle.pem | vault write pki/config/ca pem_bundle="-" Success! Data written to: pki/config/ca ``` Although in this example the value being piped into *stdin* could be passed directly into the Vault CLI command, a more complex usage might be to use [Ansible](http://www.ansible.com) to securely store the certificate and private key in an `ansible-vault` file, then have an `ansible-playbook` command decrypt this value and pass it in to Vault. The next step is to configure a role. A role is a logical name that maps to a policy used to generated those credentials. For example, let's create an "example-dot-com" role: ```text $ vault write pki/roles/example-dot-com \ allowed_base_domain="example.com" \ allow_subdomains="true" lease_max="72h" Success! Data written to: pki/roles/example-dot-com ``` By writing to the `roles/example-dot-com` path we are defining the `example-dot-com` role. To generate a new set of credentials, we simply write to the `issue` endpoint with that role name: Vault is now configured to create and manage certificates! ```text $ vault write pki/issue/example-dot-com common_name=blah.example.com Key Value lease_id pki/issue/example-dot-com/819393b5-e1a1-9efd-b72f-4dc3a1972e31 lease_duration 259200 lease_renewable false certificate -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIECDCCAvKgAwIBAgIUXmLrLkTdBIOOIYg2/BXO7docKfUwCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEL ... az3gfwlOqVTdgi/ZVAtIzhSEJ0OY136bq4NOaw== -----END CERTIFICATE----- issuing_ca -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIDUTCCAjmgAwIBAgIJAKM+z4MSfw2mMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBsxGTAXBgNV ... -----END CERTIFICATE----- private_key -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEowIBAAKCAQEA0cczc7Y2yIu7aD/IaDi23Io+tvvDS9XaXXDUFW1kqd58P83r ... 3xhCNnZ3CMQaM2I48sloVK/XoikMLb5MZwOUQn/V+TrhWP4Lu7qD -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- serial 5e:62:eb:2e:44:dd:04:83:8e:21:88:36:fc:15:ce:ed:da:1c:29:f5 ``` Note that this is a write, not a read, to allow values to be passed in at request time. Vault has now generated a new set of credentials using the `example-dot-com` role configuration. Here we see the dynamically generated private key and certificate. The issuing CA certificate is returned as well. Using ACLs, it is possible to restrict using the pki backend such that trusted operators can manage the role definitions, and both users and applications are restricted in the credentials they are allowed to read. If you get stuck at any time, simply run `vault path-help pki` or with a subpath for interactive help output. ## API ### /pki/ca(/pem) #### GET
Description
Retrieves the CA certificate *in raw DER-encoded form*. This is a bare endpoint that does not return a standard Vault data structure. If `/pem` is added to the endpoint, the CA certificate is returned in PEM format.

This is an unauthenticated endpoint.
Method
GET
URL
`/pki/ca(/pem)`
Parameters
None
Returns
``` ```
### /pki/cert/ #### GET
Description
Retrieves one of a selection of certificates. Valid values: `ca` for the CA certificate, `crl` for the current CRL, or a serial number in either hyphen-separated or colon-separated octal format. This endpoint returns the certificate in PEM formatting in the `certificate` key of the JSON object.

This is an unauthenticated endpoint.
Method
GET
URL
`/pki/cert/`
Parameters
None
Returns
```javascript { "data": { "certificate": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIGmDCCBYCgAwIBAgIHBzEB3fTzhTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBjDELMAkGA1UE\n..." } } ... ```
### /pki/config/ca #### POST
Description
A PEM file containing the issuing CA certificate and its private key, concatenated.

This is a root-protected endpoint.

The information can be provided from a file via a `curl` command similar to the following:
```text curl -X POST --data "@cabundle.json" http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/pki/config/ca -H X-Vault-Token:06b9d... ``` Note that if you provide the data through the HTTP API it must be JSON-formatted, with newlines replaced with `\n`, like so: ```text { "pem_bundle": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n...\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----" } ```
Method
POST
URL
`/pki/config/ca`
Parameters
Returns
A `204` response code.
### /pki/crl(/pem) #### GET
Description
Retrieves the current CRL *in raw DER-encoded form*. This endpoint is suitable for usage in the CRL Distribution Points extension in a CA certificate. This is a bare endpoint that does not return a standard Vault data structure. If `/pem` is added to the endpoint, the CRL is returned in PEM format.

This is an unauthenticated endpoint.
Method
GET
URL
`/pki/crl(/pem)`
Parameters
None
Returns
``` ```
### /pki/crl/rotate #### GET
Description
This endpoint forces a rotation of the CRL. This can be used by administrators to cut the size of the CRL if it contains a number of certificates that have now expired, but has not been rotated due to no further certificates being revoked.

This is a root-protected endpoint.
Method
GET
URL
`/pki/crl/rotate`
Parameters
None
Returns
```javascript { "data": { "success": true } } ```
### /pki/issue/ #### POST
Description
Generates a new set of credentials (private key and certificate) based on the named role. The issuing CA certificate is returned as well, so that only the root CA need be in a client's trust store.

*The private key is _not_ stored. If you do not save the private key, you will need to request a new certificate.*
Method
POST
URL
`/pki/issue/`
Parameters
Returns
```javascript { "lease_id": "pki/issue/test/7ad6cfa5-f04f-c62a-d477-f33210475d05", "renewable": false, "lease_duration": 21600, "data": { "certificate": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDzDCCAragAwIBAgIUOd0ukLcjH43TfTHFG9qE0FtlMVgwCwYJKoZIhvcNAQEL\n...\numkqeYeO30g1uYvDuWLXVA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", "issuing_ca": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIDUTCCAjmgAwIBAgIJAKM+z4MSfw2mMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBsxGTAXBgNV\n...\nG/7g4koczXLoUM3OQXd5Aq2cs4SS1vODrYmgbioFsQ3eDHd1fg==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", "private_key": "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEowIBAAKCAQEAnVHfwoKsUG1GDVyWB1AFroaKl2ImMBO8EnvGLRrmobIkQvh+\n...\nQN351pgTphi6nlCkGPzkDuwvtxSxiCWXQcaxrHAL7MiJpPzkIBq1\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n", "serial": "39:dd:2e:90:b7:23:1f:8d:d3:7d:31:c5:1b:da:84:d0:5b:65:31:58" }, "auth": null } ```
### /pki/revoke #### POST
Description
Revokes a certificate using its serial number. This is an alternative option to the standard method of revoking using Vault lease IDs. A successful revocation will rotate the CRL.

This is a root-protected endpoint.
Method
POST
URL
`/pki/revoke`
Parameters
Returns
```javascript { "data": { "revocation_time": 1433269787 } } ```
### /pki/roles/ #### POST
Description
Creates or updates the role definition. Note that the `allowed_base_domain`, `allow_token_displayname`, `allow_subdomains`, and `allow_any_name` attributes are additive; between them nearly and across multiple roles nearly any issuing policy can be accommodated. `server_flag`, `client_flag`, and `code_signing_flag` are additive as well. If a client requests a certificate that is not allowed by the CN policy in the role, the request is denied.
Method
POST
URL
`/pki/roles/`
Parameters
Returns
A `204` response code.
#### GET
Description
Queries the role definition.
Method
GET
URL
`/pki/roles/`
Parameters
None
Returns
```javascript { "data": { "allow_any_name": false, "allow_ip_sans": true, "allow_localhost": true, "allow_subdomains": false, "allow_token_displayname": false, "allowed_base_domain": "example.com", "client_flag": true, "code_signing_flag": false, "key_bits": 2048, "key_type": "rsa", "lease": "6h", "lease_max": "12h", "server_flag": true } } ```
#### DELETE
Description
Deletes the role definition. Deleting a role does not revoke certificates previously issued under this role.
Method
DELETE
URL
`/pki/roles/`
Parameters
None
Returns
A `204` response code.