key type matches that of the role, since type assertions are required to
check the bit size). Like the rest, these are fuzz tests; I have
verified that the random seed will eventually hit error conditions if
ErrorOk is not set correctly when we expect an error.
AllowedBaseDomain is only zero-ed out if the domain is not found in the (new) AllowedDomains configuration setting. If the domain is found, AllowedBaseDomain is not emptied and this code will be run every single time.
//untested
This fixes an issue where, due to clock skew, one system can get a cert
and try to use it before it thinks it's actually valid. The tolerance of
30 seconds should be high enough for pretty much any set of systems
using NTP.
Fixes#1035
1) Use the new LeaseExtend
2) Use default values controlled by mount tuning/system defaults instead
of a random hard coded value
3) Remove grace periods
This can be seen via System(). In the PKI backend, if the CA is
reconfigured but not fully (e.g. an intermediate CSR is generated but no
corresponding cert set) and there are already leases (issued certs), the
CRL is unable to be built. As a result revocation fails. But in this
case we don't actually need revocation to be successful since the CRL is
useless after unmounting. By checking taint status we know if we can
simply fast-path out of revocation with a success in this case.
Fixes#946
* Move to one place for both code paths
* Assign ExtKeyUsageAny to CA certs to help with validation with the
Windows Crypto API and Go's validation logic
Fixes#846
- Allow an email address to be the common name of a cert even if email
protection isn't in the role if any name is set to true (this allows
certificates with a common name entry of an email address but used for
other purposes; here just for CA cert signing).
- Don't check the user part of an email against the hostname regex.
Emails can contain e.g. "+" and "_" and these should be allowed even
though they're not part of a valid hostname.
Also, fix a nil pointer issue.
no common_name parameter is given, role-controlled for non-CA CSRs).
Fix logic around the CA/CRL endpoints. Now settable when generating a
self-signed root or setting a CA cert into the backend; if not set,
these values are not set in issued certs. Not required when signing an
intermediate cert (and in fact it was wrong to do so in the first
place).
