This can be seen via System(). In the PKI backend, if the CA is
reconfigured but not fully (e.g. an intermediate CSR is generated but no
corresponding cert set) and there are already leases (issued certs), the
CRL is unable to be built. As a result revocation fails. But in this
case we don't actually need revocation to be successful since the CRL is
useless after unmounting. By checking taint status we know if we can
simply fast-path out of revocation with a success in this case.
Fixes#946
* Add comments to every non-obvious (e.g. not basic read/write handler type) function
* Remove revoked/ endpoint, at least for now
* Add configurable CRL lifetime
* Cleanup
* Address some comments from code review
Commit contents (C)2015 Akamai Technologies, Inc. <opensource@akamai.com>
Also, enhance the raw cert bundle => parsed cert bundle to make it more useful and perform more validation checks.
More refactoring could be done within the PKI backend itself, but that can wait.
Commit contents (C)2015 Akamai Technologies, Inc. <opensource@akamai.com>
Complete:
* Up-to-date API documents
* Backend configuration (root certificate and private key)
* Highly granular role configuration
* Certificate generation
* CN checking against role
* IP and DNS subject alternative names
* Server, client, and code signing usage types
* Later certificate (but not private key) retrieval
* CRL creation and update
* CRL/CA bare endpoints (for cert extensions)
* Revocation (both Vault-native and by serial number)
* CRL force-rotation endpoint
Missing:
* OCSP support (can't implement without changes in Vault)
* Unit tests
Commit contents (C)2015 Akamai Technologies, Inc. <opensource@akamai.com>
