* Update go version to 1.15.3
* Fix OU ordering for go1.15.x testing
* Fix CI version
* Update docker image
* Fix test
* packagespec upgrade -version 0.1.8
Co-authored-by: Sam Salisbury <samsalisbury@gmail.com>
* pki: use revocationInfo.RevocationTimeUTC when revoking certs with tidy_revoked_certs set to true
* update comment
* tidy: use same time snapshot for OR comparison
* helpful errors: print not only CN but also exactly what we are comparing
* helpful errors: return different errors for non-existent and unknown keys
* helpful errors: print error about encrypted key instead of "private key not found"
If a CSR contains a SAN of type otherName, encoded in UTF-8, and the signing role specifies use_csr_sans, the otherName SAN will be included in the signed cert's SAN extension.
Allow single star in allowed_other_sans to match any OtherName. Update documentation to clarify globbing behaviour.
Break dataBundle into two pieces: inputBundle, which contains data that
is specific to the pki backend, and creationBundle, which is a more
generic bundle of validated inputs given to certificate creation/signing routines.
Move functions that only take creationBundle to certutil and make them public.
The result will still pass gofmtcheck and won't trigger additional
changes if someone isn't using goimports, but it will avoid the
piecemeal imports changes we've been seeing.
This PR fix#5778.
Easy test case to reproduce the problem:
https://play.golang.org/p/CAMdrOHT7C1
Since `certStr` is empty string during first iteration `strings.Join()`
will merge empty line with first CA cert.
Extra `strings.TrimSpace` call will remove that empty line, before
certificate will be return.
This endpoint eventually goes through generateCreationBundle where we
already have the right checks.
Also add expiration to returned value to match output when using root
generation.
Fixes#5549
* Set allowed OIDs to any value when generaing a CA.
Also, allow utf-8 in addition to utf8 as the OID type specifier, and
allow `*` to specify any OID of a supported type.
* Update PKI docs
* Add ability to configure the NotBefore property of certificates in role api
* Update index.html.md
* converting field to time.Duration
* setting default back to 30s
* renaming the parameter not_before_duration to differentiate between the NotBefore datetime on the cert
* Update description
This will cause them to be removed even if they have not expired yet,
whereas before it would simply leave them in the store until they were
expired, but remove from revocation info.
* Disallow adding CA's serial to revocation list
* Allow disabling revocation list generation. This returns an empty (but
signed) list, but does not affect tracking of revocations so turning it
back on will populate the list properly.
This change makes it so that if a lease is revoked through user action,
we set the expiration time to now and update pending, just as we do with
tokens. This allows the normal retry logic to apply in these cases as
well, instead of just erroring out immediately. The idea being that once
you tell Vault to revoke something it should keep doing its darndest to
actually make that happen.
* Add an idle timeout for the server
Because tidy operations can be long-running, this also changes all tidy
operations to behave the same operationally (kick off the process, get a
warning back, log errors to server log) and makes them all run in a
goroutine.
This could mean a sort of hard stop if Vault gets sealed because the
function won't have the read lock. This should generally be okay
(running tidy again should pick back up where it left off), but future
work could use cleanup funcs to trigger the functions to stop.
* Fix up tidy test
* Add deadline to cluster connections and an idle timeout to the cluster server, plus add readheader/read timeout to api server
* Update PKI to natively use time.Duration
Among other things this now means PKI will output durations in seconds
like other backends, instead of as Go strings.
* Add a warning when refusing to blow away an existing root instead of just returning success
* Fix another issue found while debugging this...
The reason it wasn't caught on tests in the first place is that the ttl
and max ttl were only being compared if in addition to a provided csr, a
role was also provided. This was because the check was in the role !=
nil block instead of outside of it. This has been fixed, which made the
problem occur in all sign-verbatim cases and the changes in this PR have
now verified the fix.
* add require_cn to pki roles
* add policy_identifiers and basic_constraints_valid_for_non_ca to pki role form
* add new fields to the PKI docs
* add add_basic_constraints field
* Max role's max_ttl parameter a TypeDurationString like ttl
* Don't clamp values at write time in favor of evaluating at issue time,
as is the current best practice
* Lots of general cleanup of logic to fix missing cases
* added a flag to make common name optional if desired
* Cover one more case where cn can be empty
* remove skipping when empty; instead check for emptiness before calling validateNames
* Add verification before adding to DNS names to also fix#3918
* Start work on passing context to backends
* More work on passing context
* Unindent logical system
* Unindent token store
* Unindent passthrough
* Unindent cubbyhole
* Fix tests
* use requestContext in rollback and expiration managers
* Fix using wrong public key in sign-self-issued
* Change behavior of TTL in sign-intermediate
This allows signing CA certs with an expiration past the signer's
NotAfter.
It also change sign-self-issued to replace the Issuer, since it's
potentially RFC legal but stacks won't validate it.
Ref: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/vault-tool/giP69-n2o20/FfhRpW1vAQAJ
* Add pki/root/sign-self-issued.
This is useful for root CA rolling, and is also suitably dangerous.
Along the way I noticed we weren't setting the authority key IDs
anywhere, so I addressed that.
* Add tests
* Add backend plugin changes
* Fix totp backend plugin tests
* Fix logical/plugin InvalidateKey test
* Fix plugin catalog CRUD test, fix NoopBackend
* Clean up commented code block
* Fix system backend mount test
* Set plugin_name to omitempty, fix handleMountTable config parsing
* Clean up comments, keep shim connections alive until cleanup
* Include pluginClient, disallow LookupPlugin call from within a plugin
* Add wrapper around backendPluginClient for proper cleanup
* Add logger shim tests
* Add logger, storage, and system shim tests
* Use pointer receivers for system view shim
* Use plugin name if no path is provided on mount
* Enable plugins for auth backends
* Add backend type attribute, move builtin/plugin/package
* Fix merge conflict
* Fix missing plugin name in mount config
* Add integration tests on enabling auth backend plugins
* Remove dependency cycle on mock-plugin
* Add passthrough backend plugin, use logical.BackendType to determine lease generation
* Remove vault package dependency on passthrough package
* Add basic impl test for passthrough plugin
* Incorporate feedback; set b.backend after shims creation on backendPluginServer
* Fix totp plugin test
* Add plugin backends docs
* Fix tests
* Fix builtin/plugin tests
* Remove flatten from PluginRunner fields
* Move mock plugin to logical/plugin, remove totp and passthrough plugins
* Move pluginMap into newPluginClient
* Do not create storage RPC connection on HandleRequest and HandleExistenceCheck
* Change shim logger's Fatal to no-op
* Change BackendType to uint32, match UX backend types
* Change framework.Backend Setup signature
* Add Setup func to logical.Backend interface
* Move OptionallyEnableMlock call into plugin.Serve, update docs and comments
* Remove commented var in plugin package
* RegisterLicense on logical.Backend interface (#3017)
* Add RegisterLicense to logical.Backend interface
* Update RegisterLicense to use callback func on framework.Backend
* Refactor framework.Backend.RegisterLicense
* plugin: Prevent plugin.SystemViewClient.ResponseWrapData from getting JWTs
* plugin: Revert BackendType to remove TypePassthrough and related references
* Fix typo in plugin backends docs
This fixes#1911 but not directly; it doesn't address the cause of the
panic. However, it turns out that this is the correct fix anyways,
because it ensures that the value being logged is RFC3339 format, which
is what the time turns into in JSON but not the normal time string
value, so what we audit log (and HMAC) matches what we are returning.
Both revocation times are UTC so clarify via parameter name that it's just a formatting difference. Also leave as a time.Time here, as it automatically marshals into RFC3339.
Some programs (such as OpenVPN) don't like it if you don't include key
usages. This adds a default set that should suffice for most extended
usages. However, since things get twitchy when these are set in ways
various crypto stacks don't like, it's fully controllable by the user.
Fixes#1476
A buffer is used to ensure that we only remove certificates that are
both expired and for which the buffer has past. Options allow removal
from revoked/ and/or certs/.
key type matches that of the role, since type assertions are required to
check the bit size). Like the rest, these are fuzz tests; I have
verified that the random seed will eventually hit error conditions if
ErrorOk is not set correctly when we expect an error.
AllowedBaseDomain is only zero-ed out if the domain is not found in the (new) AllowedDomains configuration setting. If the domain is found, AllowedBaseDomain is not emptied and this code will be run every single time.
//untested
This fixes an issue where, due to clock skew, one system can get a cert
and try to use it before it thinks it's actually valid. The tolerance of
30 seconds should be high enough for pretty much any set of systems
using NTP.
Fixes#1035
1) Use the new LeaseExtend
2) Use default values controlled by mount tuning/system defaults instead
of a random hard coded value
3) Remove grace periods
This can be seen via System(). In the PKI backend, if the CA is
reconfigured but not fully (e.g. an intermediate CSR is generated but no
corresponding cert set) and there are already leases (issued certs), the
CRL is unable to be built. As a result revocation fails. But in this
case we don't actually need revocation to be successful since the CRL is
useless after unmounting. By checking taint status we know if we can
simply fast-path out of revocation with a success in this case.
Fixes#946
* Move to one place for both code paths
* Assign ExtKeyUsageAny to CA certs to help with validation with the
Windows Crypto API and Go's validation logic
Fixes#846
