Thanks to Khai Tran for identifying that syslogging has a lower limit
on message size and sometimes large CRLs can hit that limit.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add clarifications on revocation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Talk about rationale for separating roots from intermediates
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Ensure correct write ordering in rebuildIssuersChains
When troubleshooting a recent migration failure from 1.10->1.11, it was
noted that some PKI mounts had bad chain construction despite having
valid, chaining issuers. Due to the cluster's leadership trashing
between nodes, the migration logic was re-executed several times,
partially succeeding each time. While the legacy CA bundle migration
logic was written with this in mind, one shortcoming in the chain
building code lead us to truncate the ca_chain: by sorting the list of
issuers after including non-written issuers (with random IDs), these
issuers would occasionally be persisted prior to storage _prior_ to
existing CAs with modified chains.
The migration code carefully imported the active issuer prior to its
parents. However, due to this bug, there was a chance that, if write to
the pending parent succeeded but updating the active issuer didn't, the
active issuer's ca_chain field would only contain the self-reference and
not the parent's reference as well. Ultimately, a workaround of setting
and subsequently unsetting a manual chain would force a chain
regeneration.
In this patch, we simply fix the write ordering: because we need to
ensure a stable chain sorting, we leave the sort location in the same
place, but delay writing the provided referenceCert to the last
position. This is because the reference is meant to be the user-facing
action: without transactional write capabilities, other chains may
succeed, but if the last user-facing action fails, the user will
hopefully retry the action. This will also correct migration, by
ensuring the subsequent issuer import will be attempted again,
triggering another chain build and only persisting this issuer when
all other issuers have also been updated.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Remigrate ca_chains to fix any missing issuers
In the previous commit, we identified an issue that would occur on
legacy issuer migration to the new storage format. This is easy enough
to detect for any given mount (by an operator), but automating scanning
and remediating all PKI mounts in large deployments might be difficult.
Write a new storage migration version to regenerate all chains on
upgrade, once.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add issue to PKI considerations documentation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Correct %v -> %w in chain building errs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify language around PSS CSR issues
Also point out that PKCS#11 tokens have the same problem.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/considerations.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Allow OCSP to use issuer's RevocationSigAlgo
When an issuer specifies a RevocationSigAlgo, we should largely follow
this for both CRLs and OCSP. However, x/crypto/ocsp lacks support for
PSS signatures, so we drop these down to PKCS#1v1.5 instead.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add warning when issuer has PSS-based RevSigAlgo
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about OCSP and PSS support
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* PKI: Add support for signature_bits param to the intermediate/generate api
- Mainly to work properly with GCP backed managed keys, we need to
issue signatures that would match the GCP key algorithm.
- At this time due to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/45990 we
can't issue PSS signed CSRs, as the libraries in Go always request
a PKCS1v15.
- Add an extra check in intermediate/generate that validates the CSR's
signature before providing it back to the client in case we generated
a bad signature such as if an end-user used a GCP backed managed key
with a RSA PSS algorithm.
- GCP ignores the requested signature type and always signs with the
key's algorithm which can lead to a CSR that says it is signed with
a PKCS1v15 algorithm but is actually a RSA PSS signature
* Add cl
* PR feedback
* Fix interoperability concerns with PSS
When Go parses a certificate with rsaPSS OID, it will accept this
certificate but not parse the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, leaving the
PublicKeyAlgorithm and PublicKey fields blank, but otherwise not erring.
The same behavior occurs with rsaPSS OID CSRs.
On the other hand, when Go parses rsaPSS OID PKCS8 private keys, these
keys will fail to parse completely.
Thus, detect and fail on any empty PublicKey certs and CSRs, warning the
user that we cannot parse these correctly and thus refuse to operate.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Run more PKI tests in parallel
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add notes about PSS shortcomings to considerations
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add more notes about issuer revocation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Note BYOC in considerations
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about http access to CRLs, OCSP
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Recommend enabling auto-tidy & crl rebuilding
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add missing paths to personas
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add per-issuer AIA URI information
Per discussion on GitHub with @maxb, this allows issuers to have their
own copy of AIA URIs. Because each issuer has its own URLs (for CA and
CRL access), its necessary to mint their issued certs pointing to the
correct issuer and not to the global default issuer. For anyone using
multiple issuers within a mount, this change allows the issuer to point
back to itself via leaf's AIA info.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add documentation on per-issuer AIA info
Also add it to the considerations page as something to watch out for.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add tests for per-issuer AIA information
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Refactor AIA setting on the issuer
This introduces a common helper per Steve's suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error messages w.r.t. AIA naming
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error messages regarding AIA URLs
This clarifies which request parameter the invalid URL is contained
in, disambiguating the sometimes ambiguous usage of AIA, per suggestion
by Max.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Rename getURLs -> getGlobalAIAURLs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Correct AIA acronym expansion word orders
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Fix bad comment suggesting re-generating roots
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add two entries to URL tests
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Allow marking issuers as revoked
This allows PKI's issuers to be considered revoked and appear on each
others' CRLs. We disable issuance (via removing the usage) and prohibit
modifying the usage via the regular issuer management interface.
A separate endpoint is necessary because issuers (especially if signed
by a third-party CA using incremental serial numbers) might share a
serial number (e.g., an intermediate under cross-signing might share the
same number as an external root or an unrelated intermediate).
When the next CRL rebuild happens, this issuer will then appear on
others issuers CRLs, if they validate this issuer's certificate.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add documentation on revoking issuers
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add tests for issuer revocation semantics
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Notate that CRLs will be rebuilt
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Fix timestamp field from _utc -> to _rfc3339
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Ensure serial-based accesses shows as revoked
Thanks Kit!
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add warning when revoking default issuer
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Allow Proof of Possession based revocation
Revocation by proof of possession ensures that we have a private key
matching the (provided or stored) certificate. This allows callers to
revoke certificate they own (as proven by holding the corresponding
private key), without having an admin create innumerable ACLs around
the serial_number parameter for every issuance/user.
We base this on Go TLS stack's verification of certificate<->key
matching, but extend it where applicable to ensure curves match, the
private key is indeed valid, and has the same structure as the
corresponding public key from the certificate.
This endpoint currently is authenticated, allowing operators to disable
the endpoint if it isn't desirable to use, via ACL policies.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Clarify error message on ParseDERKey
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add changelog entry
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Leave revoke-with-key authenticated
After some discussion, given the potential for DoS (via submitting a lot
of keys/certs to validate, including invalid pairs), it seems best to
leave this as an authenticated endpoint. Presently in Vault, there's no
way to have an authenticated-but-unauthorized path (i.e., one which
bypasses ACL controls), so it is recommended (but not enforced) to make
this endpoint generally available by permissive ACL policies.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add API documentation on PoP
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add acceptance tests for Proof of Possession
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Exercise negative cases in PoP tests
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
This adds a note that manual_chain is required for cross-signed
intermediates, as Vault will not automatically associate the
cross-signed pair during chain construction. During issuance, the chain
is used verbatim from the issuer, so no chain detection will be used
then.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add missing key_ref parameter to gen root docs
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add API docs section on key generation
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about managed key access
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add a little more information about PKI and replicated data sets.
- Add a TOC to the PKI considerations page
- Merge in the existing certificate storage into a new Replicated DataSets
section
- Move the existing Cluster Scalability section from the api-docs into the
considerations page.
* Add recommendations on key types and PKI performance
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Update website/content/docs/secrets/pki/considerations.mdx
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Clark <steven.clark@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about cross-cluster CRL URIs
As suggested by Ricardo Oliveira, thanks!
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note that short TTLs are relative to quantity
As suggested by Ricardo Oliveira, thanks!
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note to make sure default is configured
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add note about automating certificate renewal
As suggested by Ricardo Oliveira, thanks!
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add leaf not after best practice
Also suggest concrete recommendations for lifetimes of various issuers.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add advice to use a proper CA hierarchy
Also mention name constraints and HSM backing.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add section on safer usage of Roles
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add initial RBAC example for PKI
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Rename pki.mdx -> pki/index.mdx
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Split off quick-start document
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Split off considerations document
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Split off intermediate CA setup document
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Split off setup and usage document
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Consistent quick-start doc naming
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
* Add table of contents to index
Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
