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Merge pull request #232 from dmccarney/master

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Minor documentation typo fixes.
This commit is contained in:
Seth Vargo 2015-05-20 12:27:47 +02:00
parent 513a8edc67 c7bf89cf60
commit 4f34a670e6
2 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
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4
website/source/docs/internals/architecture.html.md
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ clarify what is being discussed:
ACL policies.
* **Secret** - A secret is the term for anything returned by Vault which contains confidential
or cryptographic material. Not all everything returned by Vault is a secret, for example
or cryptographic material. Not everything returned by Vault is a secret, for example
system configuration, status information, or backend policies are not considered Secrets.
Secrets always have an associated lease. This means clients cannot assume that the secret
contents can be used indefinitely. Vault will revoke a secret at the end of the lease, and
@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ Once authenticated, requests are made providing the client token. The token is u
to verify the client is authorized and to load the relevant policies. The policies
are used to authorize the client request. The request is then routed to the secret backend,
which is processed depending on the type of backend. If the backend returns a secret,
the core registers it with the expiration manager and attaches the a lease ID.
the core registers it with the expiration manager and attaches a lease ID.
The lease ID is used by clients to renew or revoke their secret. If a client allows the
lease to expire, the expiration manager automatically revokes the secret.

2
website/source/docs/internals/security.html.md
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The following are not parts of the Vault threat model:
* Protecting against arbitrary control of the storage backend. An attacker
that can perform arbitrary operations against the storage backend can
undermine in any number of ways that are difficult or impossible to protect
undermine security in any number of ways that are difficult or impossible to protect
against. As an example, an attacker could delete or corrupt all the contents
of the storage backend causing total data loss for Vault. The ability to control
reads would allow an attacker to snapshot in a well-known state and rollback state