open-vault/builtin/logical/pki/ca_util.go

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package pki
import (
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/framework"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/certutil"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
)
func (b *backend) getGenerationParams(
data *framework.FieldData,
) (exported bool, format string, role *roleEntry, errorResp *logical.Response) {
exportedStr := data.Get("exported").(string)
switch exportedStr {
case "exported":
exported = true
case "internal":
case "kms":
default:
errorResp = logical.ErrorResponse(
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`the "exported" path parameter must be "internal" or "exported"`)
return
}
format = getFormat(data)
if format == "" {
errorResp = logical.ErrorResponse(
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`the "format" path parameter must be "pem", "der", "der_pkcs", or "pem_bundle"`)
return
}
if exportedStr == "kms" {
_, okKeyType := data.Raw["key_type"]
_, okKeyBits := data.Raw["key_bits"]
if okKeyType || okKeyBits {
errorResp = logical.ErrorResponse(
`invalid parameter for the kms path parameter, key_type nor key_bits arguments can be set in this mode`)
return
}
}
role = &roleEntry{
Add role parameter to restrict issuance of wildcard certificates (#14238) * Add new AllowWildcardCertificate field to PKI role This field allows the PKI role to control whether or not issuance of wildcard certificates are allowed. We default (both on migration and new role creation) to the less secure true value for backwards compatibility with existing Vault versions. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Refactor sanitizedName to reducedName Per comment, this variable name was confusing during the reproduction and subsequent fix of the earlier vulnerability and associated bug report. Because the common name isn't necessarily _sanitized_ in any way (and indeed must be considered in relation to other parts or the whole), but portions of the entire name are removed, reducedName appears to make the most sense. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Enforce AllowWildcardCertificates during issuance This commit adds the bulk of correctly validating wildcard certificate Common Names during issuance according to RFC 6125 Section 6.4.3 semantics. As part of this, support for RFC 2818-conforming wildcard certificates (wherein there are almost no restrictions on issuance) has been removed. Note that this flag does take precedence over AllowAnyName, giving a little more safety in wildcard issuance in this case. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Update test cases to conform with RFC 6125 Test cases 19, 70+71, and 83+84 didn't conform with the RFC 6125, and so should've been rejected under strict conformance. For 70+71 and 83+84, we previously conditioned around the value of AllowSubdomains (allowing issuance when true), but they likely should've been rejected either way. Additionally, update the notes about globs matching wildcard certificates to notate this is indeed the case. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Check AllowWildcardCertifciates in issuance tests This allows for regression tests to cover the new AllowWildcardCertificate conditional. We add additional test cases ensuring that wildcard issuance is properly forbidden in all relevant scenarios, while allowing the existing test cases to validate that wildcard status doesn't affect non-wildcard certificates. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Add Wildcard allowance during signing operations When using sign-verbatim, sign-intermediate, or getting certificate generation parameters, set AllowWildcardCertificates to mirror existing policies. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Add changelog entry Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
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TTL: time.Duration(data.Get("ttl").(int)) * time.Second,
KeyType: data.Get("key_type").(string),
KeyBits: data.Get("key_bits").(int),
SignatureBits: data.Get("signature_bits").(int),
AllowLocalhost: true,
AllowAnyName: true,
AllowIPSANs: true,
AllowWildcardCertificates: new(bool),
EnforceHostnames: false,
AllowedURISANs: []string{"*"},
AllowedOtherSANs: []string{"*"},
AllowedSerialNumbers: []string{"*"},
OU: data.Get("ou").([]string),
Organization: data.Get("organization").([]string),
Country: data.Get("country").([]string),
Locality: data.Get("locality").([]string),
Province: data.Get("province").([]string),
StreetAddress: data.Get("street_address").([]string),
PostalCode: data.Get("postal_code").([]string),
}
Add role parameter to restrict issuance of wildcard certificates (#14238) * Add new AllowWildcardCertificate field to PKI role This field allows the PKI role to control whether or not issuance of wildcard certificates are allowed. We default (both on migration and new role creation) to the less secure true value for backwards compatibility with existing Vault versions. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Refactor sanitizedName to reducedName Per comment, this variable name was confusing during the reproduction and subsequent fix of the earlier vulnerability and associated bug report. Because the common name isn't necessarily _sanitized_ in any way (and indeed must be considered in relation to other parts or the whole), but portions of the entire name are removed, reducedName appears to make the most sense. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Enforce AllowWildcardCertificates during issuance This commit adds the bulk of correctly validating wildcard certificate Common Names during issuance according to RFC 6125 Section 6.4.3 semantics. As part of this, support for RFC 2818-conforming wildcard certificates (wherein there are almost no restrictions on issuance) has been removed. Note that this flag does take precedence over AllowAnyName, giving a little more safety in wildcard issuance in this case. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Update test cases to conform with RFC 6125 Test cases 19, 70+71, and 83+84 didn't conform with the RFC 6125, and so should've been rejected under strict conformance. For 70+71 and 83+84, we previously conditioned around the value of AllowSubdomains (allowing issuance when true), but they likely should've been rejected either way. Additionally, update the notes about globs matching wildcard certificates to notate this is indeed the case. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Check AllowWildcardCertifciates in issuance tests This allows for regression tests to cover the new AllowWildcardCertificate conditional. We add additional test cases ensuring that wildcard issuance is properly forbidden in all relevant scenarios, while allowing the existing test cases to validate that wildcard status doesn't affect non-wildcard certificates. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Add Wildcard allowance during signing operations When using sign-verbatim, sign-intermediate, or getting certificate generation parameters, set AllowWildcardCertificates to mirror existing policies. Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com> * Add changelog entry Signed-off-by: Alexander Scheel <alex.scheel@hashicorp.com>
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*role.AllowWildcardCertificates = true
var err error
if role.KeyBits, role.SignatureBits, err = certutil.ValidateDefaultOrValueKeyTypeSignatureLength(role.KeyType, role.KeyBits, role.SignatureBits); err != nil {
errorResp = logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error())
}
return
}