2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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package aws
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import (
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2018-01-19 06:44:44 +00:00
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"context"
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2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
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"fmt"
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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"log"
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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"net/http"
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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"os"
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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"reflect"
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2019-03-31 13:10:17 +00:00
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"strings"
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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"sync"
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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"testing"
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"time"
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2015-08-06 16:26:41 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/awserr"
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2015-08-06 16:37:08 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/credentials"
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2015-10-30 22:22:48 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/session"
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/dynamodb"
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2015-08-06 16:26:41 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/ec2"
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/iam"
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/iam/iamiface"
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/sts"
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2019-01-09 00:48:57 +00:00
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cleanhttp "github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp"
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/testhelpers"
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2019-04-12 21:54:35 +00:00
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logicaltest "github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/testhelpers/logical"
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2019-04-13 07:44:06 +00:00
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
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)
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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var initSetup sync.Once
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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type mockIAMClient struct {
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iamiface.IAMAPI
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}
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func (m *mockIAMClient) CreateUser(input *iam.CreateUserInput) (*iam.CreateUserOutput, error) {
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return nil, awserr.New("Throttling", "", nil)
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}
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2015-12-01 05:05:04 +00:00
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func getBackend(t *testing.T) logical.Backend {
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2018-01-19 06:44:44 +00:00
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be, _ := Factory(context.Background(), logical.TestBackendConfig())
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2015-12-01 05:05:04 +00:00
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return be
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}
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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func TestBackend_basic(t *testing.T) {
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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t.Parallel()
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
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2016-04-05 19:10:44 +00:00
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AcceptanceTest: true,
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PreCheck: func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
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2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
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LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
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testAccStepConfig(t),
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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testAccStepWritePolicy(t, "test", testDynamoPolicy),
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testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listDynamoTablesTest}),
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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},
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})
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}
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2019-09-19 23:35:12 +00:00
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func TestBackend_IamUserWithPermissionsBoundary(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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roleData := map[string]interface{}{
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"credential_type": iamUserCred,
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"policy_arns": adminAccessPolicyArn,
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"permissions_boundary_arn": iamPolicyArn,
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}
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logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
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AcceptanceTest: true,
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PreCheck: func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
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LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
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Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
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testAccStepConfig(t),
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testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
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testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listIamUsersTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
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},
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})
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}
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2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
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func TestBackend_basicSTS(t *testing.T) {
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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t.Parallel()
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awsAccountID, err := getAccountID()
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if err != nil {
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t.Logf("Unable to retrive user via sts:GetCallerIdentity: %#v", err)
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t.Skip("Could not determine AWS account ID from sts:GetCallerIdentity for acceptance tests, skipping")
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}
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roleName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
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userName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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accessKey := &awsAccessKey{}
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2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
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logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
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2016-04-05 19:10:44 +00:00
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AcceptanceTest: true,
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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PreCheck: func() {
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testAccPreCheck(t)
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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createUser(t, userName, accessKey)
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secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
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createRole(t, roleName, awsAccountID, []string{ec2PolicyArn})
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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// Sleep sometime because AWS is eventually consistent
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// Both the createUser and createRole depend on this
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log.Println("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
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time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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},
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2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
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LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
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2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
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Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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testAccStepConfigWithCreds(t, accessKey),
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2018-09-26 14:10:00 +00:00
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testAccStepRotateRoot(accessKey),
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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testAccStepWritePolicy(t, "test", testDynamoPolicy),
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testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listDynamoTablesTest}),
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testAccStepWriteArnPolicyRef(t, "test", ec2PolicyArn),
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2016-02-23 13:55:43 +00:00
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testAccStepReadSTSWithArnPolicy(t, "test"),
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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testAccStepWriteArnRoleRef(t, "test2", roleName, awsAccountID),
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testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test2", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest}),
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2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
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},
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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Teardown: func() error {
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secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
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if err := deleteTestRole(roleName); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return deleteTestUser(accessKey, userName)
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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},
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2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
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})
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}
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2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
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func TestBackend_policyCrud(t *testing.T) {
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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t.Parallel()
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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compacted, err := compactJSON(testDynamoPolicy)
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if err != nil {
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2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
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t.Fatalf("bad: %s", err)
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}
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logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
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2016-04-05 19:10:44 +00:00
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AcceptanceTest: true,
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2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
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LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
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2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
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Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
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testAccStepConfig(t),
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2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
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testAccStepWritePolicy(t, "test", testDynamoPolicy),
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testAccStepReadPolicy(t, "test", compacted),
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2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
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testAccStepDeletePolicy(t, "test"),
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testAccStepReadPolicy(t, "test", ""),
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},
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})
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}
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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func TestBackend_throttled(t *testing.T) {
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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t.Parallel()
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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config := logical.TestBackendConfig()
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config.StorageView = &logical.InmemStorage{}
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b := Backend()
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if err := b.Setup(context.Background(), config); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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connData := map[string]interface{}{
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"credential_type": "iam_user",
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}
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confReq := &logical.Request{
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Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
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Path: "roles/something",
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Storage: config.StorageView,
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Data: connData,
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}
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resp, err := b.HandleRequest(context.Background(), confReq)
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if err != nil || (resp != nil && resp.IsError()) {
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t.Fatalf("failed to write configuration: resp:%#v err:%s", resp, err)
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}
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// Mock the IAM API call to return a throttled response to the CreateUser API
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// call
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b.iamClient = &mockIAMClient{}
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credReq := &logical.Request{
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Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
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Path: "creds/something",
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Storage: config.StorageView,
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}
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credResp, err := b.HandleRequest(context.Background(), credReq)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to trigger expected throttling error condition: resp:%#v", credResp)
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}
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rErr := credResp.Error()
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expected := "Error creating IAM user: Throttling: "
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if rErr.Error() != expected {
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t.Fatalf("error message did not match, expected (%s), got (%s)", expected, rErr.Error())
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}
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// verify the error we got back is returned with a http.StatusBadGateway
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code, err := logical.RespondErrorCommon(credReq, credResp, err)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error after running req/resp/err through RespondErrorCommon, got nil")
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}
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if code != http.StatusBadGateway {
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t.Fatalf("expected HTTP status 'bad gateway', got: (%d)", code)
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}
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}
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2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
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func testAccPreCheck(t *testing.T) {
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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initSetup.Do(func() {
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if v := os.Getenv("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION"); v == "" {
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log.Println("[INFO] Test: Using us-west-2 as test region")
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os.Setenv("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION", "us-west-2")
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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}
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2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
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})
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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}
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2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
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func getAccountID() (string, error) {
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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awsConfig := &aws.Config{
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
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HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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}
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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svc := sts.New(session.New(awsConfig))
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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params := &sts.GetCallerIdentityInput{}
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res, err := svc.GetCallerIdentity(params)
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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if res == nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("got nil response from GetCallerIdentity")
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}
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
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return *res.Account, nil
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2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
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}
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|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
func createRole(t *testing.T, roleName, awsAccountID string, policyARNs []string) {
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
const testRoleAssumePolicy = `{
|
|
|
|
"Version": "2012-10-17",
|
|
|
|
"Statement": [
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
"Effect":"Allow",
|
|
|
|
"Principal": {
|
|
|
|
"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::%s:root"
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
`
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svc := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
trustPolicy := fmt.Sprintf(testRoleAssumePolicy, awsAccountID)
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params := &iam.CreateRoleInput{
|
|
|
|
AssumeRolePolicyDocument: aws.String(trustPolicy),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
RoleName: aws.String(roleName),
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: aws.String("/"),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
log.Printf("[INFO] AWS CreateRole: %s", roleName)
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err := svc.CreateRole(params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2016-12-21 18:08:27 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS CreateRole failed: %v", err)
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
for _, policyARN := range policyARNs {
|
|
|
|
attachment := &iam.AttachRolePolicyInput{
|
|
|
|
PolicyArn: aws.String(policyARN),
|
|
|
|
RoleName: aws.String(roleName), // Required
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = svc.AttachRolePolicy(attachment)
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS AttachRolePolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
func createUser(t *testing.T, userName string, accessKey *awsAccessKey) {
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
// The sequence of user creation actions is carefully chosen to minimize
|
|
|
|
// impact of stolen IAM user credentials
|
|
|
|
// 1. Create user, without any permissions or credentials. At this point,
|
|
|
|
// nobody cares if creds compromised because this user can do nothing.
|
|
|
|
// 2. Attach the timebomb policy. This grants no access but puts a time limit
|
2019-03-19 13:32:45 +00:00
|
|
|
// on validity of compromised credentials. If this fails, nobody cares
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
// because the user has no permissions to do anything anyway
|
|
|
|
// 3. Attach the AdminAccess policy. The IAM user still has no credentials to
|
|
|
|
// do anything
|
|
|
|
// 4. Generate API creds to get an actual access key and secret key
|
|
|
|
timebombPolicyTemplate := `{
|
|
|
|
"Version": "2012-10-17",
|
|
|
|
"Statement": [
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
"Effect": "Deny",
|
|
|
|
"Action": "*",
|
|
|
|
"Resource": "*",
|
|
|
|
"Condition": {
|
|
|
|
"DateGreaterThan": {
|
|
|
|
"aws:CurrentTime": "%s"
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
`
|
|
|
|
validity := time.Duration(2 * time.Hour)
|
|
|
|
expiry := time.Now().Add(validity)
|
|
|
|
timebombPolicy := fmt.Sprintf(timebombPolicyTemplate, expiry.Format(time.RFC3339))
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svc := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
createUserInput := &iam.CreateUserInput{
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
log.Printf("[INFO] AWS CreateUser: %s", userName)
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err := svc.CreateUser(createUserInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS CreateUser failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
putPolicyInput := &iam.PutUserPolicyInput{
|
|
|
|
PolicyDocument: aws.String(timebombPolicy),
|
|
|
|
PolicyName: aws.String("SelfDestructionTimebomb"),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = svc.PutUserPolicy(putPolicyInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS PutUserPolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
attachUserPolicyInput := &iam.AttachUserPolicyInput{
|
|
|
|
PolicyArn: aws.String("arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = svc.AttachUserPolicy(attachUserPolicyInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS AttachUserPolicy failed, %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
createAccessKeyInput := &iam.CreateAccessKeyInput{
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
createAccessKeyOutput, err := svc.CreateAccessKey(createAccessKeyInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS CreateAccessKey failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if createAccessKeyOutput == nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("AWS CreateAccessKey returned nil")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
genAccessKey := createAccessKeyOutput.AccessKey
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
|
|
|
accessKey.AccessKeyID = *genAccessKey.AccessKeyId
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
accessKey.SecretAccessKey = *genAccessKey.SecretAccessKey
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
func deleteTestRole(roleName string) error {
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svc := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
listAttachmentsInput := &iam.ListAttachedRolePoliciesInput{
|
|
|
|
RoleName: aws.String(roleName),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
detacher := func(result *iam.ListAttachedRolePoliciesOutput, lastPage bool) bool {
|
|
|
|
for _, policy := range result.AttachedPolicies {
|
|
|
|
detachInput := &iam.DetachRolePolicyInput{
|
|
|
|
PolicyArn: policy.PolicyArn,
|
|
|
|
RoleName: aws.String(roleName), // Required
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err := svc.DetachRolePolicy(detachInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DetachRolePolicy failed for policy %s: %v", *policy.PolicyArn, err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
err := svc.ListAttachedRolePoliciesPages(listAttachmentsInput, detacher)
|
2017-07-07 12:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DetachRolePolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
params := &iam.DeleteRoleInput{
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
RoleName: aws.String(roleName),
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
log.Printf("[INFO] AWS DeleteRole: %s", roleName)
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err = svc.DeleteRole(params)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DeleteRole failed: %v", err)
|
2017-07-07 12:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return err
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
func deleteTestUser(accessKey *awsAccessKey, userName string) error {
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svc := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
userDetachment := &iam.DetachUserPolicyInput{
|
|
|
|
PolicyArn: aws.String("arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err := svc.DetachUserPolicy(userDetachment)
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DetachUserPolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
deleteAccessKeyInput := &iam.DeleteAccessKeyInput{
|
2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
|
|
|
AccessKeyId: aws.String(accessKey.AccessKeyID),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = svc.DeleteAccessKey(deleteAccessKeyInput)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DeleteAccessKey failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
deleteTestUserPolicyInput := &iam.DeleteUserPolicyInput{
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
PolicyName: aws.String("SelfDestructionTimebomb"),
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err = svc.DeleteUserPolicy(deleteTestUserPolicyInput)
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DeleteUserPolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
deleteTestUserInput := &iam.DeleteUserInput{
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
UserName: aws.String(userName),
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
log.Printf("[INFO] AWS DeleteUser: %s", userName)
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
_, err = svc.DeleteUser(deleteTestUserInput)
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] AWS DeleteUser failed: %v", err)
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-07 12:23:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return nil
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepConfig(t *testing.T) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
2016-01-07 15:30:47 +00:00
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
2015-04-19 05:21:31 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "config/root",
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Data: map[string]interface{}{
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
"region": os.Getenv("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepConfigWithCreds(t *testing.T, accessKey *awsAccessKey) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "config/root",
|
|
|
|
Data: map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"region": os.Getenv("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION"),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
PreFlight: func(req *logical.Request) error {
|
|
|
|
// Values in Data above get eagerly evaluated due to the testing framework.
|
|
|
|
// In particular, they get evaluated before accessKey gets set by CreateUser
|
|
|
|
// and thus would fail. By moving to a closure in a PreFlight, we ensure that
|
|
|
|
// the creds get evaluated lazily after they've been properly set
|
2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
|
|
|
req.Data["access_key"] = accessKey.AccessKeyID
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
req.Data["secret_key"] = accessKey.SecretAccessKey
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 14:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepRotateRoot(oldAccessKey *awsAccessKey) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "config/rotate-root",
|
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp == nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("received nil response from config/rotate-root")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newAccessKeyID := resp.Data["access_key"].(string)
|
|
|
|
if newAccessKeyID == oldAccessKey.AccessKeyID {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("rotate-root didn't rotate access key")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
Credentials: credentials.NewStaticCredentials(oldAccessKey.AccessKeyID, oldAccessKey.SecretAccessKey, ""),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sigh....
|
|
|
|
oldAccessKey.AccessKeyID = newAccessKeyID
|
|
|
|
log.Println("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
|
|
|
|
svc := sts.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
params := &sts.GetCallerIdentityInput{}
|
|
|
|
_, err := svc.GetCallerIdentity(params)
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: old credentials succeeded after rotate")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aerr, ok := err.(awserr.Error); ok {
|
|
|
|
if aerr.Code() != "InvalidClientTokenId" {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown error returned from AWS: %#v", aerr)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepRead(t *testing.T, path, name string, credentialTests []credentialTestFunc) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: path + "/" + name,
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
var d struct {
|
|
|
|
AccessKey string `mapstructure:"access_key"`
|
|
|
|
SecretKey string `mapstructure:"secret_key"`
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
STSToken string `mapstructure:"security_token"`
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := mapstructure.Decode(resp.Data, &d); err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Generated credentials: %v", d)
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
for _, test := range credentialTests {
|
|
|
|
err := test(d.AccessKey, d.SecretKey, d.STSToken)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return nil
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-02 14:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepReadTTL(name string, maximumTTL time.Duration) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "creds/" + name,
|
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp.Secret == nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: nil Secret returned")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ttl := resp.Secret.TTL
|
|
|
|
if ttl > maximumTTL {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: ttl of %d greater than maximum of %d", ttl/time.Second, maximumTTL/time.Second)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func describeInstancesTest(accessKey, secretKey, token string) error {
|
|
|
|
creds := credentials.NewStaticCredentials(accessKey, secretKey, token)
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Credentials: creds,
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := ec2.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Verifying that the generated credentials work with ec2:DescribeInstances...")
|
|
|
|
return retryUntilSuccess(func() error {
|
|
|
|
_, err := client.DescribeInstances(&ec2.DescribeInstancesInput{})
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func describeAzsTestUnauthorized(accessKey, secretKey, token string) error {
|
|
|
|
creds := credentials.NewStaticCredentials(accessKey, secretKey, token)
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Credentials: creds,
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := ec2.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Verifying that the generated credentials don't work with ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones...")
|
|
|
|
return retryUntilSuccess(func() error {
|
|
|
|
_, err := client.DescribeAvailabilityZones(&ec2.DescribeAvailabilityZonesInput{})
|
|
|
|
// Need to make sure AWS authenticates the generated credentials but does not authorize the operation
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("operation succeeded when expected failure")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if aerr, ok := err.(awserr.Error); ok {
|
|
|
|
if aerr.Code() == "UnauthorizedOperation" {
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-31 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
func assertCreatedIAMUser(accessKey, secretKey, token string) error {
|
|
|
|
creds := credentials.NewStaticCredentials(accessKey, secretKey, token)
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Credentials: creds,
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Checking if IAM User is created properly...")
|
|
|
|
userOutput, err := client.GetUser(&iam.GetUserInput{})
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if *userOutput.User.Path != "/path/" {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: got: %#v\nexpected: %#v", userOutput.User.Path, "/path/")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func listIamUsersTest(accessKey, secretKey, token string) error {
|
|
|
|
creds := credentials.NewStaticCredentials(accessKey, secretKey, token)
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Credentials: creds,
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := iam.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Verifying that the generated credentials work with iam:ListUsers...")
|
|
|
|
return retryUntilSuccess(func() error {
|
|
|
|
_, err := client.ListUsers(&iam.ListUsersInput{})
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func listDynamoTablesTest(accessKey, secretKey, token string) error {
|
|
|
|
creds := credentials.NewStaticCredentials(accessKey, secretKey, token)
|
|
|
|
awsConfig := &aws.Config{
|
|
|
|
Credentials: creds,
|
|
|
|
Region: aws.String("us-east-1"),
|
|
|
|
HTTPClient: cleanhttp.DefaultClient(),
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := dynamodb.New(session.New(awsConfig))
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Verifying that the generated credentials work with dynamodb:ListTables...")
|
|
|
|
return retryUntilSuccess(func() error {
|
|
|
|
_, err := client.ListTables(&dynamodb.ListTablesInput{})
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func retryUntilSuccess(op func() error) error {
|
|
|
|
retryCount := 0
|
|
|
|
success := false
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
for !success && retryCount < 10 {
|
|
|
|
err = op()
|
|
|
|
if err == nil {
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return nil
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(time.Second)
|
|
|
|
retryCount++
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return err
|
2016-01-08 22:19:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-23 13:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepReadSTSWithArnPolicy(t *testing.T, name string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "sts/" + name,
|
|
|
|
ErrorOk: true,
|
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp.Data["error"] !=
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
"attempted to retrieve iam_user credentials through the sts path; this is not allowed for legacy roles" {
|
2016-02-23 13:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %v", resp)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepWritePolicy(t *testing.T, name string, policy string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
2016-01-07 15:30:47 +00:00
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
2015-04-27 21:20:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Data: map[string]interface{}{
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
"policy": policy,
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepDeletePolicy(t *testing.T, n string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.DeleteOperation,
|
2015-04-27 21:20:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + n,
|
2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepReadPolicy(t *testing.T, name string, value string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
2015-04-27 21:20:28 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp == nil {
|
|
|
|
if value == "" {
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: %#v", resp)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
expected := map[string]interface{}{
|
2019-09-19 23:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
"policy_arns": []string(nil),
|
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string(nil),
|
|
|
|
"policy_document": value,
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": strings.Join([]string{iamUserCred, federationTokenCred}, ","),
|
|
|
|
"default_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"max_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"user_path": "",
|
|
|
|
"permissions_boundary_arn": "",
|
2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(resp.Data, expected) {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: got: %#v\nexpected: %#v", resp.Data, expected)
|
2015-04-19 05:13:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
const testDynamoPolicy = `{
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
"Version": "2012-10-17",
|
|
|
|
"Statement": [
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
"Sid": "Stmt1426528957000",
|
|
|
|
"Effect": "Allow",
|
|
|
|
"Action": [
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
"dynamodb:List*"
|
2015-03-20 16:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
"Resource": [
|
|
|
|
"*"
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
`
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-09-19 23:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
const adminAccessPolicyArn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
const ec2PolicyArn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonEC2ReadOnlyAccess"
|
|
|
|
const iamPolicyArn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/IAMReadOnlyAccess"
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
const dynamoPolicyArn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AmazonDynamoDBReadOnlyAccess"
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepWriteRole(t *testing.T, name string, data map[string]interface{}) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
|
|
|
Data: data,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepReadRole(t *testing.T, name string, expected map[string]interface{}) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp == nil {
|
|
|
|
if expected == nil {
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: nil response")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(resp.Data, expected) {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: got %#v\nexpected: %#v", resp.Data, expected)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepWriteArnPolicyRef(t *testing.T, name string, arn string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
2016-01-21 20:04:16 +00:00
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
|
|
|
Data: map[string]interface{}{
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
"arn": ec2PolicyArn,
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestBackend_basicPolicyArnRef(t *testing.T) {
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
2016-04-05 19:10:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
|
2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteArnPolicyRef(t, "test", ec2PolicyArn),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest}),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestBackend_iamUserManagedInlinePolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
compacted, err := compactJSON(testDynamoPolicy)
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Fatalf("bad: %#v", err)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
roleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"policy_document": testDynamoPolicy,
|
|
|
|
"policy_arns": []string{ec2PolicyArn, iamPolicyArn},
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": iamUserCred,
|
2019-03-31 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
"user_path": "/path/",
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
expectedRoleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
2019-09-19 23:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
"policy_document": compacted,
|
|
|
|
"policy_arns": []string{ec2PolicyArn, iamPolicyArn},
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": iamUserCred,
|
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string(nil),
|
|
|
|
"default_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"max_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"user_path": "/path/",
|
|
|
|
"permissions_boundary_arn": "",
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-03-31 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() { testAccPreCheck(t) },
|
2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepReadRole(t, "test", expectedRoleData),
|
2019-03-31 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest, listIamUsersTest, listDynamoTablesTest, assertCreatedIAMUser}),
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest, listIamUsersTest, listDynamoTablesTest}),
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestBackend_AssumedRoleWithPolicyDoc(t *testing.T) {
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
roleName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
// This looks a bit curious. The policy document and the role document act
|
|
|
|
// as a logical intersection of policies. The role allows ec2:Describe*
|
|
|
|
// (among other permissions). This policy allows everything BUT
|
|
|
|
// ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones. Thus, the logical intersection of the two
|
|
|
|
// is all ec2:Describe* EXCEPT ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones, and so the
|
|
|
|
// describeAZs call should fail
|
|
|
|
allowAllButDescribeAzs := `
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
"Version": "2012-10-17",
|
|
|
|
"Statement": [{
|
|
|
|
"Effect": "Allow",
|
|
|
|
"NotAction": "ec2:DescribeAvailabilityZones",
|
|
|
|
"Resource": "*"
|
|
|
|
}]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
`
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
awsAccountID, err := getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Logf("Unable to retrive user via sts:GetCallerIdentity: %#v", err)
|
|
|
|
t.Skip("Could not determine AWS account ID from sts:GetCallerIdentity for acceptance tests, skipping")
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
roleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"policy_document": allowAllButDescribeAzs,
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:role/%s", awsAccountID, roleName)},
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
"credential_type": assumedRoleCred,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() {
|
|
|
|
testAccPreCheck(t)
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
createRole(t, roleName, awsAccountID, []string{ec2PolicyArn})
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
// Sleep sometime because AWS is eventually consistent
|
|
|
|
log.Println("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{describeInstancesTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
Teardown: func() error {
|
|
|
|
return deleteTestRole(roleName)
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestBackend_AssumedRoleWithPolicyARN(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
roleName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
awsAccountID, err := getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Logf("Unable to retrive user via sts:GetCallerIdentity: %#v", err)
|
|
|
|
t.Skip("Could not determine AWS account ID from sts:GetCallerIdentity for acceptance tests, skipping")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
roleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"policy_arns": iamPolicyArn,
|
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:role/%s", awsAccountID, roleName)},
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": assumedRoleCred,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() {
|
|
|
|
testAccPreCheck(t)
|
|
|
|
createRole(t, roleName, awsAccountID, []string{ec2PolicyArn, iamPolicyArn})
|
|
|
|
log.Printf("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listIamUsersTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listIamUsersTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Teardown: func() error {
|
|
|
|
return deleteTestRole(roleName)
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func TestBackend_FederationTokenWithPolicyARN(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
userName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
|
|
|
|
accessKey := &awsAccessKey{}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
roleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"policy_arns": dynamoPolicyArn,
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": federationTokenCred,
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() {
|
|
|
|
testAccPreCheck(t)
|
|
|
|
createUser(t, userName, accessKey)
|
|
|
|
// Sleep sometime because AWS is eventually consistent
|
|
|
|
log.Println("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfigWithCreds(t, accessKey),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "sts", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listDynamoTablesTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepRead(t, "creds", "test", []credentialTestFunc{listDynamoTablesTest, describeAzsTestUnauthorized}),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Teardown: func() error {
|
2019-09-13 18:05:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return deleteTestUser(accessKey, userName)
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-02 14:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestBackend_RoleDefaultSTSTTL(t *testing.T) {
|
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
|
|
|
roleName := generateUniqueName(t.Name())
|
|
|
|
minAwsAssumeRoleDuration := 900
|
|
|
|
awsAccountID, err := getAccountID()
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
|
|
t.Logf("Unable to retrive user via sts:GetCallerIdentity: %#v", err)
|
|
|
|
t.Skip("Could not determine AWS account ID from sts:GetCallerIdentity for acceptance tests, skipping")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
roleData := map[string]interface{}{
|
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string{fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:role/%s", awsAccountID, roleName)},
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": assumedRoleCred,
|
|
|
|
"default_sts_ttl": minAwsAssumeRoleDuration,
|
2018-10-20 14:36:47 +00:00
|
|
|
"max_sts_ttl": minAwsAssumeRoleDuration,
|
2018-10-02 14:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
|
|
|
PreCheck: func() {
|
|
|
|
testAccPreCheck(t)
|
secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles (#6789)
* secret/aws: Pass policy ARNs to AssumedRole and FederationToken roles
AWS now allows you to pass policy ARNs as well as, and in addition to,
policy documents for AssumeRole and GetFederationToken (see
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2019/05/session-permissions/).
Vault already collects policy ARNs for iam_user credential types; now it
will allow policy ARNs for assumed_role and federation_token credential
types and plumb them through to the appropriate AWS calls.
This brings along a minor breaking change. Vault roles of the
federation_token credential type are now required to have either a
policy_document or a policy_arns specified. This was implicit
previously; a missing policy_document would result in a validation error
from the AWS SDK when retrieving credentials. However, it would still
allow creating a role that didn't have a policy_document specified and
then later specifying it, after which retrieving the AWS credentials
would work. Similar workflows in which the Vault role didn't have a
policy_document specified for some period of time, such as deleting the
policy_document and then later adding it back, would also have worked
previously but will now be broken.
The reason for this breaking change is because a credential_type of
federation_token without either a policy_document or policy_arns
specified will return credentials that have equivalent permissions to
the credentials the Vault server itself is using. This is quite
dangerous (e.g., it could allow Vault clients access to retrieve
credentials that could modify Vault's underlying storage) and so should
be discouraged. This scenario is still possible when passing in an
appropriate policy_document or policy_arns parameter, but clients should
be explicitly aware of what they are doing and opt in to it by passing
in the appropriate role parameters.
* Error out on dangerous federation token retrieval
The AWS secrets role code now disallows creation of a dangerous role
configuration; however, pre-existing roles could have existed that would
trigger this now-dangerous code path, so also adding a check for this
configuration at credential retrieval time.
* Run makefmt
* Fix tests
* Fix comments/docs
2019-08-20 19:34:41 +00:00
|
|
|
createRole(t, roleName, awsAccountID, []string{ec2PolicyArn})
|
2018-10-02 14:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
log.Println("[WARN] Sleeping for 10 seconds waiting for AWS...")
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
|
|
|
|
},
|
2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
2018-10-02 14:14:16 +00:00
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteRole(t, "test", roleData),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepReadTTL("test", time.Duration(minAwsAssumeRoleDuration)*time.Second), // allow a little slack
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
Teardown: func() error {
|
|
|
|
return deleteTestRole(roleName)
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
func TestBackend_policyArnCrud(t *testing.T) {
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
t.Parallel()
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
logicaltest.Test(t, logicaltest.TestCase{
|
2016-04-05 19:10:44 +00:00
|
|
|
AcceptanceTest: true,
|
2018-11-07 01:21:24 +00:00
|
|
|
LogicalBackend: getBackend(t),
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
Steps: []logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
testAccStepConfig(t),
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
testAccStepWriteArnPolicyRef(t, "test", ec2PolicyArn),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepReadArnPolicy(t, "test", ec2PolicyArn),
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
testAccStepDeletePolicy(t, "test"),
|
|
|
|
testAccStepReadArnPolicy(t, "test", ""),
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func testAccStepReadArnPolicy(t *testing.T, name string, value string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.ReadOperation,
|
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + name,
|
|
|
|
Check: func(resp *logical.Response) error {
|
|
|
|
if resp == nil {
|
|
|
|
if value == "" {
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: %#v", resp)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
expected := map[string]interface{}{
|
2019-09-19 23:35:12 +00:00
|
|
|
"policy_arns": []string{value},
|
|
|
|
"role_arns": []string(nil),
|
|
|
|
"policy_document": "",
|
|
|
|
"credential_type": iamUserCred,
|
|
|
|
"default_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"max_sts_ttl": int64(0),
|
|
|
|
"user_path": "",
|
|
|
|
"permissions_boundary_arn": "",
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if !reflect.DeepEqual(resp.Data, expected) {
|
|
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("bad: got: %#v\nexpected: %#v", resp.Data, expected)
|
2015-12-30 18:05:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
func testAccStepWriteArnRoleRef(t *testing.T, vaultRoleName, awsRoleName, awsAccountID string) logicaltest.TestStep {
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
return logicaltest.TestStep{
|
|
|
|
Operation: logical.UpdateOperation,
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
Path: "roles/" + vaultRoleName,
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
Data: map[string]interface{}{
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
"arn": fmt.Sprintf("arn:aws:iam::%s:role/%s", awsAccountID, awsRoleName),
|
2016-04-12 02:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-26 00:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
func generateUniqueName(prefix string) string {
|
|
|
|
return testhelpers.RandomWithPrefix(prefix)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
type awsAccessKey struct {
|
2018-09-18 20:26:06 +00:00
|
|
|
AccessKeyID string
|
2018-03-13 14:35:10 +00:00
|
|
|
SecretAccessKey string
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-08-16 10:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
type credentialTestFunc func(string, string, string) error
|