open-vault/audit/format.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package audit
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
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"time"
squarejwt "gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2/jwt"
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"github.com/hashicorp/vault/helper/namespace"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/salt"
"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
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)
type AuditFormatWriter interface {
// WriteRequest writes the request entry to the writer or returns an error.
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WriteRequest(io.Writer, *AuditRequestEntry) error
// WriteResponse writes the response entry to the writer or returns an error.
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WriteResponse(io.Writer, *AuditResponseEntry) error
// Salt returns a non-nil salt or an error.
Salt(context.Context) (*salt.Salt, error)
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}
// AuditFormatter implements the Formatter interface, and allows the underlying
// marshaller to be swapped out
type AuditFormatter struct {
AuditFormatWriter
}
var _ Formatter = (*AuditFormatter)(nil)
func (f *AuditFormatter) FormatRequest(ctx context.Context, w io.Writer, config FormatterConfig, in *logical.LogInput) error {
if in == nil || in.Request == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("request to request-audit a nil request")
}
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if w == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writer for audit request is nil")
}
if f.AuditFormatWriter == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no format writer specified")
}
salt, err := f.Salt(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error fetching salt: %w", err)
}
// Set these to the input values at first
auth := in.Auth
req := in.Request
var connState *tls.ConnectionState
if auth == nil {
auth = new(logical.Auth)
}
if in.Request.Connection != nil && in.Request.Connection.ConnState != nil {
connState = in.Request.Connection.ConnState
}
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if !config.Raw {
auth, err = HashAuth(salt, auth, config.HMACAccessor)
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if err != nil {
return err
}
req, err = HashRequest(salt, req, config.HMACAccessor, in.NonHMACReqDataKeys)
if err != nil {
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return err
}
}
var errString string
if in.OuterErr != nil {
errString = in.OuterErr.Error()
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}
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ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reqType := in.Type
if reqType == "" {
reqType = "request"
}
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reqEntry := &AuditRequestEntry{
Type: reqType,
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Error: errString,
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Auth: &AuditAuth{
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ClientToken: auth.ClientToken,
Accessor: auth.Accessor,
DisplayName: auth.DisplayName,
Policies: auth.Policies,
TokenPolicies: auth.TokenPolicies,
IdentityPolicies: auth.IdentityPolicies,
ExternalNamespacePolicies: auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies,
NoDefaultPolicy: auth.NoDefaultPolicy,
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Metadata: auth.Metadata,
EntityID: auth.EntityID,
RemainingUses: req.ClientTokenRemainingUses,
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TokenType: auth.TokenType.String(),
TokenTTL: int64(auth.TTL.Seconds()),
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},
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Request: &AuditRequest{
ID: req.ID,
ClientID: req.ClientID,
ClientToken: req.ClientToken,
ClientTokenAccessor: req.ClientTokenAccessor,
Operation: req.Operation,
MountType: req.MountType,
MountAccessor: req.MountAccessor,
MountRunningVersion: req.MountRunningVersion(),
MountRunningSha256: req.MountRunningSha256(),
MountIsExternalPlugin: req.MountIsExternalPlugin(),
MountClass: req.MountClass(),
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Namespace: &AuditNamespace{
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ID: ns.ID,
Path: ns.Path,
},
Path: req.Path,
Data: req.Data,
PolicyOverride: req.PolicyOverride,
RemoteAddr: getRemoteAddr(req),
Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available (#12790) * Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available The `request.remote_port` field is now present in the audit log when it is available: ``` { "time": "2021-10-10T13:53:51.760039Z", "type": "response", "auth": { "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "display_name": "root", "policies": [ "root" ], "token_policies": [ "root" ], "token_type": "service", "token_issue_time": "2021-10-10T15:53:44+02:00" }, "request": { "id": "829c04a1-0352-2d9d-9bc9-00b928d33df5", "operation": "update", "mount_type": "system", "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "client_token_accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "namespace": { "id": "root" }, "path": "sys/audit/file", "data": { "description": "hmac-sha256:321a1d105f8c6fd62be4f34c4da4f0e6d1cdee9eb2ff4af0b59e1410950fe86b", "local": false, "options": { "file_path": "hmac-sha256:2421b5bf8dab1f9775b2e6e66e58d7bca99ab729f3f311782fda50717eee55b3" }, "type": "hmac-sha256:30dff9607b4087e3ae6808b4a3aa395b1fc064e467748c55c25ddf0e9b150fcc" }, "remote_address": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": 54798 }, "response": { "mount_type": "system" } } ``` Closes https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/7716 * Add changelog entry * Empty commit to trigger CI * Add test and explicit error handling * Change temporary file pattern in test
2022-01-26 23:47:15 +00:00
RemotePort: getRemotePort(req),
ReplicationCluster: req.ReplicationCluster,
Headers: req.Headers,
ClientCertificateSerialNumber: getClientCertificateSerialNumber(connState),
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},
}
if !auth.IssueTime.IsZero() {
reqEntry.Auth.TokenIssueTime = auth.IssueTime.Format(time.RFC3339)
}
if auth.PolicyResults != nil {
reqEntry.Auth.PolicyResults = &AuditPolicyResults{
Allowed: auth.PolicyResults.Allowed,
}
for _, p := range auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies {
reqEntry.Auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies = append(reqEntry.Auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies, PolicyInfo{
Name: p.Name,
NamespaceId: p.NamespaceId,
Type: p.Type,
})
}
}
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
reqEntry.Request.WrapTTL = int(req.WrapInfo.TTL / time.Second)
}
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if !config.OmitTime {
reqEntry.Time = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
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}
return f.AuditFormatWriter.WriteRequest(w, reqEntry)
}
func (f *AuditFormatter) FormatResponse(ctx context.Context, w io.Writer, config FormatterConfig, in *logical.LogInput) error {
if in == nil || in.Request == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("request to response-audit a nil request")
}
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if w == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writer for audit request is nil")
}
if f.AuditFormatWriter == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no format writer specified")
}
salt, err := f.Salt(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error fetching salt: %w", err)
}
// Set these to the input values at first
auth, req, resp := in.Auth, in.Request, in.Response
if auth == nil {
auth = new(logical.Auth)
}
if resp == nil {
resp = new(logical.Response)
}
var connState *tls.ConnectionState
if in.Request.Connection != nil && in.Request.Connection.ConnState != nil {
connState = in.Request.Connection.ConnState
}
Add option 'elide_list_responses' to audit backends (#18128) This PR relates to a feature request logged through HashiCorp commercial support. Vault lacks pagination in its APIs. As a result, certain list operations can return **very** large responses. The user's chosen audit sinks may experience difficulty consuming audit records that swell to tens of megabytes of JSON. In our case, one of the systems consuming audit log data could not cope, and failed. The responses of list operations are typically not very interesting, as they are mostly lists of keys, or, even when they include a "key_info" field, are not returning confidential information. They become even less interesting once HMAC-ed by the audit system. Some example Vault "list" operations that are prone to becoming very large in an active Vault installation are: auth/token/accessors/ identity/entity/id/ identity/entity-alias/id/ pki/certs/ In response, I've coded a new option that can be applied to audit backends, `elide_list_responses`. When enabled, response data is elided from audit logs, only when the operation type is "list". For added safety, the elision only applies to the "keys" and "key_info" fields within the response data - these are conventionally the only fields present in a list response - see logical.ListResponse, and logical.ListResponseWithInfo. However, other fields are technically possible if a plugin author writes unusual code, and these will be preserved in the audit log even with this option enabled. The elision replaces the values of the "keys" and "key_info" fields with an integer count of the number of entries. This allows even the elided audit logs to still be useful for answering questions like "Was any data returned?" or "How many records were listed?".
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elideListResponseData := config.ElideListResponses && req.Operation == logical.ListOperation
var respData map[string]interface{}
if config.Raw {
// In the non-raw case, elision of list response data occurs inside HashResponse, to avoid redundant deep
// copies and hashing of data only to elide it later. In the raw case, we need to do it here.
if elideListResponseData && resp.Data != nil {
// Copy the data map before making changes, but we only need to go one level deep in this case
respData = make(map[string]interface{}, len(resp.Data))
for k, v := range resp.Data {
respData[k] = v
}
doElideListResponseData(respData)
} else {
respData = resp.Data
}
} else {
auth, err = HashAuth(salt, auth, config.HMACAccessor)
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if err != nil {
return err
}
req, err = HashRequest(salt, req, config.HMACAccessor, in.NonHMACReqDataKeys)
if err != nil {
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return err
}
Add option 'elide_list_responses' to audit backends (#18128) This PR relates to a feature request logged through HashiCorp commercial support. Vault lacks pagination in its APIs. As a result, certain list operations can return **very** large responses. The user's chosen audit sinks may experience difficulty consuming audit records that swell to tens of megabytes of JSON. In our case, one of the systems consuming audit log data could not cope, and failed. The responses of list operations are typically not very interesting, as they are mostly lists of keys, or, even when they include a "key_info" field, are not returning confidential information. They become even less interesting once HMAC-ed by the audit system. Some example Vault "list" operations that are prone to becoming very large in an active Vault installation are: auth/token/accessors/ identity/entity/id/ identity/entity-alias/id/ pki/certs/ In response, I've coded a new option that can be applied to audit backends, `elide_list_responses`. When enabled, response data is elided from audit logs, only when the operation type is "list". For added safety, the elision only applies to the "keys" and "key_info" fields within the response data - these are conventionally the only fields present in a list response - see logical.ListResponse, and logical.ListResponseWithInfo. However, other fields are technically possible if a plugin author writes unusual code, and these will be preserved in the audit log even with this option enabled. The elision replaces the values of the "keys" and "key_info" fields with an integer count of the number of entries. This allows even the elided audit logs to still be useful for answering questions like "Was any data returned?" or "How many records were listed?".
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resp, err = HashResponse(salt, resp, config.HMACAccessor, in.NonHMACRespDataKeys, elideListResponseData)
if err != nil {
return err
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}
Add option 'elide_list_responses' to audit backends (#18128) This PR relates to a feature request logged through HashiCorp commercial support. Vault lacks pagination in its APIs. As a result, certain list operations can return **very** large responses. The user's chosen audit sinks may experience difficulty consuming audit records that swell to tens of megabytes of JSON. In our case, one of the systems consuming audit log data could not cope, and failed. The responses of list operations are typically not very interesting, as they are mostly lists of keys, or, even when they include a "key_info" field, are not returning confidential information. They become even less interesting once HMAC-ed by the audit system. Some example Vault "list" operations that are prone to becoming very large in an active Vault installation are: auth/token/accessors/ identity/entity/id/ identity/entity-alias/id/ pki/certs/ In response, I've coded a new option that can be applied to audit backends, `elide_list_responses`. When enabled, response data is elided from audit logs, only when the operation type is "list". For added safety, the elision only applies to the "keys" and "key_info" fields within the response data - these are conventionally the only fields present in a list response - see logical.ListResponse, and logical.ListResponseWithInfo. However, other fields are technically possible if a plugin author writes unusual code, and these will be preserved in the audit log even with this option enabled. The elision replaces the values of the "keys" and "key_info" fields with an integer count of the number of entries. This allows even the elided audit logs to still be useful for answering questions like "Was any data returned?" or "How many records were listed?".
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respData = resp.Data
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}
var errString string
if in.OuterErr != nil {
errString = in.OuterErr.Error()
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}
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ns, err := namespace.FromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
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var respAuth *AuditAuth
if resp.Auth != nil {
respAuth = &AuditAuth{
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ClientToken: resp.Auth.ClientToken,
Accessor: resp.Auth.Accessor,
DisplayName: resp.Auth.DisplayName,
Policies: resp.Auth.Policies,
TokenPolicies: resp.Auth.TokenPolicies,
IdentityPolicies: resp.Auth.IdentityPolicies,
ExternalNamespacePolicies: resp.Auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies,
NoDefaultPolicy: resp.Auth.NoDefaultPolicy,
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Metadata: resp.Auth.Metadata,
NumUses: resp.Auth.NumUses,
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EntityID: resp.Auth.EntityID,
TokenType: resp.Auth.TokenType.String(),
TokenTTL: int64(resp.Auth.TTL.Seconds()),
}
if !resp.Auth.IssueTime.IsZero() {
respAuth.TokenIssueTime = resp.Auth.IssueTime.Format(time.RFC3339)
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}
}
var respSecret *AuditSecret
if resp.Secret != nil {
respSecret = &AuditSecret{
LeaseID: resp.Secret.LeaseID,
}
}
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var respWrapInfo *AuditResponseWrapInfo
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if resp.WrapInfo != nil {
token := resp.WrapInfo.Token
if jwtToken := parseVaultTokenFromJWT(token); jwtToken != nil {
token = *jwtToken
}
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respWrapInfo = &AuditResponseWrapInfo{
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TTL: int(resp.WrapInfo.TTL / time.Second),
Token: token,
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Accessor: resp.WrapInfo.Accessor,
CreationTime: resp.WrapInfo.CreationTime.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
CreationPath: resp.WrapInfo.CreationPath,
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WrappedAccessor: resp.WrapInfo.WrappedAccessor,
}
}
respType := in.Type
if respType == "" {
respType = "response"
}
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respEntry := &AuditResponseEntry{
Type: respType,
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Error: errString,
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Auth: &AuditAuth{
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ClientToken: auth.ClientToken,
Accessor: auth.Accessor,
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DisplayName: auth.DisplayName,
Policies: auth.Policies,
TokenPolicies: auth.TokenPolicies,
IdentityPolicies: auth.IdentityPolicies,
ExternalNamespacePolicies: auth.ExternalNamespacePolicies,
NoDefaultPolicy: auth.NoDefaultPolicy,
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Metadata: auth.Metadata,
RemainingUses: req.ClientTokenRemainingUses,
EntityID: auth.EntityID,
EntityCreated: auth.EntityCreated,
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TokenType: auth.TokenType.String(),
TokenTTL: int64(auth.TTL.Seconds()),
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},
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Request: &AuditRequest{
ID: req.ID,
ClientToken: req.ClientToken,
ClientTokenAccessor: req.ClientTokenAccessor,
ClientID: req.ClientID,
Operation: req.Operation,
MountType: req.MountType,
MountAccessor: req.MountAccessor,
MountRunningVersion: req.MountRunningVersion(),
MountRunningSha256: req.MountRunningSha256(),
MountIsExternalPlugin: req.MountIsExternalPlugin(),
MountClass: req.MountClass(),
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Namespace: &AuditNamespace{
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ID: ns.ID,
Path: ns.Path,
},
Path: req.Path,
Data: req.Data,
PolicyOverride: req.PolicyOverride,
RemoteAddr: getRemoteAddr(req),
Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available (#12790) * Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available The `request.remote_port` field is now present in the audit log when it is available: ``` { "time": "2021-10-10T13:53:51.760039Z", "type": "response", "auth": { "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "display_name": "root", "policies": [ "root" ], "token_policies": [ "root" ], "token_type": "service", "token_issue_time": "2021-10-10T15:53:44+02:00" }, "request": { "id": "829c04a1-0352-2d9d-9bc9-00b928d33df5", "operation": "update", "mount_type": "system", "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "client_token_accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "namespace": { "id": "root" }, "path": "sys/audit/file", "data": { "description": "hmac-sha256:321a1d105f8c6fd62be4f34c4da4f0e6d1cdee9eb2ff4af0b59e1410950fe86b", "local": false, "options": { "file_path": "hmac-sha256:2421b5bf8dab1f9775b2e6e66e58d7bca99ab729f3f311782fda50717eee55b3" }, "type": "hmac-sha256:30dff9607b4087e3ae6808b4a3aa395b1fc064e467748c55c25ddf0e9b150fcc" }, "remote_address": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": 54798 }, "response": { "mount_type": "system" } } ``` Closes https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/7716 * Add changelog entry * Empty commit to trigger CI * Add test and explicit error handling * Change temporary file pattern in test
2022-01-26 23:47:15 +00:00
RemotePort: getRemotePort(req),
ClientCertificateSerialNumber: getClientCertificateSerialNumber(connState),
ReplicationCluster: req.ReplicationCluster,
Headers: req.Headers,
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},
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Response: &AuditResponse{
MountType: req.MountType,
MountAccessor: req.MountAccessor,
MountRunningVersion: req.MountRunningVersion(),
MountRunningSha256: req.MountRunningSha256(),
MountIsExternalPlugin: req.MountIsExternalPlugin(),
MountClass: req.MountClass(),
Auth: respAuth,
Secret: respSecret,
Data: respData,
Warnings: resp.Warnings,
Redirect: resp.Redirect,
WrapInfo: respWrapInfo,
Headers: resp.Headers,
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},
}
if auth.PolicyResults != nil {
respEntry.Auth.PolicyResults = &AuditPolicyResults{
Allowed: auth.PolicyResults.Allowed,
}
for _, p := range auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies {
respEntry.Auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies = append(respEntry.Auth.PolicyResults.GrantingPolicies, PolicyInfo{
Name: p.Name,
NamespaceId: p.NamespaceId,
Type: p.Type,
})
}
}
if !auth.IssueTime.IsZero() {
respEntry.Auth.TokenIssueTime = auth.IssueTime.Format(time.RFC3339)
}
if req.WrapInfo != nil {
respEntry.Request.WrapTTL = int(req.WrapInfo.TTL / time.Second)
}
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if !config.OmitTime {
respEntry.Time = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
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}
return f.AuditFormatWriter.WriteResponse(w, respEntry)
}
// AuditRequestEntry is the structure of a request audit log entry in Audit.
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type AuditRequestEntry struct {
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Time string `json:"time,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Auth *AuditAuth `json:"auth,omitempty"`
Request *AuditRequest `json:"request,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
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}
// AuditResponseEntry is the structure of a response audit log entry in Audit.
type AuditResponseEntry struct {
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Time string `json:"time,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Auth *AuditAuth `json:"auth,omitempty"`
Request *AuditRequest `json:"request,omitempty"`
Response *AuditResponse `json:"response,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
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}
type AuditRequest struct {
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ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id,omitempty"`
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ReplicationCluster string `json:"replication_cluster,omitempty"`
Operation logical.Operation `json:"operation,omitempty"`
MountType string `json:"mount_type,omitempty"`
MountAccessor string `json:"mount_accessor,omitempty"`
MountRunningVersion string `json:"mount_running_version,omitempty"`
MountRunningSha256 string `json:"mount_running_sha256,omitempty"`
MountClass string `json:"mount_class,omitempty"`
MountIsExternalPlugin bool `json:"mount_is_external_plugin,omitempty"`
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ClientToken string `json:"client_token,omitempty"`
ClientTokenAccessor string `json:"client_token_accessor,omitempty"`
Namespace *AuditNamespace `json:"namespace,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
Data map[string]interface{} `json:"data,omitempty"`
PolicyOverride bool `json:"policy_override,omitempty"`
RemoteAddr string `json:"remote_address,omitempty"`
Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available (#12790) * Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available The `request.remote_port` field is now present in the audit log when it is available: ``` { "time": "2021-10-10T13:53:51.760039Z", "type": "response", "auth": { "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "display_name": "root", "policies": [ "root" ], "token_policies": [ "root" ], "token_type": "service", "token_issue_time": "2021-10-10T15:53:44+02:00" }, "request": { "id": "829c04a1-0352-2d9d-9bc9-00b928d33df5", "operation": "update", "mount_type": "system", "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "client_token_accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "namespace": { "id": "root" }, "path": "sys/audit/file", "data": { "description": "hmac-sha256:321a1d105f8c6fd62be4f34c4da4f0e6d1cdee9eb2ff4af0b59e1410950fe86b", "local": false, "options": { "file_path": "hmac-sha256:2421b5bf8dab1f9775b2e6e66e58d7bca99ab729f3f311782fda50717eee55b3" }, "type": "hmac-sha256:30dff9607b4087e3ae6808b4a3aa395b1fc064e467748c55c25ddf0e9b150fcc" }, "remote_address": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": 54798 }, "response": { "mount_type": "system" } } ``` Closes https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/7716 * Add changelog entry * Empty commit to trigger CI * Add test and explicit error handling * Change temporary file pattern in test
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RemotePort int `json:"remote_port,omitempty"`
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WrapTTL int `json:"wrap_ttl,omitempty"`
Headers map[string][]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
ClientCertificateSerialNumber string `json:"client_certificate_serial_number,omitempty"`
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}
type AuditResponse struct {
Auth *AuditAuth `json:"auth,omitempty"`
MountType string `json:"mount_type,omitempty"`
MountAccessor string `json:"mount_accessor,omitempty"`
MountRunningVersion string `json:"mount_running_plugin_version,omitempty"`
MountRunningSha256 string `json:"mount_running_sha256,omitempty"`
MountClass string `json:"mount_class,omitempty"`
MountIsExternalPlugin bool `json:"mount_is_external_plugin,omitempty"`
Secret *AuditSecret `json:"secret,omitempty"`
Data map[string]interface{} `json:"data,omitempty"`
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
Redirect string `json:"redirect,omitempty"`
WrapInfo *AuditResponseWrapInfo `json:"wrap_info,omitempty"`
Headers map[string][]string `json:"headers,omitempty"`
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}
type AuditAuth struct {
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ClientToken string `json:"client_token,omitempty"`
Accessor string `json:"accessor,omitempty"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name,omitempty"`
Policies []string `json:"policies,omitempty"`
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TokenPolicies []string `json:"token_policies,omitempty"`
IdentityPolicies []string `json:"identity_policies,omitempty"`
ExternalNamespacePolicies map[string][]string `json:"external_namespace_policies,omitempty"`
NoDefaultPolicy bool `json:"no_default_policy,omitempty"`
PolicyResults *AuditPolicyResults `json:"policy_results,omitempty"`
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Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
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NumUses int `json:"num_uses,omitempty"`
RemainingUses int `json:"remaining_uses,omitempty"`
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EntityID string `json:"entity_id,omitempty"`
EntityCreated bool `json:"entity_created,omitempty"`
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TokenType string `json:"token_type,omitempty"`
TokenTTL int64 `json:"token_ttl,omitempty"`
TokenIssueTime string `json:"token_issue_time,omitempty"`
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}
type AuditPolicyResults struct {
Allowed bool `json:"allowed"`
GrantingPolicies []PolicyInfo `json:"granting_policies,omitempty"`
}
type PolicyInfo struct {
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
NamespaceId string `json:"namespace_id,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type"`
}
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type AuditSecret struct {
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LeaseID string `json:"lease_id,omitempty"`
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}
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type AuditResponseWrapInfo struct {
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TTL int `json:"ttl,omitempty"`
Token string `json:"token,omitempty"`
Accessor string `json:"accessor,omitempty"`
CreationTime string `json:"creation_time,omitempty"`
CreationPath string `json:"creation_path,omitempty"`
WrappedAccessor string `json:"wrapped_accessor,omitempty"`
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}
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type AuditNamespace struct {
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ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
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}
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// getRemoteAddr safely gets the remote address avoiding a nil pointer
func getRemoteAddr(req *logical.Request) string {
if req != nil && req.Connection != nil {
return req.Connection.RemoteAddr
}
return ""
}
Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available (#12790) * Add remote_port in the audit logs when it is available The `request.remote_port` field is now present in the audit log when it is available: ``` { "time": "2021-10-10T13:53:51.760039Z", "type": "response", "auth": { "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "display_name": "root", "policies": [ "root" ], "token_policies": [ "root" ], "token_type": "service", "token_issue_time": "2021-10-10T15:53:44+02:00" }, "request": { "id": "829c04a1-0352-2d9d-9bc9-00b928d33df5", "operation": "update", "mount_type": "system", "client_token": "hmac-sha256:1304aab0ac65747684e1b58248cc16715fa8f558f8d27e90fcbcb213220c0edf", "client_token_accessor": "hmac-sha256:f8cf0601dadd19aac84f205ded44c62898e3746a42108a51105a92ccc39baa43", "namespace": { "id": "root" }, "path": "sys/audit/file", "data": { "description": "hmac-sha256:321a1d105f8c6fd62be4f34c4da4f0e6d1cdee9eb2ff4af0b59e1410950fe86b", "local": false, "options": { "file_path": "hmac-sha256:2421b5bf8dab1f9775b2e6e66e58d7bca99ab729f3f311782fda50717eee55b3" }, "type": "hmac-sha256:30dff9607b4087e3ae6808b4a3aa395b1fc064e467748c55c25ddf0e9b150fcc" }, "remote_address": "127.0.0.1", "remote_port": 54798 }, "response": { "mount_type": "system" } } ``` Closes https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/7716 * Add changelog entry * Empty commit to trigger CI * Add test and explicit error handling * Change temporary file pattern in test
2022-01-26 23:47:15 +00:00
// getRemotePort safely gets the remote port avoiding a nil pointer
func getRemotePort(req *logical.Request) int {
if req != nil && req.Connection != nil {
return req.Connection.RemotePort
}
return 0
}
func getClientCertificateSerialNumber(connState *tls.ConnectionState) string {
if connState == nil || len(connState.VerifiedChains) == 0 || len(connState.VerifiedChains[0]) == 0 {
return ""
}
return connState.VerifiedChains[0][0].SerialNumber.String()
}
// parseVaultTokenFromJWT returns a string iff the token was a JWT and we could
// extract the original token ID from inside
func parseVaultTokenFromJWT(token string) *string {
if strings.Count(token, ".") != 2 {
return nil
}
parsedJWT, err := squarejwt.ParseSigned(token)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
var claims squarejwt.Claims
if err = parsedJWT.UnsafeClaimsWithoutVerification(&claims); err != nil {
return nil
}
return &claims.ID
}
Add option 'elide_list_responses' to audit backends (#18128) This PR relates to a feature request logged through HashiCorp commercial support. Vault lacks pagination in its APIs. As a result, certain list operations can return **very** large responses. The user's chosen audit sinks may experience difficulty consuming audit records that swell to tens of megabytes of JSON. In our case, one of the systems consuming audit log data could not cope, and failed. The responses of list operations are typically not very interesting, as they are mostly lists of keys, or, even when they include a "key_info" field, are not returning confidential information. They become even less interesting once HMAC-ed by the audit system. Some example Vault "list" operations that are prone to becoming very large in an active Vault installation are: auth/token/accessors/ identity/entity/id/ identity/entity-alias/id/ pki/certs/ In response, I've coded a new option that can be applied to audit backends, `elide_list_responses`. When enabled, response data is elided from audit logs, only when the operation type is "list". For added safety, the elision only applies to the "keys" and "key_info" fields within the response data - these are conventionally the only fields present in a list response - see logical.ListResponse, and logical.ListResponseWithInfo. However, other fields are technically possible if a plugin author writes unusual code, and these will be preserved in the audit log even with this option enabled. The elision replaces the values of the "keys" and "key_info" fields with an integer count of the number of entries. This allows even the elided audit logs to still be useful for answering questions like "Was any data returned?" or "How many records were listed?".
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// NewTemporaryFormatter creates a formatter not backed by a persistent salt
func NewTemporaryFormatter(format, prefix string) *AuditFormatter {
temporarySalt := func(ctx context.Context) (*salt.Salt, error) {
return salt.NewNonpersistentSalt(), nil
}
ret := &AuditFormatter{}
switch format {
case "jsonx":
ret.AuditFormatWriter = &JSONxFormatWriter{
Prefix: prefix,
SaltFunc: temporarySalt,
}
default:
ret.AuditFormatWriter = &JSONFormatWriter{
Prefix: prefix,
SaltFunc: temporarySalt,
}
}
return ret
}
Add option 'elide_list_responses' to audit backends (#18128) This PR relates to a feature request logged through HashiCorp commercial support. Vault lacks pagination in its APIs. As a result, certain list operations can return **very** large responses. The user's chosen audit sinks may experience difficulty consuming audit records that swell to tens of megabytes of JSON. In our case, one of the systems consuming audit log data could not cope, and failed. The responses of list operations are typically not very interesting, as they are mostly lists of keys, or, even when they include a "key_info" field, are not returning confidential information. They become even less interesting once HMAC-ed by the audit system. Some example Vault "list" operations that are prone to becoming very large in an active Vault installation are: auth/token/accessors/ identity/entity/id/ identity/entity-alias/id/ pki/certs/ In response, I've coded a new option that can be applied to audit backends, `elide_list_responses`. When enabled, response data is elided from audit logs, only when the operation type is "list". For added safety, the elision only applies to the "keys" and "key_info" fields within the response data - these are conventionally the only fields present in a list response - see logical.ListResponse, and logical.ListResponseWithInfo. However, other fields are technically possible if a plugin author writes unusual code, and these will be preserved in the audit log even with this option enabled. The elision replaces the values of the "keys" and "key_info" fields with an integer count of the number of entries. This allows even the elided audit logs to still be useful for answering questions like "Was any data returned?" or "How many records were listed?".
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// doElideListResponseData performs the actual elision of list operation response data, once surrounding code has
// determined it should apply to a particular request. The data map that is passed in must be a copy that is safe to
// modify in place, but need not be a full recursive deep copy, as only top-level keys are changed.
//
// See the documentation of the controlling option in FormatterConfig for more information on the purpose.
func doElideListResponseData(data map[string]interface{}) {
for k, v := range data {
if k == "keys" {
if vSlice, ok := v.([]string); ok {
data[k] = len(vSlice)
}
} else if k == "key_info" {
if vMap, ok := v.(map[string]interface{}); ok {
data[k] = len(vMap)
}
}
}
}