open-nomad/acl/acl.go
Tim Gross 1cf28996e7 acl: prevent privilege escalation via workload identity
ACL policies can be associated with a job so that the job's Workload Identity
can have expanded access to other policy objects, including other
variables. Policies set on the variables the job automatically has access to
were ignored, but this includes policies with `deny` capabilities.

Additionally, when resolving claims for a workload identity without any attached
policies, the `ResolveClaims` method returned a `nil` ACL object, which is
treated similarly to a management token. While this was safe in Nomad 1.4.x,
when the workload identity token was exposed to the task via the `identity`
block, this allows a user with `submit-job` capabilities to escalate their
privileges.

We originally implemented automatic workload access to Variables as a separate
code path in the Variables RPC endpoint so that we don't have to generate
on-the-fly policies that blow up the ACL policy cache. This is fairly brittle
but also the behavior around wildcard paths in policies different from the rest
of our ACL polices, which is hard to reason about.

Add an `ACLClaim` parameter to the `AllowVariableOperation` method so that we
can push all this logic into the `acl` package and the behavior can be
consistent. This will allow a `deny` policy to override automatic access (and
probably speed up checks of non-automatic variable access).
2023-03-13 11:13:27 -04:00

716 lines
18 KiB
Go

package acl
import (
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
iradix "github.com/hashicorp/go-immutable-radix/v2"
glob "github.com/ryanuber/go-glob"
)
// Redefine this value from structs to avoid circular dependency.
const AllNamespacesSentinel = "*"
// ManagementACL is a singleton used for management tokens
var ManagementACL *ACL
func init() {
var err error
ManagementACL, err = NewACL(true, nil)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Errorf("failed to setup management ACL: %v", err))
}
}
// capabilitySet is a type wrapper to help managing a set of capabilities
type capabilitySet map[string]struct{}
func (c capabilitySet) Check(k string) bool {
_, ok := c[k]
return ok
}
func (c capabilitySet) Set(k string) {
c[k] = struct{}{}
}
func (c capabilitySet) Clear() {
for cap := range c {
delete(c, cap)
}
}
// ACL object is used to convert a set of policies into a structure that
// can be efficiently evaluated to determine if an action is allowed.
type ACL struct {
// management tokens are allowed to do anything
management bool
// namespaces maps a namespace to a capabilitySet
namespaces *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
// wildcardNamespaces maps a glob pattern of a namespace to a capabilitySet
// We use an iradix for the purposes of ordered iteration.
wildcardNamespaces *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
// hostVolumes maps a named host volume to a capabilitySet
hostVolumes *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
// wildcardHostVolumes maps a glob pattern of host volume names to a capabilitySet
// We use an iradix for the purposes of ordered iteration.
wildcardHostVolumes *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
variables *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
wildcardVariables *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet]
agent string
node string
operator string
quota string
plugin string
}
// maxPrivilege returns the policy which grants the most privilege
// This handles the case of Deny always taking maximum precedence.
func maxPrivilege(a, b string) string {
switch {
case a == PolicyDeny || b == PolicyDeny:
return PolicyDeny
case a == PolicyWrite || b == PolicyWrite:
return PolicyWrite
case a == PolicyRead || b == PolicyRead:
return PolicyRead
case a == PolicyList || b == PolicyList:
return PolicyList
default:
return ""
}
}
// NewACL compiles a set of policies into an ACL object
func NewACL(management bool, policies []*Policy) (*ACL, error) {
// Hot-path management tokens
if management {
return &ACL{management: true}, nil
}
// Create the ACL object
acl := &ACL{}
nsTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
wnsTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
hvTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
whvTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
svTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
wsvTxn := iradix.New[capabilitySet]().Txn()
for _, policy := range policies {
NAMESPACES:
for _, ns := range policy.Namespaces {
// Should the namespace be matched using a glob?
globDefinition := strings.Contains(ns.Name, "*")
// Check for existing capabilities
var capabilities capabilitySet
if globDefinition {
raw, ok := wnsTxn.Get([]byte(ns.Name))
if ok {
capabilities = raw
} else {
capabilities = make(capabilitySet)
wnsTxn.Insert([]byte(ns.Name), capabilities)
}
} else {
raw, ok := nsTxn.Get([]byte(ns.Name))
if ok {
capabilities = raw
} else {
capabilities = make(capabilitySet)
nsTxn.Insert([]byte(ns.Name), capabilities)
}
}
if ns.Variables != nil {
for _, pathPolicy := range ns.Variables.Paths {
key := []byte(ns.Name + "\x00" + pathPolicy.PathSpec)
var svCapabilities capabilitySet
if globDefinition || strings.Contains(pathPolicy.PathSpec, "*") {
raw, ok := wsvTxn.Get(key)
if ok {
svCapabilities = raw
} else {
svCapabilities = make(capabilitySet)
}
wsvTxn.Insert(key, svCapabilities)
} else {
raw, ok := svTxn.Get(key)
if ok {
svCapabilities = raw
} else {
svCapabilities = make(capabilitySet)
}
svTxn.Insert(key, svCapabilities)
}
for _, cap := range pathPolicy.Capabilities {
svCapabilities.Set(cap)
}
}
}
// Deny always takes precedence
if capabilities.Check(NamespaceCapabilityDeny) {
continue NAMESPACES
}
// Add in all the capabilities
for _, cap := range ns.Capabilities {
if cap == NamespaceCapabilityDeny {
// Overwrite any existing capabilities
capabilities.Clear()
capabilities.Set(NamespaceCapabilityDeny)
continue NAMESPACES
}
capabilities.Set(cap)
}
}
HOSTVOLUMES:
for _, hv := range policy.HostVolumes {
// Should the volume be matched using a glob?
globDefinition := strings.Contains(hv.Name, "*")
// Check for existing capabilities
var capabilities capabilitySet
if globDefinition {
raw, ok := whvTxn.Get([]byte(hv.Name))
if ok {
capabilities = raw
} else {
capabilities = make(capabilitySet)
whvTxn.Insert([]byte(hv.Name), capabilities)
}
} else {
raw, ok := hvTxn.Get([]byte(hv.Name))
if ok {
capabilities = raw
} else {
capabilities = make(capabilitySet)
hvTxn.Insert([]byte(hv.Name), capabilities)
}
}
// Deny always takes precedence
if capabilities.Check(HostVolumeCapabilityDeny) {
continue
}
// Add in all the capabilities
for _, cap := range hv.Capabilities {
if cap == HostVolumeCapabilityDeny {
// Overwrite any existing capabilities
capabilities.Clear()
capabilities.Set(HostVolumeCapabilityDeny)
continue HOSTVOLUMES
}
capabilities.Set(cap)
}
}
// Take the maximum privilege for agent, node, and operator
if policy.Agent != nil {
acl.agent = maxPrivilege(acl.agent, policy.Agent.Policy)
}
if policy.Node != nil {
acl.node = maxPrivilege(acl.node, policy.Node.Policy)
}
if policy.Operator != nil {
acl.operator = maxPrivilege(acl.operator, policy.Operator.Policy)
}
if policy.Quota != nil {
acl.quota = maxPrivilege(acl.quota, policy.Quota.Policy)
}
if policy.Plugin != nil {
acl.plugin = maxPrivilege(acl.plugin, policy.Plugin.Policy)
}
}
// Finalize the namespaces
acl.namespaces = nsTxn.Commit()
acl.wildcardNamespaces = wnsTxn.Commit()
acl.hostVolumes = hvTxn.Commit()
acl.wildcardHostVolumes = whvTxn.Commit()
acl.variables = svTxn.Commit()
acl.wildcardVariables = wsvTxn.Commit()
return acl, nil
}
// AllowNsOp is shorthand for AllowNamespaceOperation
func (a *ACL) AllowNsOp(ns string, op string) bool {
return a.AllowNamespaceOperation(ns, op)
}
// AllowNsOpFunc is a helper that returns a function that can be used to check
// namespace permissions.
func (a *ACL) AllowNsOpFunc(ops ...string) func(string) bool {
return func(ns string) bool {
return NamespaceValidator(ops...)(a, ns)
}
}
// AllowNamespaceOperation checks if a given operation is allowed for a namespace.
func (a *ACL) AllowNamespaceOperation(ns string, op string) bool {
// Hot path if ACL is not enabled.
if a == nil {
return true
}
// Hot path management tokens
if a.management {
return true
}
// If using the all namespaces wildcard, allow if any namespace allows the
// operation.
if ns == AllNamespacesSentinel && a.anyNamespaceAllowsOp(op) {
return true
}
// Check for a matching capability set
capabilities, ok := a.matchingNamespaceCapabilitySet(ns)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Check if the capability has been granted
return capabilities.Check(op)
}
// AllowNamespace checks if any operations are allowed for a namespace
func (a *ACL) AllowNamespace(ns string) bool {
// Hot path if ACL is not enabled.
if a == nil {
return true
}
// Hot path management tokens
if a.management {
return true
}
// If using the all namespaces wildcard, allow if any namespace allows any
// operation.
if ns == AllNamespacesSentinel && a.anyNamespaceAllowsAnyOp() {
return true
}
// Check for a matching capability set
capabilities, ok := a.matchingNamespaceCapabilitySet(ns)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Check if the capability has been granted
if len(capabilities) == 0 {
return false
}
return !capabilities.Check(PolicyDeny)
}
// AllowHostVolumeOperation checks if a given operation is allowed for a host volume
func (a *ACL) AllowHostVolumeOperation(hv string, op string) bool {
// Hot path management tokens
if a.management {
return true
}
// Check for a matching capability set
capabilities, ok := a.matchingHostVolumeCapabilitySet(hv)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Check if the capability has been granted
return capabilities.Check(op)
}
// AllowHostVolume checks if any operations are allowed for a HostVolume
func (a *ACL) AllowHostVolume(ns string) bool {
// Hot path management tokens
if a.management {
return true
}
// Check for a matching capability set
capabilities, ok := a.matchingHostVolumeCapabilitySet(ns)
if !ok {
return false
}
// Check if the capability has been granted
if len(capabilities) == 0 {
return false
}
return !capabilities.Check(PolicyDeny)
}
func (a *ACL) AllowVariableOperation(ns, path, op string, claim *ACLClaim) bool {
if a.management {
return true
}
// Check for a matching capability set
capabilities, ok := a.matchingVariablesCapabilitySet(ns, path, claim)
if !ok {
return false
}
return capabilities.Check(op)
}
type ACLClaim struct {
Namespace string
Job string
Group string
Task string
}
// AllowVariableSearch is a very loose check that the token has *any* access to
// a variables path for the namespace, with an expectation that the actual
// search result will be filtered by specific paths
func (a *ACL) AllowVariableSearch(ns string) bool {
if a.management {
return true
}
iter := a.variables.Root().Iterator()
iter.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))
_, _, ok := iter.Next()
if ok {
return true
}
iter = a.wildcardVariables.Root().Iterator()
iter.SeekPrefix([]byte(ns))
_, _, ok = iter.Next()
return ok
}
// matchingNamespaceCapabilitySet looks for a capabilitySet that matches the namespace,
// if no concrete definitions are found, then we return the closest matching
// glob.
// The closest matching glob is the one that has the smallest character
// difference between the namespace and the glob.
func (a *ACL) matchingNamespaceCapabilitySet(ns string) (capabilitySet, bool) {
// Check for a concrete matching capability set
raw, ok := a.namespaces.Get([]byte(ns))
if ok {
return raw, true
}
// We didn't find a concrete match, so lets try and evaluate globs.
return a.findClosestMatchingGlob(a.wildcardNamespaces, ns)
}
// anyNamespaceAllowsOp returns true if any namespace in ACL object allows the
// given operation.
func (a *ACL) anyNamespaceAllowsOp(op string) bool {
return a.anyNamespaceAllows(func(c capabilitySet) bool {
return c.Check(op)
})
}
// anyNamespaceAllowsAnyOp returns true if any namespace in ACL object allows
// at least one operation.
func (a *ACL) anyNamespaceAllowsAnyOp() bool {
return a.anyNamespaceAllows(func(c capabilitySet) bool {
return len(c) > 0 && !c.Check(PolicyDeny)
})
}
// anyNamespaceAllows returns true if the callback cb returns true for any
// namespace operation of the ACL object.
func (a *ACL) anyNamespaceAllows(cb func(capabilitySet) bool) bool {
allow := false
checkFn := func(_ []byte, v capabilitySet) bool {
allow = cb(v)
return allow
}
a.namespaces.Root().Walk(checkFn)
if allow {
return true
}
a.wildcardNamespaces.Root().Walk(checkFn)
return allow
}
// matchingHostVolumeCapabilitySet looks for a capabilitySet that matches the host volume name,
// if no concrete definitions are found, then we return the closest matching
// glob.
// The closest matching glob is the one that has the smallest character
// difference between the volume name and the glob.
func (a *ACL) matchingHostVolumeCapabilitySet(name string) (capabilitySet, bool) {
// Check for a concrete matching capability set
raw, ok := a.hostVolumes.Get([]byte(name))
if ok {
return raw, true
}
// We didn't find a concrete match, so lets try and evaluate globs.
return a.findClosestMatchingGlob(a.wildcardHostVolumes, name)
}
var workloadVariablesCapabilitySet = capabilitySet{"read": struct{}{}, "list": struct{}{}}
// matchingVariablesCapabilitySet looks for a capabilitySet in the following order:
// - matching the namespace and path from a policy
// - automatic access based on the claim
// - closest matching glob
//
// The closest matching glob is the one that has the smallest character
// difference between the namespace and the glob.
func (a *ACL) matchingVariablesCapabilitySet(ns, path string, claim *ACLClaim) (capabilitySet, bool) {
// Check for a concrete matching capability set
capSet, ok := a.variables.Get([]byte(ns + "\x00" + path))
if ok {
return capSet, true
}
if claim != nil && ns == claim.Namespace {
switch path {
case "nomad/jobs",
fmt.Sprintf("nomad/jobs/%s", claim.Job),
fmt.Sprintf("nomad/jobs/%s/%s", claim.Job, claim.Group),
fmt.Sprintf("nomad/jobs/%s/%s/%s", claim.Job, claim.Group, claim.Task):
return workloadVariablesCapabilitySet, true
default:
}
}
// We didn't find a concrete match, so lets try and evaluate globs.
return a.findClosestMatchingGlob(a.wildcardVariables, ns+"\x00"+path)
}
type matchingGlob struct {
name string
difference int
capabilitySet capabilitySet
}
func (a *ACL) findClosestMatchingGlob(radix *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet], ns string) (capabilitySet, bool) {
// First, find all globs that match.
matchingGlobs := findAllMatchingWildcards(radix, ns)
// If none match, let's return.
if len(matchingGlobs) == 0 {
return capabilitySet{}, false
}
// If a single matches, lets be efficient and return early.
if len(matchingGlobs) == 1 {
return matchingGlobs[0].capabilitySet, true
}
// Stable sort the matched globs, based on the character difference between
// the glob definition and the requested namespace. This allows us to be
// more consistent about results based on the policy definition.
sort.SliceStable(matchingGlobs, func(i, j int) bool {
return matchingGlobs[i].difference <= matchingGlobs[j].difference
})
return matchingGlobs[0].capabilitySet, true
}
func findAllMatchingWildcards(radix *iradix.Tree[capabilitySet], name string) []matchingGlob {
var matches []matchingGlob
nsLen := len(name)
radix.Root().Walk(func(bk []byte, v capabilitySet) bool {
k := string(bk)
isMatch := glob.Glob(k, name)
if isMatch {
pair := matchingGlob{
name: k,
difference: nsLen - len(k) + strings.Count(k, glob.GLOB),
capabilitySet: v,
}
matches = append(matches, pair)
}
// We always want to walk the entire tree, never terminate early.
return false
})
return matches
}
// AllowAgentRead checks if read operations are allowed for an agent
func (a *ACL) AllowAgentRead() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.agent == PolicyWrite:
return true
case a.agent == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowAgentWrite checks if write operations are allowed for an agent
func (a *ACL) AllowAgentWrite() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.agent == PolicyWrite:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowNodeRead checks if read operations are allowed for a node
func (a *ACL) AllowNodeRead() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.node == PolicyWrite:
return true
case a.node == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowNodeWrite checks if write operations are allowed for a node
func (a *ACL) AllowNodeWrite() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.node == PolicyWrite:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowOperatorRead checks if read operations are allowed for a operator
func (a *ACL) AllowOperatorRead() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.operator == PolicyWrite:
return true
case a.operator == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowOperatorWrite checks if write operations are allowed for a operator
func (a *ACL) AllowOperatorWrite() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.operator == PolicyWrite:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowQuotaRead checks if read operations are allowed for all quotas
func (a *ACL) AllowQuotaRead() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.quota == PolicyWrite:
return true
case a.quota == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowQuotaWrite checks if write operations are allowed for quotas
func (a *ACL) AllowQuotaWrite() bool {
switch {
case a.management:
return true
case a.quota == PolicyWrite:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowPluginRead checks if read operations are allowed for all plugins
func (a *ACL) AllowPluginRead() bool {
switch {
// ACL is nil only if ACLs are disabled
case a == nil:
return true
case a.management:
return true
case a.plugin == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// AllowPluginList checks if list operations are allowed for all plugins
func (a *ACL) AllowPluginList() bool {
switch {
// ACL is nil only if ACLs are disabled
case a == nil:
return true
case a.management:
return true
case a.plugin == PolicyList:
return true
case a.plugin == PolicyRead:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// IsManagement checks if this represents a management token
func (a *ACL) IsManagement() bool {
return a.management
}
// NamespaceValidator returns a func that wraps ACL.AllowNamespaceOperation in
// a list of operations. Returns true (allowed) if acls are disabled or if
// *any* capabilities match.
func NamespaceValidator(ops ...string) func(*ACL, string) bool {
return func(acl *ACL, ns string) bool {
// Always allow if ACLs are disabled.
if acl == nil {
return true
}
for _, op := range ops {
if acl.AllowNamespaceOperation(ns, op) {
// An operation is allowed, return true
return true
}
}
// No operations are allowed by this ACL, return false
return false
}
}