open-nomad/nomad/secure_variables_endpoint_test.go
Tim Gross bfcbc00f4e workload identity (#13223)
In order to support implicit ACL policies for tasks to get their own
secrets, each task would need to have its own ACL token. This would
add extra raft overhead as well as new garbage collection jobs for
cleaning up task-specific ACL tokens. Instead, Nomad will create a
workload Identity Claim for each task.

An Identity Claim is a JSON Web Token (JWT) signed by the server’s
private key and attached to an Allocation at the time a plan is
applied. The encoded JWT can be submitted as the X-Nomad-Token header
to replace ACL token secret IDs for the RPCs that support identity
claims.

Whenever a key is is added to a server’s keyring, it will use the key
as the seed for a Ed25519 public-private private keypair. That keypair
will be used for signing the JWT and for verifying the JWT.

This implementation is a ruthlessly minimal approach to support the
secure variables feature. When a JWT is verified, the allocation ID
will be checked against the Nomad state store, and non-existent or
terminal allocation IDs will cause the validation to be rejected. This
is sufficient to support the secure variables feature at launch
without requiring implementation of a background process to renew
soon-to-expire tokens.
2022-07-11 13:34:05 -04:00

149 lines
4 KiB
Go

package nomad
import (
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/ci"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/mock"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/testutil"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestSecureVariablesEndpoint_auth(t *testing.T) {
ci.Parallel(t)
srv, _, shutdown := TestACLServer(t, func(c *Config) {
c.NumSchedulers = 0 // Prevent automatic dequeue
})
defer shutdown()
testutil.WaitForLeader(t, srv.RPC)
const ns = "nondefault-namespace"
alloc := mock.Alloc()
alloc.ClientStatus = structs.AllocClientStatusFailed
alloc.Job.Namespace = ns
jobID := alloc.JobID
store := srv.fsm.State()
require.NoError(t, store.UpsertAllocs(
structs.MsgTypeTestSetup, 1000, []*structs.Allocation{alloc}))
claim := alloc.ToTaskIdentityClaims("web")
e := srv.encrypter
idToken, err := e.SignClaims(claim)
require.NoError(t, err)
// corrupt the signature of the token
idTokenParts := strings.Split(idToken, ".")
require.Len(t, idTokenParts, 3)
sig := []string(strings.Split(idTokenParts[2], ""))
rand.Shuffle(len(sig), func(i, j int) {
sig[i], sig[j] = sig[j], sig[i]
})
idTokenParts[2] = strings.Join(sig, "")
invalidIDToken := strings.Join(idTokenParts, ".")
t.Run("terminal alloc should be denied", func(t *testing.T) {
err = srv.staticEndpoints.SecureVariables.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(
structs.QueryOptions{AuthToken: idToken, Namespace: ns}, "n/a",
fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/web", jobID))
require.EqualError(t, err, structs.ErrPermissionDenied.Error())
})
// make alloc non-terminal
alloc.ClientStatus = structs.AllocClientStatusRunning
require.NoError(t, store.UpsertAllocs(
structs.MsgTypeTestSetup, 1200, []*structs.Allocation{alloc}))
t.Run("wrong namespace should be denied", func(t *testing.T) {
err = srv.staticEndpoints.SecureVariables.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(
structs.QueryOptions{AuthToken: idToken, Namespace: structs.DefaultNamespace}, "n/a",
fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/web", jobID))
require.EqualError(t, err, structs.ErrPermissionDenied.Error())
})
testCases := []struct {
name string
token string
cap string
path string
expectedErr error
}{
{
name: "valid claim for path with task secret",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/web", jobID),
expectedErr: nil,
},
{
name: "valid claim for path with group secret",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web", jobID),
expectedErr: nil,
},
{
name: "valid claim for path with job secret",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s", jobID),
expectedErr: nil,
},
{
name: "valid claim for path with namespace secret",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: "jobs",
expectedErr: nil,
},
{
name: "extra trailing slash is denied",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/", jobID),
expectedErr: structs.ErrPermissionDenied,
},
{
name: "invalid prefix is denied",
token: idToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/w", jobID),
expectedErr: structs.ErrPermissionDenied,
},
{
name: "missing auth token is denied",
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/web", jobID),
expectedErr: structs.ErrPermissionDenied,
},
{
name: "invalid signature is denied",
token: invalidIDToken,
cap: "n/a",
path: fmt.Sprintf("jobs/%s/web/web", jobID),
expectedErr: structs.ErrPermissionDenied,
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := srv.staticEndpoints.SecureVariables.handleMixedAuthEndpoint(
structs.QueryOptions{AuthToken: tc.token, Namespace: ns}, tc.cap, tc.path)
if tc.expectedErr == nil {
require.NoError(t, err)
} else {
require.EqualError(t, err, tc.expectedErr.Error())
}
})
}
}