Fix numerous go-getter security issues:
- Add timeouts to http, git, and hg operations to prevent DoS
- Add size limit to http to prevent resource exhaustion
- Disable following symlinks in both artifacts and `job run`
- Stop performing initial HEAD request to avoid file corruption on
retries and DoS opportunities.
**Approach**
Since Nomad has no ability to differentiate a DoS-via-large-artifact vs
a legitimate workload, all of the new limits are configurable at the
client agent level.
The max size of HTTP downloads is also exposed as a node attribute so
that if some workloads have large artifacts they can specify a high
limit in their jobspecs.
In the future all of this plumbing could be extended to enable/disable
specific getters or artifact downloading entirely on a per-node basis.
This change makes few compromises:
* Looks up the devices associated with tasks at look up time. Given
that `nomad alloc status` is called rarely generally (compared to stats
telemetry and general job reporting), it seems fine. However, the
lookup overhead grows bounded by number of `tasks x total-host-devices`,
which can be significant.
* `client.Client` performs the task devices->statistics lookup. It
passes self to alloc/task runners so they can look up the device statistics
allocated to them.
* Currently alloc/task runners are responsible for constructing the
entire RPC response for stats
* The alternatives for making task runners device statistics aware
don't seem appealing (e.g. having task runners contain reference to hostStats)
* On the alloc aggregation resource usage, I did a naive merging of task device statistics.
* Personally, I question the value of such aggregation, compared to
costs of struct duplication and bloating the response - but opted to be
consistent in the API.
* With naive concatination, device instances from a single device group used by separate tasks in the alloc, would be aggregated in two separate device group statistics.
Michael Schurter