Part of #6120
Building on the support for enabling connect proxy paths in #7323, this change
adds the ability to configure the 'service.check.expose' flag on group-level
service check definitions for services that are connect-enabled. This is a slight
deviation from the "magic" that Consul provides. With Consul, the 'expose' flag
exists on the connect.proxy stanza, which will then auto-generate expose paths
for every HTTP and gRPC service check associated with that connect-enabled
service.
A first attempt at providing similar magic for Nomad's Consul Connect integration
followed that pattern exactly, as seen in #7396. However, on reviewing the PR
we realized having the `expose` flag on the proxy stanza inseperably ties together
the automatic path generation with every HTTP/gRPC defined on the service. This
makes sense in Consul's context, because a service definition is reasonably
associated with a single "task". With Nomad's group level service definitions
however, there is a reasonable expectation that a service definition is more
abstractly representative of multiple services within the task group. In this
case, one would want to define checks of that service which concretely make HTTP
or gRPC requests to different underlying tasks. Such a model is not possible
with the course `proxy.expose` flag.
Instead, we now have the flag made available within the check definitions themselves.
By making the expose feature resolute to each check, it is possible to have
some HTTP/gRPC checks which make use of the envoy exposed paths, as well as
some HTTP/gRPC checks which make use of some orthongonal port-mapping to do
checks on some other task (or even some other bound port of the same task)
within the task group.
Given this example,
group "server-group" {
network {
mode = "bridge"
port "forchecks" {
to = -1
}
}
service {
name = "myserver"
port = 2000
connect {
sidecar_service {
}
}
check {
name = "mycheck-myserver"
type = "http"
port = "forchecks"
interval = "3s"
timeout = "2s"
method = "GET"
path = "/classic/responder/health"
expose = true
}
}
}
Nomad will automatically inject (via job endpoint mutator) the
extrapolated expose path configuration, i.e.
expose {
path {
path = "/classic/responder/health"
protocol = "http"
local_path_port = 2000
listener_port = "forchecks"
}
}
Documentation is coming in #7440 (needs updating, doing next)
Modifications to the `countdash` examples in https://github.com/hashicorp/demo-consul-101/pull/6
which will make the examples in the documentation actually runnable.
Will add some e2e tests based on the above when it becomes available.
* acl/policy: add the volume ACL policies
* nomad/csi_endpoint: enforce ACLs for volume access
* nomad/search_endpoint_oss: volume acls
* acl/acl: add plugin read as a global policy
* acl/policy: add PluginPolicy global cap type
* nomad/csi_endpoint: check the global plugin ACL policy
* nomad/mock/acl: PluginPolicy
* nomad/csi_endpoint: fix list rebase
* nomad/core_sched_test: new test since #7358
* nomad/csi_endpoint_test: use correct permissions for list
* nomad/csi_endpoint: allowCSIMount keeps ACL checks together
* nomad/job_endpoint: check mount permission for jobs
* nomad/job_endpoint_test: need plugin read, too
Nomad jobs may be configured with a TaskGroup which contains a Service
definition that is Consul Connect enabled. These service definitions end
up establishing a Consul Connect Proxy Task (e.g. envoy, by default). In
the case where Consul ACLs are enabled, a Service Identity token is required
for these tasks to run & connect, etc. This changeset enables the Nomad Server
to recieve RPC requests for the derivation of SI tokens on behalf of instances
of Consul Connect using Tasks. Those tokens are then relayed back to the
requesting Client, which then injects the tokens in the secrets directory of
the Task.
Fixes#6853
Canonicalize jobs first before adding any sidecars. This fixes a bug
where sidecar tasks were added without interpolated names and broke
validation. Sidecar tasks must be canonicalized independently.
Also adds a group network to the mock connect job because it wasn't a
valid connect job before!
The existing version constraint uses logic optimized for package
managers, not schedulers, when checking prereleases:
- 1.3.0-beta1 will *not* satisfy ">= 0.6.1"
- 1.7.0-rc1 will *not* satisfy ">= 1.6.0-beta1"
This is due to package managers wishing to favor final releases over
prereleases.
In a scheduler versions more often represent the earliest release all
required features/APIs are available in a system. Whether the constraint
or the version being evaluated are prereleases has no impact on
ordering.
This commit adds a new constraint - `semver` - which will use Semver
v2.0 ordering when evaluating constraints. Given the above examples:
- 1.3.0-beta1 satisfies ">= 0.6.1" using `semver`
- 1.7.0-rc1 satisfies ">= 1.6.0-beta1" using `semver`
Since existing jobspecs may rely on the old behavior, a new constraint
was added and the implicit Consul Connect and Vault constraints were
updated to use it.
There's a bug in version parsing that breaks this constraint when using
a prerelease enterprise version of Vault (eg 1.3.0-beta1+ent). While
this does not fix the underlying bug it does provide a workaround for
future issues related to the implicit constraint. Like the implicit
Connect constraint: *all* implicit constraints should be overridable to
allow users to workaround bugs or other factors should the need arise.
This commit introduces support for configuring mount propagation when
mounting volumes with the `volume_mount` stanza on Linux targets.
Similar to Kubernetes, we expose 3 options for configuring mount
propagation:
- private, which is equivalent to `rprivate` on Linux, which does not allow the
container to see any new nested mounts after the chroot was created.
- host-to-task, which is equivalent to `rslave` on Linux, which allows new mounts
that have been created _outside of the container_ to be visible
inside the container after the chroot is created.
- bidirectional, which is equivalent to `rshared` on Linux, which allows both
the container to see new mounts created on the host, but
importantly _allows the container to create mounts that are
visible in other containers an don the host_
private and host-to-task are safe, but bidirectional mounts can be
dangerous, as if the code inside a container creates a mount, and does
not clean it up before tearing down the container, it can cause bad
things to happen inside the kernel.
To add a layer of safety here, we require that the user has ReadWrite
permissions on the volume before allowing bidirectional mounts, as a
defense in depth / validation case, although creating mounts should also require
a priviliged execution environment inside the container.
In a job registration request, ensure that the request namespace "header" and job
namespace field match. This should be the case already in prod, as http
handlers ensures that the values match [1].
This mitigates bugs that exploit bugs where we may check a value but act
on another, resulting into bypassing ACL system.
[1] https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/blob/v0.9.5/command/agent/job_endpoint.go#L415-L418
Currently, using a Volume in a job uses the following configuration:
```
volume "alias-name" {
type = "volume-type"
read_only = true
config {
source = "host_volume_name"
}
}
```
This commit migrates to the following:
```
volume "alias-name" {
type = "volume-type"
source = "host_volume_name"
read_only = true
}
```
The original design was based due to being uncertain about the future of storage
plugins, and to allow maxium flexibility.
However, this causes a few issues, namely:
- We frequently need to parse this configuration during submission,
scheduling, and mounting
- It complicates the configuration from and end users perspective
- It complicates the ability to do validation
As we understand the problem space of CSI a little more, it has become
clear that we won't need the `source` to be in config, as it will be
used in the majority of cases:
- Host Volumes: Always need a source
- Preallocated CSI Volumes: Always needs a source from a volume or claim name
- Dynamic Persistent CSI Volumes*: Always needs a source to attach the volumes
to for managing upgrades and to avoid dangling.
- Dynamic Ephemeral CSI Volumes*: Less thought out, but `source` will probably point
to the plugin name, and a `config` block will
allow you to pass meta to the plugin. Or will
point to a pre-configured ephemeral config.
*If implemented
The new design simplifies this by merging the source into the volume
stanza to solve the above issues with usability, performance, and error
handling.
* nomad: add admission controller framework
* nomad: add admission controller framework and Consul Connect hooks
* run admission controllers before checking permissions
* client: add default node meta for connect configurables
* nomad: remove validateJob func since it has been moved to admission controller
* nomad: use new TaskKind type
* client: use consts for connect sidecar image and log level
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-Authored-By: Michael Schurter <mschurter@hashicorp.com>
* nomad: add job register test with connect sidecar
* Update nomad/job_endpoint_hooks.go
Co-Authored-By: Michael Schurter <mschurter@hashicorp.com>
Revert "fingerprint Constraints and Affinities have Equals, as set"
This reverts commit 596f16fb5f1a4a6766a57b3311af806d22382609.
Revert "client tests assert the independent handling of interface and speed"
This reverts commit 7857ac5993a578474d0570819f99b7b6e027de40.
Revert "structs missed applying a style change from the review"
This reverts commit 658916e3274efa438beadc2535f47109d0c2f0f2.
Revert "client, structs comments"
This reverts commit be2838d6baa9d382a5013fa80ea016856f28ade2.
Revert "client fingerprint updateNetworks preserves the network configuration"
This reverts commit fc309cb430e62d8e66267a724f006ae9abe1c63c.
Revert "client_test cleanup comments from review"
This reverts commit bc0bf4efb9114e699bc662f50c8f12319b6b3445.
Revert "client Networks Equals is set equality"
This reverts commit f8d432345b54b1953a4a4c719b9269f845e3e573.
Revert "struct cleanup indentation in RequestedDevice Equals"
This reverts commit f4746411cab328215def6508955b160a53452da3.
Revert "struct Equals checks for identity before value checking"
This reverts commit 0767a4665ed30ab8d9586a59a74db75d51fd9226.
Revert "fix client-test, avoid hardwired platform dependecy on lo0"
This reverts commit e89dbb2ab182b6368507dbcd33c3342223eb0ae7.
Revert "refactor error in client fingerprint to include the offending data"
This reverts commit a7fed726c6e0264d42a58410d840adde780a30f5.
Revert "add client updateNodeResources to merge but preserve manual config"
This reverts commit 84bd433c7e1d030193e054ec23474380ff3b9032.
Revert "refactor struts.RequestedDevice to have its own Equals"
This reverts commit 689782524090e51183474516715aa2f34908b8e6.
Revert "refactor structs.Resource.Networks to have its own Equals"
This reverts commit 49e2e6c77bb3eaa4577772b36c62205061c92fa1.
Revert "refactor structs.Resource.Devices to have its own Equals"
This reverts commit 4ede9226bb971ae42cc203560ed0029897aec2c9.
Revert "add COMPAT(0.10): Remove in 0.10 notes to impl for structs.Resources"
This reverts commit 49fbaace5298d5ccf031eb7ebec93906e1d468b5.
Revert "add structs.Resources Equals"
This reverts commit 8528a2a2a6450e4462a1d02741571b5efcb45f0b.
Revert "test that fingerprint resources are updated, net not clobbered"
This reverts commit 8ee02ddd23bafc87b9fce52b60c6026335bb722d.
