The default Linux Capabilities set enabled by the docker, exec, and
java task drivers includes CAP_NET_RAW (for making ping just work),
which has the side affect of opening an ARP DoS/MiTM attack between
tasks using bridge networking on the same host network.
https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#runtime-privilege-and-linux-capabilities
This PR disables CAP_NET_RAW for the docker, exec, and java task
drivers. The previous behavior can be restored for docker using the
allow_caps docker plugin configuration option.
A future version of nomad will enable similar configurability for the
exec and java task drivers.
* Fixup uses of `sanity`
* Remove unnecessary comments.
These checks are better explained by earlier comments about
the context of the test. Per @tgross, moved the tests together
to better reinforce the overall shared context.
* Update nomad/fsm_test.go
This PR adds pid_mode and ipc_mode options to the exec and java task
driver config options. By default these will defer to the default_pid_mode
and default_ipc_mode agent plugin options created in #9969. Setting
these values to "host" mode disables isolation for the task. Doing so
is not recommended, but may be necessary to support legacy job configurations.
Closes#9970
This PR adds default_pid_mode and default_ipc_mode options to the exec and java
task drivers. By default these will default to "private" mode, enabling PID and
IPC isolation for tasks. Setting them to "host" mode disables isolation. Doing
so is not recommended, but may be necessary to support legacy job configurations.
Closes#9969
This has to have been unused because the HasPrefix operation is
backwards, meaning a Command.Env that includes PATH= never would have
worked; the default path was always used.
Use targetted ignore comments for the cases where we are bound by
backward compatibility.
I've left some file based linters, especially when the file is riddled
with linter voilations (e.g. enum names), or if it's a property of the
file (e.g. package and file names).
I encountered an odd behavior related to RPC_REQUEST_RESPONSE_UNIQUE and
RPC_REQUEST_STANDARD_NAME. Apparently, if they target a `stream` type,
we must separate them into separate lines so that the ignore comment
targets the type specifically.
Fix#9210 .
This update the executor so it honors the User when using nomad alloc exec. The bug was that the exec task didn't honor the init command when execing.
When raw_exec is configured with [`no_cgroups`](https://www.nomadproject.io/docs/drivers/raw_exec#no_cgroups), raw_exec shouldn't attempt to create a cgroup.
Prior to this change, we accidentally always required freezer cgroup to do stats PID tracking. We already have the proper fallback in place for metrics, so only need to ensure that we don't create a cgroup for the task.
Fixes https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues/8565
Previously, it was required that you `go get github.com/hashicorp/nomad` to be
able to build protos, as the protoc invocation added an include directive that
pointed to `$GOPATH/src`, which is how dependent protos were discovered. As
Nomad now uses Go modules, it won't necessarily be cloned to `$GOPATH`.
(Additionally, if you _had_ go-gotten Nomad at some point, protoc compilation
would have possibly used the _wrong_ protos, as those wouldn't necessarily be
the most up-to-date ones.)
This change modifies the proto files and the `protoc` invocation to handle
discovering dependent protos via protoc plugin modifier statements that are
specific to the protoc plugin being used.
In this change, `make proto` was run to recompile the protos, which results in
changes only to the gzipped `FileDescriptorProto`.
This fixes a bug where pre-0.9 executors fail to recover after an
upgrade.
The bug is that legacyExecutorWrappers didn't get updated with
ExecStreaming function, and thus failed to implement the Executor
function. Sadly, this meant that all recovery attempts fail, as the
runtime check in
b312aacbc9/drivers/shared/executor/utils.go (L103-L110)
.
My latest Vagrant box contains an empty cgroup name that isn't used for
isolation:
```
$ cat /proc/self/cgroup | grep ::
0::/user.slice/user-1000.slice/session-17.scope
```
Symlinking busybox may fail when the test code and the test temporary
directory live on different volumes/partitions; so we should copy
instead. This situation arises in the Vagrant setup, where the code
repository live on special file sharing volume.
Somewhat unrelated, remove `f.Sync()` invocation from a test copyFile
helper function. Sync is useful only for crash recovery, and isn't
necessary in our test setup. The sync invocation is a significant
overhead as it requires the OS to flush any cached writes to disk.
This fixes a bug where executor based drivers emit stats every second,
regardless of user configuration.
When serializing the Stats request across grpc, the nomad agent dropped
the Interval value, and then executor uses 1s as a default value.
Stop joining libcontainer executor process into the newly created task
container cgroup, to ensure that the cgroups are fully destroyed on
shutdown, and to make it consistent with other plugin processes.
Previously, executor process is added to the container cgroup so the
executor process resources get aggregated along with user processes in
our metric aggregation.
However, adding executor process to container cgroup adds some
complications with much benefits:
First, it complicates cleanup. We must ensure that the executor is
removed from container cgroup on shutdown. Though, we had a bug where
we missed removing it from the systemd cgroup. Because executor uses
`containerState.CgroupPaths` on launch, which includes systemd, but
`cgroups.GetAllSubsystems` which doesn't.
Second, it may have advese side-effects. When a user process is cpu
bound or uses too much memory, executor should remain functioning
without risk of being killed (by OOM killer) or throttled.
Third, it is inconsistent with other drivers and plugins. Logmon and
DockerLogger processes aren't in the task cgroups. Neither are
containerd processes, though it is equivalent to executor in
responsibility.
Fourth, in my experience when executor process moves cgroup while it's
running, the cgroup aggregation is odd. The cgroup
`memory.usage_in_bytes` doesn't seem to capture the full memory usage of
the executor process and becomes a red-harring when investigating memory
issues.
For all the reasons above, I opted to have executor remain in nomad
agent cgroup and we can revisit this when we have a better story for
plugin process cgroup management.
This commit introduces support for configuring mount propagation when
mounting volumes with the `volume_mount` stanza on Linux targets.
Similar to Kubernetes, we expose 3 options for configuring mount
propagation:
- private, which is equivalent to `rprivate` on Linux, which does not allow the
container to see any new nested mounts after the chroot was created.
- host-to-task, which is equivalent to `rslave` on Linux, which allows new mounts
that have been created _outside of the container_ to be visible
inside the container after the chroot is created.
- bidirectional, which is equivalent to `rshared` on Linux, which allows both
the container to see new mounts created on the host, but
importantly _allows the container to create mounts that are
visible in other containers an don the host_
private and host-to-task are safe, but bidirectional mounts can be
dangerous, as if the code inside a container creates a mount, and does
not clean it up before tearing down the container, it can cause bad
things to happen inside the kernel.
To add a layer of safety here, we require that the user has ReadWrite
permissions on the volume before allowing bidirectional mounts, as a
defense in depth / validation case, although creating mounts should also require
a priviliged execution environment inside the container.