open-nomad/nomad/acl_endpoint.go

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package nomad
import (
"fmt"
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"io/ioutil"
"net/http"
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"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
metrics "github.com/armon/go-metrics"
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log "github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
memdb "github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-set"
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policy "github.com/hashicorp/nomad/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/state/paginator"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/nomad/structs"
)
var (
// aclDisabled is returned when an ACL endpoint is hit but ACLs are not enabled
aclDisabled = structs.NewErrRPCCoded(400, "ACL support disabled")
)
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const (
// aclBootstrapReset is the file name to create in the data dir. It's only contents
// should be the reset index
aclBootstrapReset = "acl-bootstrap-reset"
)
// ACL endpoint is used for manipulating ACL tokens and policies
type ACL struct {
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srv *Server
logger log.Logger
}
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// UpsertPolicies is used to create or update a set of policies
func (a *ACL) UpsertPolicies(args *structs.ACLPolicyUpsertRequest, reply *structs.GenericResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
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if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.UpsertPolicies", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
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defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "upsert_policies"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
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if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
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// Validate non-zero set of policies
if len(args.Policies) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(400, "must specify as least one policy")
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}
// Validate each policy, compute hash
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for idx, policy := range args.Policies {
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if err := policy.Validate(); err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(404, "policy %d invalid: %v", idx, err)
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}
policy.SetHash()
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}
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// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLPolicyUpsertRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// DeletePolicies is used to delete policies
func (a *ACL) DeletePolicies(args *structs.ACLPolicyDeleteRequest, reply *structs.GenericResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.DeletePolicies", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "delete_policies"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
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if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Validate non-zero set of policies
if len(args.Names) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(400, "must specify as least one policy")
}
// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLPolicyDeleteRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ListPolicies is used to list the policies
func (a *ACL) ListPolicies(args *structs.ACLPolicyListRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyListResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.ListPolicies", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "list_policies"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// If it is not a management token determine the policies that may be listed
mgt := acl.IsManagement()
tokenPolicyNames := set.New[string](0)
if !mgt {
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
// Generate a set of policy names. This is initially generated from the
// ACL role links.
tokenPolicyNames, err = a.policyNamesFromRoleLinks(token.Roles)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add the token policies which are directly referenced into the set.
tokenPolicyNames.InsertAll(token.Policies)
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Iterate over all the policies
var err error
var iter memdb.ResultIterator
if prefix := args.QueryOptions.Prefix; prefix != "" {
iter, err = state.ACLPolicyByNamePrefix(ws, prefix)
} else {
iter, err = state.ACLPolicies(ws)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Convert all the policies to a list stub
reply.Policies = nil
for {
raw := iter.Next()
if raw == nil {
break
}
realPolicy := raw.(*structs.ACLPolicy)
if mgt || tokenPolicyNames.Contains(realPolicy.Name) {
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, realPolicy.Stub())
}
}
// Use the last index that affected the policy table
index, err := state.Index("acl_policy")
if err != nil {
return err
}
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// Ensure we never set the index to zero, otherwise a blocking query cannot be used.
// We floor the index at one, since realistically the first write must have a higher index.
if index == 0 {
index = 1
}
reply.Index = index
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// GetPolicy is used to get a specific policy
func (a *ACL) GetPolicy(args *structs.ACLPolicySpecificRequest, reply *structs.SingleACLPolicyResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.GetPolicy", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_policy"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// If the policy is the anonymous one, anyone can get it
// If it is not a management token determine if it can get this policy
mgt := acl.IsManagement()
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if !mgt && args.Name != "anonymous" {
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
// Generate a set of policy names. This is initially generated from the
// ACL role links.
tokenPolicyNames, err := a.policyNamesFromRoleLinks(token.Roles)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add the token policies which are directly referenced into the set.
tokenPolicyNames.InsertAll(token.Policies)
if !tokenPolicyNames.Contains(args.Name) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Look for the policy
out, err := state.ACLPolicyByName(ws, args.Name)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the output
reply.Policy = out
if out != nil {
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
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rules, err := policy.Parse(out.Rules)
if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Policy.RulesJSON = rules
} else {
// Use the last index that affected the policy table
index, err := state.Index("acl_policy")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
}
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
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func (a *ACL) requestACLToken(secretID string) (*structs.ACLToken, error) {
if secretID == "" {
return structs.AnonymousACLToken, nil
}
snap, err := a.srv.fsm.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return snap.ACLTokenBySecretID(nil, secretID)
}
// GetPolicies is used to get a set of policies
func (a *ACL) GetPolicies(args *structs.ACLPolicySetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicySetResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.GetPolicies", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_policies"}, time.Now())
// For client typed tokens, allow them to query any policies associated with that token.
// This is used by clients which are resolving the policies to enforce. Any associated
// policies need to be fetched so that the client can determine what to allow.
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
// Generate a set of policy names. This is initially generated from the
// ACL role links.
tokenPolicyNames, err := a.policyNamesFromRoleLinks(token.Roles)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add the token policies which are directly referenced into the set.
tokenPolicyNames.InsertAll(token.Policies)
// Ensure the token has enough permissions to query the named policies.
if token.Type != structs.ACLManagementToken && !tokenPolicyNames.ContainsAll(args.Names) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Setup the output
reply.Policies = make(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy, len(args.Names))
// Look for the policy
for _, policyName := range args.Names {
out, err := state.ACLPolicyByName(ws, policyName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if out != nil {
reply.Policies[policyName] = out
}
}
// Use the last index that affected the policy table
index, err := state.Index("acl_policy")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
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// Bootstrap is used to bootstrap the initial token
func (a *ACL) Bootstrap(args *structs.ACLTokenBootstrapRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenUpsertResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
providedTokenID := args.BootstrapSecret
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if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.Bootstrap", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "bootstrap"}, time.Now())
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// Always ignore the reset index from the arguments
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args.ResetIndex = 0
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// Snapshot the state
state, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Verify bootstrap is possible. The state store method re-verifies this,
// but we do an early check to avoid raft transactions when possible.
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ok, resetIdx, err := state.CanBootstrapACLToken()
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if err != nil {
return err
}
if !ok {
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// Check if there is a reset index specified
specifiedIndex := a.fileBootstrapResetIndex()
if specifiedIndex == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "ACL bootstrap already done (reset index: %d)", resetIdx)
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} else if specifiedIndex != resetIdx {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "Invalid bootstrap reset index (specified %d, reset index: %d)", specifiedIndex, resetIdx)
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}
// Setup the reset index to allow bootstrapping again
args.ResetIndex = resetIdx
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}
// Create a new global management token, override any parameter
args.Token = &structs.ACLToken{
AccessorID: uuid.Generate(),
SecretID: uuid.Generate(),
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Name: "Bootstrap Token",
Type: structs.ACLManagementToken,
Global: true,
CreateTime: time.Now().UTC(),
}
// if a token has been passed in from the API overwrite the generated one.
if providedTokenID != "" {
if helper.IsUUID(providedTokenID) {
args.Token.SecretID = providedTokenID
} else {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "invalid acl token")
}
}
args.Token.SetHash()
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// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenBootstrapRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Populate the response. We do a lookup against the state to
// pickup the proper create / modify times.
state, err = a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
out, err := state.ACLTokenByAccessorID(nil, args.Token.AccessorID)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "token lookup failed: %v", err)
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}
reply.Tokens = append(reply.Tokens, out)
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
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// fileBootstrapResetIndex is used to read the reset file from <data-dir>/acl-bootstrap-reset
func (a *ACL) fileBootstrapResetIndex() uint64 {
// Determine the file path to check
path := filepath.Join(a.srv.config.DataDir, aclBootstrapReset)
// Read the file
raw, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
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a.logger.Error("failed to read bootstrap file", "path", path, "error", err)
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}
return 0
}
// Attempt to parse the file
var resetIdx uint64
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(string(raw), "%d", &resetIdx); err != nil {
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a.logger.Error("failed to parse bootstrap file", "path", path, "error", err)
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return 0
}
// Return the reset index
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a.logger.Warn("bootstrap file parsed", "path", path, "reset_index", resetIdx)
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return resetIdx
}
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// UpsertTokens is used to create or update a set of tokens
func (a *ACL) UpsertTokens(args *structs.ACLTokenUpsertRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenUpsertResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
// Validate non-zero set of tokens
if len(args.Tokens) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(http.StatusBadRequest, "must specify as least one token")
}
// Force the request to the authoritative region if we are creating global tokens
hasGlobal := false
allGlobal := true
for _, token := range args.Tokens {
if token.Global {
hasGlobal = true
} else {
allGlobal = false
}
}
// Disallow mixed requests with global and non-global tokens since we forward
// the entire request as a single batch.
if hasGlobal {
if !allGlobal {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(http.StatusBadRequest,
"cannot upsert mixed global and non-global tokens")
}
// Force the request to the authoritative region if it has global
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLUpsertTokensRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
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return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "upsert_tokens"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
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if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Snapshot the state so we can perform lookups against the accessor ID if
// needed. Do it here, so we only need to do this once no matter how many
// tokens we are upserting.
stateSnapshot, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
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// Validate each token
for idx, token := range args.Tokens {
// Store any existing token found, so we can perform the correct update
// validation.
var existingToken *structs.ACLToken
// If the token is being updated, perform a lookup so can can validate
// the new changes against the old.
if token.AccessorID != "" {
out, err := stateSnapshot.ACLTokenByAccessorID(nil, token.AccessorID)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusInternalServerError, "token lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if out == nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "cannot find token %s", token.AccessorID)
}
existingToken = out
}
// Canonicalize sets information needed by the validation function, so
// this order must be maintained.
token.Canonicalize()
if err := token.Validate(a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL,
a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL, existingToken); err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "token %d invalid: %v", idx, err)
}
var normalizedRoleLinks []*structs.ACLTokenRoleLink
uniqueRoleIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
// Iterate, check, and normalize the ACL role links that the token has.
for _, roleLink := range token.Roles {
var (
existing *structs.ACLRole
roleIdentifier string
lookupErr error
)
// In the event the caller specified the role name, we need to
// identify the immutable ID. In either case, we need to ensure the
// role exists.
switch roleLink.ID {
case "":
roleIdentifier = roleLink.Name
existing, lookupErr = stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByName(nil, roleIdentifier)
default:
roleIdentifier = roleLink.ID
existing, lookupErr = stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByID(nil, roleIdentifier)
}
// Handle any state lookup error or inability to locate the role
// within state.
if lookupErr != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusInternalServerError, "role lookup failed: %v", lookupErr)
}
if existing == nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "cannot find role %s", roleIdentifier)
}
// Ensure the role ID is written to the object and that the name is
// emptied as it is possible the role name is updated in the future.
roleLink.ID = existing.ID
roleLink.Name = ""
// Deduplicate role links by their ID.
if _, ok := uniqueRoleIDs[roleLink.ID]; !ok {
normalizedRoleLinks = append(normalizedRoleLinks, roleLink)
uniqueRoleIDs[roleLink.ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Write the normalized array of ACL role links back to the token.
token.Roles = normalizedRoleLinks
// Compute the token hash
token.SetHash()
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}
// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenUpsertRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Populate the response. We do a lookup against the state to pick up the
// proper create / modify times.
stateSnapshot, err = a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, token := range args.Tokens {
out, err := stateSnapshot.ACLTokenByAccessorID(nil, token.AccessorID)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "token lookup failed: %v", err)
}
reply.Tokens = append(reply.Tokens, out)
}
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// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// DeleteTokens is used to delete tokens
func (a *ACL) DeleteTokens(args *structs.ACLTokenDeleteRequest, reply *structs.GenericResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
// Validate non-zero set of tokens
if len(args.AccessorIDs) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(400, "must specify as least one token")
}
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if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.DeleteTokens", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "delete_tokens"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
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if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Snapshot the state
state, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Determine if we are deleting local or global tokens
hasGlobal := false
allGlobal := true
nonexistentTokens := make([]string, 0)
for _, accessor := range args.AccessorIDs {
token, err := state.ACLTokenByAccessorID(nil, accessor)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "token lookup failed: %v", err)
}
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if token == nil {
nonexistentTokens = append(nonexistentTokens, accessor)
continue
}
if token.Global {
hasGlobal = true
} else {
allGlobal = false
}
}
if len(nonexistentTokens) != 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "Cannot delete nonexistent tokens: %v", strings.Join(nonexistentTokens, ", "))
}
// Disallow mixed requests with global and non-global tokens since we forward
// the entire request as a single batch.
if hasGlobal {
if !allGlobal {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(400, "cannot delete mixed global and non-global tokens")
}
// Force the request to the authoritative region if it has global
if a.srv.config.Region != a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion {
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
_, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.DeleteTokens", args, args, reply)
return err
}
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}
// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenDeleteRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ListTokens is used to list the tokens
func (a *ACL) ListTokens(args *structs.ACLTokenListRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenListResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
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if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.ListTokens", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "list_tokens"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
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if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
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// Setup the blocking query
sort := state.SortOption(args.Reverse)
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opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Iterate over all the tokens
var err error
var iter memdb.ResultIterator
var opts paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions
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if prefix := args.QueryOptions.Prefix; prefix != "" {
iter, err = state.ACLTokenByAccessorIDPrefix(ws, prefix, sort)
opts = paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithID: true,
}
} else if args.GlobalOnly {
iter, err = state.ACLTokensByGlobal(ws, true, sort)
opts = paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithID: true,
}
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
} else {
iter, err = state.ACLTokens(ws, sort)
opts = paginator.StructsTokenizerOptions{
WithCreateIndex: true,
WithID: true,
}
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
tokenizer := paginator.NewStructsTokenizer(iter, opts)
var tokens []*structs.ACLTokenListStub
paginator, err := paginator.NewPaginator(iter, tokenizer, nil, args.QueryOptions,
func(raw interface{}) error {
token := raw.(*structs.ACLToken)
tokens = append(tokens, token.Stub())
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to create result paginator: %v", err)
}
nextToken, err := paginator.Page()
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(
http.StatusBadRequest, "failed to read result page: %v", err)
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
}
reply.QueryMeta.NextToken = nextToken
reply.Tokens = tokens
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// Use the last index that affected the token table
index, err := state.Index("acl_token")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// GetToken is used to get a specific token
func (a *ACL) GetToken(args *structs.ACLTokenSpecificRequest, reply *structs.SingleACLTokenResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.GetToken", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_token"}, time.Now())
2017-10-12 22:16:33 +00:00
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
2017-09-27 20:42:56 +00:00
// Ensure ACLs are enabled and this call is made with one
if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Look for the token
out, err := state.ACLTokenByAccessorID(ws, args.AccessorID)
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
if err != nil {
return err
}
2017-09-27 20:42:56 +00:00
if out == nil {
// If the token doesn't resolve, only allow management tokens to
// block.
if !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
2017-09-27 20:42:56 +00:00
// Check management level permissions or that the secret ID matches the
// accessor ID
2017-10-12 22:16:33 +00:00
} else if !acl.IsManagement() && out.SecretID != args.AuthToken {
2017-09-27 20:42:56 +00:00
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
2017-08-12 22:44:05 +00:00
// Setup the output
reply.Token = out
if out != nil {
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
} else {
// Use the last index that affected the token table
index, err := state.Index("acl_token")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
}
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// GetTokens is used to get a set of token
func (a *ACL) GetTokens(args *structs.ACLTokenSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenSetResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.GetTokens", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_tokens"}, time.Now())
// Check management level permissions
2017-10-12 22:16:33 +00:00
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Setup the blocking query
opts := blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.StateStore) error {
// Setup the output
reply.Tokens = make(map[string]*structs.ACLToken, len(args.AccessorIDS))
// Look for the token
for _, accessor := range args.AccessorIDS {
out, err := state.ACLTokenByAccessorID(ws, accessor)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if out != nil {
reply.Tokens[out.AccessorID] = out
}
}
// Use the last index that affected the token table
index, err := state.Index("acl_token")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
return nil
}}
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&opts)
}
// ResolveToken is used to lookup a specific token by a secret ID. This is used for enforcing ACLs by clients.
func (a *ACL) ResolveToken(args *structs.ResolveACLTokenRequest, reply *structs.ResolveACLTokenResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward("ACL.ResolveToken", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "resolve_token"}, time.Now())
// Setup the query meta
a.srv.setQueryMeta(&reply.QueryMeta)
// Snapshot the state
state, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Look for the token
out, err := state.ACLTokenBySecretID(nil, args.SecretID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Setup the output
reply.Token = out
if out != nil {
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
} else {
// Use the last index that affected the token table
index, err := state.Index("acl_token")
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) UpsertOneTimeToken(args *structs.OneTimeTokenUpsertRequest, reply *structs.OneTimeTokenUpsertResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
"ACL.UpsertOneTimeToken", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince(
[]string{"nomad", "acl", "upsert_one_time_token"}, time.Now())
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), a.srv.Region(), minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("All servers should be running version %v or later to use one-time authentication tokens", minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion)
}
// Snapshot the state
state, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Look up the token; there's no capability check as you can only
// request a OTT for your own ACL token
aclToken, err := state.ACLTokenBySecretID(nil, args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if aclToken == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
ott := &structs.OneTimeToken{
OneTimeSecretID: uuid.Generate(),
AccessorID: aclToken.AccessorID,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(10 * time.Minute),
}
// Update via Raft
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.OneTimeTokenUpsertRequestType, ott)
if err != nil {
return err
}
ott.ModifyIndex = index
ott.CreateIndex = index
reply.OneTimeToken = ott
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ExchangeOneTimeToken provides a one-time token's secret ID to exchange it
// for the ACL token that created that one-time token
func (a *ACL) ExchangeOneTimeToken(args *structs.OneTimeTokenExchangeRequest, reply *structs.OneTimeTokenExchangeResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
"ACL.ExchangeOneTimeToken", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince(
[]string{"nomad", "acl", "exchange_one_time_token"}, time.Now())
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), a.srv.Region(), minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("All servers should be running version %v or later to use one-time authentication tokens", minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion)
}
// Snapshot the state
state, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
ott, err := state.OneTimeTokenBySecret(nil, args.OneTimeSecretID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if ott == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
if ott.ExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
// we return early and leave cleaning up the expired token for GC
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Look for the token; it may have been deleted, in which case, 403
aclToken, err := state.ACLTokenByAccessorID(nil, ott.AccessorID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if aclToken == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Expire token via raft; because this is the only write in the RPC the
// caller can safely retry with the same token if the raft write fails
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.OneTimeTokenDeleteRequestType,
&structs.OneTimeTokenDeleteRequest{
AccessorIDs: []string{ott.AccessorID},
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Token = aclToken
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ExpireOneTimeTokens removes all expired tokens from the state store. It is
// called only by garbage collection
func (a *ACL) ExpireOneTimeTokens(args *structs.OneTimeTokenExpireRequest, reply *structs.GenericResponse) error {
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
"ACL.ExpireOneTimeTokens", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince(
[]string{"nomad", "acl", "expire_one_time_tokens"}, time.Now())
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), a.srv.Region(), minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("All servers should be running version %v or later to use one-time authentication tokens", minOneTimeAuthenticationTokenVersion)
}
// Check management level permissions
if a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
args.Timestamp = time.Now() // use the leader's timestamp
// Expire token via raft; because this is the only write in the RPC the
// caller can safely retry with the same token if the raft write fails
_, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.OneTimeTokenExpireRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// UpsertRoles creates or updates ACL roles held within Nomad.
func (a *ACL) UpsertRoles(
args *structs.ACLRolesUpsertRequest,
reply *structs.ACLRolesUpsertResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to upsert ACL roles when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
// This endpoint always forwards to the authoritative region as ACL roles
// are global.
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLUpsertRolesRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "upsert_roles"}, time.Now())
// ACL roles can only be used once all servers, in all federated regions
// have been upgraded to 1.4.0 or greater.
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), AllRegions, minACLRoleVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("all servers should be running version %v or later to use ACL roles",
minACLRoleVersion)
}
// Only tokens with management level permissions can create ACL roles.
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Snapshot the state so we can perform lookups against the ID and policy
// links if needed. Do it here, so we only need to do this once no matter
// how many roles we are upserting.
stateSnapshot, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Validate each role.
for idx, role := range args.ACLRoles {
// Perform all the static validation of the ACL role object. Use the
// array index as we cannot be sure the error was caused by a missing
// name.
if err := role.Validate(); err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "role %d invalid: %v", idx, err)
}
// If the caller has passed a role ID, this call is considered an
// update to an existing role. We should therefore ensure it is found
// within state. Otherwise, the call is considered a new creation, and
// we must ensure a role of the same name does not exist.
if role.ID == "" {
existingRole, err := stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByName(nil, role.Name)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusInternalServerError, "role lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if existingRole != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "role with name %s already exists", role.Name)
}
} else {
existingRole, err := stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByID(nil, role.ID)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusInternalServerError, "role lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if existingRole == nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "cannot find role %s", role.ID)
}
}
policyNames := make(map[string]struct{})
var policiesLinks []*structs.ACLRolePolicyLink
// We need to deduplicate the ACL policy links within this role as well
// as ensure the policies exist within state.
for _, policyLink := range role.Policies {
// If the RPC does not allow for missing policies, perform a state
// look up for the policy. An error or not being able to find the
// policy is terminal. We can include the name in the error message
// as it has previously been validated.
if !args.AllowMissingPolicies {
existing, err := stateSnapshot.ACLPolicyByName(nil, policyLink.Name)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusInternalServerError, "policy lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if existing == nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "cannot find policy %s", policyLink.Name)
}
}
// If the policy name is not found within our map, this means we
// have not seen it previously. We need to add this to our
// deduplicated array and also mark the policy name as seen, so we
// skip any future policies of the same name.
if _, ok := policyNames[policyLink.Name]; !ok {
policiesLinks = append(policiesLinks, policyLink)
policyNames[policyLink.Name] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Stored the potentially updated policy links within our role.
role.Policies = policiesLinks
role.Canonicalize()
role.SetHash()
}
// Update via Raft.
out, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLRolesUpsertRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Populate the response. We do a lookup against the state to pick up the
// proper create / modify times.
stateSnapshot, err = a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, role := range args.ACLRoles {
lookupACLRole, err := stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByName(nil, role.Name)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "ACL role lookup failed: %v", err)
}
reply.ACLRoles = append(reply.ACLRoles, lookupACLRole)
}
// Update the index. There is no need to floor this as we are writing to
// state and therefore will get a non-zero index response.
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// DeleteRolesByID is used to batch delete ACL roles using the ID as the
// deletion key.
func (a *ACL) DeleteRolesByID(
args *structs.ACLRolesDeleteByIDRequest,
reply *structs.ACLRolesDeleteByIDResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to delete ACL roles when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
// This endpoint always forwards to the authoritative region as ACL roles
// are global.
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLDeleteRolesByIDRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "delete_roles"}, time.Now())
// ACL roles can only be used once all servers, in all federated regions
// have been upgraded to 1.4.0 or greater.
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), AllRegions, minACLRoleVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("all servers should be running version %v or later to use ACL roles",
minACLRoleVersion)
}
// Only tokens with management level permissions can create ACL roles.
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Update via Raft.
out, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLRolesDeleteByIDRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index. There is no need to floor this as we are writing to
// state and therefore will get a non-zero index response.
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ListRoles is used to list ACL roles within state. If not prefix is supplied,
// all ACL roles are listed, otherwise a prefix search is performed on the ACL
// role name.
func (a *ACL) ListRoles(
args *structs.ACLRolesListRequest,
reply *structs.ACLRolesListResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to list ACL roles when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLListRolesRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "list_roles"}, time.Now())
// Resolve the token and ensure it has some form of permissions.
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// If the token is a management token, they can list all tokens. If not,
// the role set tracks which role links the token has and therefore which
// ones the caller can list.
isManagement := acl.IsManagement()
roleSet := &set.Set[string]{}
// If the token is not a management token, we determine which roles are
// linked to the token and therefore can be listed by the caller.
if !isManagement {
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
// Generate a set of Role IDs from the token role links.
roleSet = set.FromFunc(token.Roles, func(roleLink *structs.ACLTokenRoleLink) string { return roleLink.ID })
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// The iteration below appends directly to the reply object, so in
// order for blocking queries to work properly we must ensure the
// ACLRoles are reset. This allows the blocking query run function
// to work as expected.
reply.ACLRoles = nil
var (
err error
iter memdb.ResultIterator
)
// If the operator supplied a prefix, perform a prefix search.
// Otherwise, list all ACL roles in state.
switch args.QueryOptions.Prefix {
case "":
iter, err = stateStore.GetACLRoles(ws)
default:
iter, err = stateStore.GetACLRoleByIDPrefix(ws, args.QueryOptions.Prefix)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Iterate all the results and add these to our reply object. Check
// before appending to the reply that the caller is allowed to view
// the role.
for raw := iter.Next(); raw != nil; raw = iter.Next() {
role := raw.(*structs.ACLRole)
if roleSet.Contains(role.ID) || isManagement {
reply.ACLRoles = append(reply.ACLRoles, role.Stub())
}
}
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return a.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableACLRoles, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
// GetRolesByID is used to get a set of ACL Roles as defined by their ID. This
// endpoint is used by the replication process and Nomad agent client token
// resolution.
func (a *ACL) GetRolesByID(args *structs.ACLRolesByIDRequest, reply *structs.ACLRolesByIDResponse) error {
// This endpoint is only used by the replication process which is only
// running on ACL enabled clusters, so this check should never be
// triggered.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLGetRolesByIDRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_roles_id"}, time.Now())
// For client typed tokens, allow them to query any roles associated with
// that token. This is used by Nomad agents in client mode which are
// resolving the roles to enforce.
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
if token.Type != structs.ACLManagementToken && !token.HasRoles(args.ACLRoleIDs) {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Set up and return the blocking query
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Instantiate the output map to the correct maximum length.
reply.ACLRoles = make(map[string]*structs.ACLRole, len(args.ACLRoleIDs))
// Look for the ACL role and add this to our mapping if we have
// found it.
for _, roleID := range args.ACLRoleIDs {
out, err := stateStore.GetACLRoleByID(ws, roleID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if out != nil {
reply.ACLRoles[out.ID] = out
}
}
// Use the index table to populate the query meta as we have no way
// of tracking the max index on deletes.
return a.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(stateStore, state.TableACLRoles, &reply.QueryMeta)
},
})
}
// GetRoleByID is used to look up an individual ACL role using its ID.
func (a *ACL) GetRoleByID(
args *structs.ACLRoleByIDRequest,
reply *structs.ACLRoleByIDResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to read an ACL role when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLGetRoleByIDRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_role_id"}, time.Now())
// Resolve the token and ensure it has some form of permissions.
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// If the token is a management token, they can detail any token they so
// desire.
isManagement := acl.IsManagement()
// If the token is not a management token, we determine if the caller wants
// to detail a role linked to their token.
if !isManagement {
aclToken, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if aclToken == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
found := false
for _, roleLink := range aclToken.Roles {
if roleLink.ID == args.RoleID {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Perform a lookup for the ACL role.
out, err := stateStore.GetACLRoleByID(ws, args.RoleID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set the index correctly depending on whether the ACL role was
// found.
switch out {
case nil:
index, err := stateStore.Index(state.TableACLRoles)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
default:
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
}
// We didn't encounter an error looking up the index; set the ACL
// role on the reply and exit successfully.
reply.ACLRole = out
return nil
},
})
}
// GetRoleByName is used to look up an individual ACL role using its name.
func (a *ACL) GetRoleByName(
args *structs.ACLRoleByNameRequest,
reply *structs.ACLRoleByNameResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to read an ACL role when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLGetRoleByNameRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_role_name"}, time.Now())
// Resolve the token and ensure it has some form of permissions.
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// If the token is a management token, they can detail any token they so
// desire.
isManagement := acl.IsManagement()
// If the token is not a management token, we determine if the caller wants
// to detail a role linked to their token.
if !isManagement {
aclToken, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if aclToken == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
found := false
for _, roleLink := range aclToken.Roles {
if roleLink.Name == args.RoleName {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Perform a lookup for the ACL role.
out, err := stateStore.GetACLRoleByName(ws, args.RoleName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set the index correctly depending on whether the ACL role was
// found.
switch out {
case nil:
index, err := stateStore.Index(state.TableACLRoles)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
default:
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
}
// We didn't encounter an error looking up the index; set the ACL
// role on the reply and exit successfully.
reply.ACLRole = out
return nil
},
})
}
// policyNamesFromRoleLinks resolves the policy names which are linked via the
// passed role links. This is useful when you need to understand what polices
// an ACL token has access to and need to include role links. The function will
// not return a nil set object, so callers can use this without having to check
// this.
func (a *ACL) policyNamesFromRoleLinks(roleLinks []*structs.ACLTokenRoleLink) (*set.Set[string], error) {
numRoles := len(roleLinks)
policyNameSet := set.New[string](numRoles)
if numRoles < 1 {
return policyNameSet, nil
}
stateSnapshot, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return policyNameSet, err
}
// Iterate all the token role links, so we can unpack these and identify
// the ACL policies.
for _, roleLink := range roleLinks {
// Any error reading the role means we cannot move forward. We just
// ignore any roles that have been detailed but are not within our
// state.
role, err := stateSnapshot.GetACLRoleByID(nil, roleLink.ID)
if err != nil {
return policyNameSet, err
}
if role == nil {
continue
}
// Unpack the policies held within the ACL role to form a single list
// of ACL policies that this token has available.
for _, policyLink := range role.Policies {
policyByName, err := stateSnapshot.ACLPolicyByName(nil, policyLink.Name)
if err != nil {
return policyNameSet, err
}
// Ignore policies that don't exist, since they don't grant any
// more privilege.
if policyByName == nil {
continue
}
// Add the policy to the tracking array.
policyNameSet.Insert(policyByName.Name)
}
}
return policyNameSet, nil
}
// UpsertAuthMethods is used to create or update a set of auth methods
func (a *ACL) UpsertAuthMethods(
args *structs.ACLAuthMethodUpsertRequest,
reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodUpsertResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the
// authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
if done, err := a.srv.forward(structs.ACLUpsertAuthMethodsRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "upsert_auth_methods"}, time.Now())
// ACL auth methods can only be used once all servers in all federated
// regions have been upgraded to 1.5.0 or greater.
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), AllRegions, minACLAuthMethodVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("all servers should be running version %v or later to use ACL auth methods",
minACLAuthMethodVersion)
}
// Check management level permissions
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Validate non-zero set of auth methods
if len(args.AuthMethods) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(http.StatusBadRequest, "must specify as least one auth method")
}
// Validate each auth method, compute hash
for idx, authMethod := range args.AuthMethods {
if err := authMethod.Validate(
a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL,
a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL); err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(http.StatusBadRequest, "auth method %d invalid: %v", idx, err)
}
authMethod.SetHash()
}
// Update via Raft
out, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLAuthMethodsUpsertRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Populate the response. We do a lookup against the state to pick up the
// proper create / modify times.
stateSnapshot, err := a.srv.State().Snapshot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, method := range args.AuthMethods {
lookupAuthMethod, err := stateSnapshot.GetACLAuthMethodByName(nil, method.Name)
if err != nil {
return structs.NewErrRPCCodedf(400, "ACL auth method lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if lookupAuthMethod != nil {
reply.AuthMethods = append(reply.AuthMethods, lookupAuthMethod)
}
}
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// DeleteAuthMethods is used to delete auth methods
func (a *ACL) DeleteAuthMethods(
args *structs.ACLAuthMethodDeleteRequest,
reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodDeleteResponse) error {
// Ensure ACLs are enabled, and always flow modification requests to the
// authoritative region
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
args.Region = a.srv.config.AuthoritativeRegion
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
structs.ACLDeleteAuthMethodsRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "delete_auth_methods_by_name"}, time.Now())
// ACL auth methods can only be used once all servers in all federated
// regions have been upgraded to 1.5.0 or greater.
if !ServersMeetMinimumVersion(a.srv.Members(), AllRegions, minACLRoleVersion, false) {
return fmt.Errorf("all servers should be running version %v or later to use ACL auth methods",
minACLAuthMethodVersion)
}
// Check management level permissions
if acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken); err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Validate non-zero set of auth methods
if len(args.Names) == 0 {
return structs.NewErrRPCCoded(http.StatusBadRequest, "must specify as least one auth method")
}
// Update via Raft
out, index, err := a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLAuthMethodsDeleteRequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check if the FSM response, which is an interface, contains an error.
if err, ok := out.(error); ok && err != nil {
return err
}
// Update the index
reply.Index = index
return nil
}
// ListAuthMethods returns a list of ACL auth methods
func (a *ACL) ListAuthMethods(
args *structs.ACLAuthMethodListRequest,
reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodListResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to list auth methods when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
structs.ACLListAuthMethodsRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "list_auth_methods"}, time.Now())
// Resolve the token and ensure it has some form of permissions.
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// The iteration below appends directly to the reply object, so in
// order for blocking queries to work properly we must ensure the
// auth methods are reset. This allows the blocking query run
// function to work as expected.
reply.AuthMethods = nil
iter, err := stateStore.GetACLAuthMethods(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Iterate all the results and add these to our reply object.
for raw := iter.Next(); raw != nil; raw = iter.Next() {
method := raw.(*structs.ACLAuthMethod)
reply.AuthMethods = append(reply.AuthMethods, method.Stub())
}
// Use the index table to populate the query meta
return a.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(
stateStore, state.TableACLAuthMethods, &reply.QueryMeta,
)
},
})
}
func (a *ACL) GetAuthMethod(
args *structs.ACLAuthMethodGetRequest,
reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodGetResponse) error {
// Only allow operators to read an auth method when ACLs are enabled.
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
structs.ACLGetAuthMethodRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_auth_method_name"}, time.Now())
// Resolve the token and ensure it has some form of permissions.
acl, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if acl == nil || !acl.IsManagement() {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Set up and return the blocking query.
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, stateStore *state.StateStore) error {
// Perform a lookup
out, err := stateStore.GetACLAuthMethodByName(ws, args.MethodName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set the index correctly depending on whether the auth method was
// found.
switch out {
case nil:
index, err := stateStore.Index(state.TableACLAuthMethods)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
default:
reply.Index = out.ModifyIndex
}
// We didn't encounter an error looking up the index; set the auth
// method on the reply and exit successfully.
reply.AuthMethod = out
return nil
},
})
}
// GetAuthMethods is used to get a set of auth methods
func (a *ACL) GetAuthMethods(
args *structs.ACLAuthMethodsGetRequest,
reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodsGetResponse) error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLEnabled {
return aclDisabled
}
if done, err := a.srv.forward(
structs.ACLGetAuthMethodsRPCMethod, args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"nomad", "acl", "get_auth_methods"}, time.Now())
// allow only management token holders to query this endpoint
token, err := a.requestACLToken(args.AuthToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token == nil {
return structs.ErrTokenNotFound
}
if token.Type != structs.ACLManagementToken {
return structs.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Setup the blocking query
return a.srv.blockingRPC(&blockingOptions{
queryOpts: &args.QueryOptions,
queryMeta: &reply.QueryMeta,
run: func(ws memdb.WatchSet, statestore *state.StateStore) error {
// Setup the output
reply.AuthMethods = make(map[string]*structs.ACLAuthMethod, len(args.Names))
// Look for the auth method
for _, methodName := range args.Names {
out, err := statestore.GetACLAuthMethodByName(ws, methodName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if out != nil {
reply.AuthMethods[methodName] = out
}
}
// Use the index table to populate the query meta
return a.srv.setReplyQueryMeta(
statestore, state.TableACLAuthMethods, &reply.QueryMeta,
)
}},
)
}