open-consul/agent/connect_auth.go
Matt Keeler baa89c7c65
Intentions ACL enforcement updates (#7028)
* Renamed structs.IntentionWildcard to structs.WildcardSpecifier

* Refactor ACL Config

Get rid of remnants of enterprise only renaming.

Add a WildcardName field for specifying what string should be used to indicate a wildcard.

* Add wildcard support in the ACL package

For read operations they can call anyAllowed to determine if any read access to the given resource would be granted.

For write operations they can call allAllowed to ensure that write access is granted to everything.

* Make v1/agent/connect/authorize namespace aware

* Update intention ACL enforcement

This also changes how intention:read is granted. Before the Intention.List RPC would allow viewing an intention if the token had intention:read on the destination. However Intention.Match allowed viewing if access was allowed for either the source or dest side. Now Intention.List and Intention.Get fall in line with Intention.Matches previous behavior.

Due to this being done a few different places ACL enforcement for a singular intention is now done with the CanRead and CanWrite methods on the intention itself.

* Refactor Intention.Apply to make things easier to follow.
2020-01-13 15:51:40 -05:00

122 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache"
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
// ConnectAuthorize implements the core authorization logic for Connect. It's in
// a separate agent method here because we need to re-use this both in our own
// HTTP API authz endpoint and in the gRPX xDS/ext_authz API for envoy.
//
// The ACL token and the auth request are provided and the auth decision (true
// means authorized) and reason string are returned.
//
// If the request input is invalid the error returned will be a BadRequestError,
// if the token doesn't grant necessary access then an acl.ErrPermissionDenied
// error is returned, otherwise error indicates an unexpected server failure. If
// access is denied, no error is returned but the first return value is false.
func (a *Agent) ConnectAuthorize(token string,
req *structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest) (allowed bool, reason string, m *cache.ResultMeta, err error) {
// Helper to make the error cases read better without resorting to named
// returns which get messy and prone to mistakes in a method this long.
returnErr := func(err error) (bool, string, *cache.ResultMeta, error) {
return false, "", nil, err
}
if req == nil {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Invalid request"})
}
// We need to have a target to check intentions
if req.Target == "" {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Target service must be specified"})
}
// Parse the certificate URI from the client ID
uri, err := connect.ParseCertURIFromString(req.ClientCertURI)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Connect identifier"})
}
uriService, ok := uri.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
if !ok {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Service identifier"})
}
// We need to verify service:write permissions for the given token.
// We do this manually here since the RPC request below only verifies
// service:read.
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &req.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
if authz != nil && authz.ServiceWrite(req.Target, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return returnErr(acl.ErrPermissionDenied)
}
// Note that we DON'T explicitly validate the trust-domain matches ours. See
// the PR for this change for details.
// TODO(banks): Implement revocation list checking here.
// Get the intentions for this target service.
args := &structs.IntentionQueryRequest{
Datacenter: a.config.Datacenter,
Match: &structs.IntentionQueryMatch{
Type: structs.IntentionMatchDestination,
Entries: []structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
{
Namespace: req.TargetNamespace(),
Name: req.Target,
},
},
},
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: token},
}
raw, meta, err := a.cache.Get(cachetype.IntentionMatchName, args)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedIntentionMatches)
if !ok {
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct"))
}
if len(reply.Matches) != 1 {
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("Internal error loading matches"))
}
// Test the authorization for each match
for _, ixn := range reply.Matches[0] {
if auth, ok := uriService.Authorize(ixn); ok {
reason = fmt.Sprintf("Matched intention: %s", ixn.String())
return auth, reason, &meta, nil
}
}
// No match, we need to determine the default behavior. We do this by
// specifying the anonymous token, which will get the default behavior. The
// default behavior if ACLs are disabled is to allow connections to mimic the
// behavior of Consul itself: everything is allowed if ACLs are disabled.
authz, err = a.resolveToken("")
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
if authz == nil {
// ACLs not enabled at all, the default is allow all.
return true, "ACLs disabled, access is allowed by default", &meta, nil
}
reason = "Default behavior configured by ACLs"
return authz.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil) == acl.Allow, reason, &meta, nil
}