open-consul/agent/connect_auth.go

120 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache"
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
// ConnectAuthorize implements the core authorization logic for Connect. It's in
// a separate agent method here because we need to re-use this both in our own
// HTTP API authz endpoint and in the gRPX xDS/ext_authz API for envoy.
//
// The ACL token and the auth request are provided and the auth decision (true
// means authorized) and reason string are returned.
//
// If the request input is invalid the error returned will be a BadRequestError,
// if the token doesn't grant necessary access then an acl.ErrPermissionDenied
// error is returned, otherwise error indicates an unexpected server failure. If
// access is denied, no error is returned but the first return value is false.
func (a *Agent) ConnectAuthorize(token string,
req *structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest) (authz bool, reason string, m *cache.ResultMeta, err error) {
// Helper to make the error cases read better without resorting to named
// returns which get messy and prone to mistakes in a method this long.
returnErr := func(err error) (bool, string, *cache.ResultMeta, error) {
return false, "", nil, err
}
if req == nil {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Invalid request"})
}
// We need to have a target to check intentions
if req.Target == "" {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Target service must be specified"})
}
// Parse the certificate URI from the client ID
uri, err := connect.ParseCertURIFromString(req.ClientCertURI)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Connect identifier"})
}
uriService, ok := uri.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
if !ok {
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Service identifier"})
}
// We need to verify service:write permissions for the given token.
// We do this manually here since the RPC request below only verifies
// service:read.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceWrite(req.Target, nil) {
return returnErr(acl.ErrPermissionDenied)
}
// Note that we DON'T explicitly validate the trust-domain matches ours. See
// the PR for this change for details.
// TODO(banks): Implement revocation list checking here.
// Get the intentions for this target service.
args := &structs.IntentionQueryRequest{
Datacenter: a.config.Datacenter,
Match: &structs.IntentionQueryMatch{
Type: structs.IntentionMatchDestination,
Entries: []structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
{
Namespace: structs.IntentionDefaultNamespace,
Name: req.Target,
},
},
},
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: token},
}
raw, meta, err := a.cache.Get(cachetype.IntentionMatchName, args)
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedIntentionMatches)
if !ok {
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct"))
}
if len(reply.Matches) != 1 {
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("Internal error loading matches"))
}
// Test the authorization for each match
for _, ixn := range reply.Matches[0] {
if auth, ok := uriService.Authorize(ixn); ok {
reason = fmt.Sprintf("Matched intention: %s", ixn.String())
return auth, reason, &meta, nil
}
}
// No match, we need to determine the default behavior. We do this by
// specifying the anonymous token, which will get the default behavior. The
// default behavior if ACLs are disabled is to allow connections to mimic the
// behavior of Consul itself: everything is allowed if ACLs are disabled.
rule, err = a.resolveToken("")
if err != nil {
return returnErr(err)
}
if rule == nil {
// ACLs not enabled at all, the default is allow all.
return true, "ACLs disabled, access is allowed by default", &meta, nil
}
reason = "Default behavior configured by ACLs"
return rule.IntentionDefaultAllow(), reason, &meta, nil
}