open-consul/agent/consul/catalog_endpoint.go

937 lines
29 KiB
Go

package consul
import (
"fmt"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/armon/go-metrics"
"github.com/armon/go-metrics/prometheus"
bexpr "github.com/hashicorp/go-bexpr"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/ipaddr"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
)
var CatalogCounters = []prometheus.CounterDefinition{
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "service", "query"},
Help: "Increments for each catalog query for the given service.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "connect", "query"},
Help: "Increments for each connect-based catalog query for the given service.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "service", "query-tag"},
Help: "Increments for each catalog query for the given service with the given tag.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "connect", "query-tag"},
Help: "Increments for each connect-based catalog query for the given service with the given tag.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "service", "query-tags"},
Help: "Increments for each catalog query for the given service with the given tags.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "connect", "query-tags"},
Help: "Increments for each connect-based catalog query for the given service with the given tags.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "service", "not-found"},
Help: "Increments for each catalog query where the given service could not be found.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "connect", "not-found"},
Help: "Increments for each connect-based catalog query where the given service could not be found.",
},
}
var CatalogSummaries = []prometheus.SummaryDefinition{
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "deregister"},
Help: "Measures the time it takes to complete a catalog deregister operation.",
},
{
Name: []string{"catalog", "register"},
Help: "Measures the time it takes to complete a catalog register operation.",
},
}
// Catalog endpoint is used to manipulate the service catalog
type Catalog struct {
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
}
// Register a service and/or check(s) in a node, creating the node if it doesn't exist.
// It is valid to pass no service or checks to simply create the node itself.
func (c *Catalog) Register(args *structs.RegisterRequest, reply *struct{}) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.Register", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"catalog", "register"}, time.Now())
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(args.GetEnterpriseMeta(), true); err != nil {
return err
}
// This needs to happen before the other preapply checks as it will fixup some of the
// internal enterprise metas on the services and checks
state := c.srv.fsm.State()
entMeta, err := state.ValidateRegisterRequest(args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Verify the args.
if err := nodePreApply(args.Node, string(args.ID)); err != nil {
return err
}
if args.Address == "" && !args.SkipNodeUpdate {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide address if SkipNodeUpdate is not set")
}
// Handle a service registration.
if args.Service != nil {
if err := servicePreApply(args.Service, authz, args.Service.FillAuthzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Move the old format single check into the slice, and fixup IDs.
if args.Check != nil {
args.Checks = append(args.Checks, args.Check)
args.Check = nil
}
for _, check := range args.Checks {
if check.Node == "" {
check.Node = args.Node
}
checkPreApply(check)
// Populate check type for cases when a check is registered in the catalog directly
// and not via anti-entropy
if check.Type == "" {
chkType := check.CheckType()
check.Type = chkType.Type()
}
}
// Check the complete register request against the given ACL policy.
_, ns, err := state.NodeServices(nil, args.Node, entMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Node lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if err := vetRegisterWithACL(authz, args, ns); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.srv.raftApply(structs.RegisterRequestType, args)
return err
}
// nodePreApply does the verification of a node before it is applied to Raft.
func nodePreApply(nodeName, nodeID string) error {
if nodeName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide node")
}
if nodeID != "" {
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(nodeID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Bad node ID: %v", err)
}
}
return nil
}
func servicePreApply(service *structs.NodeService, authz acl.Authorizer, authzCtxFill func(*acl.AuthorizerContext)) error {
// Validate the service. This is in addition to the below since
// the above just hasn't been moved over yet. We should move it over
// in time.
if err := service.Validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
// If no service id, but service name, use default
if service.ID == "" && service.Service != "" {
service.ID = service.Service
}
// Verify ServiceName provided if ID.
if service.ID != "" && service.Service == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide service name with ID")
}
// Check the service address here and in the agent endpoint
// since service registration isn't synchronous.
if ipaddr.IsAny(service.Address) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid service address")
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authzCtxFill(&authzContext)
// Apply the ACL policy if any. The 'consul' service is excluded
// since it is managed automatically internally (that behavior
// is going away after version 0.8). We check this same policy
// later if version 0.8 is enabled, so we can eventually just
// delete this and do all the ACL checks down there.
if service.Service != structs.ConsulServiceName {
if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// Proxies must have write permission on their destination
if service.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
if authz.ServiceWrite(service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}
// checkPreApply does the verification of a check before it is applied to Raft.
func checkPreApply(check *structs.HealthCheck) {
if check.CheckID == "" && check.Name != "" {
check.CheckID = types.CheckID(check.Name)
}
}
// vetRegisterWithACL applies the given ACL's policy to the catalog update and
// determines if it is allowed. Since the catalog register request is so
// dynamic, this is a pretty complex algorithm and was worth breaking out of the
// endpoint. The NodeServices record for the node must be supplied, and can be
// nil.
//
// This is a bit racy because we have to check the state store outside of a
// transaction. It's the best we can do because we don't want to flow ACL
// checking down there. The node information doesn't change in practice, so this
// will be fine. If we expose ways to change node addresses in a later version,
// then we should split the catalog API at the node and service level so we can
// address this race better (even then it would be super rare, and would at
// worst let a service update revert a recent node update, so it doesn't open up
// too much abuse).
func vetRegisterWithACL(
authz acl.Authorizer,
subj *structs.RegisterRequest,
ns *structs.NodeServices,
) error {
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
subj.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
// Vet the node info. This allows service updates to re-post the required
// node info for each request without having to have node "write"
// privileges.
needsNode := ns == nil || subj.ChangesNode(ns.Node)
if needsNode && authz.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Vet the service change. This includes making sure they can register
// the given service, and that we can write to any existing service that
// is being modified by id (if any).
if subj.Service != nil {
if authz.ServiceWrite(subj.Service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
if ns != nil {
other, ok := ns.Services[subj.Service.ID]
if ok {
// This is effectively a delete, so we DO NOT apply the
// sentinel scope to the service we are overwriting, just
// the regular ACL policy.
var secondaryCtx acl.AuthorizerContext
other.FillAuthzContext(&secondaryCtx)
if authz.ServiceWrite(other.Service, &secondaryCtx) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
}
}
// Make sure that the member was flattened before we got there. This
// keeps us from having to verify this check as well.
if subj.Check != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("check member must be nil")
}
// Vet the checks. Node-level checks require node write, and
// service-level checks require service write.
for _, check := range subj.Checks {
// Make sure that the node matches - we don't allow you to mix
// checks from other nodes because we'd have to pull a bunch
// more state store data to check this. If ACLs are enabled then
// we simply require them to match in a given request. There's a
// note in state_store.go to ban this down there in Consul 0.8,
// but it's good to leave this here because it's required for
// correctness wrt. ACLs.
if !strings.EqualFold(check.Node, subj.Node) {
return fmt.Errorf("Node '%s' for check '%s' doesn't match register request node '%s'",
check.Node, check.CheckID, subj.Node)
}
// Node-level check.
if check.ServiceID == "" {
if authz.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
continue
}
// Service-level check, check the common case where it
// matches the service part of this request, which has
// already been vetted above, and might be being registered
// along with its checks.
if subj.Service != nil && subj.Service.ID == check.ServiceID {
continue
}
// Service-level check for some other service. Make sure they've
// got write permissions for that service.
if ns == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service ID '%s' for check ID '%s'", check.ServiceID, check.CheckID)
}
other, ok := ns.Services[check.ServiceID]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service ID '%s' for check ID '%s'", check.ServiceID, check.CheckID)
}
// We are only adding a check here, so we don't add the scope,
// since the sentinel policy doesn't apply to adding checks at
// this time.
var secondaryCtx acl.AuthorizerContext
other.FillAuthzContext(&secondaryCtx)
if authz.ServiceWrite(other.Service, &secondaryCtx) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}
// Deregister a service or check in a node, or the entire node itself.
//
// If a ServiceID is provided in the request, any associated Checks
// with that service are also deregistered.
//
// If a ServiceID or CheckID is not provided in the request, the entire
// node is deregistered.
func (c *Catalog) Deregister(args *structs.DeregisterRequest, reply *struct{}) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.Deregister", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"catalog", "deregister"}, time.Now())
// Verify the args
if args.Node == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide node")
}
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
// Check the complete deregister request against the given ACL policy.
state := c.srv.fsm.State()
var ns *structs.NodeService
if args.ServiceID != "" {
_, ns, err = state.NodeService(args.Node, args.ServiceID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Service lookup failed: %v", err)
}
}
var nc *structs.HealthCheck
if args.CheckID != "" {
_, nc, err = state.NodeCheck(args.Node, args.CheckID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Check lookup failed: %v", err)
}
}
if err := vetDeregisterWithACL(authz, args, ns, nc); err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.srv.raftApply(structs.DeregisterRequestType, args)
return err
}
// vetDeregisterWithACL applies the given ACL's policy to the catalog update and
// determines if it is allowed. Since the catalog deregister request is so
// dynamic, this is a pretty complex algorithm and was worth breaking out of the
// endpoint. The NodeService for the referenced service must be supplied, and can
// be nil; similar for the HealthCheck for the referenced health check.
func vetDeregisterWithACL(
authz acl.Authorizer,
subj *structs.DeregisterRequest,
ns *structs.NodeService,
nc *structs.HealthCheck,
) error {
// We don't apply sentinel in this path, since at this time sentinel
// only applies to create and update operations.
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// fill with the defaults for use with the NodeWrite check
subj.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
// Allow service deregistration if the token has write permission for the node.
// This accounts for cases where the agent no longer has a token with write permission
// on the service to deregister it.
if authz.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) == acl.Allow {
return nil
}
// This order must match the code in applyDeregister() in
// fsm/commands_oss.go since it also evaluates things in this order,
// and will ignore fields based on this precedence. This lets us also
// ignore them from an ACL perspective.
if subj.ServiceID != "" {
if ns == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service ID '%s'", subj.ServiceID)
}
ns.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(ns.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else if subj.CheckID != "" {
if nc == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown check ID '%s'", subj.CheckID)
}
nc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if nc.ServiceID != "" {
if authz.ServiceWrite(nc.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else {
if authz.NodeWrite(subj.Node, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
} else {
// Since NodeWrite is not given - otherwise the earlier check
// would've returned already - we can deny here.
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
return nil
}
// ListDatacenters is used to query for the list of known datacenters
func (c *Catalog) ListDatacenters(args *structs.DatacentersRequest, reply *[]string) error {
dcs, err := c.srv.router.GetDatacentersByDistance()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(dcs) == 0 { // no WAN federation, so return the local data center name
dcs = []string{c.srv.config.Datacenter}
}
*reply = dcs
return nil
}
// ListNodes is used to query the nodes in a DC.
func (c *Catalog) ListNodes(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedNodes) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.ListNodes", args, reply); done {
return err
}
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Nodes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var err error
if len(args.NodeMetaFilters) > 0 {
reply.Index, reply.Nodes, err = state.NodesByMeta(ws, args.NodeMetaFilters, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
} else {
reply.Index, reply.Nodes, err = state.Nodes(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if isUnmodified(args.QueryOptions, reply.Index) {
reply.QueryMeta.NotModified = true
reply.Nodes = nil
return nil
}
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.Nodes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Nodes = raw.(structs.Nodes)
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := c.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.sortNodesByDistanceFrom(args.Source, reply.Nodes)
})
}
func isUnmodified(opts structs.QueryOptions, index uint64) bool {
return opts.AllowNotModifiedResponse && opts.MinQueryIndex > 0 && opts.MinQueryIndex == index
}
// ListServices is used to query the services in a DC.
// Returns services as a map of service names to available tags.
func (c *Catalog) ListServices(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServices) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.ListServices", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
// Set reply enterprise metadata after resolving and validating the token so
// that we can properly infer metadata from the token.
reply.EnterpriseMeta = args.EnterpriseMeta
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var err error
if len(args.NodeMetaFilters) > 0 {
reply.Index, reply.Services, err = state.ServicesByNodeMeta(ws, args.NodeMetaFilters, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
} else {
reply.Index, reply.Services, err = state.Services(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if isUnmodified(args.QueryOptions, reply.Index) {
reply.Services = nil
reply.QueryMeta.NotModified = true
return nil
}
c.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
return nil
})
}
// ServiceList is used to query the services in a DC.
// Returns services as a list of ServiceNames.
func (c *Catalog) ServiceList(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.ServiceList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, services, err := state.ServiceList(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Services = index, services
c.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
return nil
})
}
// ServiceNodes returns all the nodes registered as part of a service.
func (c *Catalog) ServiceNodes(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceNodes) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.ServiceNodes", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify the arguments
if args.ServiceName == "" && args.ServiceAddress == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide service name")
}
// Determine the function we'll call
var f func(memdb.WatchSet, *state.Store) (uint64, structs.ServiceNodes, error)
switch {
case args.Connect:
f = func(ws memdb.WatchSet, s *state.Store) (uint64, structs.ServiceNodes, error) {
return s.ConnectServiceNodes(ws, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
default:
f = func(ws memdb.WatchSet, s *state.Store) (uint64, structs.ServiceNodes, error) {
if args.ServiceAddress != "" {
return s.ServiceAddressNodes(ws, args.ServiceAddress, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
if args.TagFilter {
tags := args.ServiceTags
// DEPRECATED (singular-service-tag) - remove this when backwards RPC compat
// with 1.2.x is not required.
// Agents < v1.3.0 populate the ServiceTag field. In this case,
// use ServiceTag instead of the ServiceTags field.
if args.ServiceTag != "" {
tags = []string{args.ServiceTag}
}
return s.ServiceTagNodes(ws, args.ServiceName, tags, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
return s.ServiceNodes(ws, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
// If we're doing a connect query, we need read access to the service
// we're trying to find proxies for, so check that.
if args.Connect {
if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
// Just return nil, which will return an empty response (tested)
return nil
}
}
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.ServiceNodes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, services, err := f(ws, state)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.ServiceNodes = index, services
if len(args.NodeMetaFilters) > 0 {
var filtered structs.ServiceNodes
for _, service := range services {
if structs.SatisfiesMetaFilters(service.NodeMeta, args.NodeMetaFilters) {
filtered = append(filtered, service)
}
}
reply.ServiceNodes = filtered
}
// This is safe to do even when the filter is nil - its just a no-op then
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.ServiceNodes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.ServiceNodes = raw.(structs.ServiceNodes)
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := c.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.sortNodesByDistanceFrom(args.Source, reply.ServiceNodes)
})
// Provide some metrics
if err == nil {
// For metrics, we separate Connect-based lookups from non-Connect
key := "service"
if args.Connect {
key = "connect"
}
metrics.IncrCounterWithLabels([]string{"catalog", key, "query"}, 1,
[]metrics.Label{{Name: "service", Value: args.ServiceName}})
// DEPRECATED (singular-service-tag) - remove this when backwards RPC compat
// with 1.2.x is not required.
if args.ServiceTag != "" {
metrics.IncrCounterWithLabels([]string{"catalog", key, "query-tag"}, 1,
[]metrics.Label{{Name: "service", Value: args.ServiceName}, {Name: "tag", Value: args.ServiceTag}})
}
if len(args.ServiceTags) > 0 {
// Sort tags so that the metric is the same even if the request
// tags are in a different order
sort.Strings(args.ServiceTags)
// Build metric labels
labels := []metrics.Label{{Name: "service", Value: args.ServiceName}}
for _, tag := range args.ServiceTags {
labels = append(labels, metrics.Label{Name: "tag", Value: tag})
}
metrics.IncrCounterWithLabels([]string{"catalog", key, "query-tags"}, 1, labels)
}
if len(reply.ServiceNodes) == 0 {
metrics.IncrCounterWithLabels([]string{"catalog", key, "not-found"}, 1,
[]metrics.Label{{Name: "service", Value: args.ServiceName}})
}
}
return err
}
// NodeServices returns all the services registered as part of a node.
// Returns NodeServices as a map of service IDs to services.
func (c *Catalog) NodeServices(args *structs.NodeSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedNodeServices) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.NodeServices", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify the arguments
if args.Node == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide node")
}
var filterType map[string]*structs.NodeService
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, filterType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, services, err := state.NodeServices(ws, args.Node, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.NodeServices = index, services
if reply.NodeServices != nil {
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.NodeServices.Services)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.NodeServices.Services = raw.(map[string]*structs.NodeService)
}
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := c.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
// NodeServiceList returns all the services registered as part of a node.
// Returns NodeServices as a list of services.
func (c *Catalog) NodeServiceList(args *structs.NodeSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedNodeServiceList) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.NodeServiceList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify the arguments
if args.Node == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide node")
}
var filterType []*structs.NodeService
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, filterType)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, err = c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, services, err := state.NodeServiceList(ws, args.Node, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
if services != nil {
reply.NodeServices = *services
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.NodeServices.Services)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.NodeServices.Services = raw.([]*structs.NodeService)
}
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := c.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
func (c *Catalog) GatewayServices(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedGatewayServices) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.GatewayServices", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
return c.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var index uint64
var services structs.GatewayServices
supportedGateways := []string{structs.IngressGateway, structs.TerminatingGateway}
var found bool
for _, kind := range supportedGateways {
// We only use this call to validate the RPC call, don't add the watch set
_, entry, err := state.ConfigEntry(nil, kind, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if entry != nil {
found = true
break
}
}
// We log a warning here to indicate that there is a potential
// misconfiguration. We explicitly do NOT return an error because this
// can occur in the course of normal operation by deleting a
// configuration entry or starting the proxy before registering the
// config entry.
if !found {
c.logger.Warn("no terminating-gateway or ingress-gateway associated with this gateway",
"gateway", args.ServiceName,
)
}
index, services, err = state.GatewayServices(ws, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Services = index, services
if err := c.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
func (c *Catalog) VirtualIPForService(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *string) error {
if done, err := c.srv.ForwardRPC("Catalog.VirtualIPForService", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := c.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := c.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
state := c.srv.fsm.State()
*reply, err = state.VirtualIPForService(structs.NewServiceName(args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta))
return err
}