a7fb26f50f
This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
1444 lines
42 KiB
Go
1444 lines
42 KiB
Go
package agent
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"path/filepath"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
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"github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
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cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/debug"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
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token_store "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/token"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/api"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/ipaddr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/file"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logging"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logging/monitor"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-bexpr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/serf/coordinate"
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"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
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)
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type Self struct {
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Config interface{}
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DebugConfig map[string]interface{}
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Coord *coordinate.Coordinate
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Member serf.Member
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Stats map[string]map[string]string
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Meta map[string]string
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentSelf(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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var cs lib.CoordinateSet
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if !s.agent.config.DisableCoordinates {
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var err error
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if cs, err = s.agent.GetLANCoordinate(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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config := struct {
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Datacenter string
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NodeName string
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NodeID string
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Revision string
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Server bool
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Version string
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}{
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Datacenter: s.agent.config.Datacenter,
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NodeName: s.agent.config.NodeName,
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NodeID: string(s.agent.config.NodeID),
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Revision: s.agent.config.Revision,
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Server: s.agent.config.ServerMode,
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Version: s.agent.config.Version,
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}
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return Self{
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Config: config,
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DebugConfig: s.agent.config.Sanitized(),
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Coord: cs[s.agent.config.SegmentName],
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Member: s.agent.LocalMember(),
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Stats: s.agent.Stats(),
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Meta: s.agent.State.Metadata(),
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}, nil
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}
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// acceptsOpenMetricsMimeType returns true if mime type is Prometheus-compatible
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func acceptsOpenMetricsMimeType(acceptHeader string) bool {
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mimeTypes := strings.Split(acceptHeader, ",")
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for _, v := range mimeTypes {
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mimeInfo := strings.Split(v, ";")
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if len(mimeInfo) > 0 {
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rawMime := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(mimeInfo[0], " "))
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if rawMime == "application/openmetrics-text" {
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return true
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}
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if rawMime == "text/plain" && (len(mimeInfo) > 1 && strings.Trim(mimeInfo[1], " ") == "version=0.4.0") {
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// enablePrometheusOutput will look for Prometheus mime-type or format Query parameter the same way as Nomad
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func enablePrometheusOutput(req *http.Request) bool {
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if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format == "prometheus" {
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return true
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}
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return acceptsOpenMetricsMimeType(req.Header.Get("Accept"))
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMetrics(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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if enablePrometheusOutput(req) {
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if s.agent.config.Telemetry.PrometheusRetentionTime < 1 {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
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fmt.Fprint(resp, "Prometheus is not enabled since its retention time is not positive")
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return nil, nil
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}
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handlerOptions := promhttp.HandlerOpts{
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ErrorLog: s.agent.logger.StandardLogger(&hclog.StandardLoggerOptions{
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InferLevels: true,
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}),
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ErrorHandling: promhttp.ContinueOnError,
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}
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handler := promhttp.HandlerFor(prometheus.DefaultGatherer, handlerOptions)
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handler.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
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return nil, nil
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}
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return s.agent.MemSink.DisplayMetrics(resp, req)
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentReload(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if rule != nil && rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
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return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Trigger the reload
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errCh := make(chan error)
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select {
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case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
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case s.agent.reloadCh <- errCh:
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}
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// Wait for the result of the reload, or for the agent to shutdown
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select {
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case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
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case err := <-errCh:
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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func buildAgentService(s *structs.NodeService) api.AgentService {
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weights := api.AgentWeights{Passing: 1, Warning: 1}
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if s.Weights != nil {
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if s.Weights.Passing > 0 {
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weights.Passing = s.Weights.Passing
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}
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weights.Warning = s.Weights.Warning
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}
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var taggedAddrs map[string]api.ServiceAddress
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if len(s.TaggedAddresses) > 0 {
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taggedAddrs = make(map[string]api.ServiceAddress)
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for k, v := range s.TaggedAddresses {
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taggedAddrs[k] = v.ToAPIServiceAddress()
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}
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}
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as := api.AgentService{
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Kind: api.ServiceKind(s.Kind),
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ID: s.ID,
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Service: s.Service,
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Tags: s.Tags,
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Meta: s.Meta,
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Port: s.Port,
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Address: s.Address,
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TaggedAddresses: taggedAddrs,
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EnableTagOverride: s.EnableTagOverride,
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CreateIndex: s.CreateIndex,
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ModifyIndex: s.ModifyIndex,
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Weights: weights,
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}
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if as.Tags == nil {
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as.Tags = []string{}
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}
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if as.Meta == nil {
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as.Meta = map[string]string{}
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}
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// Attach Proxy config if exists
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if s.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy ||
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s.Kind == structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway {
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as.Proxy = s.Proxy.ToAPI()
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}
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// Attach Connect configs if they exist.
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if s.Connect.Native {
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as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
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Native: true,
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}
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}
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fillAgentServiceEnterpriseMeta(&as, &s.EnterpriseMeta)
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return as
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}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServices(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
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// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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|
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var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
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if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &entMeta); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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|
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var filterExpression string
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s.parseFilter(req, &filterExpression)
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authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &entMeta, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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services := s.agent.State.Services(&entMeta)
|
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if err := s.agent.filterServicesWithAuthorizer(authz, &services); err != nil {
|
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return nil, err
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}
|
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|
|
// Convert into api.AgentService since that includes Connect config but so far
|
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// NodeService doesn't need to internally. They are otherwise identical since
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// that is the struct used in client for reading the one we output here
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// anyway.
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agentSvcs := make(map[string]*api.AgentService)
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|
|
// Use empty list instead of nil
|
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for id, s := range services {
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agentService := buildAgentService(s)
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agentSvcs[id.ID] = &agentService
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}
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|
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filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(filterExpression, nil, agentSvcs)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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return nil, err
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}
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|
return filter.Execute(agentSvcs)
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}
|
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|
|
// GET /v1/agent/service/:service_id
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//
|
|
// Returns the service definition for a single local services and allows
|
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// blocking watch using hash-based blocking.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance.
|
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/")
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|
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// Maybe block
|
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var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions
|
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if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) {
|
|
// parseWait returns an error itself
|
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return nil, nil
|
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}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the token
|
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var token string
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s.parseToken(req, &token)
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|
|
var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
|
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if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &entMeta); err != nil {
|
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return nil, err
|
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}
|
|
|
|
// need to resolve to default the meta
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_, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &entMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
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return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse hash specially. Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up
|
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// in QueryOptions but I didn't want to make very general changes right away.
|
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hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash")
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|
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sid := structs.NewServiceID(id, &entMeta)
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|
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resultHash, service, err := s.agent.LocalBlockingQuery(false, hash, queryOpts.MaxQueryTime,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) {
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|
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svcState := s.agent.State.ServiceState(sid)
|
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if svcState == nil {
|
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
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fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown service ID: %s", sid.String())
|
|
return "", nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
svc := svcState.Service
|
|
|
|
// Setup watch on the service
|
|
ws.Add(svcState.WatchCh)
|
|
|
|
// Check ACLs.
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
|
|
svc.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
|
|
if authz != nil && authz.ServiceRead(svc.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return "", nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Calculate the content hash over the response, minus the hash field
|
|
aSvc := buildAgentService(svc)
|
|
reply := &aSvc
|
|
|
|
rawHash, err := hashstructure.Hash(reply, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Include the ContentHash in the response body
|
|
reply.ContentHash = fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawHash)
|
|
|
|
return reply.ContentHash, reply, nil
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
if resultHash != "" {
|
|
resp.Header().Set("X-Consul-ContentHash", resultHash)
|
|
}
|
|
return service, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentChecks(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &entMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &entMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var filterExpression string
|
|
s.parseFilter(req, &filterExpression)
|
|
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(filterExpression, nil, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
checks := s.agent.State.Checks(&entMeta)
|
|
if err := s.agent.filterChecksWithAuthorizer(authz, &checks); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agentChecks := make(map[types.CheckID]*structs.HealthCheck)
|
|
|
|
// Use empty list instead of nil
|
|
for id, c := range checks {
|
|
if c.ServiceTags == nil {
|
|
clone := *c
|
|
clone.ServiceTags = make([]string, 0)
|
|
agentChecks[id.ID] = &clone
|
|
} else {
|
|
agentChecks[id.ID] = c
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return filter.Execute(agentChecks)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMembers(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried
|
|
wan := false
|
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
|
|
wan = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
segment := req.URL.Query().Get("segment")
|
|
if wan {
|
|
switch segment {
|
|
case "", api.AllSegments:
|
|
// The zero value and the special "give me all members"
|
|
// key are ok, otherwise the argument doesn't apply to
|
|
// the WAN.
|
|
default:
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Cannot provide a segment with wan=true")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var members []serf.Member
|
|
if wan {
|
|
members = s.agent.WANMembers()
|
|
} else {
|
|
var err error
|
|
if segment == api.AllSegments {
|
|
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANMembersAllSegments()
|
|
} else {
|
|
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANSegmentMembers(segment)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.agent.filterMembers(token, &members); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return members, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentJoin(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if the WAN is being queried
|
|
wan := false
|
|
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
|
|
wan = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the address
|
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/join/")
|
|
|
|
if wan {
|
|
if s.agent.config.ConnectMeshGatewayWANFederationEnabled {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("WAN join is disabled when wan federation via mesh gateways is enabled")
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinWAN([]string{addr})
|
|
} else {
|
|
_, err = s.agent.JoinLAN([]string{addr})
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.Leave(); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, s.agent.ShutdownAgent()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentForceLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//Check the value of the prune query
|
|
_, prune := req.URL.Query()["prune"]
|
|
|
|
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/force-leave/")
|
|
return nil, s.agent.ForceLeave(addr, prune)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// syncChanges is a helper function which wraps a blocking call to sync
|
|
// services and checks to the server. If the operation fails, we only
|
|
// only warn because the write did succeed and anti-entropy will sync later.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) syncChanges() {
|
|
if err := s.agent.State.SyncChanges(); err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Error("failed to sync changes", "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
var args structs.CheckDefinition
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &args.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req.Body, &args); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check has a name.
|
|
if args.Name == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing check name")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if args.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(args.Status) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Bad check status")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Construct the health check.
|
|
health := args.HealthCheck(s.agent.config.NodeName)
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check type.
|
|
chkType := args.CheckType()
|
|
err = chkType.Validate()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Store the type of check based on the definition
|
|
health.Type = chkType.Type()
|
|
|
|
if health.ServiceID != "" {
|
|
// fixup the service name so that vetCheckRegister requires the right ACLs
|
|
service := s.agent.State.Service(health.CompoundServiceID())
|
|
if service != nil {
|
|
health.ServiceName = service.Service
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz, health); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the check.
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddCheck(health, chkType, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := structs.NewCheckID(types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/deregister/")), nil)
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &checkID.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &checkID.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
checkID.Normalize()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz, checkID); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveCheck(checkID, true); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckPass(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/pass/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
return s.agentCheckUpdate(resp, req, checkID, api.HealthPassing, note)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckWarn(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/warn/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
|
|
return s.agentCheckUpdate(resp, req, checkID, api.HealthWarning, note)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckFail(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/fail/"))
|
|
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
|
|
|
|
return s.agentCheckUpdate(resp, req, checkID, api.HealthCritical, note)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// checkUpdate is the payload for a PUT to AgentCheckUpdate.
|
|
type checkUpdate struct {
|
|
// Status us one of the api.Health* states, "passing", "warning", or
|
|
// "critical".
|
|
Status string
|
|
|
|
// Output is the information to post to the UI for operators as the
|
|
// output of the process that decided to hit the TTL check. This is
|
|
// different from the note field that's associated with the check
|
|
// itself.
|
|
Output string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentCheckUpdate is a PUT-based alternative to the GET-based Pass/Warn/Fail
|
|
// APIs.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckUpdate(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var update checkUpdate
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req.Body, &update); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch update.Status {
|
|
case api.HealthPassing:
|
|
case api.HealthWarning:
|
|
case api.HealthCritical:
|
|
default:
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid check status: '%s'", update.Status)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/update/"))
|
|
|
|
return s.agentCheckUpdate(resp, req, checkID, update.Status, update.Output)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) agentCheckUpdate(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, checkID types.CheckID, status string, output string) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
cid := structs.NewCheckID(checkID, nil)
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &cid.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &cid.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cid.Normalize()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz, cid); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(cid, status, output); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// agentHealthService Returns Health for a given service ID
|
|
func agentHealthService(serviceID structs.ServiceID, s *HTTPServer) (int, string, api.HealthChecks) {
|
|
checks := s.agent.State.ChecksForService(serviceID, true)
|
|
serviceChecks := make(api.HealthChecks, 0)
|
|
for _, c := range checks {
|
|
// TODO: harmonize struct.HealthCheck and api.HealthCheck (or at least extract conversion function)
|
|
healthCheck := &api.HealthCheck{
|
|
Node: c.Node,
|
|
CheckID: string(c.CheckID),
|
|
Name: c.Name,
|
|
Status: c.Status,
|
|
Notes: c.Notes,
|
|
Output: c.Output,
|
|
ServiceID: c.ServiceID,
|
|
ServiceName: c.ServiceName,
|
|
ServiceTags: c.ServiceTags,
|
|
}
|
|
fillHealthCheckEnterpriseMeta(healthCheck, &c.EnterpriseMeta)
|
|
serviceChecks = append(serviceChecks, healthCheck)
|
|
}
|
|
status := serviceChecks.AggregatedStatus()
|
|
switch status {
|
|
case api.HealthWarning:
|
|
return http.StatusTooManyRequests, status, serviceChecks
|
|
case api.HealthPassing:
|
|
return http.StatusOK, status, serviceChecks
|
|
default:
|
|
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, status, serviceChecks
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func returnTextPlain(req *http.Request) bool {
|
|
if contentType := req.Header.Get("Accept"); strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "text/plain") {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format != "" {
|
|
return format == "text"
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByID return the local Service Health given its ID
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByID(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Pull out the service id (service id since there may be several instance of the same service on this host)
|
|
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/id/")
|
|
if serviceID == "" {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing serviceID"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &entMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
// need to resolve to default the meta
|
|
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &entMeta, &authzContext)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var sid structs.ServiceID
|
|
sid.Init(serviceID, &entMeta)
|
|
|
|
if service := s.agent.State.Service(sid); service != nil {
|
|
if authz != nil && authz.ServiceRead(service.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
code, status, healthChecks := agentHealthService(sid, s)
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
|
|
}
|
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service)
|
|
result := &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: status,
|
|
Checks: healthChecks,
|
|
Service: &serviceInfo,
|
|
}
|
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
notFoundReason := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", sid.String())
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return notFoundReason, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: notFoundReason, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
return &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: api.HealthCritical,
|
|
Checks: nil,
|
|
Service: nil,
|
|
}, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: notFoundReason, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHealthServiceByName return the worse status of all the services with given name on an agent
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByName(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Pull out the service name
|
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/name/")
|
|
if serviceName == "" {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing service Name"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &entMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
// need to resolve to default the meta
|
|
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &entMeta, &authzContext)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if authz != nil && authz.ServiceRead(serviceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
code := http.StatusNotFound
|
|
status := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceName %s Not Found", serviceName)
|
|
services := s.agent.State.Services(&entMeta)
|
|
result := make([]api.AgentServiceChecksInfo, 0, 16)
|
|
for _, service := range services {
|
|
if service.Service == serviceName {
|
|
var sid structs.ServiceID
|
|
sid.Init(service.ID, &entMeta)
|
|
|
|
scode, sstatus, healthChecks := agentHealthService(sid, s)
|
|
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service)
|
|
res := api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
|
|
AggregatedStatus: sstatus,
|
|
Checks: healthChecks,
|
|
Service: &serviceInfo,
|
|
}
|
|
result = append(result, res)
|
|
// When service is not found, we ignore it and keep existing HTTP status
|
|
if code == http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
code = scode
|
|
status = sstatus
|
|
}
|
|
// We take the worst of all statuses, so we keep iterating
|
|
// passing: 200 < warning: 429 < critical: 503
|
|
if code < scode {
|
|
code = scode
|
|
status = sstatus
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if returnTextPlain(req) {
|
|
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
|
|
}
|
|
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var args structs.ServiceDefinition
|
|
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval if a check if provided.
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &args.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req.Body, &args); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the service has a name.
|
|
if args.Name == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service name")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the service address here and in the catalog RPC endpoint
|
|
// since service registration isn't synchronous.
|
|
if ipaddr.IsAny(args.Address) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid service address")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the node service.
|
|
ns := args.NodeService()
|
|
if ns.Weights != nil {
|
|
if err := structs.ValidateWeights(ns.Weights); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Weights: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err := structs.ValidateServiceMetadata(ns.Kind, ns.Meta, false); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Service Meta: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Run validation. This is the same validation that would happen on
|
|
// the catalog endpoint so it helps ensure the sync will work properly.
|
|
if err := ns.Validate(); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the check type.
|
|
chkTypes, err := args.CheckTypes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
for _, check := range chkTypes {
|
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the sidecar check types
|
|
if args.Connect != nil && args.Connect.SidecarService != nil {
|
|
chkTypes, err := args.Connect.SidecarService.CheckTypes()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid check in sidecar_service: %v", err),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, check := range chkTypes {
|
|
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'",
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegisterWithAuthorizer(authz, ns); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// See if we have a sidecar to register too
|
|
sidecar, sidecarChecks, sidecarToken, err := s.agent.sidecarServiceFromNodeService(ns, token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, &BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid SidecarService: %s", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if sidecar != nil {
|
|
// Make sure we are allowed to register the sidecar using the token
|
|
// specified (might be specific to sidecar or the same one as the overall
|
|
// request).
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(sidecarToken, sidecar); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// We parsed the sidecar registration, now remove it from the NodeService
|
|
// for the actual service since it's done it's job and we don't want to
|
|
// persist it in the actual state/catalog. SidecarService is meant to be a
|
|
// registration syntax sugar so don't propagate it any further.
|
|
ns.Connect.SidecarService = nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the service.
|
|
replaceExistingChecks := false
|
|
|
|
query := req.URL.Query()
|
|
if len(query["replace-existing-checks"]) > 0 && (query.Get("replace-existing-checks") == "" || query.Get("replace-existing-checks") == "true") {
|
|
replaceExistingChecks = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if replaceExistingChecks {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddServiceAndReplaceChecks(ns, chkTypes, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(ns, chkTypes, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Add sidecar.
|
|
if sidecar != nil {
|
|
if replaceExistingChecks {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddServiceAndReplaceChecks(sidecar, sidecarChecks, true, sidecarToken, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if err := s.agent.AddService(sidecar, sidecarChecks, true, sidecarToken, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
sid := structs.NewServiceID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/deregister/"), nil)
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &sid.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &sid.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sid.Normalize()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz, sid); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.RemoveService(sid); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServiceMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Ensure we have a service ID
|
|
sid := structs.NewServiceID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/maintenance/"), nil)
|
|
|
|
if sid.ID == "" {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service ID")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ensure we have some action
|
|
params := req.URL.Query()
|
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable")
|
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &sid.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, err := s.agent.resolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(token, &sid.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sid.Normalize()
|
|
|
|
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdateWithAuthorizer(authz, sid); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if enable {
|
|
reason := params.Get("reason")
|
|
if err = s.agent.EnableServiceMaintenance(sid, reason, token); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if err = s.agent.DisableServiceMaintenance(sid); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentNodeMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Ensure we have some action
|
|
params := req.URL.Query()
|
|
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw := params.Get("enable")
|
|
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.NodeWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if enable {
|
|
s.agent.EnableNodeMaintenance(params.Get("reason"), token)
|
|
} else {
|
|
s.agent.DisableNodeMaintenance()
|
|
}
|
|
s.syncChanges()
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMonitor(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the provided loglevel.
|
|
logLevel := req.URL.Query().Get("loglevel")
|
|
if logLevel == "" {
|
|
logLevel = "INFO"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var logJSON bool
|
|
if _, ok := req.URL.Query()["logjson"]; ok {
|
|
logJSON = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !logging.ValidateLogLevel(logLevel) {
|
|
return nil, BadRequestError{
|
|
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Unknown log level: %s", logLevel),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
flusher, ok := resp.(http.Flusher)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Streaming not supported")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
monitor := monitor.New(monitor.Config{
|
|
BufferSize: 512,
|
|
Logger: s.agent.logger,
|
|
LoggerOptions: &hclog.LoggerOptions{
|
|
Level: logging.LevelFromString(logLevel),
|
|
JSONFormat: logJSON,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
logsCh := monitor.Start()
|
|
|
|
// Send header so client can start streaming body
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
|
|
// 0 byte write is needed before the Flush call so that if we are using
|
|
// a gzip stream it will go ahead and write out the HTTP response header
|
|
resp.Write([]byte(""))
|
|
flusher.Flush()
|
|
|
|
// Stream logs until the connection is closed.
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-req.Context().Done():
|
|
droppedCount := monitor.Stop()
|
|
if droppedCount > 0 {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Warn("Dropped logs during monitor request", "dropped_count", droppedCount)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
case log := <-logsCh:
|
|
fmt.Fprint(resp, string(log))
|
|
flusher.Flush()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentToken(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
if s.checkACLDisabled(resp, req) {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The body is just the token, but it's in a JSON object so we can add
|
|
// fields to this later if needed.
|
|
var args api.AgentToken
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req.Body, &args); err != nil {
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
|
|
// we hold the lock around updating the internal token store
|
|
// as well as persisting the tokens because we don't want to write
|
|
// into the store to have something else wipe it out before we can
|
|
// persist everything (like an agent config reload). The token store
|
|
// lock is only held for those operations so other go routines that
|
|
// just need to read some token out of the store will not be impacted
|
|
// any more than they would be without token persistence.
|
|
s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Lock()
|
|
defer s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Figure out the target token.
|
|
target := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/token/")
|
|
triggerAntiEntropySync := false
|
|
switch target {
|
|
case "acl_token", "default":
|
|
changed := s.agent.tokens.UpdateUserToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
if changed {
|
|
triggerAntiEntropySync = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_token", "agent":
|
|
changed := s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
if changed {
|
|
triggerAntiEntropySync = true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case "acl_agent_master_token", "agent_master":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentMasterToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
case "acl_replication_token", "replication":
|
|
s.agent.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Token %q is unknown", target)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if triggerAntiEntropySync {
|
|
s.agent.sync.SyncFull.Trigger()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
|
|
tokens := persistedTokens{}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.UserTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Default = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Agent = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentMasterTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.AgentMaster = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.ReplicationTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
|
|
tokens.Replication = tok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := json.Marshal(tokens)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Warn("failed to persist tokens", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to marshal tokens for persistence: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := file.WriteAtomicWithPerms(filepath.Join(s.agent.config.DataDir, tokensPath), data, 0700, 0600); err != nil {
|
|
s.agent.logger.Warn("failed to persist tokens", "error", err)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.agent.logger.Info("Updated agent's ACL token", "token", target)
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCARoots returns the trusted CA roots.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCARoots(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
var args structs.DCSpecificRequest
|
|
if done := s.parse(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &args.QueryOptions); done {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &args)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
|
|
|
|
// Add cache hit
|
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
|
|
}
|
|
defer setMeta(resp, &reply.QueryMeta)
|
|
|
|
return *reply, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectCALeafCert returns the certificate bundle for a service
|
|
// instance. This supports blocking queries to update the returned bundle.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCALeafCert(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Get the service name. Note that this is the name of the service,
|
|
// not the ID of the service instance.
|
|
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/ca/leaf/")
|
|
|
|
args := cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
|
|
Service: serviceName, // Need name not ID
|
|
}
|
|
var qOpts structs.QueryOptions
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &args.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Store DC in the ConnectCALeafRequest but query opts separately
|
|
if done := s.parse(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &qOpts); done {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
args.MinQueryIndex = qOpts.MinQueryIndex
|
|
args.MaxQueryTime = qOpts.MaxQueryTime
|
|
args.Token = qOpts.Token
|
|
|
|
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &args)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
|
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IssuedCert)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
|
|
}
|
|
setIndex(resp, reply.ModifyIndex)
|
|
|
|
return reply, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentConnectAuthorize
|
|
//
|
|
// POST /v1/agent/connect/authorize
|
|
//
|
|
// Note: when this logic changes, consider if the Intention.Check RPC method
|
|
// also needs to be updated.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectAuthorize(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the token
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
|
|
var authReq structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest
|
|
|
|
if err := s.parseEntMetaNoWildcard(req, &authReq.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := decodeBody(req.Body, &authReq); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, BadRequestError{fmt.Sprintf("Request decode failed: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authz, reason, cacheMeta, err := s.agent.ConnectAuthorize(token, &authReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
setCacheMeta(resp, cacheMeta)
|
|
|
|
return &connectAuthorizeResp{
|
|
Authorized: authz,
|
|
Reason: reason,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// connectAuthorizeResp is the response format/structure for the
|
|
// /v1/agent/connect/authorize endpoint.
|
|
type connectAuthorizeResp struct {
|
|
Authorized bool // True if authorized, false if not
|
|
Reason string // Reason for the Authorized value (whether true or false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentHost
|
|
//
|
|
// GET /v1/agent/host
|
|
//
|
|
// Retrieves information about resources available and in-use for the
|
|
// host the agent is running on such as CPU, memory, and disk usage. Requires
|
|
// a operator:read ACL token.
|
|
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHost(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
|
|
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
|
|
var token string
|
|
s.parseToken(req, &token)
|
|
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.OperatorRead(nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return debug.CollectHostInfo(), nil
|
|
}
|