open-consul/agent/consul/connect_ca_endpoint.go

408 lines
11 KiB
Go

package consul
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
)
var ErrConnectNotEnabled = errors.New("Connect must be enabled in order to use this endpoint")
// ConnectCA manages the Connect CA.
type ConnectCA struct {
// srv is a pointer back to the server.
srv *Server
}
// ConfigurationGet returns the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationGet(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.CAConfiguration) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationGet", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator read access.
rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorRead() {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *config
return nil
}
// ConfigurationSet updates the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationSet(
args *structs.CARequest,
reply *interface{}) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationSet", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator write access.
rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorWrite() {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Exit early if it's a no-op change
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
args.Config.ClusterID = config.ClusterID
if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider && reflect.DeepEqual(args.Config.Config, config.Config) {
return nil
}
// Create a new instance of the provider described by the config
// and get the current active root CA. This acts as a good validation
// of the config and makes sure the provider is functioning correctly
// before we commit any changes to Raft.
newProvider, err := s.srv.createCAProvider(args.Config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not initialize provider: %v", err)
}
if err := newProvider.Configure(args.Config.ClusterID, true, args.Config.Config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err)
}
if err := newProvider.GenerateRoot(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error generating CA root certificate: %v", err)
}
newRootPEM, err := newProvider.ActiveRoot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
newActiveRoot, err := parseCARoot(newRootPEM, args.Config.Provider)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Compare the new provider's root CA ID to the current one. If they
// match, just update the existing provider with the new config.
// If they don't match, begin the root rotation process.
_, root, err := state.CARootActive(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if root != nil && root.ID == newActiveRoot.ID {
args.Op = structs.CAOpSetConfig
resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
return respErr
}
// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA provider config updated")
return nil
}
// At this point, we know the config change has trigged a root rotation,
// either by swapping the provider type or changing the provider's config
// to use a different root certificate.
// If it's a config change that would trigger a rotation (different provider/root):
// 1. Get the root from the new provider.
// 2. Call CrossSignCA on the old provider to sign the new root with the old one to
// get a cross-signed certificate.
// 3. Take the active root for the new provider and append the intermediate from step 2
// to its list of intermediates.
newRoot, err := connect.ParseCert(newRootPEM)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Have the old provider cross-sign the new intermediate
oldProvider, _ := s.srv.getCAProvider()
if oldProvider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
}
xcCert, err := oldProvider.CrossSignCA(newRoot)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add the cross signed cert to the new root's intermediates.
newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = []string{xcCert}
intermediate, err := newProvider.GenerateIntermediate()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if intermediate != newRootPEM {
newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = append(newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts, intermediate)
}
// Update the roots and CA config in the state store at the same time
idx, roots, err := state.CARoots(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var newRoots structs.CARoots
for _, r := range roots {
newRoot := *r
if newRoot.Active {
newRoot.Active = false
newRoot.RotatedOutAt = time.Now()
}
newRoots = append(newRoots, &newRoot)
}
newRoots = append(newRoots, newActiveRoot)
args.Op = structs.CAOpSetRootsAndConfig
args.Index = idx
args.Roots = newRoots
resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
return respErr
}
// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
// and call teardown on the old provider
s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
if err := oldProvider.Cleanup(); err != nil {
s.srv.logger.Printf("[WARN] connect: failed to clean up old provider %q", config.Provider)
}
s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA rotated to new root under provider %q", args.Config.Provider)
return nil
}
// Roots returns the currently trusted root certificates.
func (s *ConnectCA) Roots(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.IndexedCARoots) error {
// Forward if necessary
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Roots", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
// Load the ClusterID to generate TrustDomain. We do this outside the loop
// since by definition this value should be immutable once set for lifetime of
// the cluster so we don't need to look it up more than once. We also don't
// have to worry about non-atomicity between the config fetch transaction and
// the CARoots transaction below since this field must remain immutable. Do
// not re-use this state/config for other logic that might care about changes
// of config during the blocking query below.
{
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Check CA is actually bootstrapped...
if config != nil {
// Build TrustDomain based on the ClusterID stored.
signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
if signingID == nil {
// If CA is bootstrapped at all then this should never happen but be
// defensive.
return errors.New("no cluster trust domain setup")
}
reply.TrustDomain = signingID.Host()
}
}
return s.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, roots, err := state.CARoots(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Roots = index, roots
if reply.Roots == nil {
reply.Roots = make(structs.CARoots, 0)
}
// The API response must NEVER contain the secret information
// such as keys and so on. We use a whitelist below to copy the
// specific fields we want to expose.
for i, r := range reply.Roots {
// IMPORTANT: r must NEVER be modified, since it is a pointer
// directly to the structure in the memdb store.
reply.Roots[i] = &structs.CARoot{
ID: r.ID,
Name: r.Name,
SerialNumber: r.SerialNumber,
SigningKeyID: r.SigningKeyID,
NotBefore: r.NotBefore,
NotAfter: r.NotAfter,
RootCert: r.RootCert,
IntermediateCerts: r.IntermediateCerts,
RaftIndex: r.RaftIndex,
Active: r.Active,
}
if r.Active {
reply.ActiveRootID = r.ID
}
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Sign signs a certificate for a service.
func (s *ConnectCA) Sign(
args *structs.CASignRequest,
reply *structs.IssuedCert) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Sign", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Parse the CSR
csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Parse the SPIFFE ID
spiffeID, err := connect.ParseCertURI(csr.URIs[0])
if err != nil {
return err
}
serviceID, ok := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service ID")
}
provider, caRoot := s.srv.getCAProvider()
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
}
// Verify that the CSR entity is in the cluster's trust domain
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
if !signingID.CanSign(serviceID) {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+
"we are %s", serviceID.Host, signingID.Host())
}
// Verify that the ACL token provided has permission to act as this service
rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceWrite(serviceID.Service, nil) {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Verify that the DC in the service URI matches us. We might relax this
// requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer.
if serviceID.Datacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+
"we are %s", serviceID.Datacenter, s.srv.config.Datacenter)
}
// All seems to be in order, actually sign it.
pem, err := provider.Sign(csr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Append any intermediates needed by this root.
for _, p := range caRoot.IntermediateCerts {
pem = strings.TrimSpace(pem) + "\n" + p
}
// TODO(banks): when we implement IssuedCerts table we can use the insert to
// that as the raft index to return in response. Right now we can rely on only
// the built-in provider being supported and the implementation detail that we
// have to write a SerialIndex update to the provider config table for every
// cert issued so in all cases this index will be higher than any previous
// sign response. This has to be reloaded after the provider.Sign call to
// observe the index update.
state = s.srv.fsm.State()
modIdx, _, err := state.CAConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set the response
*reply = structs.IssuedCert{
SerialNumber: connect.HexString(cert.SerialNumber.Bytes()),
CertPEM: pem,
Service: serviceID.Service,
ServiceURI: cert.URIs[0].String(),
ValidAfter: cert.NotBefore,
ValidBefore: cert.NotAfter,
RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{
ModifyIndex: modIdx,
CreateIndex: modIdx,
},
}
return nil
}