a84b82b3df
* Update AWS SDK to use PCA features. * Add AWS PCA provider * Add plumbing for config, config validation tests, add test for inheriting existing CA resources created by user * Unparallel the tests so we don't exhaust PCA limits * Merge updates * More aggressive polling; rate limit pass through on sign; Timeout on Sign and CA create * Add AWS PCA docs * Fix Vault doc typo too * Doc typo * Apply suggestions from code review Co-Authored-By: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com> Co-Authored-By: kaitlincarter-hc <43049322+kaitlincarter-hc@users.noreply.github.com> * Doc fixes; tests for erroring if State is modified via API * More review cleanup * Uncomment tests! * Minor suggested clean ups
134 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
134 lines
5.4 KiB
Go
package connect
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"encoding/binary"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"regexp"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
var invalidDNSNameChars = regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-z0-9]`)
|
|
|
|
// ServiceCN returns the common name for a service's certificate. We can't use
|
|
// SPIFFE URIs because some CAs require valid FQDN format. We can't use SNI
|
|
// values because they are often too long than the 64 bytes allowed by
|
|
// CommonNames. We could attempt to encode more information into this to make
|
|
// identifying which instance/node it was issued to in a management tool easier
|
|
// but that just introduces more complications around length. It's also strange
|
|
// that the Common Name would encode more information than the actual
|
|
// identifying URI we use to assert anything does and my lead to bad assumptions
|
|
// that the common name is in some way "secure" or verified - there is nothing
|
|
// inherently provable here except that the requestor had ACLs for that service
|
|
// name in that DC.
|
|
//
|
|
// Format is:
|
|
// <sanitized_service_name>.svc.<trust_domain_first_8>.consul
|
|
//
|
|
// service name is sanitized by removing any chars that are not legal in a DNS
|
|
// name and lower casing. It is truncated to the first X chars to keep the
|
|
// total at 64.
|
|
//
|
|
// trust domain is truncated to keep the whole name short
|
|
func ServiceCN(serviceName, trustDomain string) string {
|
|
svc := invalidDNSNameChars.ReplaceAllString(strings.ToLower(serviceName), "")
|
|
// 20 = 7 bytes for ".consul", 8 bytes for trust domain, 5 bytes for ".svc."
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s.svc.%s.consul",
|
|
truncateTo(svc, 64-20), truncateTo(trustDomain, 8))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AgentCN returns the common name for an agent certificate. See ServiceCN for
|
|
// more details on rationale.
|
|
//
|
|
// Format is:
|
|
// <sanitized_node_name>.agnt.<trust_domain_first_8>.consul
|
|
//
|
|
// node name is sanitized by removing any chars that are not legal in a DNS
|
|
// name and lower casing. It is truncated to the first X chars to keep the
|
|
// total at 64.
|
|
//
|
|
// trust domain is truncated to keep the whole name short
|
|
func AgentCN(node, trustDomain string) string {
|
|
nodeSan := invalidDNSNameChars.ReplaceAllString(strings.ToLower(node), "")
|
|
// 21 = 7 bytes for ".consul", 8 bytes for trust domain, 6 bytes for ".agnt."
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s.agnt.%s.consul",
|
|
truncateTo(nodeSan, 64-21), truncateTo(trustDomain, 8))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CompactUID returns a crypto random Unique Identifier string consiting of 8
|
|
// characters of base36 encoded random value. This has roughly 41 bits of
|
|
// entropy so is suitable for infrequently occuring events with low probability
|
|
// of collision. It is not suitable for UUIDs for very frequent events. It's
|
|
// main purpose is to assign unique values to CA certificate Common Names which
|
|
// need to be unique in some providers - see CACN - but without using up large
|
|
// amounts of the limited 64 character Common Name. It also makes the values
|
|
// more easily digestable by humans considering there are likely to be few of
|
|
// them ever in use.
|
|
func CompactUID() (string, error) {
|
|
// 48 bits (6 bytes) is enough to fill 8 bytes in base36 but it's simpler to
|
|
// have a whole uint8 to convert from.
|
|
var raw [8]byte
|
|
_, err := rand.Read(raw[:])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(raw[:])
|
|
return truncateTo(strconv.FormatInt(int64(i), 36), 8), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CACN returns the common name for a CA certificate. See ServiceCN for more
|
|
// details on rationale. A uniqueID is requires because some providers (e.g.
|
|
// Vault) cache by subject and so produce incorrect results - for example they
|
|
// won't cross-sign an older CA certificate with the same common name since they
|
|
// think they already have a valid cert for that CN and just return the current
|
|
// root.
|
|
//
|
|
// This can be generated by any means but will be truncated to 8 chars and
|
|
// sanitised to DNS-safe chars. CompactUID generates suitable UIDs for this
|
|
// specific purpose.
|
|
//
|
|
// Format is:
|
|
// {provider}-{uniqueID_first8}.{pri|sec}.ca.<trust_domain_first_8>.consul
|
|
//
|
|
// trust domain is truncated to keep the whole name short
|
|
func CACN(provider, uniqueID, trustDomain string, primaryDC bool) string {
|
|
providerSan := invalidDNSNameChars.ReplaceAllString(strings.ToLower(provider), "")
|
|
typ := "pri"
|
|
if !primaryDC {
|
|
typ = "sec"
|
|
}
|
|
// 32 = 7 bytes for ".consul", 8 bytes for trust domain, 8 bytes for
|
|
// ".pri.ca.", 9 bytes for "-{uniqueID-8-b36}"
|
|
uidSAN := invalidDNSNameChars.ReplaceAllString(strings.ToLower(uniqueID), "")
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s.%s.ca.%s.consul", typ, truncateTo(uidSAN, 8),
|
|
truncateTo(providerSan, 64-32), truncateTo(trustDomain, 8))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func truncateTo(s string, n int) string {
|
|
if len(s) > n {
|
|
return s[:n]
|
|
}
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CNForCertURI returns the correct common name for a given cert URI type. It
|
|
// doesn't work for CA Signing IDs since more context is needed and CA Providers
|
|
// always know their CN from their own context.
|
|
func CNForCertURI(uri CertURI) (string, error) {
|
|
// Even though leafs should be from our own CSRs which should have the same CN
|
|
// logic as here, override anyway to account for older version clients that
|
|
// didn't include the Common Name in the CSR.
|
|
switch id := uri.(type) {
|
|
case *SpiffeIDService:
|
|
return ServiceCN(id.Service, id.Host), nil
|
|
case *SpiffeIDAgent:
|
|
return AgentCN(id.Agent, id.Host), nil
|
|
case *SpiffeIDSigning:
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("CertURI is a SpiffeIDSigning, not enough context to generate Common Name")
|
|
default:
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("CertURI type not recognized")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|