f9a43a1e2d
* ACL Authorizer overhaul To account for upcoming features every Authorization function can now take an extra *acl.EnterpriseAuthorizerContext. These are unused in OSS and will always be nil. Additionally the acl package has received some thorough refactoring to enable all of the extra Consul Enterprise specific authorizations including moving sentinel enforcement into the stubbed structs. The Authorizer funcs now return an acl.EnforcementDecision instead of a boolean. This improves the overall interface as it makes multiple Authorizers easily chainable as they now indicate whether they had an authoritative decision or should use some other defaults. A ChainedAuthorizer was added to handle this Authorizer enforcement chain and will never itself return a non-authoritative decision. * Include stub for extra enterprise rules in the global management policy * Allow for an upgrade of the global-management policy
122 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
122 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
package agent
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache"
|
|
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
|
|
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ConnectAuthorize implements the core authorization logic for Connect. It's in
|
|
// a separate agent method here because we need to re-use this both in our own
|
|
// HTTP API authz endpoint and in the gRPX xDS/ext_authz API for envoy.
|
|
//
|
|
// The ACL token and the auth request are provided and the auth decision (true
|
|
// means authorized) and reason string are returned.
|
|
//
|
|
// If the request input is invalid the error returned will be a BadRequestError,
|
|
// if the token doesn't grant necessary access then an acl.ErrPermissionDenied
|
|
// error is returned, otherwise error indicates an unexpected server failure. If
|
|
// access is denied, no error is returned but the first return value is false.
|
|
func (a *Agent) ConnectAuthorize(token string,
|
|
req *structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest) (authz bool, reason string, m *cache.ResultMeta, err error) {
|
|
|
|
// Helper to make the error cases read better without resorting to named
|
|
// returns which get messy and prone to mistakes in a method this long.
|
|
returnErr := func(err error) (bool, string, *cache.ResultMeta, error) {
|
|
return false, "", nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req == nil {
|
|
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Invalid request"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We need to have a target to check intentions
|
|
if req.Target == "" {
|
|
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"Target service must be specified"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Parse the certificate URI from the client ID
|
|
uri, err := connect.ParseCertURIFromString(req.ClientCertURI)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Connect identifier"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uriService, ok := uri.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return returnErr(BadRequestError{"ClientCertURI not a valid Service identifier"})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We need to verify service:write permissions for the given token.
|
|
// We do this manually here since the RPC request below only verifies
|
|
// service:read.
|
|
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return returnErr(err)
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
|
|
if rule != nil && rule.ServiceWrite(req.Target, nil) != acl.Allow {
|
|
return returnErr(acl.ErrPermissionDenied)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note that we DON'T explicitly validate the trust-domain matches ours. See
|
|
// the PR for this change for details.
|
|
|
|
// TODO(banks): Implement revocation list checking here.
|
|
|
|
// Get the intentions for this target service.
|
|
args := &structs.IntentionQueryRequest{
|
|
Datacenter: a.config.Datacenter,
|
|
Match: &structs.IntentionQueryMatch{
|
|
Type: structs.IntentionMatchDestination,
|
|
Entries: []structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
|
|
{
|
|
Namespace: structs.IntentionDefaultNamespace,
|
|
Name: req.Target,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: token},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
raw, meta, err := a.cache.Get(cachetype.IntentionMatchName, args)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return returnErr(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedIntentionMatches)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct"))
|
|
}
|
|
if len(reply.Matches) != 1 {
|
|
return returnErr(fmt.Errorf("Internal error loading matches"))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test the authorization for each match
|
|
for _, ixn := range reply.Matches[0] {
|
|
if auth, ok := uriService.Authorize(ixn); ok {
|
|
reason = fmt.Sprintf("Matched intention: %s", ixn.String())
|
|
return auth, reason, &meta, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No match, we need to determine the default behavior. We do this by
|
|
// specifying the anonymous token, which will get the default behavior. The
|
|
// default behavior if ACLs are disabled is to allow connections to mimic the
|
|
// behavior of Consul itself: everything is allowed if ACLs are disabled.
|
|
rule, err = a.resolveToken("")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return returnErr(err)
|
|
}
|
|
if rule == nil {
|
|
// ACLs not enabled at all, the default is allow all.
|
|
return true, "ACLs disabled, access is allowed by default", &meta, nil
|
|
}
|
|
reason = "Default behavior configured by ACLs"
|
|
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
|
|
return rule.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil) == acl.Allow, reason, &meta, nil
|
|
}
|