open-consul/agent/consul/connect_ca_endpoint.go
Matt Keeler f9a43a1e2d
ACL Authorizer overhaul (#6620)
* ACL Authorizer overhaul

To account for upcoming features every Authorization function can now take an extra *acl.EnterpriseAuthorizerContext. These are unused in OSS and will always be nil.

Additionally the acl package has received some thorough refactoring to enable all of the extra Consul Enterprise specific authorizations including moving sentinel enforcement into the stubbed structs. The Authorizer funcs now return an acl.EnforcementDecision instead of a boolean. This improves the overall interface as it makes multiple Authorizers easily chainable as they now indicate whether they had an authoritative decision or should use some other defaults. A ChainedAuthorizer was added to handle this Authorizer enforcement chain and will never itself return a non-authoritative decision.

* Include stub for extra enterprise rules in the global management policy

* Allow for an upgrade of the global-management policy
2019-10-15 16:58:50 -04:00

597 lines
18 KiB
Go

package consul
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/semaphore"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
)
var (
// Err strings. net/rpc doesn't have a way to transport typed/rich errors so
// we currently rely on sniffing the error string in a few cases where we need
// to change client behavior. These are the canonical error strings to use.
// Note though that client code can't use `err == consul.Err*` directly since
// the error returned by RPC will be a plain error.errorString created by
// net/rpc client so will not be the same _instance_ that this package
// variable points to. Clients need to compare using `err.Error() ==
// consul.ErrRateLimited.Error()` which is very sad. Short of replacing our
// RPC mechanism it's hard to know how to make that much better though.
ErrConnectNotEnabled = errors.New("Connect must be enabled in order to use this endpoint")
ErrRateLimited = errors.New("Rate limit reached, try again later")
ErrNotPrimaryDatacenter = errors.New("not the primary datacenter")
)
const (
// csrLimitWait is the maximum time we'll wait for a slot when CSR concurrency
// limiting or rate limiting is occurring. It's intentionally short so small
// batches of requests can be accommodated when server has capacity (assuming
// signing one cert takes much less than this) but failing requests fast when
// a thundering herd comes along.
csrLimitWait = 500 * time.Millisecond
)
// ConnectCA manages the Connect CA.
type ConnectCA struct {
// srv is a pointer back to the server.
srv *Server
// csrRateLimiter limits the rate of signing new certs if configured. Lazily
// initialized from current config to support dynamic changes.
// csrRateLimiterMu must be held while dereferencing the pointer or storing a
// new one, but methods can be called on the limiter object outside of the
// locked section. This is done only in the getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit method.
csrRateLimiter *rate.Limiter
csrRateLimiterMu sync.RWMutex
// csrConcurrencyLimiter is a dynamically resizable semaphore used to limit
// Sign RPC concurrency if configured. The zero value is usable as soon as
// SetSize is called which we do dynamically in the RPC handler to avoid
// having to hook elaborate synchronization mechanisms through the CA config
// endpoint and config reload etc.
csrConcurrencyLimiter semaphore.Dynamic
}
// getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit returns a rate.Limiter with the desired limit set.
// It uses the shared server-wide limiter unless the limit has been changed in
// config or the limiter has not been setup yet in which case it just-in-time
// configures the new limiter. We assume that limit changes are relatively rare
// and that all callers (there is currently only one) use the same config value
// as the limit. There might be some flapping if there are multiple concurrent
// requests in flight at the time the config changes where A sees the new value
// and updates, B sees the old but then gets this lock second and changes back.
// Eventually though and very soon (once all current RPCs are complete) we are
// guaranteed to have the correct limit set by the next RPC that comes in so I
// assume this is fine. If we observe strange behavior because of it, we could
// add hysteresis that prevents changes too soon after a previous change but
// that seems unnecessary for now.
func (s *ConnectCA) getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit(limit rate.Limit) *rate.Limiter {
s.csrRateLimiterMu.RLock()
lim := s.csrRateLimiter
s.csrRateLimiterMu.RUnlock()
// If there is a current limiter with the same limit, return it. This should
// be the common case.
if lim != nil && lim.Limit() == limit {
return lim
}
// Need to change limiter, get write lock
s.csrRateLimiterMu.Lock()
defer s.csrRateLimiterMu.Unlock()
// No limiter yet, or limit changed in CA config, reconfigure a new limiter.
// We use burst of 1 for a hard limit. Note that either bursting or waiting is
// necessary to get expected behavior in fact of random arrival times, but we
// don't need both and we use Wait with a small delay to smooth noise. See
// https://github.com/banks/sim-rate-limit-backoff/blob/master/README.md.
s.csrRateLimiter = rate.NewLimiter(limit, 1)
return s.csrRateLimiter
}
// ConfigurationGet returns the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationGet(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.CAConfiguration) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationGet", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator read access.
rule, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && rule.OperatorRead(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *config
return nil
}
// ConfigurationSet updates the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationSet(
args *structs.CARequest,
reply *interface{}) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationSet", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator write access.
rule, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && rule.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Exit early if it's a no-op change
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
confIdx, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Don't allow users to change the ClusterID.
args.Config.ClusterID = config.ClusterID
if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider && reflect.DeepEqual(args.Config.Config, config.Config) {
return nil
}
// Create a new instance of the provider described by the config
// and get the current active root CA. This acts as a good validation
// of the config and makes sure the provider is functioning correctly
// before we commit any changes to Raft.
newProvider, err := s.srv.createCAProvider(args.Config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not initialize provider: %v", err)
}
if err := newProvider.Configure(args.Config.ClusterID, true, args.Config.Config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error configuring provider: %v", err)
}
if err := newProvider.GenerateRoot(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error generating CA root certificate: %v", err)
}
newRootPEM, err := newProvider.ActiveRoot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
newActiveRoot, err := parseCARoot(newRootPEM, args.Config.Provider, args.Config.ClusterID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Compare the new provider's root CA ID to the current one. If they
// match, just update the existing provider with the new config.
// If they don't match, begin the root rotation process.
_, root, err := state.CARootActive(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If the root didn't change or if this is a secondary DC, just update the
// config and return.
if (s.srv.config.Datacenter != s.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter) ||
root != nil && root.ID == newActiveRoot.ID {
args.Op = structs.CAOpSetConfig
resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
return respErr
}
// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA provider config updated")
return nil
}
// At this point, we know the config change has trigged a root rotation,
// either by swapping the provider type or changing the provider's config
// to use a different root certificate.
// If it's a config change that would trigger a rotation (different provider/root):
// 1. Get the root from the new provider.
// 2. Call CrossSignCA on the old provider to sign the new root with the old one to
// get a cross-signed certificate.
// 3. Take the active root for the new provider and append the intermediate from step 2
// to its list of intermediates.
newRoot, err := connect.ParseCert(newRootPEM)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Have the old provider cross-sign the new intermediate
oldProvider, _ := s.srv.getCAProvider()
if oldProvider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
}
xcCert, err := oldProvider.CrossSignCA(newRoot)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add the cross signed cert to the new root's intermediates.
newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = []string{xcCert}
intermediate, err := newProvider.GenerateIntermediate()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if intermediate != newRootPEM {
newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = append(newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts, intermediate)
}
// Update the roots and CA config in the state store at the same time
idx, roots, err := state.CARoots(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var newRoots structs.CARoots
for _, r := range roots {
newRoot := *r
if newRoot.Active {
newRoot.Active = false
newRoot.RotatedOutAt = time.Now()
}
newRoots = append(newRoots, &newRoot)
}
newRoots = append(newRoots, newActiveRoot)
args.Op = structs.CAOpSetRootsAndConfig
args.Index = idx
args.Config.ModifyIndex = confIdx
args.Roots = newRoots
resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
return respErr
}
if respOk, ok := resp.(bool); ok && !respOk {
return fmt.Errorf("could not atomically update roots and config")
}
// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
// and call teardown on the old provider
s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
if err := oldProvider.Cleanup(); err != nil {
s.srv.logger.Printf("[WARN] connect: failed to clean up old provider %q", config.Provider)
}
s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA rotated to new root under provider %q", args.Config.Provider)
return nil
}
// Roots returns the currently trusted root certificates.
func (s *ConnectCA) Roots(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.IndexedCARoots) error {
// Forward if necessary
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Roots", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
return s.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, roots, config, err := state.CARootsAndConfig(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if config != nil {
// Build TrustDomain based on the ClusterID stored.
signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
if signingID == nil {
// If CA is bootstrapped at all then this should never happen but be
// defensive.
return errors.New("no cluster trust domain setup")
}
reply.TrustDomain = signingID.Host()
}
reply.Index, reply.Roots = index, roots
if reply.Roots == nil {
reply.Roots = make(structs.CARoots, 0)
}
// The API response must NEVER contain the secret information
// such as keys and so on. We use a whitelist below to copy the
// specific fields we want to expose.
for i, r := range reply.Roots {
// IMPORTANT: r must NEVER be modified, since it is a pointer
// directly to the structure in the memdb store.
reply.Roots[i] = &structs.CARoot{
ID: r.ID,
Name: r.Name,
SerialNumber: r.SerialNumber,
SigningKeyID: r.SigningKeyID,
ExternalTrustDomain: r.ExternalTrustDomain,
NotBefore: r.NotBefore,
NotAfter: r.NotAfter,
RootCert: r.RootCert,
IntermediateCerts: r.IntermediateCerts,
RaftIndex: r.RaftIndex,
Active: r.Active,
PrivateKeyType: r.PrivateKeyType,
PrivateKeyBits: r.PrivateKeyBits,
}
if r.Active {
reply.ActiveRootID = r.ID
}
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Sign signs a certificate for a service.
func (s *ConnectCA) Sign(
args *structs.CASignRequest,
reply *structs.IssuedCert) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Sign", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Parse the CSR
csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Parse the SPIFFE ID
spiffeID, err := connect.ParseCertURI(csr.URIs[0])
if err != nil {
return err
}
provider, caRoot := s.srv.getCAProvider()
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
} else if caRoot == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA root is nil")
}
// Verify that the CSR entity is in the cluster's trust domain
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
serviceID, isService := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
agentID, isAgent := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDAgent)
if !isService && !isAgent {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service or agent ID")
}
if isService {
if !signingID.CanSign(spiffeID) {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+
"we are %s", serviceID.Host, signingID.Host())
}
}
// Verify that the ACL token provided has permission to act as this service
rule, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if isService {
// TODO (namespaces) use actual ent authz context
if rule != nil && rule.ServiceWrite(serviceID.Service, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Verify that the DC in the service URI matches us. We might relax this
// requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer.
if serviceID.Datacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+
"we are %s", serviceID.Datacenter, s.srv.config.Datacenter)
}
} else if isAgent {
// TODO (namespaces) use actual ent authz context
if rule != nil && rule.NodeWrite(agentID.Agent, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
commonCfg, err := config.GetCommonConfig()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if commonCfg.CSRMaxPerSecond > 0 {
lim := s.getCSRRateLimiterWithLimit(rate.Limit(commonCfg.CSRMaxPerSecond))
// Wait up to the small threshold we allow for a token.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), csrLimitWait)
defer cancel()
if lim.Wait(ctx) != nil {
return ErrRateLimited
}
} else if commonCfg.CSRMaxConcurrent > 0 {
s.csrConcurrencyLimiter.SetSize(int64(commonCfg.CSRMaxConcurrent))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), csrLimitWait)
defer cancel()
if err := s.csrConcurrencyLimiter.Acquire(ctx); err != nil {
return ErrRateLimited
}
defer s.csrConcurrencyLimiter.Release()
}
// All seems to be in order, actually sign it.
pem, err := provider.Sign(csr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Append any intermediates needed by this root.
for _, p := range caRoot.IntermediateCerts {
pem = strings.TrimSpace(pem) + "\n" + p
}
// Append our local CA's intermediate if there is one.
inter, err := provider.ActiveIntermediate()
if err != nil {
return err
}
root, err := provider.ActiveRoot()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if inter != root {
pem = strings.TrimSpace(pem) + "\n" + inter
}
// TODO(banks): when we implement IssuedCerts table we can use the insert to
// that as the raft index to return in response.
//
// UPDATE(mkeeler): The original implementation relied on updating the CAConfig
// and using its index as the ModifyIndex for certs. This was buggy. The long
// term goal is still to insert some metadata into raft about the certificates
// and use that raft index for the ModifyIndex. This is a partial step in that
// direction except that we only are setting an index and not storing the
// metadata.
req := structs.CALeafRequest{
Op: structs.CALeafOpIncrementIndex,
Datacenter: s.srv.config.Datacenter,
WriteRequest: structs.WriteRequest{Token: args.Token},
}
resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCALeafRequestType|structs.IgnoreUnknownTypeFlag, &req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
modIdx, ok := resp.(uint64)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid response from updating the leaf cert index")
}
cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Set the response
*reply = structs.IssuedCert{
SerialNumber: connect.EncodeSerialNumber(cert.SerialNumber),
CertPEM: pem,
ValidAfter: cert.NotBefore,
ValidBefore: cert.NotAfter,
RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{
ModifyIndex: modIdx,
CreateIndex: modIdx,
},
}
if isService {
reply.Service = serviceID.Service
reply.ServiceURI = cert.URIs[0].String()
} else if isAgent {
reply.Agent = agentID.Agent
reply.AgentURI = cert.URIs[0].String()
}
return nil
}
// SignIntermediate signs an intermediate certificate for a remote datacenter.
func (s *ConnectCA) SignIntermediate(
args *structs.CASignRequest,
reply *string) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.SignIntermediate", args, args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify we are allowed to serve this request
if s.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
return ErrNotPrimaryDatacenter
}
// This action requires operator write access.
rule, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule != nil && rule.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
provider, _ := s.srv.getCAProvider()
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
}
csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cert, err := provider.SignIntermediate(csr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = cert
return nil
}