564 lines
16 KiB
Go
564 lines
16 KiB
Go
package consul
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import (
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"fmt"
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bexpr "github.com/hashicorp/go-bexpr"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
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"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
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)
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// Internal endpoint is used to query the miscellaneous info that
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// does not necessarily fit into the other systems. It is also
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// used to hold undocumented APIs that users should not rely on.
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type Internal struct {
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srv *Server
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logger hclog.Logger
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}
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// NodeInfo is used to retrieve information about a specific node.
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func (m *Internal) NodeInfo(args *structs.NodeSpecificRequest,
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reply *structs.IndexedNodeDump) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.NodeInfo", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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index, dump, err := state.NodeInfo(ws, args.Node, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Dump = index, dump
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return m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply)
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})
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}
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// NodeDump is used to generate information about all of the nodes.
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func (m *Internal) NodeDump(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
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reply *structs.IndexedNodeDump) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.NodeDump", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Dump)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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index, dump, err := state.NodeDump(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Dump = index, dump
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.Dump)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Dump = raw.(structs.NodeDump)
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return nil
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})
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}
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func (m *Internal) ServiceDump(args *structs.ServiceDumpRequest, reply *structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ServiceDump", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Nodes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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// Get, store, and filter nodes
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maxIdx, nodes, err := state.ServiceDump(ws, args.ServiceKind, args.UseServiceKind, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Nodes = nodes
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, &reply.Nodes); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Get, store, and filter gateway services
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idx, gatewayServices, err := state.DumpGatewayServices(ws)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Gateways = gatewayServices
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if idx > maxIdx {
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maxIdx = idx
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}
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reply.Index = maxIdx
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, &reply.Gateways); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.Nodes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Nodes = raw.(structs.CheckServiceNodes)
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return nil
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})
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}
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func (m *Internal) ServiceTopology(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceTopology) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ServiceTopology", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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if args.ServiceName == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("Must provide a service name")
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}
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var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
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authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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defaultAllow := authz.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil)
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index, topology, err := state.ServiceTopology(ws, args.Datacenter, args.ServiceName, args.ServiceKind, defaultAllow, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Index = index
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reply.ServiceTopology = topology
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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})
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}
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// IntentionUpstreams returns the upstreams of a service. Upstreams are inferred from intentions.
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// If intentions allow a connection from the target to some candidate service, the candidate service is considered
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// an upstream of the target.
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func (m *Internal) IntentionUpstreams(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList) error {
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// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
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if !m.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
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return ErrConnectNotEnabled
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}
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if args.ServiceName == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("Must provide a service name")
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}
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.IntentionUpstreams", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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defaultDecision := authz.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil)
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sn := structs.NewServiceName(args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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index, services, err := state.IntentionTopology(ws, sn, false, defaultDecision)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Services = index, services
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m.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
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return nil
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})
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}
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// GatewayServiceNodes returns all the nodes for services associated with a gateway along with their gateway config
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func (m *Internal) GatewayServiceDump(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceDump) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.GatewayServiceDump", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// Verify the arguments
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if args.ServiceName == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("Must provide gateway name")
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}
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var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
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authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// We need read access to the gateway we're trying to find services for, so check that first.
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if authz.ServiceRead(args.ServiceName, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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err = m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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var maxIdx uint64
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idx, gatewayServices, err := state.GatewayServices(ws, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if idx > maxIdx {
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maxIdx = idx
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}
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// Loop over the gateway <-> serviceName mappings and fetch all service instances for each
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var result structs.ServiceDump
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for _, gs := range gatewayServices {
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idx, instances, err := state.CheckServiceNodes(ws, gs.Service.Name, &gs.Service.EnterpriseMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if idx > maxIdx {
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maxIdx = idx
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}
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for _, n := range instances {
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svc := structs.ServiceInfo{
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Node: n.Node,
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Service: n.Service,
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Checks: n.Checks,
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GatewayService: gs,
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}
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result = append(result, &svc)
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}
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// Ensure we store the gateway <-> service mapping even if there are no instances of the service
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if len(instances) == 0 {
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svc := structs.ServiceInfo{
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GatewayService: gs,
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}
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result = append(result, &svc)
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}
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Dump = maxIdx, result
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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})
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return err
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}
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// Match returns the set of intentions that match the given source/destination.
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func (m *Internal) GatewayIntentions(args *structs.IntentionQueryRequest, reply *structs.IndexedIntentions) error {
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// Forward if necessary
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.GatewayIntentions", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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if len(args.Match.Entries) > 1 {
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return fmt.Errorf("Expected 1 gateway name, got %d", len(args.Match.Entries))
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}
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// Get the ACL token for the request for the checks below.
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var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
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var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
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authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &entMeta, &authzContext)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace == "" {
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args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace = entMeta.NamespaceOrDefault()
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}
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if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseIntentionNamespace(args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace, true); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("Invalid match entry namespace %q: %v", args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace, err)
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}
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// We need read access to the gateway we're trying to find intentions for, so check that first.
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if authz.ServiceRead(args.Match.Entries[0].Name, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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return m.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions,
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&reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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var maxIdx uint64
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idx, gatewayServices, err := state.GatewayServices(ws, args.Match.Entries[0].Name, &entMeta)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if idx > maxIdx {
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maxIdx = idx
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}
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// Loop over the gateway <-> serviceName mappings and fetch all intentions for each
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seen := make(map[string]bool)
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result := make(structs.Intentions, 0)
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for _, gs := range gatewayServices {
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entry := structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
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Namespace: gs.Service.NamespaceOrDefault(),
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Partition: gs.Service.PartitionOrDefault(),
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Name: gs.Service.Name,
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}
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idx, intentions, err := state.IntentionMatchOne(ws, entry, structs.IntentionMatchDestination)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if idx > maxIdx {
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maxIdx = idx
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}
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// Deduplicate wildcard intentions
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for _, ixn := range intentions {
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if !seen[ixn.ID] {
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result = append(result, ixn)
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seen[ixn.ID] = true
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}
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}
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Intentions = maxIdx, result
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if reply.Intentions == nil {
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reply.Intentions = make(structs.Intentions, 0)
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}
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if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return nil
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},
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)
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}
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// EventFire is a bit of an odd endpoint, but it allows for a cross-DC RPC
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// call to fire an event. The primary use case is to enable user events being
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// triggered in a remote DC.
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func (m *Internal) EventFire(args *structs.EventFireRequest,
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reply *structs.EventFireResponse) error {
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if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.EventFire", args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// Check ACLs
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authz, err := m.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if authz.EventWrite(args.Name, nil) != acl.Allow {
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accessorID := m.aclAccessorID(args.Token)
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m.logger.Warn("user event blocked by ACLs", "event", args.Name, "accessorID", accessorID)
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Set the query meta data
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m.srv.setQueryMeta(&reply.QueryMeta, args.Token)
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// Add the consul prefix to the event name
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eventName := userEventName(args.Name)
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// Fire the event on all LAN segments
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return m.srv.LANSendUserEvent(eventName, args.Payload, false)
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}
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// KeyringOperation will query the WAN and LAN gossip keyrings of all nodes.
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func (m *Internal) KeyringOperation(
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args *structs.KeyringRequest,
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reply *structs.KeyringResponses) error {
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// Error aggressively to be clear about LocalOnly behavior
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if args.LocalOnly && args.Operation != structs.KeyringList {
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return fmt.Errorf("argument error: LocalOnly can only be used for List operations")
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}
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// Check ACLs
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identity, authz, err := m.srv.acls.ResolveTokenToIdentityAndAuthorizer(args.Token)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseToken(identity); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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switch args.Operation {
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case structs.KeyringList:
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if authz.KeyringRead(nil) != acl.Allow {
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return fmt.Errorf("Reading keyring denied by ACLs")
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}
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case structs.KeyringInstall:
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fallthrough
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case structs.KeyringUse:
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fallthrough
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case structs.KeyringRemove:
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if authz.KeyringWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
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return fmt.Errorf("Modifying keyring denied due to ACLs")
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}
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default:
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panic("Invalid keyring operation")
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}
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if args.LocalOnly || args.Forwarded || m.srv.serfWAN == nil {
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// Handle operations that are localOnly, already forwarded or
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// there is no serfWAN. If any of this is the case this
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// operation shouldn't go out to other dcs or WAN pool.
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reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpLAN(args)...)
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} else {
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// Handle not already forwarded, non-local operations.
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// Marking this as forwarded because this is what we are about
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// to do. Prevents the same message from being fowarded by
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// other servers.
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args.Forwarded = true
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reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpWAN(args))
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reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpLAN(args)...)
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dcs := m.srv.router.GetRemoteDatacenters(m.srv.config.Datacenter)
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responses, err := m.srv.keyringRPCs("Internal.KeyringOperation", args, dcs)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Add(responses)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpLAN(args *structs.KeyringRequest) []*structs.KeyringResponse {
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responses := []*structs.KeyringResponse{}
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_ = m.srv.DoWithLANSerfs(func(poolName, poolKind string, pool *serf.Serf) error {
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mgr := pool.KeyManager()
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serfResp, err := m.executeKeyringOpMgr(mgr, args)
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resp := translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(serfResp, m.srv.config.Datacenter, err)
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if poolKind == PoolKindSegment {
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resp.Segment = poolName
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} else {
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resp.Partition = poolName
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}
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responses = append(responses, &resp)
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return nil
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}, nil)
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return responses
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}
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func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpWAN(args *structs.KeyringRequest) *structs.KeyringResponse {
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mgr := m.srv.KeyManagerWAN()
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serfResp, err := m.executeKeyringOpMgr(mgr, args)
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resp := translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(serfResp, m.srv.config.Datacenter, err)
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resp.WAN = true
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return &resp
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}
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func translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(keyresponse *serf.KeyResponse, datacenter string, err error) structs.KeyringResponse {
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resp := structs.KeyringResponse{
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Datacenter: datacenter,
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Messages: keyresponse.Messages,
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Keys: keyresponse.Keys,
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PrimaryKeys: keyresponse.PrimaryKeys,
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NumNodes: keyresponse.NumNodes,
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}
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if err != nil {
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resp.Error = err.Error()
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}
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return resp
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}
|
|
|
|
// executeKeyringOpMgr executes the appropriate keyring-related function based on
|
|
// the type of keyring operation in the request. It takes the KeyManager as an
|
|
// argument, so it can handle any operation for either LAN or WAN pools.
|
|
func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpMgr(
|
|
mgr *serf.KeyManager,
|
|
args *structs.KeyringRequest,
|
|
) (*serf.KeyResponse, error) {
|
|
var serfResp *serf.KeyResponse
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
opts := &serf.KeyRequestOptions{RelayFactor: args.RelayFactor}
|
|
switch args.Operation {
|
|
case structs.KeyringList:
|
|
serfResp, err = mgr.ListKeysWithOptions(opts)
|
|
case structs.KeyringInstall:
|
|
serfResp, err = mgr.InstallKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
|
|
case structs.KeyringUse:
|
|
serfResp, err = mgr.UseKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
|
|
case structs.KeyringRemove:
|
|
serfResp, err = mgr.RemoveKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return serfResp, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// aclAccessorID is used to convert an ACLToken's secretID to its accessorID for non-
|
|
// critical purposes, such as logging. Therefore we interpret all errors as empty-string
|
|
// so we can safely log it without handling non-critical errors at the usage site.
|
|
func (m *Internal) aclAccessorID(secretID string) string {
|
|
_, ident, err := m.srv.ResolveIdentityFromToken(secretID)
|
|
if acl.IsErrNotFound(err) {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
m.logger.Debug("non-critical error resolving acl token accessor for logging", "error", err)
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
if ident == nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return ident.ID()
|
|
}
|