open-consul/agent/consul/connect_ca_endpoint.go

250 lines
6.6 KiB
Go

package consul
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
var (
// Err strings. net/rpc doesn't have a way to transport typed/rich errors so
// we currently rely on sniffing the error string in a few cases where we need
// to change client behavior. These are the canonical error strings to use.
// Note though that client code can't use `err == consul.Err*` directly since
// the error returned by RPC will be a plain error.errorString created by
// net/rpc client so will not be the same _instance_ that this package
// variable points to. Clients need to compare using `err.Error() ==
// consul.ErrRateLimited.Error()` which is very sad. Short of replacing our
// RPC mechanism it's hard to know how to make that much better though.
ErrConnectNotEnabled = errors.New("Connect must be enabled in order to use this endpoint")
ErrRateLimited = errors.New("Rate limit reached, try again later")
ErrNotPrimaryDatacenter = errors.New("not the primary datacenter")
ErrStateReadOnly = errors.New("CA Provider State is read-only")
)
const (
// csrLimitWait is the maximum time we'll wait for a slot when CSR concurrency
// limiting or rate limiting is occurring. It's intentionally short so small
// batches of requests can be accommodated when server has capacity (assuming
// signing one cert takes much less than this) but failing requests fast when
// a thundering herd comes along.
csrLimitWait = 500 * time.Millisecond
)
// ConnectCA manages the Connect CA.
type ConnectCA struct {
// srv is a pointer back to the server.
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
}
// ConfigurationGet returns the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationGet(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.CAConfiguration) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.ForwardRPC("ConnectCA.ConfigurationGet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator read access.
authz, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
state := s.srv.fsm.State()
_, config, err := state.CAConfig(nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *config
return nil
}
// ConfigurationSet updates the configuration for the CA.
func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationSet(
args *structs.CARequest,
reply *interface{}) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.ForwardRPC("ConnectCA.ConfigurationSet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// This action requires operator write access.
authz, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
return s.srv.caManager.UpdateConfiguration(args)
}
// Roots returns the currently trusted root certificates.
func (s *ConnectCA) Roots(
args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.IndexedCARoots) error {
// Forward if necessary
if done, err := s.srv.ForwardRPC("ConnectCA.Roots", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
return s.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
roots, err := s.srv.getCARoots(ws, state)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *roots
return nil
},
)
}
// Sign signs a certificate for a service.
func (s *ConnectCA) Sign(
args *structs.CASignRequest,
reply *structs.IssuedCert) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.ForwardRPC("ConnectCA.Sign", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Parse the CSR
csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Parse the SPIFFE ID
spiffeID, err := connect.ParseCertURI(csr.URIs[0])
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Verify that the ACL token provided has permission to act as this service
authz, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
var entMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
serviceID, isService := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
agentID, isAgent := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDAgent)
if !isService && !isAgent {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service or agent ID")
}
if isService {
entMeta.Merge(serviceID.GetEnterpriseMeta())
entMeta.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.ServiceWrite(serviceID.Service, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Verify that the DC in the service URI matches us. We might relax this
// requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer.
if serviceID.Datacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+
"we are %s", serviceID.Datacenter, s.srv.config.Datacenter)
}
} else if isAgent {
structs.DefaultEnterpriseMetaInDefaultPartition().FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if authz.NodeWrite(agentID.Agent, &authzContext) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
cert, err := s.srv.caManager.SignCertificate(csr, spiffeID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = *cert
return nil
}
// SignIntermediate signs an intermediate certificate for a remote datacenter.
func (s *ConnectCA) SignIntermediate(
args *structs.CASignRequest,
reply *string) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := s.srv.ForwardRPC("ConnectCA.SignIntermediate", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify we are allowed to serve this request
if s.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
return ErrNotPrimaryDatacenter
}
// This action requires operator write access.
authz, err := s.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.OperatorWrite(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
provider, _ := s.srv.caManager.getCAProvider()
if provider == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
}
csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
if err != nil {
return err
}
cert, err := provider.SignIntermediate(csr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = cert
return nil
}