open-consul/agent/consul/acl_endpoint.go

2619 lines
76 KiB
Go

package consul
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"time"
"github.com/armon/go-metrics"
"github.com/armon/go-metrics/prometheus"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-bexpr"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
memdb "github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
uuid "github.com/hashicorp/go-uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/authmethod"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/template"
)
const (
// aclBootstrapReset is the file name to create in the data dir. It's only contents
// should be the reset index
aclBootstrapReset = "acl-bootstrap-reset"
)
var ACLEndpointSummaries = []prometheus.SummaryDefinition{
{
Name: []string{"acl", "token", "clone"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "token", "upsert"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "token", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "policy", "upsert"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "policy", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "policy", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "role", "upsert"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "role", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "bindingrule", "upsert"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "bindingrule", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "authmethod", "upsert"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "authmethod", "delete"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "login"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "login"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "logout"},
Help: "",
},
{
Name: []string{"acl", "logout"},
Help: "",
},
}
// Regex for matching
var (
validPolicyName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{1,128}$`)
validServiceIdentityName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9\-_]*[a-z0-9])?$`)
serviceIdentityNameMaxLength = 256
validNodeIdentityName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9\-_]*[a-z0-9])?$`)
nodeIdentityNameMaxLength = 256
validRoleName = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{1,256}$`)
validAuthMethod = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{1,128}$`)
)
// ACL endpoint is used to manipulate ACLs
type ACL struct {
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
}
// fileBootstrapResetIndex retrieves the reset index specified by the administrator from
// the file on disk.
//
// Q: What is the bootstrap reset index?
// A: If you happen to lose acess to all tokens capable of ACL management you need a way
// to get back into your system. This allows an admin to write the current
// bootstrap "index" into a special file on disk to override the mechanism preventing
// a second token bootstrap. The index will be retrieved by a API call to /v1/acl/bootstrap
// When already bootstrapped this API will return the reset index necessary within
// the error response. Once set in the file, the bootstrap API can be used again to
// get a new token.
//
// Q: Why is the reset index not in the config?
// A: We want to be able to remove the reset index once we have used it. This prevents
// accidentally allowing bootstrapping yet again after a snapshot restore.
//
func (a *ACL) fileBootstrapResetIndex() uint64 {
// Determine the file path to check
path := filepath.Join(a.srv.config.DataDir, aclBootstrapReset)
// Read the file
raw, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
a.logger.Error("bootstrap: failed to read path",
"path", path,
"error", err,
)
}
return 0
}
// Attempt to parse the file
var resetIdx uint64
if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(string(raw), "%d", &resetIdx); err != nil {
a.logger.Error("failed to parse bootstrap reset index path", "path", path, "error", err)
return 0
}
// Return the reset index
a.logger.Debug("parsed bootstrap reset index path", "path", path, "reset_index", resetIdx)
return resetIdx
}
func (a *ACL) removeBootstrapResetFile() {
if err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(a.srv.config.DataDir, aclBootstrapReset)); err != nil {
a.logger.Warn("failed to remove bootstrap file", "error", err)
}
}
func (a *ACL) aclPreCheck() error {
if !a.srv.config.ACLsEnabled {
return acl.ErrDisabled
}
return nil
}
// BootstrapTokens is used to perform a one-time ACL bootstrap operation on
// a cluster to get the first management token.
func (a *ACL) BootstrapTokens(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.ACLToken) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.BootstrapTokens", args, reply); done {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.aclBootstrapAllowed(); err != nil {
return err
}
// Verify we are allowed to serve this request
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
return acl.ErrDisabled
}
// By doing some pre-checks we can head off later bootstrap attempts
// without having to run them through Raft, which should curb abuse.
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
allowed, resetIdx, err := state.CanBootstrapACLToken()
if err != nil {
return err
}
var specifiedIndex uint64 = 0
if !allowed {
// Check if there is a reset index specified
specifiedIndex = a.fileBootstrapResetIndex()
if specifiedIndex == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("ACL bootstrap no longer allowed (reset index: %d)", resetIdx)
} else if specifiedIndex != resetIdx {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid bootstrap reset index (specified %d, reset index: %d)", specifiedIndex, resetIdx)
}
}
// remove the bootstrap override file now that we have the index from it and it was valid.
// whether bootstrapping works or not is irrelevant as we really don't want this file hanging around
// in case a snapshot restore is done. In that case we don't want to accidentally allow re-bootstrapping
// just because the file was unchanged.
a.removeBootstrapResetFile()
accessor, err := lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkTokenUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
secret, err := lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkTokenUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req := structs.ACLTokenBootstrapRequest{
Token: structs.ACLToken{
AccessorID: accessor,
SecretID: secret,
Description: "Bootstrap Token (Global Management)",
Policies: []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink{
{
ID: structs.ACLPolicyGlobalManagementID,
},
},
CreateTime: time.Now(),
Local: false,
EnterpriseMeta: *structs.DefaultEnterpriseMetaInDefaultPartition(),
},
ResetIndex: specifiedIndex,
}
req.Token.SetHash(true)
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLBootstrapRequestType, &req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if _, token, err := state.ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, accessor, structs.DefaultEnterpriseMetaInDefaultPartition()); err == nil {
*reply = *token
}
a.logger.Info("ACL bootstrap completed")
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) TokenRead(args *structs.ACLTokenGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
// clients will not know whether the server has local token store. In the case
// where it doesn't we will transparently forward requests.
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authz ACLResolveResult
if args.TokenIDType == structs.ACLTokenAccessor {
var err error
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Only ACLRead privileges are required to list tokens
// However if you do not have ACLWrite as well the token
// secrets will be redacted
if authz, err = a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var index uint64
var token *structs.ACLToken
var err error
if args.TokenIDType == structs.ACLTokenAccessor {
index, token, err = state.ACLTokenGetByAccessor(ws, args.TokenID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if token != nil {
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &token)
// token secret was redacted
if token.SecretID == redactedToken {
reply.Redacted = true
}
}
} else {
index, token, err = state.ACLTokenGetBySecret(ws, args.TokenID, nil)
// no extra validation is needed here. If you have the secret ID you can read it.
}
if token != nil && token.IsExpired(time.Now()) {
token = nil
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Token = index, token
reply.SourceDatacenter = args.Datacenter
if token == nil {
return errNotFound
}
if args.Expanded {
info, err := a.lookupExpandedTokenInfo(ws, state, token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.ExpandedTokenInfo = info
}
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) lookupExpandedTokenInfo(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store, token *structs.ACLToken) (structs.ExpandedTokenInfo, error) {
policyIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
roleIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
identityPolicies := make(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy)
tokenInfo := structs.ExpandedTokenInfo{}
// Add the token's policies and node/service identity policies
for _, policy := range token.Policies {
policyIDs[policy.ID] = struct{}{}
}
for _, roleLink := range token.Roles {
roleIDs[roleLink.ID] = struct{}{}
}
for _, identity := range token.ServiceIdentities {
policy := identity.SyntheticPolicy(&token.EnterpriseMeta)
identityPolicies[policy.ID] = policy
}
for _, identity := range token.NodeIdentities {
policy := identity.SyntheticPolicy(&token.EnterpriseMeta)
identityPolicies[policy.ID] = policy
}
// Get any namespace default roles/policies to look up
nsPolicies, nsRoles, err := getTokenNamespaceDefaults(ws, state, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return tokenInfo, err
}
tokenInfo.NamespaceDefaultPolicyIDs = nsPolicies
tokenInfo.NamespaceDefaultRoleIDs = nsRoles
for _, id := range nsPolicies {
policyIDs[id] = struct{}{}
}
for _, id := range nsRoles {
roleIDs[id] = struct{}{}
}
// Add each role's policies and node/service identity policies
for roleID := range roleIDs {
_, role, err := state.ACLRoleGetByID(ws, roleID, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return tokenInfo, err
}
if role == nil {
continue
}
for _, policy := range role.Policies {
policyIDs[policy.ID] = struct{}{}
}
for _, identity := range role.ServiceIdentities {
policy := identity.SyntheticPolicy(&role.EnterpriseMeta)
identityPolicies[policy.ID] = policy
}
for _, identity := range role.NodeIdentities {
policy := identity.SyntheticPolicy(&role.EnterpriseMeta)
identityPolicies[policy.ID] = policy
}
tokenInfo.ExpandedRoles = append(tokenInfo.ExpandedRoles, role)
}
var policies []*structs.ACLPolicy
for id := range policyIDs {
_, policy, err := state.ACLPolicyGetByID(ws, id, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return tokenInfo, err
}
if policy == nil {
continue
}
policies = append(policies, policy)
}
for _, policy := range identityPolicies {
policies = append(policies, policy)
}
tokenInfo.ExpandedPolicies = policies
tokenInfo.AgentACLDefaultPolicy = a.srv.config.ACLResolverSettings.ACLDefaultPolicy
tokenInfo.AgentACLDownPolicy = a.srv.config.ACLResolverSettings.ACLDownPolicy
tokenInfo.ResolvedByAgent = a.srv.config.NodeName
return tokenInfo, nil
}
func (a *ACL) TokenClone(args *structs.ACLTokenSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLToken) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
// clients will not know whether the server has local token store. In the case
// where it doesn't we will transparently forward requests.
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenClone", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "token", "clone"}, time.Now())
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
_, token, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, args.ACLToken.AccessorID, &args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if token == nil || token.IsExpired(time.Now()) {
return acl.ErrNotFound
} else if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() && !token.Local {
// global token writes must be forwarded to the primary DC
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
return a.srv.forwardDC("ACL.TokenClone", a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter, args, reply)
}
if token.AuthMethod != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot clone a token created from an auth method")
}
if token.Rules != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot clone a legacy ACL with this endpoint")
}
cloneReq := structs.ACLTokenSetRequest{
Datacenter: args.Datacenter,
ACLToken: structs.ACLToken{
Policies: token.Policies,
Roles: token.Roles,
ServiceIdentities: token.ServiceIdentities,
NodeIdentities: token.NodeIdentities,
Local: token.Local,
Description: token.Description,
ExpirationTime: token.ExpirationTime,
EnterpriseMeta: args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta,
},
WriteRequest: args.WriteRequest,
}
if args.ACLToken.Description != "" {
cloneReq.ACLToken.Description = args.ACLToken.Description
}
return a.tokenSetInternal(&cloneReq, reply, false)
}
func (a *ACL) TokenSet(args *structs.ACLTokenSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLToken) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
// Global token creation/modification always goes to the ACL DC
if !args.ACLToken.Local {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
} else if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return fmt.Errorf("Local tokens are disabled")
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenSet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "token", "upsert"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.ACLToken.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.tokenSetInternal(args, reply, false)
}
func (a *ACL) tokenSetInternal(args *structs.ACLTokenSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLToken, fromLogin bool) error {
token := &args.ACLToken
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
// local token operations
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot upsert tokens within this datacenter")
} else if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() && !token.Local {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot upsert global tokens within this datacenter")
}
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
var accessorMatch *structs.ACLToken
var secretMatch *structs.ACLToken
var err error
if token.AccessorID != "" {
_, accessorMatch, err = state.ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, token.AccessorID, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed acl token lookup by accessor: %v", err)
}
}
if token.SecretID != "" {
_, secretMatch, err = state.ACLTokenGetBySecret(nil, token.SecretID, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed acl token lookup by secret: %v", err)
}
}
if token.AccessorID == "" || args.Create {
// Token Create
// Generate the AccessorID if not specified
if token.AccessorID == "" {
token.AccessorID, err = lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkTokenUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(token.AccessorID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: AccessorID is not a valid UUID")
} else if accessorMatch != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: AccessorID is already in use")
} else if _, match, err := state.ACLTokenGetBySecret(nil, token.AccessorID, nil); err != nil || match != nil {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to lookup the acl token: %v", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: AccessorID is already in use")
} else if structs.ACLIDReserved(token.AccessorID) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: UUIDs with the prefix %q are reserved", structs.ACLReservedPrefix)
}
// Generate the SecretID if not specified
if token.SecretID == "" {
token.SecretID, err = lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkTokenUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(token.SecretID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: SecretID is not a valid UUID")
} else if secretMatch != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: SecretID is already in use")
} else if _, match, err := state.ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, token.SecretID, nil); err != nil || match != nil {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to lookup the acl token: %v", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: SecretID is already in use")
} else if structs.ACLIDReserved(token.SecretID) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Token: UUIDs with the prefix %q are reserved", structs.ACLReservedPrefix)
}
token.CreateTime = time.Now()
if fromLogin {
if token.AuthMethod == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("AuthMethod field is required during Login")
}
} else {
if token.AuthMethod != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("AuthMethod field is disallowed outside of Login")
}
}
// Ensure an ExpirationTTL is valid if provided.
if token.ExpirationTTL != 0 {
if token.ExpirationTTL < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Token Expiration TTL '%s' should be > 0", token.ExpirationTTL)
}
if token.HasExpirationTime() {
return fmt.Errorf("Token Expiration TTL and Expiration Time cannot both be set")
}
token.ExpirationTime = timePointer(token.CreateTime.Add(token.ExpirationTTL))
token.ExpirationTTL = 0
}
if token.HasExpirationTime() {
if token.CreateTime.After(*token.ExpirationTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("ExpirationTime cannot be before CreateTime")
}
expiresIn := token.ExpirationTime.Sub(token.CreateTime)
if expiresIn > a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL {
return fmt.Errorf("ExpirationTime cannot be more than %s in the future (was %s)",
a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL, expiresIn)
} else if expiresIn < a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL {
return fmt.Errorf("ExpirationTime cannot be less than %s in the future (was %s)",
a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL, expiresIn)
}
}
} else {
// Token Update
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(token.AccessorID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("AccessorID is not a valid UUID")
}
// DEPRECATED (ACL-Legacy-Compat) - maybe get rid of this in the future
// and instead do a ParseUUID check. New tokens will not have
// secrets generated by users but rather they will always be UUIDs.
// However if users just continue the upgrade cycle they may still
// have tokens using secrets that are not UUIDS
// The RootAuthorizer checks that the SecretID is not "allow", "deny"
// or "manage" as a precaution against something accidentally using
// one of these root policies by setting the secret to it.
if acl.RootAuthorizer(token.SecretID) != nil {
return acl.PermissionDeniedError{Cause: "Cannot modify root ACL"}
}
// Verify the token exists
if accessorMatch == nil || accessorMatch.IsExpired(time.Now()) {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot find token %q", token.AccessorID)
}
if token.SecretID == "" {
token.SecretID = accessorMatch.SecretID
} else if accessorMatch.SecretID != token.SecretID {
return fmt.Errorf("Changing a tokens SecretID is not permitted")
}
// Cannot toggle the "Global" mode
if token.Local != accessorMatch.Local {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot toggle local mode of %s", token.AccessorID)
}
if token.AuthMethod == "" {
token.AuthMethod = accessorMatch.AuthMethod
} else if token.AuthMethod != accessorMatch.AuthMethod {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot change AuthMethod of %s", token.AccessorID)
}
if token.ExpirationTTL != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot change expiration time of %s", token.AccessorID)
}
if !token.HasExpirationTime() {
token.ExpirationTime = accessorMatch.ExpirationTime
} else if !accessorMatch.HasExpirationTime() {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot change expiration time of %s", token.AccessorID)
} else if !token.ExpirationTime.Equal(*accessorMatch.ExpirationTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("Cannot change expiration time of %s", token.AccessorID)
}
token.CreateTime = accessorMatch.CreateTime
}
policyIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
var policies []structs.ACLTokenPolicyLink
// Validate all the policy names and convert them to policy IDs
for _, link := range token.Policies {
if link.ID == "" {
_, policy, err := state.ACLPolicyGetByName(nil, link.Name, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error looking up policy for name %q: %v", link.Name, err)
}
if policy == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("No such ACL policy with name %q", link.Name)
}
link.ID = policy.ID
} else {
_, policy, err := state.ACLPolicyGetByID(nil, link.ID, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error looking up policy for id %q: %v", link.ID, err)
}
if policy == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("No such ACL policy with ID %q", link.ID)
}
}
// Do not store the policy name within raft/memdb as the policy could be renamed in the future.
link.Name = ""
// dedup policy links by id
if _, ok := policyIDs[link.ID]; !ok {
policies = append(policies, link)
policyIDs[link.ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
token.Policies = policies
roleIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
var roles []structs.ACLTokenRoleLink
// Validate all the role names and convert them to role IDs.
for _, link := range token.Roles {
if link.ID == "" {
_, role, err := state.ACLRoleGetByName(nil, link.Name, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error looking up role for name %q: %v", link.Name, err)
}
if role == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("No such ACL role with name %q", link.Name)
}
link.ID = role.ID
} else {
_, role, err := state.ACLRoleGetByID(nil, link.ID, &token.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error looking up role for id %q: %v", link.ID, err)
}
if role == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("No such ACL role with ID %q", link.ID)
}
}
// Do not store the role name within raft/memdb as the role could be renamed in the future.
link.Name = ""
// dedup role links by id
if _, ok := roleIDs[link.ID]; !ok {
roles = append(roles, link)
roleIDs[link.ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
token.Roles = roles
for _, svcid := range token.ServiceIdentities {
if svcid.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Service identity is missing the service name field on this token")
}
if token.Local && len(svcid.Datacenters) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Service identity %q cannot specify a list of datacenters on a local token", svcid.ServiceName)
}
if !isValidServiceIdentityName(svcid.ServiceName) {
return fmt.Errorf("Service identity %q has an invalid name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed", svcid.ServiceName)
}
}
token.ServiceIdentities = dedupeServiceIdentities(token.ServiceIdentities)
for _, nodeid := range token.NodeIdentities {
if nodeid.NodeName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity is missing the node name field on this token")
}
if nodeid.Datacenter == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity is missing the datacenter field on this token")
}
if !isValidNodeIdentityName(nodeid.NodeName) {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity has an invalid name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed")
}
}
token.NodeIdentities = dedupeNodeIdentities(token.NodeIdentities)
if token.Rules != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Rules cannot be specified for this token")
}
if token.Type != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Type cannot be specified for this token")
}
token.SetHash(true)
// validate the enterprise specific fields
if err = a.tokenUpsertValidateEnterprise(token, accessorMatch); err != nil {
return err
}
req := &structs.ACLTokenBatchSetRequest{
Tokens: structs.ACLTokens{token},
CAS: false,
}
if fromLogin {
// Logins may attempt to link to roles that do not exist. These
// may be persisted, but don't allow tokens to be created that
// have no privileges (i.e. role links that point nowhere).
req.AllowMissingLinks = true
req.ProhibitUnprivileged = true
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenSetRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply token write request: %v", err)
}
// Purge the identity from the cache to prevent using the previous definition of the identity
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemoveIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(token.SecretID))
// Don't check expiration times here as it doesn't really matter.
if _, updatedToken, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, token.AccessorID, nil); err == nil && updatedToken != nil {
*reply = *updatedToken
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to retrieve the token after insertion")
}
return nil
}
func validateBindingRuleBindName(bindType, bindName string, availableFields []string) (bool, error) {
if bindType == "" || bindName == "" {
return false, nil
}
fakeVarMap := make(map[string]string)
for _, v := range availableFields {
fakeVarMap[v] = "fake"
}
_, valid, err := computeBindingRuleBindName(bindType, bindName, fakeVarMap)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return valid, nil
}
// computeBindingRuleBindName processes the HIL for the provided bind type+name
// using the projected variables.
//
// - If the HIL is invalid ("", false, AN_ERROR) is returned.
// - If the computed name is not valid for the type ("INVALID_NAME", false, nil) is returned.
// - If the computed name is valid for the type ("VALID_NAME", true, nil) is returned.
func computeBindingRuleBindName(bindType, bindName string, projectedVars map[string]string) (string, bool, error) {
bindName, err := template.InterpolateHIL(bindName, projectedVars, true)
if err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
valid := false
switch bindType {
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeService:
valid = isValidServiceIdentityName(bindName)
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeNode:
valid = isValidNodeIdentityName(bindName)
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeRole:
valid = validRoleName.MatchString(bindName)
default:
return "", false, fmt.Errorf("unknown binding rule bind type: %s", bindType)
}
return bindName, valid, nil
}
// isValidServiceIdentityName returns true if the provided name can be used as
// an ACLServiceIdentity ServiceName. This is more restrictive than standard
// catalog registration, which basically takes the view that "everything is
// valid".
func isValidServiceIdentityName(name string) bool {
if len(name) < 1 || len(name) > serviceIdentityNameMaxLength {
return false
}
return validServiceIdentityName.MatchString(name)
}
// isValidNodeIdentityName returns true if the provided name can be used as
// an ACLNodeIdentity NodeName. This is more restrictive than standard
// catalog registration, which basically takes the view that "everything is
// valid".
func isValidNodeIdentityName(name string) bool {
if len(name) < 1 || len(name) > nodeIdentityNameMaxLength {
return false
}
return validNodeIdentityName.MatchString(name)
}
func (a *ACL) TokenDelete(args *structs.ACLTokenDeleteRequest, reply *string) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenDelete", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "token", "delete"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(args.TokenID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Accessor ID is missing or an invalid UUID")
}
if args.TokenID == structs.ACLTokenAnonymousID {
return fmt.Errorf("Delete operation not permitted on the anonymous token")
}
// grab the token here so we can invalidate our cache later on
_, token, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetByAccessor(nil, args.TokenID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if token != nil {
if args.Token == token.SecretID {
return fmt.Errorf("Deletion of the request's authorization token is not permitted")
}
// No need to check expiration time because it's being deleted.
// token found in secondary DC but its not local so it must be deleted in the primary
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() && !token.Local {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
return a.srv.forwardDC("ACL.TokenDelete", a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter, args, reply)
}
} else if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
// token not found in secondary DC - attempt to delete within the primary
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
return a.srv.forwardDC("ACL.TokenDelete", a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter, args, reply)
} else {
// in Primary Datacenter but the token does not exist - return early as there is nothing to do.
return nil
}
req := &structs.ACLTokenBatchDeleteRequest{
TokenIDs: []string{args.TokenID},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenDeleteRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply token delete request: %v", err)
}
// Purge the identity from the cache to prevent using the previous definition of the identity
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemoveIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(token.SecretID))
if reply != nil {
*reply = token.AccessorID
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) TokenList(args *structs.ACLTokenListRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenListResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
if args.Datacenter != a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
args.IncludeLocal = false
args.IncludeGlobal = true
}
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
var requestMeta acl.EnterpriseMeta
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &requestMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// merge the token default meta into the requests meta
args.EnterpriseMeta.Merge(&requestMeta)
args.EnterpriseMeta.FillAuthzContext(&authzContext)
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
var methodMeta *acl.EnterpriseMeta
if args.AuthMethod != "" {
methodMeta = args.ACLAuthMethodEnterpriseMeta.ToEnterpriseMeta()
// attempt to merge in the overall meta, wildcards will not be merged
methodMeta.MergeNoWildcard(&args.EnterpriseMeta)
// in the event that the meta above didn't merge due to being a wildcard
// we ensure that proper token based meta inference occurs
methodMeta.Merge(&requestMeta)
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, tokens, err := state.ACLTokenList(ws, args.IncludeLocal, args.IncludeGlobal, args.Policy, args.Role, args.AuthMethod, methodMeta, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
now := time.Now()
stubs := make([]*structs.ACLTokenListStub, 0, len(tokens))
for _, token := range tokens {
if token.IsExpired(now) {
continue
}
stubs = append(stubs, token.Stub())
}
// filter down to just the tokens that the requester has permissions to read
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &stubs)
reply.Index, reply.Tokens = index, stubs
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) TokenBatchRead(args *structs.ACLTokenBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLTokenBatchResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.TokenBatchRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, tokens, err := state.ACLTokenBatchGet(ws, args.AccessorIDs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// This RPC is used for replication, so don't filter out expired tokens here.
// Filter the tokens down to just what we have permission to see - also redact
// secrets based on allowed permissions. We could just call filterACLWithAuthorizer
// on the whole token list but then it would require another pass through the token
// list to determine if any secrets were redacted. Its a small amount of code to
// process the loop so it was duplicated here and we instead call the filter func
// with just a single token.
ret := make(structs.ACLTokens, 0, len(tokens))
for _, token := range tokens {
final := token
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &final)
if final != nil {
ret = append(ret, final)
if final.SecretID == redactedToken {
reply.Redacted = true
}
} else {
reply.Removed = true
}
}
reply.Index, reply.Tokens = index, ret
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) PolicyRead(args *structs.ACLPolicyGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicyRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var (
index uint64
policy *structs.ACLPolicy
err error
)
if args.PolicyID != "" {
index, policy, err = state.ACLPolicyGetByID(ws, args.PolicyID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
} else {
index, policy, err = state.ACLPolicyGetByName(ws, args.PolicyName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Policy = index, policy
if policy == nil {
return errNotFound
}
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) PolicyBatchRead(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicyBatchRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, policies, err := state.ACLPolicyBatchGet(ws, args.PolicyIDs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &policies)
reply.Index, reply.Policies = index, policies
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) PolicySet(args *structs.ACLPolicySetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicy) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.Policy.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicySet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "policy", "upsert"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.Policy.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
policy := &args.Policy
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
// Almost all of the checks here are also done in the state store. However,
// we want to prevent the raft operations when we know they are going to fail
// so we still do them here.
// ensure a name is set
if policy.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Policy: no Name is set")
}
if !validPolicyName.MatchString(policy.Name) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Policy: invalid Name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed")
}
var idMatch *structs.ACLPolicy
var nameMatch *structs.ACLPolicy
var err error
if policy.ID != "" {
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(policy.ID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Policy ID invalid UUID")
}
_, idMatch, err = state.ACLPolicyGetByID(nil, policy.ID, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl policy lookup by id failed: %v", err)
}
}
_, nameMatch, err = state.ACLPolicyGetByName(nil, policy.Name, &policy.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl policy lookup by name failed: %v", err)
}
if policy.ID == "" {
// with no policy ID one will be generated
var err error
policy.ID, err = lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkPolicyUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// validate the name is unique
if nameMatch != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Policy: A Policy with Name %q already exists", policy.Name)
}
} else {
// Verify the policy exists
if idMatch == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot find policy %s", policy.ID)
}
// Verify that the name isn't changing or that the name is not already used
if idMatch.Name != policy.Name && nameMatch != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Policy: A policy with name %q already exists", policy.Name)
}
if policy.ID == structs.ACLPolicyGlobalManagementID {
if policy.Datacenters != nil || len(policy.Datacenters) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Changing the Datacenters of the builtin global-management policy is not permitted")
}
if policy.Rules != idMatch.Rules {
return fmt.Errorf("Changing the Rules for the builtin global-management policy is not permitted")
}
}
}
// validate the rules
_, err = acl.NewPolicyFromSource(policy.Rules, policy.Syntax, a.srv.aclConfig, policy.EnterprisePolicyMeta())
if err != nil {
return err
}
// validate the enterprise specific fields
if err = a.policyUpsertValidateEnterprise(policy, idMatch); err != nil {
return err
}
// calculate the hash for this policy
policy.SetHash(true)
req := &structs.ACLPolicyBatchSetRequest{
Policies: structs.ACLPolicies{policy},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLPolicySetRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply policy upsert request: %v", err)
}
// Remove from the cache to prevent stale cache usage
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemovePolicy(policy.ID)
if _, policy, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLPolicyGetByID(nil, policy.ID, &policy.EnterpriseMeta); err == nil && policy != nil {
*reply = *policy
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) PolicyDelete(args *structs.ACLPolicyDeleteRequest, reply *string) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicyDelete", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "policy", "delete"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
_, policy, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLPolicyGetByID(nil, args.PolicyID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if policy == nil {
return nil
}
if policy.ID == structs.ACLPolicyGlobalManagementID {
return fmt.Errorf("Delete operation not permitted on the builtin global-management policy")
}
req := structs.ACLPolicyBatchDeleteRequest{
PolicyIDs: []string{args.PolicyID},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLPolicyDeleteRequestType, &req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply policy delete request: %v", err)
}
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemovePolicy(policy.ID)
*reply = policy.Name
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) PolicyList(args *structs.ACLPolicyListRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyListResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicyList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, policies, err := state.ACLPolicyList(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// filter down to just what the requester has permissions to see
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &policies)
var stubs structs.ACLPolicyListStubs
for _, policy := range policies {
stubs = append(stubs, policy.Stub())
}
reply.Index, reply.Policies = index, stubs
return nil
})
}
// PolicyResolve is used to retrieve a subset of the policies associated with a given token
// The policy ids in the args simply act as a filter on the policy set assigned to the token
func (a *ACL) PolicyResolve(args *structs.ACLPolicyBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLPolicyBatchResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.PolicyResolve", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// get full list of policies for this token
identity, policies, err := a.srv.ACLResolver.resolveTokenToIdentityAndPolicies(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entIdentity, entPolicies, err := a.srv.ACLResolver.resolveEnterpriseIdentityAndPolicies(identity)
if err != nil {
return err
}
idMap := make(map[string]*structs.ACLPolicy)
for _, policyID := range identity.PolicyIDs() {
idMap[policyID] = nil
}
if entIdentity != nil {
for _, policyID := range entIdentity.PolicyIDs() {
idMap[policyID] = nil
}
}
for _, policy := range policies {
idMap[policy.ID] = policy
}
for _, policy := range entPolicies {
idMap[policy.ID] = policy
}
for _, policyID := range args.PolicyIDs {
if policy, ok := idMap[policyID]; ok {
// only add non-deleted policies
if policy != nil {
reply.Policies = append(reply.Policies, policy)
}
} else {
// send a permission denied to indicate that the request included
// policy ids not associated with this token
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
a.srv.setQueryMeta(&reply.QueryMeta, args.Token)
return nil
}
// ReplicationStatus is used to retrieve the current ACL replication status.
func (a *ACL) ReplicationStatus(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.ACLReplicationStatus) error {
// This must be sent to the leader, so we fix the args since we are
// re-using a structure where we don't support all the options.
args.RequireConsistent = true
args.AllowStale = false
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.ReplicationStatus", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// There's no ACL token required here since this doesn't leak any
// sensitive information, and we don't want people to have to use
// management tokens if they are querying this via a health check.
// Poll the latest status.
a.srv.aclReplicationStatusLock.RLock()
*reply = a.srv.aclReplicationStatus
a.srv.aclReplicationStatusLock.RUnlock()
return nil
}
func timePointer(t time.Time) *time.Time {
return &t
}
func (a *ACL) RoleRead(args *structs.ACLRoleGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLRoleResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var (
index uint64
role *structs.ACLRole
err error
)
if args.RoleID != "" {
index, role, err = state.ACLRoleGetByID(ws, args.RoleID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
} else {
index, role, err = state.ACLRoleGetByName(ws, args.RoleName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Role = index, role
if role == nil {
return errNotFound
}
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) RoleBatchRead(args *structs.ACLRoleBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLRoleBatchResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleBatchRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, roles, err := state.ACLRoleBatchGet(ws, args.RoleIDs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &roles)
reply.Index, reply.Roles = index, roles
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) RoleSet(args *structs.ACLRoleSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLRole) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.Role.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleSet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "role", "upsert"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.Role.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
role := &args.Role
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
// Almost all of the checks here are also done in the state store. However,
// we want to prevent the raft operations when we know they are going to fail
// so we still do them here.
// ensure a name is set
if role.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Role: no Name is set")
}
if !validRoleName.MatchString(role.Name) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Role: invalid Name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed")
}
var existing *structs.ACLRole
var err error
if role.ID == "" {
// with no role ID one will be generated
role.ID, err = lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkRoleUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// validate the name is unique
if _, existing, err = state.ACLRoleGetByName(nil, role.Name, &role.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl role lookup by name failed: %v", err)
} else if existing != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Role: A Role with Name %q already exists", role.Name)
}
} else {
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(role.ID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Role ID invalid UUID")
}
// Verify the role exists
_, existing, err = state.ACLRoleGetByID(nil, role.ID, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl role lookup failed: %v", err)
} else if existing == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot find role %s", role.ID)
}
if existing.Name != role.Name {
if _, nameMatch, err := state.ACLRoleGetByName(nil, role.Name, &role.EnterpriseMeta); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl role lookup by name failed: %v", err)
} else if nameMatch != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Role: A role with name %q already exists", role.Name)
}
}
}
// validate the enterprise specific fields
if err := a.roleUpsertValidateEnterprise(role, existing); err != nil {
return err
}
policyIDs := make(map[string]struct{})
var policies []structs.ACLRolePolicyLink
// Validate all the policy names and convert them to policy IDs
for _, link := range role.Policies {
if link.ID == "" {
_, policy, err := state.ACLPolicyGetByName(nil, link.Name, &role.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Error looking up policy for name %q: %v", link.Name, err)
}
if policy == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("No such ACL policy with name %q", link.Name)
}
link.ID = policy.ID
}
// Do not store the policy name within raft/memdb as the policy could be renamed in the future.
link.Name = ""
// dedup policy links by id
if _, ok := policyIDs[link.ID]; !ok {
policies = append(policies, link)
policyIDs[link.ID] = struct{}{}
}
}
role.Policies = policies
for _, svcid := range role.ServiceIdentities {
if svcid.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Service identity is missing the service name field on this role")
}
if !isValidServiceIdentityName(svcid.ServiceName) {
return fmt.Errorf("Service identity %q has an invalid name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed", svcid.ServiceName)
}
}
role.ServiceIdentities = dedupeServiceIdentities(role.ServiceIdentities)
for _, nodeid := range role.NodeIdentities {
if nodeid.NodeName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity is missing the node name field on this role")
}
if nodeid.Datacenter == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity is missing the datacenter field on this role")
}
if !isValidNodeIdentityName(nodeid.NodeName) {
return fmt.Errorf("Node identity has an invalid name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed")
}
}
role.NodeIdentities = dedupeNodeIdentities(role.NodeIdentities)
// calculate the hash for this role
role.SetHash(true)
req := &structs.ACLRoleBatchSetRequest{
Roles: structs.ACLRoles{role},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLRoleSetRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply role upsert request: %v", err)
}
// Remove from the cache to prevent stale cache usage
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemoveRole(role.ID)
if _, role, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLRoleGetByID(nil, role.ID, &role.EnterpriseMeta); err == nil && role != nil {
*reply = *role
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) RoleDelete(args *structs.ACLRoleDeleteRequest, reply *string) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleDelete", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "role", "delete"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
_, role, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLRoleGetByID(nil, args.RoleID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if role == nil {
return nil
}
req := structs.ACLRoleBatchDeleteRequest{
RoleIDs: []string{args.RoleID},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLRoleDeleteRequestType, &req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply role delete request: %v", err)
}
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemoveRole(role.ID)
*reply = role.Name
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) RoleList(args *structs.ACLRoleListRequest, reply *structs.ACLRoleListResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, roles, err := state.ACLRoleList(ws, args.Policy, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &roles)
reply.Index, reply.Roles = index, roles
return nil
})
}
// RoleResolve is used to retrieve a subset of the roles associated with a given token
// The role ids in the args simply act as a filter on the role set assigned to the token
func (a *ACL) RoleResolve(args *structs.ACLRoleBatchGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLRoleBatchResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.RoleResolve", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// get full list of roles for this token
identity, roles, err := a.srv.ACLResolver.resolveTokenToIdentityAndRoles(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
entIdentity, entRoles, err := a.srv.ACLResolver.resolveEnterpriseIdentityAndRoles(identity)
if err != nil {
return err
}
idMap := make(map[string]*structs.ACLRole)
for _, roleID := range identity.RoleIDs() {
idMap[roleID] = nil
}
if entIdentity != nil {
for _, roleID := range entIdentity.RoleIDs() {
idMap[roleID] = nil
}
}
for _, role := range roles {
idMap[role.ID] = role
}
for _, role := range entRoles {
idMap[role.ID] = role
}
for _, roleID := range args.RoleIDs {
if role, ok := idMap[roleID]; ok {
// only add non-deleted roles
if role != nil {
reply.Roles = append(reply.Roles, role)
}
} else {
// send a permission denied to indicate that the request included
// role ids not associated with this token
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
a.srv.setQueryMeta(&reply.QueryMeta, args.Token)
return nil
}
var errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication = errors.New("Token replication is required for auth methods to function")
func (a *ACL) BindingRuleRead(args *structs.ACLBindingRuleGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLBindingRuleResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.BindingRuleRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, rule, err := state.ACLBindingRuleGetByID(ws, args.BindingRuleID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.BindingRule = index, rule
if rule == nil {
return errNotFound
}
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) BindingRuleSet(args *structs.ACLBindingRuleSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLBindingRule) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.BindingRule.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.BindingRuleSet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "bindingrule", "upsert"}, time.Now())
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.BindingRule.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
var existing *structs.ACLBindingRule
rule := &args.BindingRule
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
if rule.ID == "" {
// with no binding rule ID one will be generated
var err error
rule.ID, err = lib.GenerateUUID(a.srv.checkBindingRuleUUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
if _, err := uuid.ParseUUID(rule.ID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Binding Rule ID invalid UUID")
}
// Verify the role exists
var err error
// specifically disregarding the enterprise meta here
_, existing, err = state.ACLBindingRuleGetByID(nil, rule.ID, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl binding rule lookup failed: %v", err)
} else if existing == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot find binding rule %s", rule.ID)
}
if rule.AuthMethod == "" {
rule.AuthMethod = existing.AuthMethod
} else if existing.AuthMethod != rule.AuthMethod {
return fmt.Errorf("the AuthMethod field of an Binding Rule is immutable")
}
}
if rule.AuthMethod == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: no AuthMethod is set")
}
// this is done early here to produce better errors
if err := state.ACLBindingRuleUpsertValidateEnterprise(rule, existing); err != nil {
return err
}
methodIdx, method, err := state.ACLAuthMethodGetByName(nil, rule.AuthMethod, &args.BindingRule.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl auth method lookup failed: %v", err)
} else if method == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot find auth method with name %q", rule.AuthMethod)
}
validator, err := a.srv.loadAuthMethodValidator(methodIdx, method)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Create a blank placeholder identity for use in validation below.
blankID := validator.NewIdentity()
if rule.Selector != "" {
if _, err := bexpr.CreateEvaluatorForType(rule.Selector, nil, blankID.SelectableFields); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid Binding Rule: Selector is invalid: %v", err)
}
}
if rule.BindType == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: no BindType is set")
}
if rule.BindName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: no BindName is set")
}
switch rule.BindType {
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeService:
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeNode:
case structs.BindingRuleBindTypeRole:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: unknown BindType %q", rule.BindType)
}
if valid, err := validateBindingRuleBindName(rule.BindType, rule.BindName, blankID.ProjectedVarNames()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: invalid BindName: %v", err)
} else if !valid {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Binding Rule: invalid BindName")
}
req := &structs.ACLBindingRuleBatchSetRequest{
BindingRules: structs.ACLBindingRules{rule},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLBindingRuleSetRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply binding rule upsert request: %v", err)
}
if _, rule, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLBindingRuleGetByID(nil, rule.ID, &rule.EnterpriseMeta); err == nil && rule != nil {
*reply = *rule
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) BindingRuleDelete(args *structs.ACLBindingRuleDeleteRequest, reply *bool) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.BindingRuleDelete", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "bindingrule", "delete"}, time.Now())
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
_, rule, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLBindingRuleGetByID(nil, args.BindingRuleID, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
switch {
case err != nil:
return err
case rule == nil:
return nil
}
req := structs.ACLBindingRuleBatchDeleteRequest{
BindingRuleIDs: []string{args.BindingRuleID},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLBindingRuleDeleteRequestType, &req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply binding rule delete request: %v", err)
}
*reply = true
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) BindingRuleList(args *structs.ACLBindingRuleListRequest, reply *structs.ACLBindingRuleListResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.BindingRuleList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, rules, err := state.ACLBindingRuleList(ws, args.AuthMethod, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &rules)
reply.Index, reply.BindingRules = index, rules
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) AuthMethodRead(args *structs.ACLAuthMethodGetRequest, reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.AuthMethodRead", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, method, err := state.ACLAuthMethodGetByName(ws, args.AuthMethodName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.AuthMethod = index, method
if method == nil {
return errNotFound
}
_ = a.enterpriseAuthMethodTypeValidation(method.Type)
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) AuthMethodSet(args *structs.ACLAuthMethodSetRequest, reply *structs.ACLAuthMethod) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.AuthMethod.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.AuthMethodSet", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "authmethod", "upsert"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.AuthMethod.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
method := &args.AuthMethod
state := a.srv.fsm.State()
// ensure a name is set
if method.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: no Name is set")
}
if !validAuthMethod.MatchString(method.Name) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: invalid Name. Only alphanumeric characters, '-' and '_' are allowed")
}
if err := a.enterpriseAuthMethodTypeValidation(method.Type); err != nil {
return err
}
// Check to see if the method exists first.
_, existing, err := state.ACLAuthMethodGetByName(nil, method.Name, &method.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acl auth method lookup failed: %v", err)
}
if existing != nil {
if method.Type == "" {
method.Type = existing.Type
} else if existing.Type != method.Type {
return fmt.Errorf("the Type field of an Auth Method is immutable")
}
}
if !authmethod.IsRegisteredType(method.Type) {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: Type should be one of: %v", authmethod.Types())
}
if method.MaxTokenTTL != 0 {
if method.MaxTokenTTL > a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL {
return fmt.Errorf("MaxTokenTTL %s cannot be more than %s",
method.MaxTokenTTL, a.srv.config.ACLTokenMaxExpirationTTL)
} else if method.MaxTokenTTL < a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL {
return fmt.Errorf("MaxTokenTTL %s cannot be less than %s",
method.MaxTokenTTL, a.srv.config.ACLTokenMinExpirationTTL)
}
}
switch method.TokenLocality {
case "local", "":
case "global":
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: TokenLocality 'global' can only be used in the primary datacenter")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: TokenLocality should be one of 'local' or 'global'")
}
// Instantiate a validator but do not cache it yet. This will validate the
// configuration.
validator, err := authmethod.NewValidator(a.srv.logger, method)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Auth Method: %v", err)
}
if err := enterpriseAuthMethodValidation(method, validator); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLAuthMethodUpsertValidateEnterprise(method, existing); err != nil {
return err
}
req := &structs.ACLAuthMethodBatchSetRequest{
AuthMethods: structs.ACLAuthMethods{method},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLAuthMethodSetRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply auth method upsert request: %v", err)
}
if _, method, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLAuthMethodGetByName(nil, method.Name, &method.EnterpriseMeta); err == nil && method != nil {
*reply = *method
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) AuthMethodDelete(args *structs.ACLAuthMethodDeleteRequest, reply *bool) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.AuthMethodDelete", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "authmethod", "delete"}, time.Now())
// Verify token is permitted to modify ACLs
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
if authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLWriteAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
_, method, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLAuthMethodGetByName(nil, args.AuthMethodName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if method == nil {
return nil
}
if err := a.enterpriseAuthMethodTypeValidation(method.Type); err != nil {
return err
}
req := structs.ACLAuthMethodBatchDeleteRequest{
AuthMethodNames: []string{args.AuthMethodName},
EnterpriseMeta: args.EnterpriseMeta,
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLAuthMethodDeleteRequestType, &req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply auth method delete request: %v", err)
}
*reply = true
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) AuthMethodList(args *structs.ACLAuthMethodListRequest, reply *structs.ACLAuthMethodListResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.AuthMethodList", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ACLReadAllowed(&authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return a.srv.blockingQuery(&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, methods, err := state.ACLAuthMethodList(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, &methods)
var stubs structs.ACLAuthMethodListStubs
for _, method := range methods {
_ = a.enterpriseAuthMethodTypeValidation(method.Type)
stubs = append(stubs, method.Stub())
}
reply.Index, reply.AuthMethods = index, stubs
return nil
})
}
func (a *ACL) Login(args *structs.ACLLoginRequest, reply *structs.ACLToken) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if args.Auth == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid Login request: Missing auth parameters")
}
if err := a.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.Auth.EnterpriseMeta, true); err != nil {
return err
}
if args.Token != "" { // This shouldn't happen.
return errors.New("do not provide a token when logging in")
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.Login", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "login"}, time.Now())
auth := args.Auth
// 1. take args.Data.AuthMethod to get an AuthMethod Validator
idx, method, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLAuthMethodGetByName(nil, auth.AuthMethod, &auth.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if method == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: auth method %q not found", acl.ErrNotFound, auth.AuthMethod)
}
if err := a.enterpriseAuthMethodTypeValidation(method.Type); err != nil {
return err
}
validator, err := a.srv.loadAuthMethodValidator(idx, method)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// 2. Send args.Data.BearerToken to method validator and get back a fields map
verifiedIdentity, err := validator.ValidateLogin(context.Background(), auth.BearerToken)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.tokenSetFromAuthMethod(
method,
&auth.EnterpriseMeta,
"token created via login",
auth.Meta,
validator,
verifiedIdentity,
&structs.ACLTokenSetRequest{
Datacenter: args.Datacenter,
WriteRequest: args.WriteRequest,
},
reply,
)
}
func (a *ACL) tokenSetFromAuthMethod(
method *structs.ACLAuthMethod,
entMeta *acl.EnterpriseMeta,
tokenDescriptionPrefix string,
tokenMetadata map[string]string,
validator authmethod.Validator,
verifiedIdentity *authmethod.Identity,
createReq *structs.ACLTokenSetRequest, // this should be prepopulated with datacenter+writerequest
reply *structs.ACLToken,
) error {
// This always will return a valid pointer
targetMeta, err := computeTargetEnterpriseMeta(method, verifiedIdentity)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// 3. send map through role bindings
bindings, err := a.srv.evaluateRoleBindings(validator, verifiedIdentity, entMeta, targetMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We try to prevent the creation of a useless token without taking a trip
// through the state store if we can.
if bindings == nil || (len(bindings.serviceIdentities) == 0 && len(bindings.nodeIdentities) == 0 && len(bindings.roles) == 0) {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// TODO(sso): add a CapturedField to ACLAuthMethod that would pluck fields from the returned identity and stuff into `auth.Meta`.
description := tokenDescriptionPrefix
loginMeta, err := encodeLoginMeta(tokenMetadata)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if loginMeta != "" {
description += ": " + loginMeta
}
// 4. create token
createReq.ACLToken = structs.ACLToken{
Description: description,
Local: true,
AuthMethod: method.Name,
ServiceIdentities: bindings.serviceIdentities,
NodeIdentities: bindings.nodeIdentities,
Roles: bindings.roles,
ExpirationTTL: method.MaxTokenTTL,
EnterpriseMeta: *targetMeta,
}
if method.TokenLocality == "global" {
if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() {
return errors.New("creating global tokens via auth methods is only permitted in the primary datacenter")
}
createReq.ACLToken.Local = false
}
createReq.ACLToken.ACLAuthMethodEnterpriseMeta.FillWithEnterpriseMeta(entMeta)
// 5. return token information like a TokenCreate would
err = a.tokenSetInternal(createReq, reply, true)
// If we were in a slight race with a role delete operation then we may
// still end up failing to insert an unprivileged token in the state
// machine instead. Return the same error as earlier so it doesn't
// actually matter which one prevents the insertion.
if err != nil && err.Error() == state.ErrTokenHasNoPrivileges.Error() {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
return err
}
func encodeLoginMeta(meta map[string]string) (string, error) {
if len(meta) == 0 {
return "", nil
}
d, err := json.Marshal(meta)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return string(d), nil
}
func (a *ACL) Logout(args *structs.ACLLogoutRequest, reply *bool) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if !a.srv.LocalTokensEnabled() {
return errAuthMethodsRequireTokenReplication
}
if args.Token == "" {
return acl.ErrNotFound
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.Logout", args, reply); done {
return err
}
defer metrics.MeasureSince([]string{"acl", "logout"}, time.Now())
_, token, err := a.srv.fsm.State().ACLTokenGetBySecret(nil, args.Token, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
} else if token == nil {
return acl.ErrNotFound
} else if token.AuthMethod == "" {
// Can't "logout" of a token that wasn't a result of login.
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
} else if !a.srv.InPrimaryDatacenter() && !token.Local {
// global token writes must be forwarded to the primary DC
args.Datacenter = a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter
return a.srv.forwardDC("ACL.Logout", a.srv.config.PrimaryDatacenter, args, reply)
}
// No need to check expiration time because it's being deleted.
req := &structs.ACLTokenBatchDeleteRequest{
TokenIDs: []string{token.AccessorID},
}
_, err = a.srv.raftApply(structs.ACLTokenDeleteRequestType, req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Failed to apply token delete request: %v", err)
}
// Purge the identity from the cache to prevent using the previous definition of the identity
a.srv.ACLResolver.cache.RemoveIdentity(tokenSecretCacheID(token.SecretID))
*reply = true
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) Authorize(args *structs.RemoteACLAuthorizationRequest, reply *[]structs.ACLAuthorizationResponse) error {
if err := a.aclPreCheck(); err != nil {
return err
}
if done, err := a.srv.ForwardRPC("ACL.Authorize", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := a.srv.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
responses, err := structs.CreateACLAuthorizationResponses(authz, args.Requests)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*reply = responses
return nil
}