217137b775
* Fix theoretical cache collision bug if/when we use more cache types with same result type * Generalized fix for blocking query handling when state store methods return zero index * Refactor test retry to only affect CI * Undo make file merge * Add hint to error message returned to end-user requests if Connect is not enabled when they try to request cert * Explicit error for Roots endpoint if connect is disabled * Fix tests that were asserting old behaviour
402 lines
11 KiB
Go
402 lines
11 KiB
Go
package consul
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
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)
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var ErrConnectNotEnabled = errors.New("Connect must be enabled in order to use this endpoint")
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// ConnectCA manages the Connect CA.
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type ConnectCA struct {
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// srv is a pointer back to the server.
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srv *Server
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}
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// ConfigurationGet returns the configuration for the CA.
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func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationGet(
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args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
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reply *structs.CAConfiguration) error {
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// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
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if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
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return ErrConnectNotEnabled
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}
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if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationGet", args, args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// This action requires operator read access.
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rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorRead() {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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state := s.srv.fsm.State()
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_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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*reply = *config
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return nil
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}
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// ConfigurationSet updates the configuration for the CA.
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func (s *ConnectCA) ConfigurationSet(
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args *structs.CARequest,
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reply *interface{}) error {
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// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
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if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
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return ErrConnectNotEnabled
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}
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if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.ConfigurationSet", args, args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// This action requires operator write access.
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rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorWrite() {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Exit early if it's a no-op change
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state := s.srv.fsm.State()
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_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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args.Config.ClusterID = config.ClusterID
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if args.Config.Provider == config.Provider && reflect.DeepEqual(args.Config.Config, config.Config) {
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return nil
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}
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// Create a new instance of the provider described by the config
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// and get the current active root CA. This acts as a good validation
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// of the config and makes sure the provider is functioning correctly
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// before we commit any changes to Raft.
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newProvider, err := s.srv.createCAProvider(args.Config)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("could not initialize provider: %v", err)
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}
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newRootPEM, err := newProvider.ActiveRoot()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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newActiveRoot, err := parseCARoot(newRootPEM, args.Config.Provider)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Compare the new provider's root CA ID to the current one. If they
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// match, just update the existing provider with the new config.
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// If they don't match, begin the root rotation process.
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_, root, err := state.CARootActive(nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if root != nil && root.ID == newActiveRoot.ID {
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args.Op = structs.CAOpSetConfig
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resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
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return respErr
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}
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// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
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s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
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s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA provider config updated")
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return nil
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}
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// At this point, we know the config change has trigged a root rotation,
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// either by swapping the provider type or changing the provider's config
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// to use a different root certificate.
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// If it's a config change that would trigger a rotation (different provider/root):
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// 1. Get the root from the new provider.
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// 2. Call CrossSignCA on the old provider to sign the new root with the old one to
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// get a cross-signed certificate.
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// 3. Take the active root for the new provider and append the intermediate from step 2
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// to its list of intermediates.
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newRoot, err := connect.ParseCert(newRootPEM)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Have the old provider cross-sign the new intermediate
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oldProvider, _ := s.srv.getCAProvider()
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if oldProvider == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
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}
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xcCert, err := oldProvider.CrossSignCA(newRoot)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Add the cross signed cert to the new root's intermediates.
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newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = []string{xcCert}
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intermediate, err := newProvider.GenerateIntermediate()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if intermediate != newRootPEM {
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newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts = append(newActiveRoot.IntermediateCerts, intermediate)
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}
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// Update the roots and CA config in the state store at the same time
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idx, roots, err := state.CARoots(nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var newRoots structs.CARoots
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for _, r := range roots {
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newRoot := *r
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if newRoot.Active {
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newRoot.Active = false
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newRoot.RotatedOutAt = time.Now()
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}
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newRoots = append(newRoots, &newRoot)
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}
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newRoots = append(newRoots, newActiveRoot)
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args.Op = structs.CAOpSetRootsAndConfig
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args.Index = idx
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args.Roots = newRoots
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resp, err := s.srv.raftApply(structs.ConnectCARequestType, args)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if respErr, ok := resp.(error); ok {
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return respErr
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}
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// If the config has been committed, update the local provider instance
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// and call teardown on the old provider
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s.srv.setCAProvider(newProvider, newActiveRoot)
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if err := oldProvider.Cleanup(); err != nil {
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s.srv.logger.Printf("[WARN] connect: failed to clean up old provider %q", config.Provider)
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}
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s.srv.logger.Printf("[INFO] connect: CA rotated to new root under provider %q", args.Config.Provider)
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return nil
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}
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// Roots returns the currently trusted root certificates.
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func (s *ConnectCA) Roots(
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args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
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reply *structs.IndexedCARoots) error {
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// Forward if necessary
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if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Roots", args, args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
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if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
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return ErrConnectNotEnabled
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}
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// Load the ClusterID to generate TrustDomain. We do this outside the loop
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// since by definition this value should be immutable once set for lifetime of
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// the cluster so we don't need to look it up more than once. We also don't
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// have to worry about non-atomicity between the config fetch transaction and
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// the CARoots transaction below since this field must remain immutable. Do
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// not re-use this state/config for other logic that might care about changes
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// of config during the blocking query below.
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{
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state := s.srv.fsm.State()
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_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Check CA is actually bootstrapped...
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if config != nil {
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// Build TrustDomain based on the ClusterID stored.
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signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
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if signingID == nil {
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// If CA is bootstrapped at all then this should never happen but be
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// defensive.
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return errors.New("no cluster trust domain setup")
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}
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reply.TrustDomain = signingID.Host()
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}
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}
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return s.srv.blockingQuery(
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&args.QueryOptions, &reply.QueryMeta,
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func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
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index, roots, err := state.CARoots(ws)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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reply.Index, reply.Roots = index, roots
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if reply.Roots == nil {
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reply.Roots = make(structs.CARoots, 0)
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}
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// The API response must NEVER contain the secret information
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// such as keys and so on. We use a whitelist below to copy the
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// specific fields we want to expose.
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for i, r := range reply.Roots {
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// IMPORTANT: r must NEVER be modified, since it is a pointer
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// directly to the structure in the memdb store.
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reply.Roots[i] = &structs.CARoot{
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ID: r.ID,
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Name: r.Name,
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SerialNumber: r.SerialNumber,
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SigningKeyID: r.SigningKeyID,
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NotBefore: r.NotBefore,
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NotAfter: r.NotAfter,
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RootCert: r.RootCert,
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IntermediateCerts: r.IntermediateCerts,
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RaftIndex: r.RaftIndex,
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Active: r.Active,
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}
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if r.Active {
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reply.ActiveRootID = r.ID
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}
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}
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return nil
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},
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)
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}
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// Sign signs a certificate for a service.
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func (s *ConnectCA) Sign(
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args *structs.CASignRequest,
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reply *structs.IssuedCert) error {
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// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
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if !s.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
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return ErrConnectNotEnabled
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}
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if done, err := s.srv.forward("ConnectCA.Sign", args, args, reply); done {
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return err
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}
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// Parse the CSR
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csr, err := connect.ParseCSR(args.CSR)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Parse the SPIFFE ID
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spiffeID, err := connect.ParseCertURI(csr.URIs[0])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serviceID, ok := spiffeID.(*connect.SpiffeIDService)
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR must be a service ID")
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}
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provider, caRoot := s.srv.getCAProvider()
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if provider == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("internal error: CA provider is nil")
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}
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// Verify that the CSR entity is in the cluster's trust domain
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state := s.srv.fsm.State()
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_, config, err := state.CAConfig()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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signingID := connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(config)
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if !signingID.CanSign(serviceID) {
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return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different trust domain: %s, "+
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"we are %s", serviceID.Host, signingID.Host())
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}
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// Verify that the ACL token provided has permission to act as this service
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rule, err := s.srv.resolveToken(args.Token)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceWrite(serviceID.Service, nil) {
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return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
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// Verify that the DC in the service URI matches us. We might relax this
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// requirement later but being restrictive for now is safer.
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if serviceID.Datacenter != s.srv.config.Datacenter {
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return fmt.Errorf("SPIFFE ID in CSR from a different datacenter: %s, "+
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"we are %s", serviceID.Datacenter, s.srv.config.Datacenter)
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}
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// All seems to be in order, actually sign it.
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pem, err := provider.Sign(csr)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Append any intermediates needed by this root.
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for _, p := range caRoot.IntermediateCerts {
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pem = strings.TrimSpace(pem) + "\n" + p
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}
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// TODO(banks): when we implement IssuedCerts table we can use the insert to
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// that as the raft index to return in response. Right now we can rely on only
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// the built-in provider being supported and the implementation detail that we
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// have to write a SerialIndex update to the provider config table for every
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// cert issued so in all cases this index will be higher than any previous
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// sign response. This has to be reloaded after the provider.Sign call to
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// observe the index update.
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state = s.srv.fsm.State()
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modIdx, _, err := state.CAConfig()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cert, err := connect.ParseCert(pem)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Set the response
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*reply = structs.IssuedCert{
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SerialNumber: connect.HexString(cert.SerialNumber.Bytes()),
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CertPEM: pem,
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Service: serviceID.Service,
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ServiceURI: cert.URIs[0].String(),
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ValidAfter: cert.NotBefore,
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ValidBefore: cert.NotAfter,
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RaftIndex: structs.RaftIndex{
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ModifyIndex: modIdx,
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CreateIndex: modIdx,
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},
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}
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return nil
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}
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