open-consul/agent/consul/internal_endpoint.go

898 lines
28 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
package consul
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-bexpr"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
hashstructure_v2 "github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure/v2"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/consul/state"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
// Internal endpoint is used to query the miscellaneous info that
// does not necessarily fit into the other systems. It is also
// used to hold undocumented APIs that users should not rely on.
type Internal struct {
srv *Server
logger hclog.Logger
}
// NodeInfo is used to retrieve information about a specific node.
func (m *Internal) NodeInfo(args *structs.NodeSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.IndexedNodeDump) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.NodeInfo", args, reply); done {
return err
}
_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, dump, err := state.NodeInfo(ws, args.Node, &args.EnterpriseMeta, args.PeerName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Dump = index, dump
return m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply)
})
}
// NodeDump is used to generate information about all of the nodes.
func (m *Internal) NodeDump(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest,
reply *structs.IndexedNodeDump) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.NodeDump", args, reply); done {
return err
}
_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Dump)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
// we don't support calling this endpoint for a specific peer
if args.PeerName != "" {
return fmt.Errorf("this endpoint does not support specifying a peer: %q", args.PeerName)
}
// this maxIndex will be the max of the NodeDump calls and the PeeringList call
var maxIndex uint64
// Get data for local nodes
index, dump, err := state.NodeDump(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta, structs.DefaultPeerKeyword)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not get a node dump for local nodes: %w", err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
reply.Dump = dump
// get a list of all peerings
index, listedPeerings, err := state.PeeringList(ws, args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not list peers for node dump %w", err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
// get node dumps for all peerings
for _, p := range listedPeerings {
index, importedDump, err := state.NodeDump(ws, &args.EnterpriseMeta, p.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not get a node dump for peer %q: %w", p.Name, err)
}
reply.ImportedDump = append(reply.ImportedDump, importedDump...)
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
}
reply.Index = maxIndex
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.Dump)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not filter local node dump: %w", err)
}
reply.Dump = raw.(structs.NodeDump)
importedRaw, err := filter.Execute(reply.ImportedDump)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not filter peer node dump: %w", err)
}
reply.ImportedDump = importedRaw.(structs.NodeDump)
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
func (m *Internal) ServiceDump(args *structs.ServiceDumpRequest, reply *structs.IndexedNodesWithGateways) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ServiceDump", args, reply); done {
return err
}
_, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
filter, err := bexpr.CreateFilter(args.Filter, nil, reply.Nodes)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
// this maxIndex will be the max of the ServiceDump calls and the PeeringList call
var maxIndex uint64
// If PeerName is not empty, we return only the imported services from that peer
if args.PeerName != "" {
// get a local dump for services
index, nodes, err := state.ServiceDump(ws,
args.ServiceKind,
args.UseServiceKind,
// Note we fetch imported services with wildcard namespace because imported services' namespaces
// are in a different locality; regardless of our local namespace, we return all imported services
// of the local partition.
args.EnterpriseMeta.WithWildcardNamespace(),
args.PeerName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not get a service dump for peer %q: %w", args.PeerName, err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
reply.Index = maxIndex
reply.ImportedNodes = nodes
} else {
// otherwise return both local and all imported services
// get a local dump for services
index, nodes, err := state.ServiceDump(ws, args.ServiceKind, args.UseServiceKind, &args.EnterpriseMeta, structs.DefaultPeerKeyword)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not get a service dump for local nodes: %w", err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
reply.Nodes = nodes
// get a list of all peerings
index, listedPeerings, err := state.PeeringList(ws, args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not list peers for service dump %w", err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
for _, p := range listedPeerings {
// Note we fetch imported services with wildcard namespace because imported services' namespaces
// are in a different locality; regardless of our local namespace, we return all imported services
// of the local partition.
index, importedNodes, err := state.ServiceDump(ws, args.ServiceKind, args.UseServiceKind, args.EnterpriseMeta.WithWildcardNamespace(), p.Name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not get a service dump for peer %q: %w", p.Name, err)
}
if index > maxIndex {
maxIndex = index
}
reply.ImportedNodes = append(reply.ImportedNodes, importedNodes...)
}
// Get, store, and filter gateway services
idx, gatewayServices, err := state.DumpGatewayServices(ws)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Gateways = gatewayServices
if idx > maxIndex {
maxIndex = idx
}
reply.Index = maxIndex
raw, err := filter.Execute(reply.Nodes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not filter local service dump: %w", err)
}
reply.Nodes = raw.(structs.CheckServiceNodes)
}
importedRaw, err := filter.Execute(reply.ImportedNodes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not filter peer service dump: %w", err)
}
reply.ImportedNodes = importedRaw.(structs.CheckServiceNodes)
// Note: we filter the results with ACLs *after* applying the user-supplied
// bexpr filter, to ensure QueryMeta.ResultsFilteredByACLs does not include
// results that would be filtered out even if the user did have permission.
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
func (m *Internal) CatalogOverview(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.CatalogSummary) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.CatalogOverview", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if authz.OperatorRead(nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.PermissionDeniedByACLUnnamed(authz, nil, acl.ResourceOperator, acl.AccessRead)
}
summary := m.srv.overviewManager.GetCurrentSummary()
if summary != nil {
*reply = *summary
}
return nil
}
func (m *Internal) ServiceTopology(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceTopology) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ServiceTopology", args, reply); done {
return err
}
if args.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide a service name")
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceReadAllowed(args.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
defaultAllow := authz.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil)
index, topology, err := state.ServiceTopology(ws, args.Datacenter, args.ServiceName, args.ServiceKind, defaultAllow, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index = index
reply.ServiceTopology = topology
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
}
// IntentionUpstreams returns a service's upstreams which are inferred from intentions.
// If intentions allow a connection from the target to some candidate service, the candidate service is considered
// an upstream of the target.
func (m *Internal) IntentionUpstreams(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !m.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if args.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide a service name")
}
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.IntentionUpstreams", args, reply); done {
return err
}
return m.internalUpstreams(args, reply, structs.IntentionTargetService)
}
// IntentionUpstreamsDestination returns a service's upstreams which are inferred from intentions.
// If intentions allow a connection from the target to some candidate destination, the candidate destination is considered
// an upstream of the target. This performs the same logic as IntentionUpstreams endpoint but for destination upstreams only.
func (m *Internal) IntentionUpstreamsDestination(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !m.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if args.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide a service name")
}
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.IntentionUpstreamsDestination", args, reply); done {
return err
}
return m.internalUpstreams(args, reply, structs.IntentionTargetDestination)
}
func (m *Internal) internalUpstreams(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList, intentionTarget structs.IntentionTargetType) error {
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
var (
priorHash uint64
ranOnce bool
)
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
defaultDecision := authz.IntentionDefaultAllow(nil)
sn := structs.NewServiceName(args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
index, services, err := state.IntentionTopology(ws, sn, false, defaultDecision, intentionTarget)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Services = index, services
m.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
// Generate a hash of the intentions content driving this response.
// Use it to determine if the response is identical to a prior
// wakeup.
newHash, err := hashstructure_v2.Hash(services, hashstructure_v2.FormatV2, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error hashing reply for spurious wakeup suppression: %w", err)
}
if ranOnce && priorHash == newHash {
priorHash = newHash
return errNotChanged
} else {
priorHash = newHash
ranOnce = true
}
return nil
})
}
// GatewayServiceDump returns all the nodes for services associated with a gateway along with their gateway config
func (m *Internal) GatewayServiceDump(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceDump) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.GatewayServiceDump", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify the arguments
if args.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide gateway name")
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
// We need read access to the gateway we're trying to find services for, so check that first.
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceReadAllowed(args.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
err = m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var maxIdx uint64
idx, gatewayServices, err := state.GatewayServices(ws, args.ServiceName, &args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if idx > maxIdx {
maxIdx = idx
}
// Loop over the gateway <-> serviceName mappings and fetch all service instances for each
var result structs.ServiceDump
for _, gs := range gatewayServices {
idx, instances, err := state.CheckServiceNodes(ws, gs.Service.Name, &gs.Service.EnterpriseMeta, args.PeerName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if idx > maxIdx {
maxIdx = idx
}
for _, n := range instances {
svc := structs.ServiceInfo{
Node: n.Node,
Service: n.Service,
Checks: n.Checks,
GatewayService: gs,
}
result = append(result, &svc)
}
// Ensure we store the gateway <-> service mapping even if there are no instances of the service
if len(instances) == 0 {
svc := structs.ServiceInfo{
GatewayService: gs,
}
result = append(result, &svc)
}
}
reply.Index, reply.Dump = maxIdx, result
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
return err
}
// ServiceGateways returns all the nodes for services associated with a gateway along with their gateway config
func (m *Internal) ServiceGateways(args *structs.ServiceSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ServiceGateways", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Verify the arguments
if args.ServiceName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Must provide gateway name")
}
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
// We need read access to the service we're trying to find gateways for, so check that first.
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceReadAllowed(args.ServiceName, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
err = m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var maxIdx uint64
idx, gateways, err := state.ServiceGateways(ws, args.ServiceName, args.ServiceKind, args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if idx > maxIdx {
maxIdx = idx
}
reply.Index, reply.Nodes = maxIdx, gateways
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
})
return err
}
// GatewayIntentions Match returns the set of intentions that match the given source/destination.
func (m *Internal) GatewayIntentions(args *structs.IntentionQueryRequest, reply *structs.IndexedIntentions) error {
// Forward if necessary
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.GatewayIntentions", args, reply); done {
return err
}
if len(args.Match.Entries) > 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("Expected 1 gateway name, got %d", len(args.Match.Entries))
}
// Get the ACL token for the request for the checks below.
var entMeta acl.EnterpriseMeta
var authzContext acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &entMeta, &authzContext)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace == "" {
args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace = entMeta.NamespaceOrDefault()
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseIntentionNamespace(args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace, true); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid match entry namespace %q: %v", args.Match.Entries[0].Namespace, err)
}
// We need read access to the gateway we're trying to find intentions for, so check that first.
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceReadAllowed(args.Match.Entries[0].Name, &authzContext); err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
var maxIdx uint64
idx, gatewayServices, err := state.GatewayServices(ws, args.Match.Entries[0].Name, &entMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if idx > maxIdx {
maxIdx = idx
}
// Loop over the gateway <-> serviceName mappings and fetch all intentions for each
seen := make(map[string]bool)
result := make(structs.Intentions, 0)
for _, gs := range gatewayServices {
entry := structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
Namespace: gs.Service.NamespaceOrDefault(),
Partition: gs.Service.PartitionOrDefault(),
Name: gs.Service.Name,
}
idx, intentions, err := state.IntentionMatchOne(ws, entry, structs.IntentionMatchDestination, structs.IntentionTargetService)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if idx > maxIdx {
maxIdx = idx
}
// Deduplicate wildcard intentions
for _, ixn := range intentions {
if !seen[ixn.ID] {
result = append(result, ixn)
seen[ixn.ID] = true
}
}
}
reply.Index, reply.Intentions = maxIdx, result
if reply.Intentions == nil {
reply.Intentions = make(structs.Intentions, 0)
}
if err := m.srv.filterACL(args.Token, reply); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
},
)
}
// ExportedPeeredServices is used to query the exported services for peers.
// Returns services as a map of ServiceNames by peer.
// To get exported services for a single peer, use ExportedServicesForPeer.
func (m *Internal) ExportedPeeredServices(args *structs.DCSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedExportedServiceList) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ExportedPeeredServices", args, reply); done {
return err
}
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, serviceMap, err := state.ExportedServicesForAllPeersByName(ws, args.Datacenter, args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Index, reply.Services = index, serviceMap
m.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
return nil
})
}
// ExportedServicesForPeer returns a list of Service names that are exported for a given peer.
func (m *Internal) ExportedServicesForPeer(args *structs.ServiceDumpRequest, reply *structs.IndexedServiceList) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.ExportedServicesForPeer", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzCtx acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzCtx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if args.PeerName == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("must provide PeerName")
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, store *state.Store) error {
idx, p, err := store.PeeringRead(ws, state.Query{
Value: args.PeerName,
EnterpriseMeta: args.EnterpriseMeta,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while fetching peer %q: %w", args.PeerName, err)
}
if p == nil {
reply.Index = idx
reply.Services = nil
return errNotFound
}
idx, exportedSvcs, err := store.ExportedServicesForPeer(ws, p.ID, args.Datacenter)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error while listing exported services for peer %q: %w", args.PeerName, err)
}
reply.Index = idx
reply.Services = exportedSvcs.Services
// If MeshWrite is allowed, we assume it is an operator role and
// return all the services. Otherwise, the results are filtered.
if authz.MeshWrite(&authzCtx) != acl.Allow {
m.srv.filterACLWithAuthorizer(authz, reply)
}
return nil
})
}
// PeeredUpstreams returns all imported services as upstreams for any service in a given partition.
// Cluster peering does not replicate intentions so all imported services are considered potential upstreams.
func (m *Internal) PeeredUpstreams(args *structs.PartitionSpecificRequest, reply *structs.IndexedPeeredServiceList) error {
// Exit early if Connect hasn't been enabled.
if !m.srv.config.ConnectEnabled {
return ErrConnectNotEnabled
}
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.PeeredUpstreams", args, reply); done {
return err
}
var authzCtx acl.AuthorizerContext
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, &args.EnterpriseMeta, &authzCtx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().ServiceWriteAnyAllowed(&authzCtx); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseRequest(&args.EnterpriseMeta, false); err != nil {
return err
}
return m.srv.blockingQuery(
&args.QueryOptions,
&reply.QueryMeta,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet, state *state.Store) error {
index, vips, err := state.VirtualIPsForAllImportedServices(ws, args.EnterpriseMeta)
if err != nil {
return err
}
result := make([]structs.PeeredServiceName, 0, len(vips))
for _, vip := range vips {
result = append(result, vip.Service)
}
reply.Index, reply.Services = index, result
return nil
})
}
// EventFire is a bit of an odd endpoint, but it allows for a cross-DC RPC
// call to fire an event. The primary use case is to enable user events being
// triggered in a remote DC.
func (m *Internal) EventFire(args *structs.EventFireRequest,
reply *structs.EventFireResponse) error {
if done, err := m.srv.ForwardRPC("Internal.EventFire", args, reply); done {
return err
}
// Check ACLs
authz, err := m.srv.ResolveTokenAndDefaultMeta(args.Token, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().EventWriteAllowed(args.Name, nil); err != nil {
accessorID := authz.AccessorID()
m.logger.Warn("user event blocked by ACLs", "event", args.Name, "accessorID", acl.AliasIfAnonymousToken(accessorID))
return err
}
// Set the query meta data
m.srv.setQueryMeta(&reply.QueryMeta, args.Token)
// Add the consul prefix to the event name
eventName := userEventName(args.Name)
// Fire the event on all LAN segments
return m.srv.LANSendUserEvent(eventName, args.Payload, false)
}
// KeyringOperation will query the WAN and LAN gossip keyrings of all nodes.
func (m *Internal) KeyringOperation(
args *structs.KeyringRequest,
reply *structs.KeyringResponses) error {
// Error aggressively to be clear about LocalOnly behavior
if args.LocalOnly && args.Operation != structs.KeyringList {
return fmt.Errorf("argument error: LocalOnly can only be used for List operations")
}
// Check ACLs
authz, err := m.srv.ACLResolver.ResolveToken(args.Token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.srv.validateEnterpriseToken(authz.Identity()); err != nil {
return err
}
switch args.Operation {
case structs.KeyringList:
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().KeyringReadAllowed(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
case structs.KeyringInstall:
fallthrough
case structs.KeyringUse:
fallthrough
case structs.KeyringRemove:
if err := authz.ToAllowAuthorizer().KeyringWriteAllowed(nil); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
panic("Invalid keyring operation")
}
if args.LocalOnly || args.Forwarded || m.srv.serfWAN == nil {
// Handle operations that are localOnly, already forwarded or
// there is no serfWAN. If any of this is the case this
// operation shouldn't go out to other dcs or WAN pool.
reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpLAN(args)...)
} else {
// Handle not already forwarded, non-local operations.
// Marking this as forwarded because this is what we are about
// to do. Prevents the same message from being fowarded by
// other servers.
args.Forwarded = true
reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpWAN(args))
reply.Responses = append(reply.Responses, m.executeKeyringOpLAN(args)...)
dcs := m.srv.router.GetRemoteDatacenters(m.srv.config.Datacenter)
responses, err := m.srv.keyringRPCs("Internal.KeyringOperation", args, dcs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reply.Add(responses)
}
return nil
}
func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpLAN(args *structs.KeyringRequest) []*structs.KeyringResponse {
responses := []*structs.KeyringResponse{}
_ = m.srv.DoWithLANSerfs(func(poolName, poolKind string, pool *serf.Serf) error {
mgr := pool.KeyManager()
serfResp, err := m.executeKeyringOpMgr(mgr, args)
resp := translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(serfResp, m.srv.config.Datacenter, err)
if poolKind == PoolKindSegment {
resp.Segment = poolName
} else {
resp.Partition = poolName
}
responses = append(responses, &resp)
return nil
}, nil)
return responses
}
func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpWAN(args *structs.KeyringRequest) *structs.KeyringResponse {
mgr := m.srv.KeyManagerWAN()
serfResp, err := m.executeKeyringOpMgr(mgr, args)
resp := translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(serfResp, m.srv.config.Datacenter, err)
resp.WAN = true
return &resp
}
func translateKeyResponseToKeyringResponse(keyresponse *serf.KeyResponse, datacenter string, err error) structs.KeyringResponse {
resp := structs.KeyringResponse{
Datacenter: datacenter,
Messages: keyresponse.Messages,
Keys: keyresponse.Keys,
PrimaryKeys: keyresponse.PrimaryKeys,
NumNodes: keyresponse.NumNodes,
}
if err != nil {
resp.Error = err.Error()
}
return resp
}
// executeKeyringOpMgr executes the appropriate keyring-related function based on
// the type of keyring operation in the request. It takes the KeyManager as an
// argument, so it can handle any operation for either LAN or WAN pools.
func (m *Internal) executeKeyringOpMgr(
mgr *serf.KeyManager,
args *structs.KeyringRequest,
) (*serf.KeyResponse, error) {
var serfResp *serf.KeyResponse
var err error
opts := &serf.KeyRequestOptions{RelayFactor: args.RelayFactor}
switch args.Operation {
case structs.KeyringList:
serfResp, err = mgr.ListKeysWithOptions(opts)
case structs.KeyringInstall:
serfResp, err = mgr.InstallKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
case structs.KeyringUse:
serfResp, err = mgr.UseKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
case structs.KeyringRemove:
serfResp, err = mgr.RemoveKeyWithOptions(args.Key, opts)
}
return serfResp, err
}